


GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY
CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY

CLASS _____

CALL No. 938.05 Thu-Smi



•

•

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

EDITED BY

†T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D.

†E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. †W. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D.

L. A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.A. F.R. HIST.SOC.

THUCYDIDES

III

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.

EDITED BY

†T. E. PAGE, C.H., LITT.D.

†E. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D.

†W. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D.

L. A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.A. F.R. HIST.SOC.

THUCYDIDES


III

•

•

•

•



RENTILL

GRIRON

THUCYDIDES
BUST IN HOLKHAM HALL

THUCYDIDES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
CHARLES FORSTER SMITH
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

IN FOUR VOLUMES

III

HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
BOOKS V AND VI

745

938.05

Thuc/Smith



LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MCMLIV

First printed 1921
Reprinted and revised 1931
Reprinted 1952

OEN

... 1931

... 1931

A...

745

.....

B...

13-1-54

.....

938.05/

John / Sme.

CONTENTS

THUCYDIDES	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	PAGE
BOOK V	1
BOOK VI	181

MAPS:—

Amphipolis	<i>To face p. 11</i>
Sicily	<i>At end</i>
Siege of Syracuse	„

THUCYDIDES

BOOK V

ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ

Ε

Ι. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου, ἡγησάμενοι κατὰ παλαιάν τινα αἰτίαν οὐ καθαροὺς ὄντας ἱερῶσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἐλλιπὲς σφίσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς καθάρσεως, ἣ πρότερόν μοι δεδῆλωται ὡς ἀνελόντες τὰς θήκας τῶν τεθνεώτων ὀρθῶς ἐνόμισαν ποιῆσαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν Δήλιοι Ἀτραμύττειον Φαρνάκου δόντος αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὥκησαν, οὕτως ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο.

ΙΙ. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν ὀπλίτας ἔχων διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων πλείους, 2 ναῦς δὲ τριάκοντα. σχὼν δὲ ἐς Σκιωνην πρῶτον ἔτι πολιορκουμένην καὶ προσλαβὼν αὐτόθεν ὀπλίτας τῶν φρουρῶν, κατέπλευσεν ἐς τὸν Κωφὸν λιμένα, τῶν Τωρωναίων ἀπέχοντα οὐ πολὺ τῆς

¹ The truce had really expired, according to iv. cxviii. 12, the 14th of the Attic month Elaphebolion (about the end of March), but hostilities were not renewed till after the Pythian games, which were celebrated in the Attic month Metageitnion (latter half of August and first of September). This seems the most natural interpretation of Thucydides'

THUCYDIDES

BOOK V

I. THE next summer the one-year's truce continued till, and ended with, the Pythian games.¹ 422 B.C.
During the suspension of arms the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos, thinking that they had been consecrated² while in a state of pollution from some ancient crime, and besides, that they themselves had been responsible for this defect in the purification, in which, as I have before related, they believed they had acted rightly in removing the coffins of the dead. And the Delians settled, according as each man chose,³ in Atramytteum in Asia, which had been given them by Pharnaces.

II. After the armistice had expired Cleon persuaded the Athenians to let him sail to the cities in Thrace, with twelve hundred Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry, and a larger force of the allies, and thirty ships. And touching first at Scione, which was still under siege, and taking on from there some hoplites of the garrison, he then sailed down to the port of Cophus, which is not far distant

language, but many editors render "The next summer the one-year's truce was ended and war was renewed till the Pythian games"

² Referring to their purification and consecration to Apollo four years before (iii 107).

³ Or, "was inclined" (*sc. οἰκῆσαι*).

3 πόλεως. ἐκ δ' αὐτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ὑπ' αὐτομόλων
ὅτι οὔτε Βρασίδης ἐν τῇ Τορώνῃ οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες
ἀξιόμαχοι εἶεν, τῇ μὲν στρατιᾷ τῇ πεζῇ ἐχώρει
ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ναὺς δὲ περιέπεμψε δέκα ἐς¹ τὸν
4 λιμένα περιπλεῖν. καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιτείχισμα
πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖται, ὃ προσπεριέβαλε τῇ πόλει ὁ
Βρασίδης ἐντὸς βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι τὸ προά-
στειον καὶ διελὼν τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους μίαν
αὐτὴν ἐποίησε πόλιν.

III. Βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ Πασιτελίδας τε
ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων καὶ ἡ παροῦσα φυλακὴ
προσβαλόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνοντο. καὶ ὥς
ἐβιάζοντο καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα περιέπλεον αἱ² ἐς τὸν
λιμένα περιπεμφθεῖσαι, δείσας ὁ Πασιτελίδας μὴ
αἷ τε νῆες φθάσωσι λαβοῦσαι ἐρῆμον τὴν πόλιν
καὶ τοῦ τειχίσματος ἀλίσκομένου ἐγκαταληφθῇ,
2 ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸ δρόμῳ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν. οἱ
δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φθάνουσιν οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐλόν-
τες τὴν Τορώνῃ καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἐπισπόμενος αὐτο-
βοεῖ, κατὰ τὸ διηρημένον τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους
ξυνεσπεσών. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν τῶν Πελο-
ποννησίων καὶ Τορωναίων εὐθύς ἐν χερσὶ, τοὺς δὲ
ζῶντας ἔλαβον καὶ Πασιτελίδαν τὸν ἄρχοντα.
3 Βρασίδης δὲ ἐβοήθει μὲν τῇ Τορώνῃ, αἰσθόμενος
δὲ καθ' ὁδὸν ἐάλωκυῖαν ἀνεχώρησεν, ἀποσχὼν
τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους μὴ φθάσαι
4 ἐλθών. ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖά τε
ἔστησαν δύο, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν λιμένα, τὸ δὲ πρὸς
τῷ τειχίσματι, καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων γυναῖκας μὲν
καὶ παῖδας ἠνδραπόδισαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πε-
λοποννησίους καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Χαλκιδέων ἦν,

¹ ἐς added by Bekker.

² αἱ added by Haacke.

from the city of Torone. From there, on learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Torone and that the inhabitants were not a match for him in battle, he advanced with his land-force against the city, but sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. And first he arrived at the new wall which Brasidas had built round the city for the purpose of taking in the suburb, having pulled down a part of the old wall and made one city of Torone.

III. But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander, and the garrison that was present came to the defence of this wall and tried to ward off the Athenian assault. But they were hard pressed and the ships that had been sent round were now sailing into the harbour ; so Pasitelidas, in fear that the ships might take the town, undefended as it was, before he could get there, and that if the new fortifications were carried he might be captured in them, left them and hurried back into the town. But the Athenians from the ships forestalled him and took Torone, and their land-force, following close upon him, at the first assault dashed in with him at the breach in the old wall. And they slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans on the spot in hand to hand fighting, but others they took alive, including Pasitelidas the commander. Brasidas meanwhile was coming to the relief of Torone, but learning on the road that it had fallen he retreated, having missed getting there in time by just about forty stadia. Cleon and the Athenians set up two trophies, one at the harbour, the other at the new wall, and made slaves of the women and children of the Toronaeans, but the men of Torone along with the Peloponnesians, and any that were Chalcidians, all together to the number of

ξύμπαντας ἐς ἑπτακοσίους, ἀπέπεμψαν ἐς τὰς
 Ἀθήνας· καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν Πελοποννήσιον
 ὕστερον ἐν ταῖς γενομέναις σπονδαῖς ἀπῆλθε, τὸ
 δὲ ἄλλο ἐκομίσθη ὑπ' Ὀλυνθίων, ἀνὴρ αὐτ'
 5 ἀνδρὸς λυθείς. εἶλον δὲ καὶ Πάνακτον Ἀθη-
 ναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τεῖχος Βοιωτοὶ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν
 6 χρόνον προδοσίᾳ. καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων φυλακὴν
 καταστησάμενος τῆς Τωρώνης ἄρας περιέπλει
 τὸν Ἀθων ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.

IV. Φαίαξ δὲ ὁ Ἐρασιστράτου τρίτος αὐτὸς
 Ἀθηναίων πεμπόντων ναυσὶ δύο ἐς Ἰταλίαν καὶ
 Σικελίαν πρεσβευτὴς ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐξέ-
 2 πλευσεν. Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων
 ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπε-
 γράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει
 3 ἀναδάσασθαι. οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρα-
 κοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον.
 καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι· οἱ δὲ
 δυνατοὶ ὁμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίοις καὶ τὴν
 πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας
 4 ἐπὶ πολιτείᾳ ᾤκησαν. καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν αὐτῶν
 τινες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι ἀπολιπόντες ἐκ τῶν
 Συρακουσῶν Φωκέας τε, τῆς πόλεως τι τῆς
 Λεοντίνων χωρίον καλούμενον, καταλαμβάνουσι
 καὶ Βρικιννίας, ὃν ἔρυμα ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. καὶ
 τῶν τοῦ δῆμου τότε ἐκπεσόντων οἱ πολλοὶ ἦλθον
 ὡς αὐτοὺς, καὶ καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπο-
 5 λέμουν. ἃ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Φαίακα
 πέμπουσιν, εἴ πως πείσαντες τοὺς σφίσιν ὄντας

¹ i.e. in exchange for Athenian prisoners.

² cf. IV. lxx. *init.*

seven hundred, they sent to Athens. There, however, the Peloponnesians were afterwards set free in the treaty that was made, but the rest were brought back by the Olynthians, being ransomed man for man.¹ About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the frontier of Attica, was betrayed to the Boeotians. As for Cleon, after setting a guard over Torone, he weighed anchor and sailed round Athos with a view to attacking Amphipolis.

IV. About the same time Phaeax son of Erasistratus and two others were sent by the Athenians with two ships on a mission to Italy and Sicily. For the Leontines, on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the general peace,² had enrolled many new citizens,³ and the people were minded to make a redistribution of the land. But the oligarchs, perceiving their intention, brought over the Syracusans and expelled the people. And the latter were scattered in every direction; but the oligarchs, coming to an agreement with the Syracusans and leaving their own city desolated, settled at Syracuse on condition of having the rights of citizenship. But later some of them, owing to discontent, left Syracuse and occupied Phoceae, a quarter so named of the city of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a stronghold in Leontine territory. These being joined by most of the members of the popular party who had been expelled, they established themselves and carried on war from their strongholds. Hearing of this, the Athenians sent Phaeax to see if perchance they might persuade their own allies there, and the rest of the Siceliots

³ This was to strengthen the democratic party, and for their benefit a new division of state lands was to be made.

αὐτόθι ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἦν δύνωνται, Σικελιώτας κοινῇ, ὥς Συρακοσίων δύναμιν περιποιουμένων, ἐπιστρατεῦσαι, διασώσειαν τὸν
 6 δῆμον τῶν Λεοντίνων. ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ ἀφικόμενος τοὺς μὲν Καμαριναίους πείθει καὶ Ἀκραγαντί-
 νους, ἐν δὲ Γέλα ἀντιστάντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρχεται, αἰσθόμενος οὐκ ἂν πείθειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἐς Κατάνην, καὶ ἅμα ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καὶ ἐς τὰς Βρικινίας ἐλθὼν καὶ παραθαρσύνας, ἀπέπλει.

V. Ἐν δὲ τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῇ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀναχωρήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ τισὶ πόλεσιν ἐχρημάτισε περὶ φιλίας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λοκρῶν ἐντυχάνει τοῖς ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἐποίκοις ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἳ μετὰ τὴν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν στασιασάντων Μεσσηνίων καὶ ἐπαγαγομένων τῶν ἐτέρων Λοκροὺς ἔποικοι ἐξεπέμφθησαν καὶ ἐγένετο Μεσσήνη Λοκρῶν
 2 τινὰ χρόνον. τούτοις οὖν ὁ Φαίαξ ἐντυχὼν κομιζομένοις¹ οὐκ ἠδίκησεν· ἐγεγένητο γὰρ τοῖς Λοκροῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογία ξυμβάσεως πέρι
 3 πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτε Σικελιωταὶ ξυνηλλάσσοντο, οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο Ἀθηναίοις, οὐδ' ἂν τότε, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὺς κατεῖχεν ὁ πρὸς Ἰπωνιᾶς² καὶ Μεδμαίους πόλεμος, ὁμόρους τε ὄντας καὶ ἀποίκους. καὶ ὁ μὲν Φαίαξ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας χρόνῳ ὕστερον ἀφίκετο.

¹ τοῖς of the MSS. before κομιζομένοις deleted by Dobree.

² So corrected by Beloch with the help of coins; MSS. Ἰπωνίας.

if possible, to make a common expedition against the Syracusans on the ground of their continual aggression, and thus save the people of Leontini. Phaeax, on his arrival, persuaded the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines; but since his undertaking did not prosper at Gela he did not go on to the other states, perceiving that he could not persuade them, but withdrew through the country of the Sicels to Catana, having visited Bricinniae on the way and encouraged its inhabitants. He then sailed back home.

V. On his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily and in Italy he negotiated with certain cities about friendship with the Athenians. He fell in also with the Locrian settlers who had been expelled from Messene; for these, after the general agreement among the Siceliots, when the Messenians had fallen into discord and one faction had called in the Locrians, had been sent out as colonists, Messene thus coming for a time into the hands of the Locrians. Falling in, then, with these when they were on their way home, he did them no injury, as an agreement had been made with him¹ by the Locrians for a treaty with the Athenians. For they alone of the allies, when the Siceliots became reconciled, made no treaty with the Athenians, nor would they have done so then if they had not been pressed by the war with the Iponieans and Medmaeans, who lived on their borders and were colonists of theirs. And Phaeax some time after this returned to Athens.

¹ On his way to Sicily.


VI. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων ὥς τότε ἀπὸ τῆς Τορώνης περιέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἡϊόνος Σταγίρῳ μὲν προσβάλλει Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία καὶ οὐχ εἶλε, Γαληψὸν δὲ τὴν Θασίῳν
 2 ἀποικίαν λαμβάνει κατὰ κράτος. καὶ πέμψας ὥς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγένοιτο στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Θράκην ἄλλους παρὰ Πολλῇν τὸν Ὀδομάντων βασιλέα, ἄξοντας μισθοῦ Θρᾷκας ὥς πλείστους, αὐτὸς
 3 ἡσύχαζε περιμέειν ἐν τῇ Ἡϊόνι. Βρασίδης δὲ πυνθανόμενος ταῦτα ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ· ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων ἐπὶ μετεωρου πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ οὐ πολὺν ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ κατεφαίνεται πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ· ὅπερ προσεδέχετο ποιήσῃν αὐτόν, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλῆθος τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ ἀναβήσεσθαι.
 4 ἅμα δὲ καὶ παρεσκευάζετο Θρᾷκὰς τε μισθωτοὺς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ τοὺς Ἠδῶνας πάντας παρακαλῶν, πελταστὰς καὶ ἱππέας· καὶ Μυρκινίων καὶ Χαλκιδέων χιλίους πελταστὰς
 5 εἶχε πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει. τὸ δ' ὀπλιτικὸν ξύμπαν ἡθροίσθη δισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ἱππῆς ἑλληνες τριακόσιοι. τούτων Βρασίδης μὲν ἔχων ἐπὶ Κερδυλίῳ ἐκάθητο ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μετὰ Κλεαρίδου ἐτετάχατο.

VII. Ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδης προσε-

¹ cf. iv. lxxxviii. 2.

² cf. iv. cvii. 3.

THE BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.



Edward Stanford del. Imbert sc.

----- Modern Roads

===== Ancient Roads.

- 1 Thracian Gate.
2. First Gate in the Long Wall.
3. Gate from the town into space inclosed by the Palisade.
4. Gate in the Palisade.

VI. Now when Cleon had sailed round from Torone to Amphipolis, as mentioned above, taking Eion as his base he made an unsuccessful attack upon Stagirus,¹ an Andrian colony, but did take by storm Galepsus,² a colony of the Thasians. Then sending envoys to Perdiccas, with a request to join him with an army in accordance with the terms of alliance,³ and other envoys to Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible, he himself kept quiet at Eion. But Brasidas, on hearing of these things, took post over against him at Cerdylum. This place is in the territory of the Argilians, on high ground across the river not far from Amphipolis, and commands a view in all directions, so that Cleon could not move his army without being observed; for Brasidas expected that Cleon in contempt of the small numbers of the Lacedaemonians would go up against Amphipolis, with his present army.⁴ At the same time he made further preparations, calling to his aid fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and all the Edonians, both targeteers and cavalry. And he had also of the Myrcinians and the Chalcidians one thousand targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis. The whole body of hoplites collected by him was about two thousand in number, and he had three hundred Hellenic horsemen. Of these forces Brasidas took about fifteen hundred and stationed himself at Cerdylum; the rest were posted at Amphipolis under the command of Clearidas.

VII. Cleon kept quiet for a while, then was forced to do just what Brasidas had expected. For when

¹ cf. IV. cxxxii. 1.

⁴ i.e. without waiting for reinforcements.

- 2 δέχετο. τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ
 ἔδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν
 πρὸς οἷαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οἷας ἀνεπι-
 στημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οἴ-
 κοθεν ὥς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνεξῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος
 τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν
 τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν
 3 ἦγεν. καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν
 Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν· ἐς μά-
 χην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἥλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα,
 κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου,
 καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμεινεν, οὐχ ὥς
 τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἣν ἀναγκάζεται, περισχίσων, ἀλλ'
 ὥς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἵρήσων τὴν πόλιν.
 4 ἔλθων τε καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ
 τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως τὸν στρατόν, αὐτὸς ἐθεᾶτο τὸ
 λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως
 5 ἐπὶ τῇ Θράκῃ¹ ὥς ἔχοι. ἀπιέναι τε ἐνόμιζεν,
 ὁπότεν βούληται, ἀμαχεί· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐφαίνετο
 οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους οὐδεὶς οὔτε κατὰ πύλας
 ἐξῆι, κεκλημέναι τε ἦσαν πᾶσαι. ὥστε καὶ μη-
 χανὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνήλθεν ἔχων, ἀμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει·
 ἐλεῖν γὰρ αὖ τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρήμον.

VIII. Ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας εὐθὺς ὥς εἶδε κινου-
 μένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καταβὰς καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ
 τοῦ Κερδυλίου ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.
 2 καὶ ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο
 πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, δεδιὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ παρα-

¹ With most MSS.; Hude reads τὴν Θράκην with CGc.

the soldiers began to be annoyed at sitting still and to discuss the quality of his leadership—what experience and daring there was on the other side and what incompetence and cowardice would be pitted against it, and how unwillingly they had come with him from home—he became aware of their grumbling, and unwilling that they should be exasperated by remaining inactive in the same place, marched out with them. He adopted the same course in which he had been successful at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom; for he had no expectation that anybody would come against him for battle, but he was going up, he said, rather to reconnoitre the place; and in fact he was waiting for the larger force,¹ not with a view to gaining the victory without risk should he be forced to fight, but to surrounding the town and taking it by force of arms. Accordingly he went and posted his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, and was himself surveying the marshy part of the Strymon and the situation of the city in respect to the surrounding Thracian country, and he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle; for no one was visible on the wall or was seen coming out by the gates, which were all closed. He therefore thought that he had made a mistake in coming up without storming-machines; for he might have taken the town, since it was undefended.

VIII. But Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians stirring, went down himself from Cerdylum and entered Amphipolis. But he did not march out and draw up against the Athenians, because he mistrusted his own force, believing them

¹ cf. ch. vi. 2.

σκευὴν καὶ νομίζων ὑποδεεστέρους εἶναι, οὐ τῷ
 πληθῇ (ἀντίπαλα γὰρ πως ἦν), ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώ-
 ματι (τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὅπερ ἐστράτεψε κα-
 θαρὸν ἐξῆλθε, καὶ Λημνίων καὶ Ἰμβρίων τὸ
 3 κράτιστον), τέχνη δὲ παρεσκευάζετο ἐπιθησό-
 μενος. εἰ γὰρ δείξειε τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὸ τε πλήθος
 καὶ τὴν ὀπλισιν ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν τῶν μεθ'
 ἑαυτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἡγείτο μᾶλλον περιγενέσθαι ἢ
 4 ἀνευ προόψεως τε αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος
 καταφρονήσεως. ἀπολεξάμενος οὖν αὐτὸς πεν-
 τήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ὀπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 Κλεαρίδα προστάξας, ἐβουλεύετο ἐπιχειρεῖν
 αἰφνιδίως, πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐκ
 ἂν νομίζων ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἀπολαβεῖν αὐτῆς
 μεμονωμένους, εἰ τύχοι ἐλθοῦσα αὐτοῖς ἡ βοή-
 5 θεια. ξυγκαλέσας δὲ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας
 καὶ βουλόμενος παραθαρσύναι τε καὶ τὴν ἐπί-
 νοιαν φράσαι ἔλεγε τοιαύδε.

IX. “Ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπὸ μὲν οἷας
 χώρας ἤκομεν, ὅτι αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ εὐψυχον ἐλευθέρας,
 καὶ ὅτι Δωριῆς μέλλετε Ἴωσι μάχεσθαι, ὧν
 εἰώθατε κρείσσους εἶναι, ἀρκείτω βραχέως δεδη-
 2 λωμένον· τὴν δὲ ἐπιχείρησιν ᾧ τρόπῳ διανοοῦμαι
 ποιεῖσθαι διδάξω, ἵνα μὴ τῷ τὸ κατ’ ὀλίγον καὶ
 μὴ ἅπαντας κινδυνεύειν ἐνδεὲς φαινόμενον ἀτολ-
 3 μίαν παράσχη. τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω
 καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας
 ὥς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην, ἀναβῆναι
 τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θεῶν
 4 τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν. ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας
 ἁμαρτίας τῶν ἐναντίων κάλλιστα ἰδὼν καὶ ἄμα

to be inferior, not in numbers—as they were about equal—but in quality; for the force that was in the field were Athenians of pure blood and the pick of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he was preparing to attack by means of a stratagem; for he thought that if he showed the enemy the number and the barely sufficient equipment of the troops with him he should be less likely to gain a victory than if they had no previous sight of his forces and did not look upon them with contempt from seeing their real character. Accordingly, picking out for himself one hundred and fifty hoplites and assigning the rest to Clearidas, he determined to make a sudden attack before the Athenians withdrew, thinking that he could not again cut them off thus isolated if once reinforcements should reach them. So calling together all the soldiers, wishing to encourage them and explain his plan, he spoke to them as follows:

IX. “Men of the Peloponnesus, let it suffice to remind you briefly from what manner of country we have come, that it has ever been free because of its courage, and that you are going to fight, Dorians against Ionians, whom you have been accustomed to vanquish. I will, however, explain to you in what way I intend to make the attack, in order that my plan of fighting in detachments and not in a body may not seem to anyone poor tactics and thus cause discouragement. For I imagine that the enemy ascended the hill in contempt of us and because they could not have expected that anybody would come out for battle against them, and now, with broken ranks and intent upon reconnoitring, are taking small account of us. Now when an assailant having most clearly observed such errors in the enemy also makes

πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖται
 μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀντιπαρα-
 ταχθέντος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν συμφέροντος,
 5 πλείστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο· καὶ τὰ κλέμματα ταῦτα
 καλλίστην δόξαν ἔχει ἂ τὸν πολέμιον μάλιστ'
 ἂν τις ἀπατήσας τοὺς φίλους μέγιστ' ἂν ὠφε-
 6 λήσειεν. ἕως οὖν ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι καὶ
 τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ
 φαίνονται, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ
 αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης καὶ πρὶν ξυνταθῆναι¹ μᾶλλον
 τὴν δόξαν, ἐγὼ μὲν ἔχων τοὺς μετ' ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ
 φθάσας, ἣν δύνωμαι, προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ
 7 μέσον τὸ στράτευμα· σὺ δέ, Κλεαρίδα, ὕστερον,
 ὅταν ἐμὲ ὁρᾷς ἤδη προσκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς
 φοβοῦντα αὐτούς, τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ τοὺς τ'
 Ἀμφιπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους ἄγων
 αἰφνιδίως τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπεί-
 8 γεσθαι ὡς τάχιστα συμμείξαι. ἐλπίς γὰρ μά-
 λιστα αὐτοὺς οὕτως φοβηθῆναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ οὖν
 ὕστερον δεινότερον τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ παρόντος
 9 καὶ μαχομένου. καὶ αὐτὸς τε ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γί-
 γνου, ὥσπερ σε εἰκὸς ὄντα Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ὑμεῖς,
 ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, ἀκολουθήσατε ἀνδρείως, καὶ
 νομίσατε τρία² εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν, τὸ ἐθέ-
 λειν καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ τὸ³ τοῖς ἄρχουσι
 πείθεσθαι, καὶ τῇδε ὑμῖν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ἀγαθοῖς
 γενομένοις ἐλευθερίαν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ Λακεδαι-
 μοιῶν συμμάχοις κεκληῆσθαι, ἢ Ἀθηναίων τε
 δούλοις, ἣν τὰ ἄριστα ἄνευ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ ἢ

¹ Krüger's emendation for ξυνταχθῆναι of the MSS.

² Omitted by MSS. but rightly restored by Stahl from Stobaeus and schol. ³ Added by Krüger.

his attack in accordance with the force at his own disposal, not openly and in array of battle, but as may be advantageous under present circumstances, then he would be most likely to succeed. And those stratagems have won the highest credit by which a man most completely deceives the enemy and helps his friends. While, then, the Athenians, still unprepared, are full of confidence and are thinking, so far as I can see, more of withdrawing than of staying where they are, while their tension of mind is relaxed and before they have got their thoughts together, I will take my own troops and if possible surprise them by a dash upon the centre of their army. Then, Clearchidas, the moment you see me pressing on and in all likelihood striking terror into them, do you suddenly throw open the gates and at the head of your own men and the Amphipolitans and the rest of our allies rush out upon them and make all haste to close with them at once. In this way there is the best hope to put them in a panic; for a force that comes up afterwards has always more terror for an enemy than that with which he is already engaged. As for yourself, shew yourself a brave man, as becomes a Spartan; and do you, men of the allies, follow him bravely, and bear in mind that the three virtues of a good soldier are zeal, sense of honour, and obedience to his leaders; and that on this day there is in store for you, if you are brave, freedom and to be called allies of the Lacedaemonians—or else vassals of the Athenians (if you be so fortunate as to escape death or being sold

θανατώσεως πράξῃτε, καὶ δουλείαν χαλεπωτέραν
ἢ πρὶν εἶχετε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς "Ελλησι κωλυταῖς
10 γενέσθαι ἐλευθερώσεως. ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς μαλα-
κισθῆτε, ὀρώντες περὶ ὅσων ὁ ἀγὼν ἐστίν, ἐγὼ τε
δείξω οὐ παραινέσαι οἷός τε ὦν μᾶλλον τοῖς πέ-
λας ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ ἐπεξελεθεῖν."

X. Ὁ μὲν Βρασίδης τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν τὴν τε
ἔξοδον παρεσκευάζετο αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδα καθίστη ἐπὶ τὰς Θρακίας
καλουμένας τῶν πυλῶν, ὅπως ὥσπερ εἴρητο ἐπ-
2 ἐξίοιεν. τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ
ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει,
ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ ἔξωθεν, περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθη-
ναίας θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, ἀγγέλ-
λεται (προυκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν)
ὅτι ἦ τε στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερά τῶν πολεμίων ἐν
τῇ πόλει καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας ἵππων τε πόδες
πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὥς ἐξιόντων ὑποφαίνονται.
3 ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐπῆλθε, καὶ ὥς εἶδεν, οὐ βουλόμενος
μάχῃ διαγωνίσασθαι πρὶν οἱ καὶ τοὺς βοηθοὺς
ἤκειν καὶ οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθὼν, σημαίνειν
τε ἅμα ἐκέλευεν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ παρήγγελλε
τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, ὥσπερ
4 μόνον οἷόν τ' ἦν, ὑπάγειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰηόνος. ὥς δ'
αὐτῷ ἐδόκει σχολῇ γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας
τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὰ γυμνὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους δούς
5 ἀπῆγε τὴν στρατιάν. κὰν τούτῳ Βρασίδης ὥς
ὁρᾷ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων

into slavery) and that, too, in a harsher vassalage than you had before, while for the rest of the Hellenes you will prove a barrier to their liberation. Nay, then, seeing how much is at stake, do you on your part not play the coward; and I, for my part, will show that I am not better able to exhort others than to carry out myself in action the advice I give to my fellows."

X. After this brief speech, Brasidas himself prepared for the sally and placed the rest with Clearidas at the gate called Thracian, in order that they might come out to his support according to his orders. But he had been seen when he came down from Cerdylum, and again in the city—which is in full view from outside—while sacrificing at the temple of Athena and busied about these matters; and word was brought to Cleon, who had gone forward at that time for the reconnoissance, that the whole army of the enemy could be clearly seen inside the city, and the feet of men and horses in great numbers were visible under the gates, as though ready for a sally. Hearing this Cleon came nearer; and when he saw it, being unwilling to risk a battle before his reinforcements arrived, and thinking that he could get away in time, he gave orders to sound a retreat and at the same time passed along word to the troops as they set off to go to the left—as alone was possible—upon the road to Eion. But as it seemed to him this was being done too slowly, he himself wheeled the right wing, thus exposing the unarmed side¹ to the enemy, and began to lead off his army. At this moment Brasidas, seeing his opportunity and the army of the Athenians on the

¹ i.e. the right side, the left being covered by the shield.

THUCYDIDES

κινούμενον, λέγει τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι "Οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μένουσιν· δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν· οἷς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας. ἀλλὰ τὰς τε πύλας τις ἀνοιγέτω ἐμοὶ ἅς εἴρηται, 6 καὶ ἐπεξίωμεν ὥς τάχιστα θαρσοῦντες." καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας καὶ τὰς πρῶτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθείαν ἥπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τροπαῖον ἔστηκε, καὶ προσβαλὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, πεφοβημένοις τε ἅμα τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἀταξίᾳ καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ ἐκπεπληγμένοις, κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα, 7 τρέπει· καὶ ὁ Κλεαρίδας, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, ἅμα κατὰ τὰς Θρακίας πύλας ἐπεξελθὼν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπεφέρετο. ξυνέβη τε τῷ ἀδοκίτῳ καὶ ἐξαπίνης 8 ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθῆναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον κέρας αὐτῶν, τὸ πρὸς τὴν Ἡϊόνα ὅπερ δὴ καὶ προυκεχωρήκει, εὐθὺς ἀπορραγὲν ἔφευγε (καὶ ὁ Βρασίδης ὑποχωροῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐπιπαριῶν τῷ δεξιῷ τιτρώσκεται, καὶ πεσόντα αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, οἱ δὲ πλησίον ἄραντες ἀπήνεγκαν), τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν 9 Ἀθηναίων ἔμενε μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων, ὥς τὸ πρῶτον οὐ διανοεῖτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγων καὶ καταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ξυστραφέντες ὀπλῖται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τὸν τε Κλεαρίδαν ἡμύνοντο καὶ δις ἡ τὰς προσβαλόντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν

move, said to those immediately about him¹ and to the rest of the troops: "These men will not stand before us; they show it by the wagging of their spears and of their heads; men who do that never await an attack. Somebody open the gates for me as I have ordered and let us boldly get at them as quickly as possible." He went out then by the gate that led to the palisade and by the first gate of the long wall, which was then standing, and advanced at full speed up the straight road where now, as one comes to the steepest part of the hill, a trophy stands, and attacking the centre of the Athenians, who were amazed at his audacity, as well as panic-stricken because of their own disorder, he routed them. At the same moment Clearidas, as he had been ordered, went out at the Thracian gate and bore down with his troops. And so it came to pass that owing to the unexpected and sudden nature of the attack from both sides at once the Athenians were thrown into confusion; and the left wing, on the side toward Eion, which had already gone some distance in advance, was at once cut off, and fled. (It was just when it began to retire that Brasidas, who was pressing forward against the right wing, was wounded, and the Athenians did not observe that he had fallen, but those who were near took him up and carried him from the field.) The right wing of the Athenians stood its ground better. Cleon, indeed, as he had not intended from the first to stand his ground, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer; but the hoplites, rallying at their first position on the hill, twice or thrice repulsed the attack of Clearidas, and did not

¹ *i.e.* the hundred and fifty (ch. viii. 4).

- πρὶν ἢ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἵππος καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἑσακοντίζοντες
 10 αὐτοὺς ἔτρεψαν. οὕτω δὴ¹ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὁδοὺς τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὄρη, ὅσοι μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἢ αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς
 11 τὴν Ἡϊόνα. οἱ δὲ τὸν Βρασίδαν ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς μάχης καὶ διασώσαντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἔτι ἔμπνουν ἐσεκόμισαν· καὶ ἦσθετο μὲν ὅτι νικῶσιν οἱ μεθ'
 12 αὐτοῦ, οὐ πολὺ δὲ διαλιπὼν ἐτελεύτησεν· καὶ ἡ ἄλλη στρατιὰ ἀναχωρήσασα μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου ἐκ τῆς διώξεως νεκροὺς τε ἐσκύλευσε καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησεν.

XI. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες ξὺν ὀιγλοῖς ἐπισπόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολίται περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον ὥς ἥρῳ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὥς οἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἀγνώνεια² οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἴ τι μνημόσυνόν που ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκίσεως περιέσεσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρά τε σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἅμα τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχίαν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἀγνώνα κατὰ τὸ πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ' ἂν ἡδέως τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν. καὶ
 2 τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀπέδοσαν. ἀπέθανον

¹ δὴ, Krieger's correction for δὲ of the MSS.

² cf. IV. cii. 3, 4.

give way till the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, who surrounded and hurled javelins at them, put them to flight. Then at last the whole Athenian army took to flight, making their way with difficulty and by many routes over the hills, until finally the survivors—all that were not destroyed either at once in hand to hand conflict or by the Chalcidian horse and targeteers—got back to Eion. Brasidas was taken up by his followers and carried safely from the battlefield to the city, still breathing; and he learned that his men were victorious, but after a little interval he died. The rest of the army, after returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, despoiled the dead and set up a trophy.

XI. After this all the allies gave Brasidas a public burial in the city at a spot facing what is now the market-place, following his body in full armour. And the Amphipolitans fenced in his monument and have ever since made offerings to him as a hero, giving honours and instituting games and yearly sacrifices. They also adopted him as founder of the colony, pulling down the edifices of Hagnon and obliterating whatever was likely, if left standing, to be a reminder of his settlement,¹ for at the present moment they courted the alliance of the Lacedaemonians through fear of the Athenians, thinking Brasidas to have been their saviour, whereas Hagnon, in consequence of their hostile attitude towards Athens, would not in like manner as before² receive their honours either with benefit to themselves or with pleasure to himself. The dead they gave back to the Athenians.

¹ cf. iv. cii. 3, 4.

² i.e. as formerly, when their relations with Athens were pleasant. Or the meaning may be, "so advantageously for them as Brasidas would."

δὲ Ἀθηναίων μὲν περὶ ἑξακοσίους, τῶν δ' ἐναν-
 τίων ἑπτὰ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ παρατάξεως, ἀπὸ δὲ
 3 τοιαύτης ξυντυχίας καὶ προεκφοβήσεως τὴν μά-
 χην μᾶλλον γειέσθαι. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν οἱ
 μὲν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κλεα-
 ρίδου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καθίσταντο.

XII. Καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους
 τελευτῶντος Ῥαμφίας καὶ Αὐτοχαρίδας καὶ Ἐπι-
 κυδίδας Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία
 βοήθειαν ἦγον ἑνακοσίων ὀπλιτῶν, καὶ ἀφικό-
 2 μενοι ἐς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχίνι καθίσταντο ὃ
 τι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν. ἐνδιατριβόντων
 δὲ αὐτῶν ἔτυχεν ἡ μάχη αὕτη γενομένη, καὶ τὸ
 θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

XIII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς μέ-
 χρι μὲν Πιερίου τῆς Θεσσαλίας διῆλθον οἱ περὶ
 τὸν Ῥαμφίαν, κωλυόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ
 ἄμα Βρασίδου τεθνεῶτος, ᾧπερ ἦγον τὴν στρα-
 2 τιάν, ἀπετράποντο ἐπ' οἴκου, νομίσαντες οὐδένα
 καιρὸν ἔτι εἶναι, τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων ἥσση ἀπελη-
 λυθότων καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοχρεῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων δρᾶν τι
 ὧν κακείνος ἐπενόει. μάλιστα δὲ ἀπῆλθον εἰδότες
 τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτε ἐξῆσαν, πρὸς τὴν εἰρή-
 νην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας.

XIV. Ξυνέβη τε εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει
 μάχην καὶ τὴν Ῥαμφίου ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ Θεσσα-
 λίας ὥστε πολέμου μὲν μηδὲν ἔτι ἄψασθαι μηδε-
 τέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην
 εἶχον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι πληγέντες ἐπὶ τε τῷ

¹ cf. IV. a., ci.

About six hundred of these had been killed, but of their adversaries only seven; for the fight had been made, not as a regular battle, but as the result of such an accident and previous panic as has been described. After taking up the dead the Athenians sailed back home, but Clearidas and his followers remained and set in order the affairs of Amphipolis.

XII. About the same time, towards the close of this summer, Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epi-cydidias, who were Lacedaemonians, were on their way with reinforcements, consisting of nine hundred hoplites, to the strongholds in Thrace, and arriving at Heracleia in Trachis they set in order whatever seemed to them amiss. It was while they were staying there that the battle at Amphipolis occurred; and so the summer ended.

XIII. As soon as winter came on Rhamphias and his followers advanced as far as Pierium in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians hindered their progress and Brasidas, to whom they were bringing the army, was now dead, they turned back homeward. They thought the favourable moment was past, for the Athenians had gone away in consequence of their defeat, and they were not competent by themselves to carry out any of Brasidas' plans. But the chief reason for their return was that they knew that the Lacedaemonians, at the time when they set out, were more than ever inclined to peace.

XIV. It so happened, too, that directly after the battle at Amphipolis and the withdrawal of Rhamphias from Thessaly neither side undertook any further military operations, and both were more inclined to peace. The Athenians were so inclined because they had been beaten at Delium,¹ and again

Δηλὶφ καὶ δι' ὀλίγου αὐθις ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ῥώμης πιστὴν ἔτι, ἥπερ οὐ προσεδέχοντο πρότερον τὰς σπονδάς, δοκοῦντες τῇ παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ καθυπέρτεροι γε-
 2 νήσεσθαι (καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἅμα ἐδέδισαν σφῶν μὴ διὰ τὰ σφάλματα ἐπαιρόμενοι ἐπὶ πλεον ἄποστῶσι, μετεμέλονται τε ὅτι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ
 3 καλῶς παρασχόν οὐ ξυνέβησαν), οἱ δ' αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρὰ γνώμην μὲν ἀποβαίνοντος σφίσι τοῦ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ὥροντο ὀλίγων ἐτῶν καθαιρήσειν τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν εἰ τὴν γῆν τέμνοιεν, περιπεσόντες δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορᾷ, οἷα οὐπω ἐγεγένητο τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ ληστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου καὶ Κυθήρων, αὐτομολούντων τε τῶν Εἰλώτων καὶ αἰεὶ προσδοκίας οὔσης μή τι καὶ οἱ ὑπομένοντες τοῖς ἔξω πίσυνοι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφίσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον,
 4 νεωτερίσωσιν· ξυνέβαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδάς ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ἤθελον σπένδεσθαι οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἀποδώσει (ἀδύνατα δ'¹ εἶναι ἐφαίνετο Ἀργείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμεῖν), τῶν τε ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεων ὑπώπτευσεν τινὰς ἀποστήσεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.

XV. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς λογιζομένοις ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι ἢ ξύμβασις, καὶ οὐχ ἦσσαν

¹ Stahl's emendation for ὥστ' ἀδύνατα of the MSS.

¹ i.e. those who had escaped.

² The great revolt of the Helots, called the Third Messenian War; cf. I. ci.-ciii.

at Amphipolis a little later, and consequently had no longer that confidence in their strength in reliance upon which they had earlier refused to accept the truce, as they then thought that with their existing good luck they would prove superior. They were afraid, too, of their allies, lest, elated over these failures of theirs, the revolt among them might spread, and they repented that they had not come to terms when a good opportunity offered after the affair at Pylos. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, favoured peace because the war was turning out contrary to their hopes. They had expected that in a few years, if they should ravage their territory, they could pull down the power of the Athenians; whereas they had met with the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, such an one as had never before befallen Sparta; their territory was ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and always there was apprehension that those who remained, relying on those beyond the border,¹ might revolt in the present state of affairs, just as they had done before.² It happened also that the thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring,³ and the Argives were unwilling to make another treaty unless the territory of Cynuria⁴ were restored to them; and it seemed impossible to carry on the war with the Argives and the Athenians at the same time. Besides, they suspected that some of the cities in the Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed did happen.

XV. In consideration of these things, both parties thought it advisable to come to an agreement,

³ It expired the next year (*cf.* ch. xxviii. 2), and therefore dated from 457 B.C.

⁴ *cf.* iv. lvi. 2.

τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπιθυμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτῶν πρῶτοί τε καὶ ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυγγενεῖς.
 2 ἦρξαντο μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐθύς μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν αὐτῶν πράσσειν, ἀλλ' οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐπὼς ἤθελον, εὖ φερόμενοι, ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καταλύεσθαι. σφαλέντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξαμένους ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει ξυνιόντας καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλείονος χρόνου βουλευέσθαι.

XVI. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγεγένητο καὶ ἐτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδης, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἦναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, τότε δὲ¹ ἑκατέρα τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστ' αὐτὴν² Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ Πausανίου, βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλείστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθῆς ἦν καὶ ἡξιούτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν,

¹ So all the better MSS.; Hude reads δῆ.

² The vulgate has μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν: Stahl deletes ἡγεμονίαν and corrects τὴν to αὐτήν. The vulgate would mean: "then those who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely . . ."

especially the Lacedaemonians, because of their desire to recover the men captured at Sphacteria; for the Spartiates among these were men of high rank and all alike kinsmen of theirs.¹ Accordingly, they began negotiations directly after their capture, but the Athenians were not at all inclined, as long as they were getting on well, to make a settlement on fair terms. When, however, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, the Lacedaemonians knew immediately that they would now be more ready to accept offers, and they concluded the truce for a year, during which they were to come together and consult about a treaty for a longer period.

XVI. But when the Athenians had met defeat at Amphipolis also and both Cleon and Brasidas had been killed—the men who on either side had been most opposed to peace, the one because of his success and the reputation he had derived from the war, the other because he thought if quiet were restored he would be more manifest in his villainies and less credited in his calumnies—then it was that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who had been of all the generals of his day most successful in his commands—men who had most zealously supported the cause of peace each in the interest of his own state—urged this course with greater zeal than ever. Nicias wished, while his record was still free from disaster and he was held in esteem, to pre-

¹ i.e. of the Lacedaemonians in authority. The Spartiates formed a clan; besides their common descent, they were closely connected by intermarriage. Or reading, with the schol., ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιάται αὐτῶν κτλ., "for there were among them *some* Spartiates of the first rank and related to the most distinguished families."

THUCYDIDES

καὶ ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαῦσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς
καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι, καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ
καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὥς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν
διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμ-
βαίνειν καὶ ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὐτὸν παρα-
δίδωσι, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν.
Πλειστοάναξ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διαβαλλόμενος
περὶ τῆς καθόδου καὶ ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαι-
μονίοις αἰεὶ προβαλλόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὁπότε τι
πταίσειαν, ὥς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κάθοδον παρανο-
2 μηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαῖνοι. τὴν γὰρ πρόμαντιν
τὴν ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπητιῶντο αὐτὸν πείσαι μετ'
'Αριστοκλέους τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὥστε χρῆσαι Λακε-
δαιμονίοις ἐπὶ πολὺ τάδε θεωροῖς ἀφικνουμένοις,
Διὸς υἱοῦ ἡμιθέου τὸ σπέρμα ἐκ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐς
τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀναφέρειν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀργυρεὰ εὐλάκα
3 εὐλαξεῖν· χρόνῳ δὲ προτρέψαι τοὺς Λάκεδαι-
μονίους φεύγοντα αὐτὸν ἐς Λύκαιον διὰ τὴν ἐκ
τῆς Ἀττικῆς ποτε μετὰ δώρων δοκοῦσαν ἀναχώ-
ρησιν καὶ ἡμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ
Διὸς οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔτει ἐνὸς
δέοντι εἰκοστῷ τοῖς ὁμοίοις χοροῖς καὶ θυσίαις
καταγαγεῖν ὥσπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαίμονα
κτίζοντες τοὺς βασιλέας καθίσταντο.

¹ i.e. as the schol. explains, there would be a pestilence, and they would buy food at a very high price, as it were using silver tools.

² 427 B.C., since he had left the country in 446. cf. i. cxiv. 2 and ii. xxi. 1.

BOOK V. xvi. 1-3

serve his good luck to the end, and not only at present both to rest from toil himself and to give his fellow-citizens a rest, but also to hand down to after times a name as of one who had lived his life through without injuring the state; and he thought that a man might achieve such a result by keeping out of danger and by least exposing himself to the caprices of fortune, and that it was peace only that offered freedom from danger. Pleistoanax, on the other hand, was for peace, because he was constantly maligned by his enemies about his return from exile, and because, whenever any reverses occurred, he was always spitefully recalled to their thoughts by these persons as though these misfortunes were due to his illegal restoration. For they charged that he, along with his brother Aristocles, had bribed the priestess at Delphi constantly to answer the Lacedaemonians, whenever they came to consult the oracle: "Bring back the seed of the demigod, son of Zeus, from the foreign land to your own; otherwise you shall plough with a silver plough-share"¹; and that in course of time she had induced the Lacedaemonians to bring him back from banishment in the twentieth year² with like dances and sacrifices as when at the founding of Lacedaemon they had first enthroned their kings. For he had fled for refuge to Mt. Lycaeanum,³ on account of his retreat from Attica, that was thought to be due to bribery, and through fear of the Lacedaemonians had occupied at that time a house whereof the half was within the sanctuary of Zeus.

³ A mountain in Arcadia on which was an ancient sanctuary of Zeus.

XVII. Ἀχθόμενος οὖν τῇ διαβολῇ ταύτῃ καὶ νομίζων ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν οὐδενὸς σφάλματος γιγνομένου καὶ ἅμα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιζομένων κἂν αὐτὸς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀνεπίληπτος εἶναι, πολέμου δὲ καθεστῶτος αἰεὶ ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοὺς προύχοντας ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν διαβάλλεσθαι, προυθυμήθη τὴν ξύμβασιν.

- 2 Καὶ τὸν τε χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἦσαν ἐς λόγους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔαρῆδῃ παρασκευή τε προεπανεσείσθη ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, περιαγγελλομένη κατὰ πόλεις ὥς ἐς ἐπιτειχισμόν,¹ ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐσακούοιεν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῶν ξυνόδων ἅμα πολλὰς δικαιοῦσαι προενεγκόντων ἀλλήλοις ξυνεχωρεῖτο ὥστε ἂ ἐκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδόντας τὴν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι, Νίσαιαν δ' ἔχειν Ἀθηναίους (ἀνταπαιτούντων γὰρ Πλάταιαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἔφασαν οὐ βία, ἀλλ' ὁμολογία αὐτῶν προσχωρησάντων καὶ οὐ προδόντων ἔχειν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν), τότε δὴ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ξυμμάχους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ψηφισαμένων πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἡλείων καὶ Μεγαρέων τῶν ἄλλων ὥστε καταλύεσθαι (τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρρασσόμενα), ποιοῦνται τὴν ξύμβασιν καὶ ἐσπείσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ὤμοσαν, ἐκείνοί τε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τάδε.

¹ Poppo's conjecture for ὡς ἐπὶ τειχισμόν of MSS.

¹ cf. v. lxi.

² cf. iii. lii. 2.

XVII. Vexed, therefore, by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no calamity would occur and, moreover, the Lacedaemonians would be recovering their men, he himself would not be exposed to the attack of his enemies, whereas so long as there was war it must always be that the leading men would be maligned in the event of any misfortunes, he became very ardent for the agreement.

During this winter they kept attending conferences; and toward spring there was a menace of warlike preparation on the part of the Lacedaemonians, orders being sent to the cities as though for the erection of a fortress to overawe the territory of the Athenians, that they might be more inclined to listen to terms; and at the same time as the result of their conferences, in which each party had filed many claims against the other, an agreement was finally reached that they should make peace, each party to restore to the other the territories which they had gained by war, though the Athenians were to keep Nisaea.¹ (For when they had demanded back Plataea, the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place, not by force, but because the Plataeans had come over to them by agreement and not through betrayal²; and the Athenians claimed to have obtained Nisaea in the same way.) At this time the Lacedaemonians summoned their own allies, and when all the rest had voted to stop hostilities, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians—to whom the negotiations were displeasing—they made the agreement, ratifying it by libations and oaths with the Athenians, and the Athenians with them, on the following terms:—

XVIII. "Σπονδὰς ἐποίησαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις.

"Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν ἐξεῖναι¹ καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδεῶς.

2 "Τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφούς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

3 "Ἐπὶ δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

4 "Ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, μήτε τέχνη μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. ἣν δέ τι διάφορον ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δίκαις χρήσθων καὶ ὅρκοις, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ξύνθωνται.

5 "Ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀμφίπολιν. ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις ἐξέστω ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούλωνται αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας. τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξίστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μηδὲ τοὺς

¹ Kirchhoff's emendation for καὶ εἶναι of MSS.

XVIII. "The Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and their respective allies have concluded a treaty and sworn to it state by state upon the following terms :

1. "With regard to the common sanctuaries,¹ whoever wishes may offer sacrifices and consult the oracles and attend as a deputy according to the customs of the fathers, both by land and sea, without fear.

2. "The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the people of Delphi shall be independent, having their own system of taxation and their own courts of justice, both as regards themselves and their own territory, according to the customs of the fathers.

3. "The truce shall be in force for fifty years between the Athenians and their allies and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, without fraud or hurt, both by land and sea.

4. "It shall not be lawful to bear arms with harmful intent, either for the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies, by any art or device. And if there be any dispute with one another, they shall have recourse to courts and oaths, according as they shall agree.

5. "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. But in the case of cities delivered by the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, their inhabitants shall be allowed to go away wherever they wish, having their own possessions ; and these cities, so long as they pay the tribute that was fixed in the time of Aristides, shall be independent. And it shall not be lawful for the Athenians and their allies, after the ratification of the treaty,

¹ With reference especially to Delphi and Olympia.

ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἄργιλος, Στάγιρος, Ἀκανθος, Στῶλος,¹ Ὀλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος. ξυμμάχους δ' εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων· ἣν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιείσθαι αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίους.

6 “Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγίους² οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι.

7 “Ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Πάνακτον. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Κορυφάσιον καὶ Κύθηρα καὶ Μέθανα³ καὶ Πτελεὸν καὶ Ἀταλάντην, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὅσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἄλλοθί που ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σκιῶνι πολιορκουμένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ἐν Σκιῶνι εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσους Βρασίδας ἐσέπεμψε, καὶ εἴ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν Ἀθῆναις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἣς Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὐστinas ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ ταυτά.

8 “Σκιωναίων δὲ καὶ Τορωναίων καὶ Σερμυλιῶν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἀθη-

¹ Kirchhoff's correction after inscriptions; MSS. Σκῶλος.

² Kirchhoff's correction for Σιγγαίους of the MSS.

³ Stahl's correction for Μεθώνη of MSS.

to bear arms against the cities to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. These cities are Argilus,¹ Stagirus,² Acanthus,³ Stalus, Olynthus,⁴ Spartolus.⁵ These shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities it shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them, with their own free will and consent, allies to themselves.

6. "The Mecybernaeans and Sanaeans⁶ and Singians shall dwell in their own towns on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

7. "The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Panactum⁷ to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians, Coryphasium,⁸ Cythera,⁹ Methana,¹⁰ Pteleum, and Atalante¹¹; also they shall set at liberty the Lacedaemonian captives who are in the public prison at Athens or in public prison anywhere else that the Athenians hold sway, and the men of the Peloponnesus who are being besieged in Scione, and all besides who are allies of the Lacedaemonians in Scione,¹² and those whom Brasidas sent into the place,¹³ as likewise any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison in Athens, or in public prison anywhere else that the Athenians have sway. In like manner the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore whomsoever they have of the Athenians and their allies.

8. "As to Scione, Torone,¹⁴ Sermyle, or any other city which the Athenians hold, the Athenians shall

¹ cf. iv. ciii. 4.

³ cf. iv. lxxxviii. 1.

⁶ cf. iv. cix. 3, 5.

⁹ cf. iv. liv.

¹² cf. iv. cxxxi.

² cf. iv. lxxxviii. 2.

⁴ cf. i. lviii. 2.

⁷ cf. ch. iii. 5.

¹⁰ cf. iv. xlv. 2.

¹³ cf. iv. cxxii. 4.

⁵ cf. ii. lxxix.

⁸ cf. iv. iii. 2.

¹¹ cf. ii. xxxii.

¹⁴ cf. ch. iii. 2.

ναίους βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὃ τι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.

9 “Ὅρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις· ὁμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὄρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον, ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα¹ ἑκάστης πόλεως. ὁ δ’ ὄρκος ἔστω ὅδε· ‘Ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως.’ ἔστω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτ’ ὄρκος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους. τὸν δὲ ὄρκον ἀνανεοῦσθαι κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀμφοτέρους.

10 “Στήλας δὲ στήσαι Ὀλυμπίασι καὶ Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ.

11 “Εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὅποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὅτου πέρι, λόγοις δικαίοις χρωμένοις εὖορκον εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις ταύτῃ μεταθεῖναι ὅπῃ ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις.

XIX. “Ἀρχει δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν ἔφορος Πλειστόλας, Ἀρτεμισίου μηνὸς τετάρτη φθίνοντος, ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις ἄρχων Ἀλκαῖος, Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς ἕκτη φθίνοντος. ὥμνουν δὲ οἶδε καὶ ἐσπένδοντο· Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγης,² Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἀκανθος, Δαίθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἀντιππος, Τέλλις, Ἀλκινάδας, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος· Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἶδε· Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Νικίας, Λάχης, Εὐθύδη-

¹ ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα, Classen and Stahl assume that ις' has fallen out of the MSS.

² Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγης, wanting in all MSS., added from inscriptions.

determine about these and the other cities as they may think best.

9. "The Athenians shall bind themselves by oaths with the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city; and either party shall swear its customary oath in the form that is most binding,¹ seventeen men representing each city. The oath shall be as follows: 'I will abide by this agreement and this treaty, justly and without deceit.' For the Lacedaemonians and their allies there shall be an oath, in the same terms, with the Athenians. And both parties shall renew the oath year by year.

10. "They shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, and on the Acropolis at Athens, and at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo of Amyclae.²

11. "If either party forgets anything about any matter whatsoever, it shall be consistent with their oath for both, by means of fair discussion, to make a change at any point where it may seem good to both parties, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.

XIX. "The treaty begins at Lacedaemon in the ephorate of Pleistolas, on the fourth day from the end of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the archonship of Alcaeus, on the sixth day from the end of the month Elaphebolion. The following persons took oaths and ratified the treaty: on behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcínadas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; on behalf of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches,

¹ The Athenians, in ratifying treaties, swore by Zeus, Demeter and Apollo. See Frankel, *Hermes*, xiii. 460. Ullrich suggests for Sparta the Dioscuri.

² Two or three miles from Sparta.

μος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, "Αγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκρατης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης."

XX. Αὐται αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ἦρι ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν, αὐτόδεκα ἐτῶν διελθόντων καὶ ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ἐσβολῇ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ ἢ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε
 2 ἐγένετο. σκοπεῖτω δέ τις κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ μὴ τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ ἢ ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀπὸ τιμῆς τινος ἐς τὰ προγεγενημένα σημαινόντων¹ τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ὀνομάτων πιστεύσας² μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἐστιν, οἷς καὶ ἀρχομένοις καὶ μεσοῦσι καὶ ὅπως
 3 ἔτυχέ τῳ ἐπεγένετό τι. κατὰ θέρη δὲ καὶ χειμῶνας ἀριθμῶν, ὥσπερ γέγραπται, εὐρήσει, ἐξ ἡμισείας ἐκατέρου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος, δέκα μὲν θέρη, ἴσους δὲ χειμῶνας τῷ πρῶτῳ πολέμῳ τῷδε γεγεννημένους.

XXI. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ (ἔλαχον γὰρ πρότεροι ἀποδιδόναι ἃ εἶχον) τοὺς τε ἄνδρας εὐθὺς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν αἰχμαλώτους ἀφίεσαν καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης πρέσβεις Ἰσχαγόραν καὶ Μηνᾶν καὶ Φιλοχαρίδαν ἐκέλευον τὸν Κλεαρίδαν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τὰς σπονδάς, ὡς εἴρητο ἐκάστοις,
 2 δέχεσθαι. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἤθελον, νομίζοντες οὐκ ἐπι-

¹ ἐς τὰ . . . σημαινόντων, the order is according to Arnold's suggestion; in MSS. these words come after ὀνομάτων.

² Hude corrects to ποιήσας.

Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

XX. This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter and the opening of spring immediately after the City Dionysia.¹ Just ten years and a few days had passed since the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war. But one must reckon according to the natural divisions of the year, not according to the catalogue of the names of officials in each place, be they archons or others who in consequence of some office mark the dates for past events, in the belief that this method is more to be trusted; for it is really inexact, since an event may have occurred in the beginning of their term of office, or in the middle, or at any other point as it happened. But reckoning by summers and winters, as has been done in this history—inasmuch as each of these divisions is to be reckoned as half a year—it will be found that there have been ten summers and as many winters in this first war.²

XXI. Now since the lot fell to the Lacedaemonians to make restoration first of the positions they held, they straightway set at liberty the prisoners of war that were in their hands, and sending Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to Thrace ordered Clearidas to give up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of the allies to accept the treaty, as it had been prescribed for each. But the latter were unwilling to do so, as they thought that the terms were unfavourable to them;

¹ The City or Greater Dionysia began before the vernal equinox and lasted several days.

² Commonly referred to by the Attic orators as the Archidamian War. See Introduction, vol. i., p. xiii.

τηδείας εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὁ Κλεαρίδας παρέδωκε τὴν πολιν χαριζόμενος τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὐ
 3 δυνατὸς εἶη βία ἐκείνων παραδιδόναι. ἐλθὼν δὲ αὐτὸς κατὰ τάχος μετὰ πρέσβεων αὐτόθεν ἀπολογησόμενός τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἣν κατηγορῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἴσχαγόραν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέιθετο, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος εἰδέναι εἰ ἔτι μετακινητὴ εἶη ἡ ὁμολογία, ἐπειδὴ ἡῦρε κατειλημμένους,¹ αὐτὸς μὲν πάλιν πεμπόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κελευόντων μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τὸ χωρίον παραδόναι, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπόσοι Πελοποννησίων ἔναισιν ἐξαγαγεῖν, κατὰ τάχος ἐπορεύετο.

XXII. Οἱ δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοῖς² ἔτι ἔτυχον ὄντες, καὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὴ δεξαμένους τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκέλευον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖσθαι. οἱ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ προφάσει, ἥπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεώσαντο, οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξεσθαι,
 2 ἣν μὴ τινὰς δικαιότερας τούτων ποιῶνται. ὡς δ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐσήκουον, ἐκείνους μὲν ἀπέπεμψαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιούντο, νομίζοντες ἥκιστα ἂν σφίσι τοὺς τε Ἀργεῖους,³ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ᾔθελον Ἀμπελίδου καὶ Λίχου ἐλθόντων ἐπισπένδεσθαι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐ δεινούς εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μάλιστ' ἂν ἡσυχάζειν· πρὸς γὰρ ἂν

¹ Kruger's correction for κατειλημμένας of the MSS.

² αὐτοῦ, Kruger's correction for αὐτοί of the MSS., is adopted by Hude. ἔτι was added by Stahl.

³ Hude inserts ἐπιτίθεσθαι after Ἀργεῖους, with Madvig.

¹ The narrative recurs to the end of ch. xvii.

² cf. ch. xvii. (end).

and Clearidas, to oblige the Chalcidians, did not give up Amphipolis, saying that he was unable to give it up against their will. And he hastened in person, with envoys from the place, to Lacedaemon, in order to defend himself in case Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of disobedience; and he wished also to learn whether the agreement could still be changed. But when he found that they were already bound by oath, he himself went back again in haste, with orders from the Lacedaemonians to give up Amphipolis if possible, or at all events to fetch away whatsoever Peloponnesians were in it.

XXII. The representatives of the allies¹ happened to be still present in person at Lacedaemon, and as many of them as had not accepted the treaty were ordered by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. But they, on the same pretext for which they had at first² rejected it, still refused to accept it unless a fairer treaty were made. Since, then, they would not hearken to them, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them, and proceeded to make an alliance with the Athenians by themselves, thinking that the Argives would by no means make an alliance with Sparta—since they had refused to renew the treaty with them when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos—and believing that they would not be dangerous to them without the Athenians, and that the rest of the Peloponnesians would be most likely to remain quiet;³ for, had it been possible, they might have gone over

³ The text is surely not in order and numerous emendations have been offered. The rendering above assumes *ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι* as predicate of *νομίζοντες*, and adds *καί*, before *νομίσαντες*, as correlative to *τε*—or, possibly, *νομίσαντες* may be causal.

3 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ ἐξῆν, χωρεῖν. παρόντων οὖν πρέσβειων ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ γενομένων λόγων ξυνέβησαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία ἥδε·

XXIII. “Κατὰ τάδε ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ¹ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεντήκοντα ἔτη·

“Ἦν² τινες ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσι Λακεδαιμονίους, ὠφελεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους τρόπῳ ὁποῖῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πᾶσχειν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἅμφω τὸ πόλει. ταῦτα δ’ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως.

2 “Καὶ ἦν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων γῆν ἴωσι πολέμιοι καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσιν Ἀθηναίους, ὠφελεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναίους³ τρόπῳ ὅτῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἦν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πᾶσχειν ὑπ’ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἅμφω τὸ πόλει. ταῦτα δ’ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως.

3 “Ἦν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανίστηται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.

4 “Ὁμοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα οἷπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

¹ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ, wanting in MSS., added by Kruger.

² δέ, after ἦν, deleted by Boehme.

³ Ἀθηναίους added by Ullrich.

to the Athenians.¹ Accordingly since envoys were present from the Athenians, a conference was held and they came to an agreement, and oaths were sworn and an alliance made on the following terms :

XXIII. "The Lacedaemonians and Athenians shall be allies for fifty years on the following conditions:

1. "If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedaemonians and be doing them harm, the Athenians shall help the Lacedaemonians in whatever way they can most effectively, with all their might; but if the enemy, after ravaging the country, shall have departed, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both, and neither city shall make peace with it without the other. These conditions shall be observed honestly, zealously, and without fraud.

2. "If any enemy invade the territory of the Athenians and be doing them harm, the Lacedaemonians shall help the Athenians in whatever way they can most effectively, with all their might; but if the enemy, after ravaging the country, shall have departed, that city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both, and neither city shall make peace with it without the other. These conditions shall be observed honestly, zealously, and without fraud.

3. "If there shall be an insurrection of slaves, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might, to the utmost of their power.

4. "These articles shall be sworn to by the same

¹ i.e. if there should be no treaty between Athens and Sparta, any dissatisfied state in the Peloponnesus might join the Athenian alliance and cause trouble. This danger would be removed by entering into the treaty, and also Argos, whose relations continued hostile, would be isolated.

σπονδὰς ὥμνουν ἑκατέρων. ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἰόντας εἰς Ἀθήνας πρὸς τὰ Διονύσια, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ἰόντας εἰς Λακεδαίμονα πρὸς τὰ Τακίνθια.

5 “Στήλην δὲ ἑκατέρους στήσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι παρ' Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ' Ἀθηναίᾳ.

6 “Ἦν δέ τι δοκῇ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας, ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ, εὖορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.

XXIV. “Τὸν δὲ ὄρκον ὥμνουν Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἷδε· Πλειστοάναξ, Ἀγίς, Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἀκανθος, Δάϊθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἀντιππος, Ἀλκινάδας, Τέλλις, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος· Ἀθηναίων δὲ Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Λάχης, Νικίας, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἀγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.”

2 Αὕτη ἡ ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἦρχε τοῦ ἐνδεκάτου ἔτους. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἔτη ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος γέγραπται.

XXV. Μετὰ δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, αἱ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὸν δεκέτη πόλεμον ἐπὶ Πλειστόλα μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐφόρου, Ἀλκαίου δ' ἄρχοντος

¹ The City Dionysia; cf. ch. xx. 1.

persons who swore to the other treaty on both sides. They shall be renewed every year, the Lacedaemonians going to Athens at the Dionysia,¹ the Athenians to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia.²

5. "Each party shall erect a pillar, that in Lacedaemon by the temple of Apollo of Amyclae, that at Athens on the Acropolis by the temple of Athena.

6. "If it shall seem good to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians to add or take away anything pertaining to the alliance, it shall be consistent with the oaths of both to do whatever may seem good to both.

XXIV. "For the Lacedaemonians the following persons took the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcínadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtillus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

This alliance was made not long after the treaty, and the Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the captives taken on the island; and thus began the summer of the eleventh year. During these ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, was waged continuously.

XXV. After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of the ten years' war, in the ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon and the archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, those who accepted these

¹ The festival of Apollo of Amyclae in the month Hyacinthius (Attic Hecatombaion).

THUCYDIDES

Ἀθήνησι, τοῖς μὲν δεξαμένοις αὐτὰς εἰρήνην ἦν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεων τινες διεκίνουν τὰ πεπραγμένα· καὶ εὐθύς ἄλλη¹ ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακεδαιμόνιον, καὶ ἅμα καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου ὑποπτοὶ ἐγένοντο ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ξυγκειμένων² ἂ εἶρητο. καὶ ἐπὶ ἕξ ἔτη μὲν καὶ δέκα μῆνας ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκατέρων γῆν στρατεῦσαι, ἔξωθεν δὲ μετ' ἀνοκωχῆς οὐ βεβαίου ἔβλαπτον ἀλλήλους τὰ μάλιστα· ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες λύσαι τὰς μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη σπονδὰς αὐθις ἐς πόλεμον φανερόν κατέστησαν.

XXVI. Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἐξῆς, ὥς ἕκαστα ἐγένετο, κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας, μέχρι οὗ τὴν τε ἀρχὴν κατέπαυσαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέλαβον. ἔτη δὲ ἐς τοῦτο τὰ ξύμπαντα ἐγένοντο τῷ πολέμῳ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι. καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιῶσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἔργοις ὥς διήρηται ἀθρεῖτω καὶ εὐρήσει οὐκ εἰκὸς ὄν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, ἐν ᾗ οὔτε ἀπέδωσαν πάντα οὔτ' ἀπεδέξαντο ἂ ξυνέθεντο, ἔξω τε τούτων πρὸς τὸν Μαντινικὸν καὶ Ἐπιδαύριον

¹ τε, after ἄλλη, inserted by Hude after Stahl.

¹ This chapter forms a kind of second introduction, and was probably written after the author enlarged his plan from a history of the first ten years to that of the whole war.

were at peace; but the Corinthians and some of the cities in the Peloponnesus attempted to disturb the agreements, and at once other trouble also began between Lacedaemon and her allies. At the same time, too, the Lacedaemonians, as time went on, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians, by not acting in some matters in accordance with the articles of the agreement. For six years and ten months the two powers abstained from invading each other's territory; in other regions, however, there was only an unstable cessation of arms and they kept on doing each other the greatest possible damage. But at last they were forced to break the treaty which had been concluded after the first ten years, and again engaged in open war.

XXVI. ¹ The history of these events, also, has been written by the same Thucydides, an Athenian, in the chronological order of events, by summers and winters, up to the time when the Lacedaemonians and their allies put an end to the dominion of the Athenians and took the Long Walls and Peiraeus.² Up to that event the war lasted twenty-seven years in all; and if anyone shall not deem it proper to include the intervening truce in the war, he will not judge aright. For let him but look at the question in the light of the facts as they have been set forth³ and he will find that that can not fitly be judged a state of peace in which neither party restored or received all that had been agreed upon. And, apart from that, there were violations of the treaty on both sides in

² According to Plutarch, *Lysander* 15, this took place in April 404.

³ Or, taking ἡ διὰ μέσου σύμβασις as subject of διαβηται, "For if he will but observe how the truce was interrupted by actual military operations."

THUCYDIDES

πόλεμον καὶ ἐς ἄλλα ἀμφοτέροις ἀμαρτήματα
 ἐγένοντο, καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ξύμμαχοι οὐδὲν
 ἦσσαν πολέμιοι ἦσαν, Βοιωτοὶ τε ἐκεχειρίαν
 3 δεχήμερον ἤγον. ὥστε ξὺν τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ
 τῷ δεκέτει καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὸν ὑπόπτῳ ἀνοκωχῇ
 καὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐξ αὐτῆς πολέμῳ εὐρήσει τις
 τοσαῦτα ἔτη, λογιζόμενος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ
 ἡμέρας οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ
 χρησμῶν τι ἰσχυρισαμένοις μόνον δὴ τοῦτο
 4 ἐχυρῶς ξυμβάν. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι, καὶ
 ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέχρι οὗ ἐτελεύτησε,
 προφερόμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι τρεῖς ἐννέα ἔτη
 5 δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτόν. ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς
 αὐτοῦ, αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων
 τὴν γνώμην ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι καὶ ξυνέβη
 μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς
 Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφο-
 τέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἦσσαν τοῖς Πελο-
 ποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγὴν, καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν
 6 μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι. τὴν οὖν μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη
 διαφορὰν τε καὶ ξύγχυσιν τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τὰ
 ἔπειτα ὡς ἐπολεμήθη ἐξηγήσομαι.

XXVII. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ πεντηκοντούτεις σπον-
 δαὶ ἐγένοντο καὶ ὕστερον ἡ ξυμμαχία, καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ
 τῆς Πελοποννήσου πρεσβεῖαι, αἵπερ παρεκλή-
 θησαν ἐς αὐτά, ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος.
 2 καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπῆλθον, Κορίνθιοι δὲ
 ἐς Ἀργος τραπόμενοι πρῶτον λόγους ποιοῦνται

the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars,¹ as well as in other matters; the allies in Thrace, too, were no less hostile to Athens than before, and the Boeotians observed a truce which had to be renewed every ten days. So that, including the first ten-years' war, the suspicious truce succeeding that, and the war which followed the truce, one will find that, reckoning according to natural seasons, there were just so many years as I have stated, and some few days over. He will also find, in the case of those who have made any assertion in reliance upon oracles, that this fact alone proved true; for always, as I remember, from the beginning of the war until its close, it was said by many that it was fated to last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole war, being of an age to form judgments, and followed it with close attention, so as to acquire accurate information. It befell me also to be banished from my own country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis,² and being conversant with affairs on both sides, especially with those of the Peloponnesians by reason of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a better acquaintance with the course of events. The difference, then, which arose after the ten years, and the breaking of the truce and the subsequent hostilities, I will now proceed to relate.

XXVII. After the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the Peloponnesus, which had been summoned for this business, withdrew from Lacedaemon. The rest went home; but the Corinthians proceeded first to Argos and entered into communication with certain

¹ For these wars, see chs. xxiii. f. and liii. f.

² cf. iv. civ. 4.

πρὸς τινὰς τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων Ἀργείων ὥς χρή, ἐπειδὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῆς Πελοποννήσου σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους πεποίηνται, ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος, καὶ ψηφίσασθαι τὴν βουλομένην πόλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἣτις αὐτόνομός τε ἐστὶ καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι, πρὸς Ἀργεῖους ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων ἐπιμαχεῖν, ἀποδείξαι δὲ ἄνδρας ὀλίγους ἀρχὴν αὐτοκράτορας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τοὺς λόγους εἶναι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πείσαντας τὸ πλῆθος. ἔφασαν δὲ πολλοὺς

3 προσχωρήσεσθαι μίσει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κορίθιοι διδάξαντες ταῦτα ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου.

XXVIII. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ἀκούσαντες ἐπειδὴ ἀνῆνεγκαν τοὺς λόγους ἔς τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐψηφίσαντο Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ ἄνδρας εἵλοντο δώδεκα πρὸς οὓς τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· τούτων δὲ μηδετέροις ἐξεῖναι ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀργείων σπεύσασθαι.
2 ἐδέξαντό τε ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μᾶλλον, ὁρῶντες τὸν τε Λακεδαιμονίων σφίσι πόλεμον ἐσόμενον (ἐπ' ἐξόδῳ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἦσαν) καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίσαντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἢ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς

of the Argive magistrates, saying that, since the Lacedaemonians had made a treaty and alliance with the Athenians, hitherto their bitterest enemies, not for the good of the Peloponnesus but for its enslavement, the Argives ought to be considering how the Peloponnesus could be saved; and should pass a decree, that any Hellenic city which is autonomous and offers settlement of disputes by fair and impartial trials, may, if it so wishes, make an alliance with the Argives for mutual defence of their territories; and that they should appoint a few men with absolutely full powers, and not discuss matters before the people, so that any who may fail to persuade the popular assembly may not become known to the Lacedaemonians. And they asserted that many would join them through hatred of the Lacedaemonians. The Corinthians, then, having suggested these things, went home.

XXVIII. The Argive magistrates, on hearing the proposals, reported them to their government and people, and the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men with whom any of the Hellenes who pleased might conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; neither of these should be allowed to make a treaty with Argos without the express consent of the Argive people. These proposals the Argives accepted the more readily, in the first place because they saw that they should have war with the Lacedaemonians—for the treaty with them was on the point of expiring—and, moreover, because they had hoped to secure the hegemony of the Peloponnesus. For at this time Lacedaemon had fallen into very ill repute and was despised on account of its misfortunes, while

ξυμφοράς, οἳ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσιν, οὐ ξυναράμενοι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἔνσπονδοι ὄντες ἐκκαρπώσάμενοι. οἳ μὲν οὖν Ἀργεῖοι οὕτως ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεδέχοντο τοὺς ἐθέλοντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

XXIX. Μαντινῆς δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχώρησαν δεδιότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον· ὥστε ἄσμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἐτράποντο, πόλιν τε μεγάλην νομίζοντες καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ διάφορον δημοκρατου-
 2 μένην τε ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί. ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὥς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομί-
 3 καὶ Ἀθηναίοις. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τὴν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι· δίκαιον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις γεγράφθαι τὴν μετάθεσιν.

the Argives had attained an excellent position in all respects, having had no part of the burden of the war with Athens, but rather, as they were at peace with both parties, having reaped a harvest from it. Thus the Argives were ready to receive into their alliance any of the Hellenes that were so inclined.

XXIX. The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For a part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on, and they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now that they had leisure, would not suffer them to retain their sovereignty. So they turned gladly to Argos, regarding it as a powerful state, one always at variance with the Lacedaemonians, and under a democratic form of government like themselves. And when the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of the Peloponnesus also began to mutter that they must do the like, thinking that the Mantineans had changed sides because they possessed some superior knowledge. At the same time they were angry with the Lacedaemonians on other grounds, and especially because it was written in the treaty with Athens that it would be consistent with their oaths to add or take away whatever shall seem good to both states, that is, to the Lacedaemonians and Athenians. For it was this article especially that was disturbing the Peloponnesus far and wide and causing suspicion that the Lacedaemonians wished in concert with the Athenians to reduce them all to slavery; for it would have been just, they thought, that the clause should have given the power to alter the articles to all the allies. And

4 ὥστε φοβούμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄρμητο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι.

XXX. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸν θρῶν τοῦτον ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καθεστῶτα καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους διδασκάλους τε γενομένους καὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας σπείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον, βουλόμενοι προκαταλαβεῖν τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ἡτιῶντο τὴν τε ἐσθήγησιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ εἰ Ἀργείοις σφῶν ἀποστάντες ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται, παραβήσεσθαι τε ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι οὐδέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, εἰρημένον κύριον εἶναι ὃ τι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσῃται, 2 ἣν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ἦ. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδὰς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον), ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο, οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, ὅτι οὔτε Σόλλιον σφίσιν ἀπέλαβον παρ' Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον, εἴ τί τι ἄλλο ἐνόμιζον ἐλασσοῦσθαι, πρόσχημα δὲ ποιούμενοι τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης μὴ προδώσειν· ὁμόσαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὅρκους ἰδίᾳ τε, ὅτε μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν τὸ πρῶτον ἀφίσταντο, καὶ 3 ἄλλους ὕστερον. οὔκουν παραβαίνειν τοὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων ὅρκους ἔφασαν οὐκ ἐσιόντες ἐς τὰς τῶν

¹ In Acarnania, taken by the Athenians in the first year of the war (II. xxx. 1).

so most of them were afraid and were eager on their own part also to make a separate alliance with the Argives.

XXX. The Lacedaemonians, aware of this murmuring that was going on in the Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had been the instigators in this matter and were themselves going to make a treaty with Argos, sent envoys to Corinth, wishing to forestall what was about to happen. And they charged them with starting the whole movement, and said that if they should revolt from them and become allies of the Argives, they would be violating the explicit terms of their oaths, and indeed were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, inasmuch as it had been declared that whatever the majority of the allies decreed should be binding, unless there should be some hindrance on the part of gods or heroes. But the Corinthians, in the presence of all their allies who had not themselves accepted the treaty—for they had on their own responsibility summoned them beforehand—in reply to the Lacedaemonians said in what respects they had been wronged, not stating outright that the Lacedaemonians had failed to recover from the Athenians for them Solium¹ or Anactorium,² nor mentioning any other matter in which they thought they were getting less than their rights, but making a pretext that they could not give up their allies in Thrace; for they said they had given their oaths to these people, both privately, when they had first revolted along with the Potidaeans,³ and afterwards. They were therefore, they said, not violating their oaths to their allies by refusing to join in

¹ cf. iv. xlix. ² cf. i. lviii. 1.

Ἀθηναίων σπονδάς· θεῶν γὰρ πίστεις ὁμόσαντες
 ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν εὖορκεῖν προδιδόντες αὐτούς.
 εἰρήσθαι δ' ὅτι “ ἢν μὴ θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ἦ.”
 4 φαίνεσθαι οὖν σφίσι κώλυμα θεῖον τοῦτο. καὶ περὶ
 μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ὄρκων τοσαῦτα εἶπον, περὶ δὲ
 τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας μετὰ τῶν φίλων βουλευ-
 5 σάμενοι ποιήσειν ὃ τι ἂν δίκαιον ἦ. καὶ οἱ μὲν
 Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἶκον.
 ἔτυχον δὲ παρόντες ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Ἀργείων
 πρέσβεις, οἳ ἐκέλευον τοὺς Κορινθίους ἰέναι ἐς
 τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν· οἱ δὲ ἐς τὸν
 ὕστερον ξύλλογον αὐτοῖς τὸν παρὰ σφίσι προεῖπον
 ἦκειν.

XXXI. Ἦλθε δὲ καὶ Ἡλείων πρεσβεῖα εὐ-
 θὺς καὶ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς Κορινθίους ξυμμαχίαν
 πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν ἐς Ἀργος ἐλθόντες,
 καθάπερ προεῖρητο, Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο·
 διαφερόμενοι γὰρ ἐτύγχανον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
 2 περὶ Λεπρέου. πολέμου γὰρ γενομένου ποτὲ πρὸς
 Ἀρκάδων τινὰς Λεπρεάταις καὶ Ἡλείων παρα-
 κληθέντων ὑπὸ Λεπρεατῶν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐπὶ τῇ
 ἡμισείᾳ τῆς γῆς καὶ λυσάντων τὸν πόλεμον,
 Ἡλεῖοι τὴν γῆν νεμομένοις αὐτοῖς τοῖς Λεπρεάταις
 τάλαντον ἔταξαν τῷ Διὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἀποφέρειν.
 3 καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον, ἔπειτα
 παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Ἡλεῖοι
 ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ' ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακε-

the treaty with the Athenians; for since they had bound themselves to those allies by pledges sworn in the name of the gods, it would not be consistent with their oaths to betray them. Besides, the words of the agreement were, "if there be no hindrance on the part of gods or heroes"; and it seemed to them that this was a hindrance on the part of the gods. So much they said in regard to their ancient oaths, but as to the Argive alliance they would consult with their friends and do whatever was right. So the envoys of the Lacedaemonians returned home. But there happened to be at Corinth Argive envoys, who urged the Corinthians to come into the alliance without delay; the latter, however, told them to come to their next assembly.

XXXI. Soon after there also came an embassy of the Eleans and first concluded an alliance with the Corinthians, and then they proceeded to Argos, as they had been instructed, and made an alliance with the Argives. It seems that at one time the Eleans were at variance with the Lacedaemonians about Lepreum.¹ For when there had been a war between the Lepreates and some of the Arcadians, and the Eleans had been invited by the Lepreates to make an alliance with them, with the offer of half their territory, on the conclusion of the war the Eleans left the Lepreates in possession of their land, but assessed upon them a tax of a talent to be paid to Olympian Zeus. Now up to the war with Athens they regularly paid the tribute; then on the pretext of the war they ceased to pay the tribute, and the Eleans tried to enforce payment, whereupon they had recourse to the Lacedaemonians.

¹ In Triphylia, not far from the boundaries of Elis and Laconia (ch. xxxiv. 1).

δαιμονίους. καὶ δίκης Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτρα-
 πείσης, ὑποτοπήσαντες οἱ Ἑλλεῖοι μὴ ἴσον ἔξειν,
 ἀνέντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν Λεπρεατῶν τὴν γῆν ἔτεμον.
 4 οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐδὲν ἤσσον ἐδίκασαν αὐτο-
 νόμους εἶναι Λεπρεάτας καὶ ἀδικεῖν Ἑλλεῖους, καὶ
 ὥς οὐκ ἐμμεινάντων τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ φρουρὰν ὀπλιτῶν
 5 ἐσέπεμψαν ἐς Λέπρεον. οἱ δὲ Ἑλλεῖοι νομίζοντες
 πόλιν σφῶν ἀφεστηκυῖαν δέξασθαι τοὺς Λακε-
 δαιμονίους καὶ τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ἡ
 εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθί-
 σταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὥς οὐκ
 ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, καὶ
 τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, ὥσπερ ποείρητο, καὶ οὗτοι ἐποιή-
 6 σαντο. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθύς μετ'
 ἐκείνους καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδῆς Ἀργείων
 ξύμμαχοι. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ
 λέγοντες ἡσύχαζον, περιορώμενοι¹ καὶ νομίζοντες
 σφισι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν, αὐτοῖς
 ὀλιγαρχουμένοις, ἡσσον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς
 Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

XXXII. Περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ
 θέρους τούτου Σκιωναῖους μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπο-
 λιορκήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἡβῶντας, παῖδας
 δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ τὴν γῆν
 Πλαταιεῦσιν ἔδοσαν νέμεσθαι. Δηλίους δὲ κατή-
 γαγον πάλιν ἐς Δῆλον, ἐνθυμούμενοι τὰς τε ἐν

¹ ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, in the MSS. after περιορώμενοι,
 deleted by Dobree. The sense of the verb, "jealously
 watched" (Jowett), required with that reading, does not
 occur in Thucydides.

The case having been referred to the Lacedaemonians for arbitration, the Eleans, suspecting that they would not receive fair treatment, renounced the arbitration and ravaged the land of the Lepreates. The Lacedaemonians, nevertheless, gave judgment, to the effect that the Lepreates were independent and the Eleans the aggressors, and as the latter did not abide by the arbitration, sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. But the Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken under their protection a city of theirs that was in revolt, cited the agreement in which it was stipulated that whatever places any of the confederates had when they entered the war with Athens they should retain when they came out of it; and on the ground that they had not received fair treatment went over to the Argives, their envoys making the alliance as they had been instructed to do. Immediately after them the Corinthians also and the Chalcidians in Thrace became allies of the Argives. But the Boeotians and Megarians, though holding the same views, kept quiet, awaiting events and thinking the Argive democracy not so advantageous for them, with their oligarchical form of government, as the political constitution of the Lacedaemonians.

XXXII. About the same time during this summer, the Athenians reduced the Scionaeans by siege, slew the adult males,¹ made slaves of the women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to occupy; and they brought back the Delians to Delos,² taking to heart their mishaps in the battles³ and

¹ In accordance with the decree moved by Cleon two years before (iv. cxxii. 6). At the conclusion of peace they had been left at the mercy of the Athenians (ch. xviii. 8).

² cf. ch. i.

³ At Delium and Amphipolis.

- ταῖς μάχαις συμφορὰς καὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεοῦ
 2 χρῆσαντος. καὶ Φωκῆς καὶ Λοκροὶ ἤρξαντο
 3 πολεμεῖν. καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἤδη ξύμ-
 μαχοι ὄντες ἔρχονται ἐς Τεγέαν ἀποστήσοντες
 Λακεδαιμονίων, ὀρώντες μέγα μέρος ὄν, καὶ εἰ
 σφίσι προσγένειτο, νομίζοντες ἅπασαν ἂν ἔχειν
 4 Πελοπόννησον. ὥς δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔφασαν ἐναν-
 τιωθῆναι οἱ Τεγεᾶται Λακεδαιμονίοις, οἱ Κορίνθιοι
 μέχρι τούτου προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνείσαν τῆς
 φιλονικίας καὶ ὠρρώδησαν μὴ οὐδεὶς σφίσιν ἔτι
 5 τῶν ἄλλων προσχωρῇ. ὅμως δὲ ἐλθόντες ἐς τοὺς
 Βοιωτοὺς ἐδέοντο σφῶν τε καὶ Ἀργείων γίγνεσθαι
 ξυμμάχους καὶ τᾶλλα κοινῇ πράσσειν· τὰς τε
 δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδᾶς, αἱ ἦσαν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ
 Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον γενό-
 μεναι αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τηκοντουτίδων σπονδῶν,
 ἐκέλευον οἱ Κορίνθιοι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἀκολουθή-
 σαντας Ἀθήναζε καὶ σφίσι ποιῆσαι, ὥσπερ
 Βοιωτοὶ εἶχον, μὴ δεχομένων δὲ Ἀθηναίων
 ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ σπέν-
 6 δεσθαι ἄνευ αὐτῶν. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ δεομένων τῶν
 Κορινθίων περὶ μὲν τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας
 ἐπισχεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευον, ἐλθόντες δὲ Ἀθήναζε
 μετὰ Κορινθίων οὐχ ἤϋροντο τὰς δεχημέρους
 σπονδᾶς, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίναντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κοριν-
 θίοις εἶναι σπονδᾶς, εἴπερ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσὶ
 7 ξύμμαχοι. Βοιωτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπείπον
 τὰς δεχημέρους, ἀξιούντων καὶ αἰτιωμένων Κοριν-

¹ It had always maintained an independent position in Arcadia, and in earlier times had been a powerful opponent of Sparta.

obeying an oracle of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile the Phocians and the Locrians began hostilities. And the Corinthians and the Argives, being now allies, came to Tegea,¹ hoping to induce it to revolt from the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was an important part of the Peloponnesus, and thinking if it should be gained to their side they would soon have the whole Peloponnesus. But when the Tegeates refused to oppose the Lacedaemonians, the Corinthians, who up to that time had been working zealously, became slack in their ardour and full of dread that none of the other Peloponnesians would henceforth come over to them. Nevertheless they went to the Boeotians and requested them to become allies of themselves and the Argives, and to act generally in concert with them. And the Corinthians further requested the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and procure for them also the ten days' truce² which had been made between the Athenians and Boeotians not long after the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty, on the same terms as the Boeotians had obtained, and, if the Athenians did not agree, to renounce the armistice and for the future to make no truce without the Corinthians. The Boeotians, when the Corinthians made these requests, desired them to wait awhile in regard to the Argive alliance, but they went with them to Athens, where however they failed to obtain the ten days' truce, the Athenians answering them that there was already a truce with the Corinthians, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians. But the Boeotians did not any the more give up the ten days' truce, although the Corinthians demanded it and accused them of having

² i.e. a truce which had to be renewed every ten days; or, perhaps, "terminable at ten days' notice," as Jowett thinks. cf. ch. xxvi. 3.

θίων ξυνθέσθαι σφίσι Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνοκωχῇ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

XXXIII. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους πανδημεὶ ἐστράτευσαν, Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Πausaniou Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως ἡγουμένου, τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐς Παρρασίους Μαντινέων ὑπηκόους ὄντας, κατὰ στάσιν ἐπικαλεσαμένων σφᾶς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος ἀναιρήσουτες, ἣν δύνωνται, ὃ ἐτείχισαν Μαντινῆς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφρούρουν, ἐν τῇ Παρρασικῇ κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ
 2 Σκιρίτιδι τῆς Λακωνικῆς. καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν γῆν τῶν Παρρασίων ἐδήουν, οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις φύλαξι παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐφρούρουν· ἀδύνατοι δ' οἶτες διασῶσαι τό τε ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος καὶ
 3 τὰς ἐν Παρρασίοις πόλεις ἀπῆλθον. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοὺς τε Παρρασίους αὐτονόμους ποιήσαντες καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἶκον.

XXXIV. Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους, ἥδη ἡκόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Θράκης μετὰ Βρασίδου ἐξελθόντων στρατιωτῶν, οὓς ὁ Κλεαρίδας μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκόμισεν, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς μὲν μετὰ Βρασίδου Εἰλωτας μαχεσαμένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν βούλωνται καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῶ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμῶδων ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν, κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς Ἠλείας, ὄντες ἤδη διάφοροι

¹ The mountainous region between the upper Eurotas and the valley of the Oenus, one of the most important districts of the Perioeci.

agreed with themselves to do so. Between the Corinthians, however, and the Athenians there was a cessation of activities without an actual truce.

XXXIII. The same summer the Lacedaemonians, under the command of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, made an expedition with all their forces into the territory of the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans. They had been called in by the Parrhasians on account of a factional quarrel, and intended also to demolish, if possible, the fort at Cypsela, which, being situated in Parrhasian territory, the Mantineans had constructed and themselves garrisoned for the annoyance of the district Sciritis¹ in Laconia. The Lacedaemonians proceeded to ravage the land of the Parrhasians, and the Mantineans, giving over the custody of their city to the Argives, tried themselves to guard the territory of their Parrhasian allies. Being unable, however, to save the fort at Cypsela and the towns in Parrhasia, they withdrew. And the Lacedaemonians, after making the Parrhasians independent and pulling down the fort, then returned home.

XXXIV. During the same summer, on the return from Thrace of the troops which had gone out with Brasidas² and which Clearidas³ had brought back after the treaty was made, the Lacedaemonians voted that the Helots who had fought with Brasidas should be free and dwell wherever they preferred; and not long afterwards they settled them with the Neodamodes⁴ at Lepreum on the borders of Laconia and Elis, for they were by this time at variance with

² cf. iv. lxxviii. 1; lxxx. 5. ³ cf. xxi. 3.

⁴ The clans of new citizens formed of Helots emancipated for service in war.

2 Ἡλείοις· τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ληφθέντας σφῶν καὶ τὰ ὄπλα παραδόντας, δέισαντες μή τι διὰ τὴν ξυμφορὰν νομίσαντες ἐλασσωθήσεσθαι καὶ ὄντες ἐπίτιμοι νεωτερίσωσιν, ἥδη καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἔχοντας ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἢ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι. ὕστερον δὲ αὖθις χρόνῳ ἐπίτιμοι ἐγένοντο.

XXXV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ Θυσσὸν τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἀθωίδι Ἀκτῇ Διῆς¹ εἶλον, Ἀθηναίων οὖσαν ξύμμαχον.

- 2 Καὶ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο πᾶν ἐπιμειξίαι μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις, ὑπώπτειν δὲ ἀλλήλους εὐθύς μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οἷ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὴν τῶν
- 3 χωρίων ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν. τὴν γὰρ Ἀμφίπολιν πρότεροι λαχόντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀποδιδόναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπεδεδώκεσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης παρεῖχον ξυμμάχους τὰς σπονδὰς δεχομένους οὐδὲ Βοιωτοὺς οὐδὲ Κορινθίους, λέγοντες αἰεὶ ὥς μετ' Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἣν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσιν· χρόνους τε προύθεντο ἄνευ ξυγγραφῆς ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσι-
- 4 όντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι. τούτων οὖν ὀρώντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον, ὑπώπτειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐ-

¹ Ἀκτῇ Διῆς, Meineke's conjecture for Δικτηδιῆς of nearly all MSS.

the Eleans. But as to their men who had been taken on the island and had given up their arms, fearing that these might expect to suffer some degradation because of their misfortune and if they continued in possession of the franchise might attempt a revolution, they disfranchised them, though some of them now held office, and with such a disfranchisement that they could neither hold office nor have the legal right to buy or sell anything. In the course of time, however, they were again enfranchised.

XXXV. During the same summer also the Dians took Thyssus, a town on the promontory of Athos, which was in alliance with the Athenians.

All this summer there was intercourse between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, but both parties began to suspect one another directly after the conclusion of the treaty, owing to their failure to give back to one another the places specified. The Lacedaemonians, though they had drawn the lot to make restoration first, had not restored Amphipolis and the other places; nor had they made their allies in Thrace accept the treaty, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians, though they continually professed that they would join the Athenians in coercing these states, if they were unwilling; and they proposed dates, without making a written agreement, on which those who did not accede to the treaty were to be enemies of both. Seeing, then, that none of these things was actually being done, the Athenians suspected the Lacedaemonians of having no just intentions, and so not only did not restore Pylos when the Lacedaemonians demanded

- τῶν ἀπεδίδουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου
 δεσμώτας μετεμέλονται ἀποδεδωκότες, τὰ τε ἄλλα
 χωρία εἶχον, μένοντες ἕως σφίσι κακείνοι ποιή-
 5 σειαν τὰ εἰρημένα. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν
 δυνατὰ ἔφασαν πεποιηκέναι· τοὺς γὰρ παρὰ
 σφίσι δεσμώτας ὄντας Ἀθηναίων ἀποδοῦναι καὶ
 τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης στρατιώτας ἀπαγαγεῖν καὶ εἰ
 του ἄλλου ἐγκρατεῖς ἦσαν· Ἀμφιπόλεως δὲ οὐκ
 ἔφασαν κρατεῖν ὥστε παραδοῦναι, Βοιωτοὺς δὲ
 πειράσεσθαι καὶ Κορινθίους ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς
 ἐσαγαγεῖν καὶ Πάνακτον ἀπολαβεῖν, καὶ Ἀθη-
 ναίων ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν Βοιωτοῖς αἰχμάλωτοι κομιεῖν.
 6 Πύλον μέντοι ἡξίουσιν ἀποδοῦναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 Μεσσηνίους γε καὶ τοὺς Εἰλωτας ἐξαγαγεῖν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Θράκης, Ἀθηναίους
 δὲ φρουρεῖν τὸ χωρίον αὐτούς, εἰ βούλονται.
 7 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ
 θέρει τούτῳ ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὥστε ἐξαγα-
 γεῖν ἐκ Πύλου Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 Εἰλωτάς τε καὶ ὅσοι ἠὲτομολήκεσαν ἐκ τῆς
 Λακωνικῆς· καὶ κατώκισαν αὐτοὺς ἐν Κρανίοις
 8 τῆς Κεφαλληνίας. τὸ μὲν οὖν θέρος τοῦτο ἡσυχία
 ἦν καὶ ἔφοδοι παρ' ἀλλήλους.

XXXVI. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος (ἔτυ-
 χον γὰρ ἔφοροι ἕτεροι καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὧν αἱ σπονδαὶ
 ἐγένοντο ἄρχοντες ἤδη καὶ τινες αὐτῶν καὶ
 ἐναντίοι σποινδαῖς) ἐλθουσῶν πρεσβειῶν ἀπὸ τῆς
 ξυμμαχίδος καὶ παρόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιω-
 τῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰπόν-

it, but even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken on the island, and they continued to hold the other places, waiting until the Lacedaemonians should have fulfilled their part of the contract. The Lacedaemonians said that they had done what was possible; for they had restored the prisoners of the Athenians that were in their hands, had brought back their troops in Thrace, and had done whatever else had been in their power. As to Amphipolis, however, they said that they were not in control of it, so as to deliver it up; but they would try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty and to get back Panactum, and would recover all Athenian prisoners that were in the hands of the Boeotians. Pylos, however, they insisted the Athenians should restore to them; or at any rate, they should withdraw the Messenians and the Helots, as they themselves had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, and the Athenians themselves might garrison the place if they wished. After many and frequent conferences had been held during this summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians, the rest of the Helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia; and these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia. This summer, then, there was peace and mutual intercourse.

XXXVI. The following winter the ephors who happened to be in office at Sparta were other than those under whom the treaty had been made, and some of them were even opposed to it. Embassies had come from their allies, and there were present also Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians; and after much discussion, without coming to an

421-420
B.C.

των καὶ οὐδὲν ξυμβάντων, ὥς ἀπῆσαν ἐπ' οἴκου, τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Κορινθίοις Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης, οὗτοι οἵπερ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα διαλύσαι τὰς σπονδάς, λόγους ποιοῦνται ἰδίους, παραινούντες ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτά τε γιγνώσκειν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι Βοιωτοὺς, Ἀργείων γενομένους πρῶτον αὐτοὺς ξυμμάχους, αὐθις μετὰ Βοιωτῶν Ἀργεῖους Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιῆσαι ξυμμάχους (οὕτω γὰρ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἀναγκασθῆναι Βοιωτοὺς ἐς τὰς Ἀττικὰς σπονδὰς ἐσελθεῖν). ἐλέσθαι γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἔχθρας καὶ διαλύσεως τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀργεῖους σφίσι φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι. τὸ γὰρ Ἀργος αἰεὶ ἠπίستانτο ἐπιθυμοῦντας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καλῶς σφίσι φίλιον γενέσθαι, ἡγουμένους τὸν
2 ἔξω Πελοποννήσου πόλεμον ῥαῖω ἂν εἶναι. τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἵνα αὐτ' αὐτοῦ Πύλον, ἣν δύνωνται, ἀπολαβόντες ῥᾶον καθιστῶνται Ἀθηναίοις ἐς πόλεμον.

XXXVII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι ταῦτα ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπὸ τε τοῦ Ξενάρους καὶ Κλεοβούλου καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥστε ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἐπὶ τὰ κοινά,
2 ἐκάτεροι ἀνεχώρουν. Ἀργείων δὲ δύο ἄνδρες τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἐπετήρουν ἀπιόντας αὐτοὺς καθ' ὁδὸν καὶ ξυγγεινόμενοι ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, εἶπώς οἱ Βοιωτοὶ σφίσι ξύμμαχοι γένοιντο, ὥσπερ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἡλεῖ· καὶ Μαντινῆς· νομίζειν γὰρ

agreement, as the envoys were on the point of departing for home, Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephors who most desired to annul the treaty, made private proposals to the Boeotians and Corinthians, advising them to adopt as far as possible the same policy, and that the Boeotians should first become allies of the Argives and then try to make the Argives along with themselves allies of the Lacedaemonians. For in this way the Boeotians would be least likely to be forced to come into the treaty with Athens, since the Lacedaemonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives, counting that more important than the enmity of the Athenians and the disruption of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedaemonians were always desirous that Argos should be friendly to them on fair terms, thinking that war outside of the Peloponnesus would then be an easier matter for them. Panactum, however, they begged the Boeotians to give up to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might, if possible, get back Pylos in exchange for it, and so be in a safer position for renewing the war with the Athenians.

XXXVII. The Boeotians and Corinthians, being charged by Xenares and Cleobulus and the Lacedaemonians that were friendly to them with these instructions, which they were to announce to their governments, now returned to their respective cities. But two Argive men of highest official position, who were watching for them by the way as they went off, joined them and made a proposal to them, in the hope that the Boeotians might become allies to them, just as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for they thought, if this

- ἂν τούτου προχωρήσαντος ῥαδίως ἤδη καὶ πολε-
 μεῖν καὶ σπένδεσθαι καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰ
 βούλονται, κοινῶ λόγῳ χρῶμένους, καὶ εἴ τινα
 3 πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι. τοῖς δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πρέσ-
 βειν ἀκούουσιν ἤρεσκει· κατὰ τύχην γὰρ
 ἐδέοντο τούτων ὧν περ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαί-
 μονος αὐτοῖς φίλοι ἐπεστάλκεσαν. καὶ οἱ τῶν
 Ἀργείων αἰδρες ὡς ἦσθοντο αὐτοὺς δεχομένους
 τὸν λόγον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πρέσβεις πέμψουσιν ἐς
 4 Βοιωτοὺς, ἀπῆλθον. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ
 ἀπήγγειλαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τὰ τε ἐκ τῆς Λακε-
 δαίμονος καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν συγγενομένων Ἀργείων·
 καὶ οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἠρέσκοντό τε καὶ πολλῶ προ-
 θυμότεροι ἦσαν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ξυνεβεβήκει
 αὐτοῖς τοὺς τε φίλους τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶν
 αὐτῶν δεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς τὰ ὁμοῖα
 5 σπεύδειν. καὶ οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον πρέσβεις
 παρήσαν Ἀργείων τὰ εἰρημένα προκαλούμενοι·
 καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν ἐπαινέσαντες τοὺς λόγους
 οἱ βοιωτάρχαι καὶ πρέσβεις ὑποσχόμενοι ἀπο-
 στελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἐς Ἀργος.

XXXVIII. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς
 βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ
 τοῖς ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβειν ὁμόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλή-
 λους ἢ μὴν ἔν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀμυνεῖν τῷ
 δεομένῳ καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῷ μηδὲ ξυμβήσεσθαι
 ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς
 καὶ Μεγαρέας (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν) πρὸς τοὺς
 2 Ἀργείους σπένδεσθαι. πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέ-
 σθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι

¹ cf. ch. xxxi. 6.

succeeded, they might then readily, all pursuing a common policy, carry on war or make peace with the Lacedaemonians, if they should wish, or with anyone else with whom it might be necessary. The Boeotian envoys were pleased at hearing these things; for by good luck these men were asking the same things as their friends at Lacedaemon had enjoined upon them. And the Argive men, seeing that they were inclined to accept the proposal, told them they would send envoys to the Boeotians and went away. On coming home the Boeotians reported to the boeotarchs the proposal made at Lacedaemon and also that of the Argives who had met them on the way; and the boeotarchs were pleased and were now far more eager for this arrangement, because matters had turned out to their liking in both directions—their friends among the Lacedaemonians wanting the same things as they did, and the Argives striving for a like end. Not long after this envoys came from the Argives with the proposals that have been mentioned; and the boeotarchs assented to their proposals and sent them away with a promise to dispatch envoys to Argos to negotiate the alliance.

XXXVIII. In the meantime it was determined by the boeotarchs and the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the envoys from Thrace, first, to bind themselves by oaths one to another, that assuredly when occasion offered they would assist the one that needed help and would not go to war with anyone or make peace without a common agreement; and that then and only then the Boeotians and the Megarians—for they were acting in concert¹—should make a treaty with the Argives. But before the oaths were sworn the boeotarchs communicated

βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ
κῦρος ἔχουσι, καὶ παρήνουν γενέσθαι ὄρκους ταῖς
πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελία σφίσι ξυνο-
3 μύναι. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες
οὐ προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία
Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσωσι τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι
Κορινθίοις ξυνομύντες· οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ
βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος, ὅτι τῶν τε
ἐφόρων Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης καὶ οἱ φίλοι
παραينوῦσιν Ἀργείων πρῶτον καὶ Κορινθίων
γενομένους ξυμμάχους ὕστερον μετ' αὐτῶν τῶν¹
Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεσθαι, οἴομενοι τὴν βουλήν,
καὶ μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἂ σφίσι
4 προδιαγνόντες παραينوῦσιν. ὥς δὲ ἀντέστη τὸ
πρᾶγμα, οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Θρίκης
πρέσβεις ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ βοιωτάρχαι,
μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, καὶ τὴν
ξυμμαχίαν πειράσεσθαι πρὸς Ἀργείους ποιεῖν,
οὐκέτι ἐσήνεγκαν περὶ Ἀργείων ἐς τὰς βουλάς,
οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ Ἄργος τοὺς πρέσβεις οὓς ὑπέσχοντο
ἔπεμπον, ἀμέλεια δέ τις ἐνῆν καὶ διατριβὴ τῶν
πάντων.

XXXIX. Καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ
Μηκύβερναν Ὀλύνθιοι Ἀθηναίων φρουρούντων
ἐπιδραμόντες εἶλον.

2 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ αἰεὶ λόγοι τοῖς
τε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ ὧν εἶχον

¹ μετ' αὐτῶν with Stahl, for μετὰ τῶν of MSS. as Hude reads.

these resolutions to the four councils of the Boeotians which have supreme authority, and recommended that oaths be exchanged with such cities as wished to take oaths with them for mutual assistance. But the members of the Boeotian council did not accept the proposal, fearing that they might offend the Lacedaemonians by taking oaths with the Corinthians who had seceded from their confederacy. For the boeotarchs did not tell them what had happened at Lacedaemon—that it was the ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and their own friends who advised them first to become allies of the Argives and Corinthians, and then in conjunction with these to become allies of the Lacedaemonians; for they thought that the council,¹ without their making any such statement, would not vote for any other course than that which they had previously resolved upon and now recommended. But now, when this difficulty arose, the Corinthians and the envoys from Thrace went away without accomplishing their purpose; and the boeotarchs, who had before intended, if they carried these measures, to try to effect also the alliance with the Argives, did not now bring before the councils the matter concerning the Argives, nor did they send to Argos the envoys they had promised; and there was neglect and delay in the whole business.

XXXIX. In the course of this same winter, the Olynthians by a sudden attack captured Mecyberna² which was garrisoned by the Athenians.

After this, while conferences were continually going on between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,

¹ The four councils here doubtless considered as one body.

² A port town of Olynthus; cf. ch. xviii. 7.

ἀλλήλων) ἐλπίζοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ Πά-
νακτον Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀπολάβοιεν,
κομίσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὶ Πύλον, ἦλθον ἐς τοὺς Βοιω-
τοὺς πρεσβευόμενοι καὶ ἐδέοντο σφίσι Πάνακτόν
τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δεσμώτας παραδοῦναι,
3 ἵνα ἀντ' αὐτῶν Πύλον κομίσωνται. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ
οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἣν μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν
ιδίαν ποιήσονται ὥσπερ Ἀθηναίοις. Λακεδαι-
μόνιοι δὲ εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι ἀδικήσουσιν Ἀθηναίους,
εἰρημένον ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπένδεσθαί τῳ
μήτε πολεμεῖν, βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ Πάνακτον
παραλαβεῖν ὥς τὴν Πύλον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ κομιού-
μενοι, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ξυγχέαι σπευδόντων τὰς
σποιδὰς προθυμουμένων τὰ ἐς Βοιωτούς, ἐποίη-
σαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, τοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος
ἤδη καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ· καὶ τὸ Πάνακτον εὐθύς καθη-
ρεῖτο. καὶ ἐνδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

XL. Ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἡρι εὐθύς τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου
θέρους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, ὥς οἱ τε πρέσβεις τῶν Βοιω-
τῶν οὓς ἔφασαν πέμψειν οὐχ ἦκον, τό τε Πά-
νακτον ἥσθοντο καθαιρούμενον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν
ιδίαν γεγενημενὴν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Λακε-
δαιμονίους, ἔδεισαν μὴ μονωθῶσι καὶ ἐς Λακεδαι-
2 μονίους πᾶσα ἡ ξυμμαχία χωρήσῃ· τοὺς γὰρ
Βοιωτούς ᾤοντο πεπεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τό
τε Πάνακτον καθελεῖν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων
σπονδὰς ἐσιέναι, τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι ταῦτα

monians about places belonging to one or the other which they respectively held, the Lacedaemonians, in the hope that, if the Athenians should get back Panactum from the Boeotians, they themselves might recover Pylos, sent envoys to the Boeotians and begged them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves, in order that they might recover Pylos in exchange for these. But the Boeotians refused to give them up, unless they would make a separate alliance with them just as with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that they would thereby be wronging the Athenians, inasmuch as it was stipulated not to make either peace or war with anyone without mutual consent, yet they wished to obtain Panactum in order to recover Pylos in exchange for it. Besides, the party that was eager to break the treaty was zealous for the connection with the Boeotians. So they concluded the alliance, when the winter was closing and the spring at hand; and the demolition of Panactum was immediately begun. So ended the eleventh year of the war.

XL. At the very beginning of the following summer, when the envoys whom the Boeotians promised to send did not come, the Argives, perceiving that Panactum was being demolished and a private alliance had been made by the Boeotians with the Lacedaemonians, began to fear that they would be left alone and the whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. For they thought that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians, and that the Athenians knew these things, so that it was no

March,
420 B.C.

ὥστε οὐδὲ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔτι σφίσιν εἶναι ξυμ-
μαχίαν ποιήσασθαι, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τῶν
διαφορῶν, εἰ μὴ μείνειαν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Λακεδαι-
μονίους σπονδαί, τοῖς γοῦν Ἀθηναίοις ξύμμαχοι
3 ἔσεσθαι. ἀποροῦντες οὖν ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
φοβούμενοι μὴ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Τεγεάταις,
Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμῶσι, πρότερον
οὐ δεχόμενοι τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς, ἀλλ' ἐν
φρονήματι ὄντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι,
ἐπεμπον ὡς ἐδύναντο τάχιστα ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα
πρέσβεις Εὐστροφον καὶ Αἴσωνα, οἱ ἐδόκουν
προσφιλέστατοι αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἡγούμενοι ἐκ τῶν
παρόντων κράτιστα, πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπον-
δὰς ποιησάμενοι ὅπῃ ἂν ξυγχωρῇ, ἡσυχίαν
ἔχειν.

XLI. Καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους
ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν
2 σφίσιν αἱ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιτο. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἡξίουσαν δίκης ἐπιτροπὴν σφίσι γενέσθαι
ἢ ἐς πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἰδιώτην περὶ τῆς Κυριουρίας γῆς,
ἣς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας οὔσης (ἔχει δὲ
ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθιπνὴν πόλιν, νέμονται δ'
αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι). ἔπειτα δ' οὐκ ἐόντων Λακε-
δαιμονίων μεμνήσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰ βούλον-
ται σπένδεσθαι ὥσπερ πρότερον, ἐτοῖμοι εἶναι, οἱ
Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τάδε ὁμῶς ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ξυγχωρῆσαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι
σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ἔτη πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ'
ὅποτεροισοῦν προκαλεσαμένοις, μήτε νόσου οὔσης
μήτε πολέμου Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Ἀργεῖ, διαμά-

¹ i.e. of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.

longer possible for them to make an alliance even with the Athenians; whereas they had formerly hoped that if their treaty with the Lacedaemonians should not continue they might at any rate, in consequence of the differences,¹ become allies of the Athenians. Being then in such perplexity and fearing lest they might have war at once with the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates, the Boeotians and the Athenians, the Argives, who before this had not accepted the treaty with the Lacedaemonians but proudly hoped to have the hegemony of the Peloponnesus, now sent to Lacedaemon in all haste two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who seemed likely to be most acceptable to them, thinking it best under the present circumstances to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians in whatever way might be feasible and to have quiet.

XLI. On their arrival their envoys made proposals to the Lacedaemonians as to the terms on which the treaty should be concluded. At first the Argives claimed that they should be allowed to submit to the arbitration of some city or private person the matter of the Cynurian territory—a district containing the towns of Thyrea and Anthene and occupied by the Lacedaemonians—which being border ground they were always disputing about. Afterwards, however, although the Lacedaemonians would not permit them to make mention of that district, but said that, if they wished to make a treaty on the same terms as before, they were ready to do so, the Argive envoys did induce the Lacedaemonians to agree to the following terms: for the present that a treaty should be made for fifty years; that, however, either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided there were at the time

χεσθαι περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε, ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι ἡξίωσαν νικᾶν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ
 3 Λακεδαίμονα ὄρων· τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλον ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ' οἷς ἡξίου καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ' οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, εἰς τὸ Ἄργος πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλήθει, καὶ ἦν ἀρέσκοντα ἦ, ἦκειν εἰς τὰ Ἑτακίνθια τοὺς ὅρκους ποιησομένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν.

XLII. Ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ᾧ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, οἱ πρέσβεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἀνδρομένης καὶ Φαίδιμος καὶ Ἀντιμεΐδας, οὓς ἔδει τὸ Πάνακτον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρὰ Βοιωτῶν παραλαβόντας Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ μὲν Πάνακτον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθηρημένον ἡῦρον, ἐπὶ προφάσει ὡς ἦσαν ποτε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἐκ διαφορᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅρκοι παλαιοὶ μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον ἀλλὰ κοινῇ νέμειν, τοὺς δ' ἄνδρας οὓς εἶχον αἰχμαλώτους Βοιωτοὶ Ἀθηναίων παραλαβόντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδρομένη ἐκόμισαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἀπέδωσαν, τοῦ τε Παιάκτου τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς, νομίζοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόναι· πολέμιον γὰρ οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίοις οἰκῆσειν

¹ 550 B.C. ; cf. Hdt. i. lxxxii.

neither pestilence nor war in either place, might challenge the other to decide by battle the question about this territory—just as once before,¹ when each had claimed to be victorious—but pursuit must not be made beyond the boundaries, between Argos and Lacedaemon. At first this seemed to the Lacedaemonians mere folly, but afterwards, as they desired under any circumstances to have Argos friendly to them, they accepted the conditions demanded and joined in a written agreement. But the Lacedaemonians urged the envoys first, before any of the provisions should be regarded as settled, to return to Argos and lay the matter before the people, and then, if it should be satisfactory to them, to come to the Hyacinthian festival and take the oaths. So they withdrew.

XLII. In the meantime, while the Argives were negotiating these matters, the Lacedaemonian envoys, Andromenes, Phaedimus and Antimenidas, who were to take over Panactum and the prisoners from the Thebans and restore them to the Athenians, found that Panactum had been destroyed by the Boeotians themselves, on the pretext that once in former times, when there had been a quarrel about Panactum, oaths had been exchanged between the Athenians and Boeotians, that neither should inhabit the district, but they should graze it in common. As for the men of the Athenians, however, whom the Boeotians held as prisoners, Andromenes and his colleagues received these from them, and bringing them back restored them to the Athenians. They also told them of the demolition of Panactum, claiming that this, too, was a restoration; for thereafter no one hostile to the Athenians would

2 οὐδένα. λεγομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεινὰ ἐποιοῦν, νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τῇ καθαιρέσει, ὃ ἔδει ὀρθὸν παραδοῦναι, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι ὅτι καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἰδίᾳ ξυμμαχίαν πεποίηται φάσκοντες πρότερον κοινῇ τοὺς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς σπονδὰς προσαναγκάσειν. τά τε ἄλλα ἐσκόπουν ὅσα ἐξελελοίπεσαν τῆς ξυυθήκης καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐξηπατήσθαι, ὥστε χαλεπῶς πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν.

XLIII. Κατὰ τοιαύτην δὴ διαφορὰν ὄντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὖ βουλόμενοι λῦσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθύς 2 ἐνέκειντο. ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ἔτι τότε ὢν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος· ᾧ ἐδόκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠγαντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τε τὴν νεότητά ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὐσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διεννοεῖτο 3 ἀνανεώσασθαι. πανταχούθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασ-

¹ cf. ch. xxxv. 3.

² Born about 450 B.C., and so now about thirty years of age.

dwell in it. The moment this was said the Athenians were very indignant, thinking that they were wronged by the Lacedaemonians, both in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored to them intact, and because they heard that the Lacedaemonians had made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, although they had said before¹ that they would join in coercing any that did not accept the treaty. And they took into consideration the other matters wherein the Lacedaemonians had failed in their contract and in which they thought they had been deceived; and so they gave the envoys an angry answer and sent them away.

XLIII. As now the Lacedaemonians were thus at variance with the Athenians, the party at Athens that wished to annul the treaty at once became urgent in pressing their views. To this party belonged, among others, Alcibiades son of Cleinias, a man who, though as regards his age he would in any other city have been accounted even at that time as still young,² was held in honour on account of the worth of his ancestors. To him it seemed really to be better to side with the Argives; it was not that alone, however, for he also opposed the treaty because he was piqued in his pride because the Lacedaemonians had negotiated it through Nicias and Laches, overlooking him on account of his youth and not showing him the respect that was due him on account of the old proxeny that once existed³ in his family. This relationship, though his grandfather had renounced it, he himself was by his attentions to their captives from Sphacteria now planning to renew. And so considering himself in

¹ cf. VI. lxxxix. 2; Plut. *Alcib.* xiv.

σοῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, οὐ βεβαίους φάσκων εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα Ἀργεῖους σφίσι σπείσάμενοι ἐξέλωσι καὶ αὖθις ἐπ' Ἀθηναίους μόνους ἴωσι, τούτου ἔνεκα σπένδεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ τότε, ἐπειδὴ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐγεγένητο, πέμπει εὐθὺς ἐς Ἀργος ἰδίᾳ, κελεύων ὥς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προκαλουμένους ἦκειν μετὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἡλείων, ὥς καιροῦ ὄντος καὶ αὐτὸς ξυμπράξων τὰ μάλιστα.

XLIV. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἀκούσαντες τῆς τε ἀγγελίας καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔγνωσαν οὐ μετ' Ἀθηναίων πραχθεῖσαν τὴν τῶν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν, ἀλλ' ἐς διαφορὰν μεγάλην καθεστῶτας αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τῶν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πρέσβειων, οἱ σφίσι περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἔτυχον ἀπόντες, ἡμέλουν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, νομίζοντες πόλιν τε σφίσι φιλίαν ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ καὶ δημοκρατουμένην ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχουσιν τὴν κατὰ θύλασσαν ξυμπολεμήσειν σφίσιν, ἣν καθιστῶν-

2 ται ἐς πόλεμον. ἔπεμπον οὖν εὐθὺς πρέσβεις ὥς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας· ξυνεπρεσ-

3 βεύοντο δὲ καὶ Ἡεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς. ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος, δοκοῦντες ἐπιτήδαιοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, Φιλοχαρίδας τε καὶ Λέων καὶ Ἐνδιος, δείσαντες μὴ τὴν τε ξυμμαχίαν ὀργιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ποιήσονται, καὶ ἅμα Πύλον ἀπαιτησόντες ἀντὶ

every way slighted, he both spoke against the treaty in the first instance, alleging that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, but that their object in making the treaty was, that by concluding a treaty with the Athenians they might utterly overthrow the Argives and then proceed against the Athenians when thus isolated; and at the present time, after the difference had occurred, he promptly dispatched a message to Argos privately, bidding them come as quickly as possible, along with the Mantineans and Eleans, and invite the Athenians to form an alliance, as the moment was favourable and he himself would cooperate to the utmost.

XLIV. When the Argives received this message and realized that the alliance with the Boeotians had been made without the consent of the Athenians, but that these were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedaemonians, they took no further thought about their envoys at Lacedaemon, who had gone thither on the matter of the treaty, and gave their attention rather to the Athenians, thinking that a city which had been of old friendly to them and was governed by a democracy, just as they were, and possessed great power on sea, would enter the war along with them, should they be involved in war. Accordingly, they at once sent envoys to Athens to negotiate the alliance; and there went with them also envoys of the Eleans and Mantineans. But thither came, too, in all haste, envoys of the Lacedaemonians who were thought to be acceptable to the Athenians, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, for there was fear that the Athenians in their anger might make the alliance with the Argives; and the envoys were also to demand the restoration of Pylos in place of

Πανάκτου, καὶ περὶ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίας ἀπολογησόμενοι ὥς οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐποιήσαντο.

XLV. Καὶ λέγοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ περὶ τούτων καὶ ὥς αὐτοκράτορες ἤκουσι περὶ πάντων ξυμβῆναι τῶν διαφόρων, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐφόβουν μὴ καί, ἣν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ταῦτὰ λέγωσιν, ἐπαγάγωνται τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀπωσθῇ ἡ Ἀργείων ξυμμαχία. μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει πίστιν αὐτοῖς δούς, ἣν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἤκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τὰλλα ξυναλλάξειν. βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσε καὶ ὅπως, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὥς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτά, τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐς τὸν δῆμον παρελθόντες καὶ ἐπερωτώμενοι οὐκ ἔφασαν ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτορες ἤκειν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἐτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγόντες τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι· σεισμῳ δὲ γειομένου πρὶν τι ἐπικυρωθῆναι, ἡ ἐκκλησία αὕτη ἀνεβλήθη.

XLVI. Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ἐκκλησία ὁ Νικίας,

Panactum, and to say at the same time, in excuse for the Boeotian alliance, that it had not been made with a view to injuring the Athenians.

XLV. Speaking in the senate on these points, and saying that they had come with full power to settle all their differences, they filled Alcibiades with alarm lest, if they should say the same things to the assembly, they should win over the people and the Argive alliance might be rejected. So he adopted the following device against them: He persuaded the Lacedaemonians, by pledging them his faith, that, if they would not admit before the assembly that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylos to them—for he himself would use his influence with the Athenians for them as now he opposed them—and would settle the other points at issue. He resorted to such methods because he wished to detach them from Nicias, and in order that he might accuse them before the assembly of having no sincere intentions and of never saying the same things, and thereby might effect an alliance with the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans. And so it turned out. For when, on coming before the popular assembly and being asked whether they had come with full powers, they answered “No,” contrary to what they had said in the senate, the Athenians could endure it no longer, but hearkened to Alcibiades, who inveighed against the Lacedaemonians far more than before, and were ready at once to bring in the Argives and their confederates and conclude an alliance. But before anything was ratified an earthquake occurred, and this assembly was adjourned.

XLVI. In the assembly on the next day, however,

καίπερ, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτῶν ἡπατημένων,
καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξηπατημένος περὶ τοῦ μὴ αὐτοκρά-
τορας ὁμολογήσαι ἤκειν, ὅμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
ἔφη χρῆναι φίλους μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπι-
σχόντας τὰ πρὸς Ἀργείους πέμψαι ἔτι ὥς αὐτοὺς
καὶ εἰδέναι ὃ τι διανοοῦνται, λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ
σφετέρῳ καλῶ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ τὸν
πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι· σφίσι μὲν γὰρ εὖ
ἐστώτων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
ἄριστον εἶναι διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν,
ἐκείνοις δὲ δυστυχοῦσιν ὅτι τάχιστα εὖρημα
2 εἶναι διακινδυνεύσαι. ἔπεισέ τε πέμψαι πρέσ-
βεις, ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν, κελεύοντας Λακε-
δαιμονίους, εἴ τι δίκαιον διανοοῦνται, Πύνακτόν
τε ὀρθὸν ἀποδιδύναι καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ τὴν
Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνεῖναι, ἣν μὴ ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς
ἐσίωσι, καθάπερ εἴρητο ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδενὶ
3 ξυμβαίνειν. εἰπεῖν τε ἐκέλευον ὅτι καὶ σφεῖς, εἰ
ἐβούλοντο ἀδικεῖν, ἤδη ἂν Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους
πεποιῆσθαι, ὥς παρεῖναι γ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ
τούτου ἔνεκα· εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνεκάλουν, πάντα
ἐπιστείλαντες ἀπέπεμψαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικίαν
4 πρέσβεις. καὶ ἀφικομένων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαγγει-
λάντων τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τέλος εἰπόντων ὅτι, εἰ μὴ

Nicias, although, as the Lacedaemonians had themselves been deceived, so he too had been deceived in the matter of their admission that they had not come with full powers, nevertheless still maintained that they ought to become friends with the Lacedaemonians rather than with the Argives; and accordingly he proposed that, deferring the question of the Argive alliance, they should again send envoys to the Lacedaemonians and find out what their intentions were. He urged the view that the postponement of hostile operations was honourable for themselves but humiliating for the Lacedaemonians; for as matters stood well for themselves, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as possible, whereas for the Lacedaemonians, who were in hard luck, it would be clear gain to risk a decisive contest as quickly as possible. So he persuaded them to send envoys, himself being one, to urge the Lacedaemonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum intact and Amphipolis, and to give up the alliance with the Boeotians—unless these should accede to the treaty—in accordance with the stipulation which had been arrived at that neither should enter into an agreement with any third party without the consent of the other. The ambassadors were instructed also to say that, if the Athenians had wished to do wrong, they would already have made the Argives allies, as their envoys were present for that very purpose; and any other complaints which they had to make they included in their instructions to Nicias and his colleagues and then despatched them to Sparta. When these had arrived and had finished reciting their other demands, they said in conclusion that, unless the Lacedaemonians

τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνήσουσι Βοιωτοῖς μὴ ἐσιούσιν ἐς τὰς σπονδάς, ποιήσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους, τὴν μὲν ξυμμαχίαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Βοιωτοῖς, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀνήσειν, ἐπικρατούντων τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη τὸν ἔφορον ταῦτα γίνεσθαι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, τοὺς δὲ ὅρκους δεομένου Νικίου ἀενεώσαντο· ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελῇ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, αἴτιος δοκῶν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδῶν.

- 5 ἀναχωρήσαντός τε αὐτοῦ ὡς ἤκουσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πεπραγμένον, εὐθύς δι' ὀργῆς εἶχον, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι (ἔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, παραγαγόντος Ἀλκιβιάδου) ἐποίησαντο σπονδάς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήνδε.

XLVII. "Σπονδάς ἐποίησαντο ἑκατὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτη καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλείοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,¹ ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι, ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

- 2 "Ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι² ἐπὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, τέχνη μὴδὲ μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ.

- 3 "Κατὰ τάδε ξυμμάχους εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ

¹ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, restored from the inscription recording this treaty (C.I.A. iv. p. 15 f., No. 46 b.). See note, p. 96

² ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι restored by Kirchhoff from the inscription.

should give up the alliance with the Boeotians, in case these would not accede to the treaty, they themselves would make an alliance with the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedaemonians refused to give up the alliance with the Boeotians—the party of Xenares the ephor and all the rest that were of that view carrying their point to this effect—but the oaths they renewed on Nicias' request; for he was afraid that he would return with nothing accomplished and be exposed to calumny, as indeed happened, since he was generally regarded as having been responsible for the treaty with the Lacedaemonians. On his return, when the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, they flew into a rage, and thinking they had been wronged, when Alcibiades brought in the Argives and their allies, who chanced to be present, they made an alliance with them on the following terms:

XLVII. 1. "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans have made a treaty with one another for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies over whom they have authority respectively, to be observed without fraud or hurt both by land and sea.

2. "It shall not be allowed to bear arms with harmful intent, either for the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans and their allies against the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians have authority, or for the Athenians and the allies over whom the Athenians have authority against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans and their allies, by any art or device.

3. "The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans

Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἑκατὸν ἔτη· ἣν πολεμιοὶ ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, βοηθεῖν Ἀργείους καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας Ἀθήναζε, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, τρόπῳ ὁποῖω ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἣν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἡλείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τούτων· καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιᾶ τῶν πόλεων, ἣν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῇ.

- 4 “Βοηθεῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐς Ἀργος καὶ ἐς¹ Μαντίνειαν καὶ ἐς² Ἡλιν, ἣν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἡλείων ἢ τὴν Μαντινέων ἢ τὴν Ἀργείων, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν αἱ πόλεις αὗται, τρόπῳ ὁποῖω ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ἣν δὲ δηώσαντες οἴχονται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἡλείοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀπασῶν τούτων τῶν πόλεων· καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιᾶ τῶν πόλεων,³ ἣν μὴ ἀπάσαις δοκῇ.⁴

- 5 “Ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἑὺν ἔχοντας διέναί ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διὰ τῆς γῆς τῆς σφετέρως αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἕκαστοι, μηδὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἣν μὴ ψηφισαμένων τῶν πόλεων ἀπασῶν τὴν δίοδον εἶναι, Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἡλείων.

¹ Added by Stahl.

² Added by Stahl.

³ μηδεμιᾶ τῶν πόλεων restored by Kirchhoff from the inscription.

⁴ ταῖς πόλεσιν, after δοκῇ, deleted by Kirchhoff according to the inscription.

BOOK V. XLVII. 3-5

shall be allies for a hundred years on the following terms: If an enemy invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans and Mantineans shall bring aid to Athens, according as the Athenians may send them word, in whatever way they can most effectually, to the limit of their power; but if the invaders shall have ravaged the land and gone, that city shall be hostile to the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of all these states; and to discontinue hostilities against that state shall not be allowed to any one of these states, unless all agree.

4. "Likewise the Athenians shall bring aid to Argos and to Mantinea and Elis, if an enemy come against the territory of the Eleans or that of the Mantineans or that of the Argives, according as these states send word, in whatever way they can most effectually, to the limit of their power; but if the invader shall have ravaged the land and gone, that city shall be hostile to the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall suffer ill at the hands of all these states; and to discontinue hostilities against that state shall not be allowed to any one of these states, unless all agree.

5. "It shall not be permitted to pass under arms with hostile intent through their own territory or that of the allies over whom they severally have authority, nor by sea, unless passage shall have been voted by all of these states, Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans.

THUCYDIDES

- 6 “Τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρέχέτω μέγρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον ἐπὶ ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιούσι κατὰ ταῦτά· ἦν δὲ πλέονα βούλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμφαμένη διδότην σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὀπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότη τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκάστης, τῷ δ’ ἵππεί δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν.
- 7 “Ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμφαμένη τὴν στρατιάν¹ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ. ἦν δέ ποι δύξῃ ἀπάσαις² ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν.
- 8 “Ὅμοσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπέρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὀμνύντων. ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ χώριον ὄρκον ἕκαστοι τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω ὅδε· “Ἐμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνη οὐδὲ μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾷ.”
- 9 “Ὀμνύντων δὲ Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ πρυτάνεις· ἐν Ἀργεὶ δὲ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ οἱ ἀρτῦναι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα· ἐν δὲ Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ θεωροὶ καὶ οἱ

¹ τὴν στρατιάν added by van Herwerden.

² ἀπάσαις according to the inscription ; MSS. omit.

6. "For the relieving force the state which sends for them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their arrival in the state which sent for succour, and in like manner on their return; but if they wish to use the army for a longer period, the city which sends for it shall furnish provisions for heavy-armed or light-armed troops or bowmen, three Aeginetan obols¹ per day, and for a cavalryman one Aeginetan drachma.²

7. "The state which sent for the troops shall have command whenever the war is in its territory. But if it shall seem good to all the states to make a joint expedition anywhere, all the states shall share the command equally.

8. "The Athenians shall swear to the treaty for themselves and their allies, but the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies shall swear to it individually by states. And they shall severally swear the oath that is most binding in their own country, over full-grown victims. And the oath shall be as follows: 'I will abide by the alliance in accordance with its stipulations, justly and without injury and without guile, and will not transgress it by any art or device.'

9. "The oath shall be sworn at Athens by the senate and the home³ magistrates, the prytanes administering it; at Argos by the senate and the eighty and the artynae, the eighty administering the oath; at Mantinea by the demiurgi and the senate and the other magistrates, the theori and the

¹ About 8d. or 16 cents.

² About 1s. 4d. or 32 cents.

³ *i.e.* those whose functions were restricted to the city.

πολέμαρχοι· ἐν δὲ Ἡλιδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ¹ καὶ οἱ ἐξακόσιοι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφύλακες.

10 “Ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἡλιν καὶ ἐς Μαντίνειαν καὶ ἐς Ἄργος τριάκοντα ἡμέραις πρὸ Ὀλυμπίων, Ἀργεῖους δὲ καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἰόντας Ἀθήναζε δέκα ἡμέραις πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων.

11 “Τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐν πόλει, Ἀργεῖους δὲ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳσι στήλην χαλκὴν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί.

12 “Ἐὰν δέ τι δοκῇ ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοῖς ξυγκειμένοις, ὃ τι ἂν² δόξῃ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομένοις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.”

XLVIII. Αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο. καὶ αἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἀπείρηντο τούτου ἕνεκα οὐδ' ὑφ' 2 ἐτέρων. Κορίνθιοι δὲ Ἀργείων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης πρὸ τούτου Ἡλείοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι ξυμμαχίας, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν καὶ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, οὐ ξυνώμοσαν, ἀρκεῖν δ' ἔφασαν σφίσι τὴν

¹ καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες, in MSS. after δημιουργοί, deleted by Kirchhoff as gloss on that word.

² ὃ τι δ' ἂν MSS., δ' deleted by Bekker.

¹ A fragment of the official document recording this treaty was found by the Archaeological Society at Athens in the

polemarchs administering the oath; at Elis by the demiurgi and the six hundred, the demiurgi and the thesmophylaces administering the oath.

10. "For renewal of the oath the Athenians shall go to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympic games; and the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens ten days before the great Panathenaea.

11. "The stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone column, by the Athenians on the Acropolis,¹ by the Argives in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo, by the Mantineans in the market-place, in the temple of Zeus; and a brazen pillar shall be set up by them jointly at the Olympic games of this year.

12. "If it shall seem advisable to these states to add anything further to these agreements, whatever shall seem good to all the states in joint deliberation shall be binding."

XLVIII. Thus the treaty and the alliance were completed; but the treaty between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians was not on this account renounced by either party. The Corinthians, however, although allies of the Argives, did not accede to the new treaty—even before this when an alliance, offensive and defensive, had been made between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, they had not joined it—but said they were content with the first defensive alliance that had been made,

spring of 1877 upon a marble slab on the southern slope of the Acropolis. The text of the inscription has been restored by Kirchhoff, Schöne, Foucart, and Stahl in substantial agreement.

πρώτην γενομένην ἐπιμαχίαν, ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν,
 3 ξυρεπιστρατεύειν δὲ μηδενί. οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι
 οὕτως ἀπέστησαν τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
 Λακεδαιμονίους πάλιν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον.

XLIX. Ὀλύμπια δ' ἐγένετο τοῦ θέρου τούτου,
 οἷς Ἀγέροσθένης Ἀρκὰς παγκράτιον τὸ πρῶτον
 ἐνίκα· καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Ἡλείων
 εἵρχθησαν ὥστε μὴ θύειν μηδ' ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐκ
 ἐκτίνοντες τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς ἣν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ
 νόμῳ Ἡεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο αὐτῶν, φάσκοντες
 σφῶν ἐπὶ Φύρκον τε τεῖχος ὅπλα ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ
 ἐς Λέπρεον αὐτῶν ὀπλίτας ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπικαῖς
 σπονδαῖς ἐσπέμψαι. ἡ δὲ καταδίκη δισχίλια
 μναῖ ἦσαν, κατὰ τὸν ὀπλίτην ἕκαστον δύο μναῖ,
 2 ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος ἔχει. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρέσβεις
 πέμψαντες ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφῶν καταδει-
 κίσθαι, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλλθαι πω ἐς Λακεδαί-
 μονα τὰς σπονδάς, ὅτ' ἐσέπεμψαν τοὺς ὀπλίτας.
 3 Ἡεῖοι δὲ τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκεχειρίαν ἤδη ἔφασαν
 εἶναι (πρώτοις γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγέλλουσι),
 καὶ ἡσυχάζοντων σφῶν καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ὥς
 4 ἐν σπονδαῖς, αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν ἀδικήσαντας. οἱ δὲ
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπελάμβανον οὐ χρεὼν εἶναι αὐτοὺς
 ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἔτι ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, εἰ ἀδικεῖν γε ἤδη
 ἐνόμιζον αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς νομίζοντας τοῦτο
 δρᾶσαι, καὶ ὅπλα οὐδαμῶσε ἔτι αὐτοῖς ἐπενεγκεῖν.

¹ The month of the festival was sacred (*ἱερομηνία*) and all warfare was stopped for that time. To enter the territory of Elis with an armed force during that month was sacrilegious.

namely to aid one another, but not to join in attacking any other party. Thus, then, the Corinthians held aloof from their allies and were turning their thoughts again to the Lacedaemonians.

XLIX. This summer the Olympic games were held, in which Androstenes an Arcadian won his first victory in the pancratium. The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the sanctuary by the Eleans, and so could neither sacrifice nor contend in the games, as they refused to pay the fine which had been assessed against them according to Olympic law by the Eleans, who alleged that they had attacked the Elean fortress of Phyrus, and sent a force of their hoplites into Lepreum during the Olympic truce.¹ The fine was two thousand minas,² two minas³ for each hoplite, as the law ordains. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys and urged that the fine had been unfairly imposed upon them, claiming that the treaty had not been announced at Lacedaemon when they sent the hoplites into Elis. But the Eleans said that the truce was already in force in their country—for they proclaim it among themselves first—and while they were keeping quiet and not expecting any attack, as in time of truce, the Lacedaemonians had done the wrong, taking them by surprise. The Lacedaemonians replied that they should not have gone on and announced the truce at Lacedaemon if they were of the opinion that the Lacedaemonians were already wronging them, but they had done this as though they did not think so, and they themselves had not kept on bearing arms against them anywhere after the announcement of the truce.

Ol. 90, 1;
July,
420 B.C.

¹ About £8,125 or \$38,840.

² About £8 2s. 6d. or \$39.

5 Ἡλεῖοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου εἶχοντο, ὥς μὲν οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι μὴ ἂν πεισθῆναι, εἰ δὲ βούλονται σφίσι Λέπρεον ἀποδοῦναι, τό τε αὐτῶν μέρος ἀφίεναι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ ὃ τῷ θεῷ γίγνεται αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἐκτείσειν.

L. Ὡς δ' οὐκ ἐσήκουον, αὐθις τάδε ἤξιουν, Λέπρεον μὲν μὴ ἀποδοῦναι, εἰ μὴ βούλονται, ἀναβάντας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου, ἐπειδὴ προθυμοῦνται χρῆσθαι τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐπομόσαι ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ μὴν ἀποδώσειν
2 ὕστερον τὴν καταδίκην. ὥς δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἤθελον, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἶργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων¹ καὶ οἳ οἳ ἔθνον, οἳ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώ-
3 ρουν πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν. ὅμως δὲ οἱ Ἡλεῖοι δεδιότες μὴ βία θύσωσι, ξὺν ὅπλοις τῶν νεωτέρων φυλακὴν εἶχον· ἦλθον δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς, χίλιοι ἑκατέρων, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἱππῆς, οἳ ἐν Ἀρ-
4 πίνῃ² ὑπέμενον τὴν ἑορτήν. δέος δ' ἐγένετο τῇ πανηγύρει μέγα μὴ ξὺν ὅπλοις ἔλθωσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου, Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως, προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος

¹ θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων bracketed by Hude following Kruger.

² Michaelis' correction for Ἀργεῖ of the MSS.

But the Eleans persisted in the same statement, saying that they could never be persuaded that the Lacedaemonians were not guilty; if, however, they were willing to restore Lepreum to them, they would give up their own half of the fine, and what was due to the gods they would themselves pay on their behalf.

L. When the Lacedaemonians refused this offer, the Eleans proposed that they should not restore Lepreum, if they objected to that, but, as they eagerly desired to have access to the sanctuary, that they should go up to the altar of Olympian Zeus and swear in the presence of the Hellenes that they would assuredly pay the fine later. But as they were unwilling to do even this, the Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple, from the sacrifice and the contests, and sacrificed at home; while the rest of the Hellenes, except the Lepreates, sent representatives to the festival. Still the Eleans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way and offer sacrifice, kept guard with the young men under arms; and there came to their aid also some Argives and Mantineans, a thousand of each, and some Athenian cavalry that were at Arpina¹ awaiting the festival. And great fear came upon the assembly that the Lacedaemonians might come with arms, especially as Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, received blows from the umpires on the course, because, when his own team won and was proclaimed as belonging to the Boeotian state on account of his having no right to contend, he had come upon the course and crowned the charioteer, wishing to show that the

¹ In the valley of the Alpheus, twenty stadia above Olympia

δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἄρμα· ὥστε πολλῶ δὴ
 μᾶλλον ἐπεφόβηντο πάντες καὶ ἐδόκει τι νέον
 ἔσεσθαι. οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡσύχασάν τε
 5 καὶ ἡ ἑορτὴ αὐτοῖς οὕτω διήλθεν. ἐς δὲ Κόρινθον
 μετὰ τὰ Ὀλύμπια Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι
 ἀφίκοντο δεησόμενοι αὐτῶν παρὰ σφᾶς ἐλθεῖν (καὶ
 Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἔτυχον παρόντες)· καὶ
 πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων τέλος οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη,
 ἀλλὰ σεισμοῦ γενομένου διελύθησαν ἕκαστοι ἐπ’
 οἴκου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

LI. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἡρακλεώ-
 ταις τοῖς ἐν Τραχίνι μάχῃ ἐγένετο πρὸς Αἰνιᾶνας
 καὶ Δόλοπας καὶ Μηλιᾶς καὶ Θεσσαλῶν τινας·
 2 προσοικοῦντα γὰρ τὰ ἔθνη ταῦτα τῇ πόλει πολέ-
 μια ἦν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ τινὶ γῇ ἢ τῇ τούτων τὸ
 χωρίον ἐτειχίσθη. καὶ εὐθύς τε καθισταμένη τῇ
 πόλει ἠναντιοῦντο, ἐς ὅσον ἐδύναντο φθίροντες,
 καὶ τότε τῇ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας, καὶ
 Ξενάρης ὁ Κνίδιος, Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἄρχων αὐτῶν
 ἀπέθανε, διεφθάρησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Ἡρα-
 κλεωτῶν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ δωδέκατον
 ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθύς ἀρχομένου
 τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, ὡς μετὰ τὴν μάχην κακῶς ἐφθεί-
 ρετο, Βοιωτοὶ παρέλαβον, καὶ Ἠγησιππίδαν τὸν
 Λακεδαιμόνιον ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἄρχοντα ἐξέπεμψαν.
 δείσαντες δὲ παρέλαβον τὸ χωρίον μὴ Λακεδαι-
 μονίων τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον θορυβουμένων
 Ἀθηναῖοι λάβωσιν· Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέντοι ὠργί-
 ζοντο αὐτοῖς.

2 Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου,

chariot was his. And so everybody was much more afraid, and it seemed that there would be some disturbance. The Lacedaemonians, however, kept quiet, and the festival went through in this way, as far as they were concerned. But after the Olympic games the Argives and their allies came to Corinth, to ask them to join their league. Lacedaemonian envoys also happened to be present. Many proposals were made, but nothing was done; for an earthquake occurred and they dispersed severally to their homes. And the summer ended.

LI. During the following winter, there was a battle between the people of Heracleia in Trachis and the Aenianians, Dolopians, Malians, and some of the Thessalians. For these were neighbouring tribes and hostile to the city of Heracleia, since the fortress there was established as a menace to no other territory but theirs. Accordingly, as soon as the city was founded, they began to show opposition to it, harassing it as much as they could; and at this time they defeated the Heracleotes, Xenares son of Cnidis, a Lacedaemonian and their commander, being killed, as well as some of the Heracleotes. And the winter ended, and with it the twelfth year of this war.

LII. At the very beginning of the following summer, as Heracleia was in a grievous plight after the battle, the Boeotians took possession of it and dismissed Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian, for misgovernment. They occupied the place through fear that, while the Lacedaemonians were disturbed about matters in the Peloponnesus, the Athenians might take it; the Lacedaemonians, however, were angry at them for this.

During the same summer Alcibiades son of

στρατηγὸς ὢν Ἀθηναίων, Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυμπρασσόντων ἐλθὼν ἐς Πελοπόννησον μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τά τε ἄλλα ξυγκαθίστη περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν διαπορευόμενος Πελοπόννησον τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ Πατρέας τε τείχῃ καθεῖναι ἔπεισεν ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕτερον διανοεῖτο τειχίσαι ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαικῷ. Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ Σικυνῶνιοι καὶ οἷς ἦν ἐν βλάβῃ τειχισθὲν βοηθησαντες διεκώλυσαν.

LIII. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο, προφάσει μὲν περὶ τοῦ θύματος τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθαιῶς,¹ ὃ δέον ἀπαγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀπέπεμπον ἱπὲρ βοτανῶν² Ἐπιδαυριοὶ (κυριώτατοι δὲ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἦσαν Ἀργεῖοι). ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις προσλαβεῖν, ἣν δύνωνται, τῆς τε Κορίνθου ἕνεκα ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λιγίνης βραχυτέραν ἔσεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν ἢ Σκύλλαιον περιπλεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. παρεσκευάζοντο οὖν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὥς αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν

¹ Correction of C, Πυθέως AEFM, Πιθέως B.

² Stahl's correction for βοταμίων of MSS.

¹ A low point of land at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf; on the opposite side of the strait was the Molycreian Rhium. The fort would have given the Athenians entire control of the entrance to the Gulf.

Cleinias, who was then a general of the Athenians, acting in concert with the Argives and their allies went into the Peloponnesus with a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and taking with him some of the allies from that region helped to settle matters pertaining to the alliance as he passed through the Peloponnesus with his army; coming to Patrae he persuaded the inhabitants to carry their walls down to the sea, and intended himself to build another fort at the Achaean Rhium.¹ But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and all those to whom the fortification of Rhium would have been a menace, went in force and prevented it.

LIII. During the same summer war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives. The alleged ground for this was that the Epidaurians were not sending the sacrifice to Apollo Pythaeus, which it was incumbent on them to render in payment for pasturage, and the Argives exercised chief authority over the sanctuary;² but even apart from this motive Alcibiades and the Argives deemed it advisable, if they could, to bring Epidaurus into the Argive alliance, both for the sake of keeping Corinth quiet, and because they thought the Athenians would be able to bring aid to Argos by a shorter way, from Aegina as base, than by sailing round Scyllaeum.³ The Argives, then, were preparing, as

² Probably the temple of Apollo Pythaeus referred to is that which alone of all the buildings in Asine the Argives spared when they destroyed that town; cf. Paus. II. xxxvi. 5.

³ A promontory between Hermione and Troezen. The short route was from Aegina to the neighbouring coast of Epidaurus and thence to Argos; if Epidaurus was hostile or neutral, reinforcements had to be carried round Scyllaeum to the Gulf of Nauplia and thence by land to Argos.

Ἐπίδαυρον διὰ τοῦ θύματος τὴν ἔσπραξιν ἐσβαλοῦντες.

LIV. Ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους πανδημεῖ ἐς Λεῦκτρα τῆς ἑαυτῶν μεθορίας πρὸς τὸ Λύκαιον, Ἀγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου βασιλέως ἡγουμένου· ἥδεις δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν, οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμ-
 2 φθησαν. ὥς δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια θυομένοις οὐ προυχῶρει, αὐτοὶ τε ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ τοῖς
 3 ξυμμάχοις περιήγγειλαν μετὰ τὸν μέλλοντα (Καρνεῖος δ' ἦν μῆν, ἱερομηνία Δωριεῦσι) παρασκευά-
 4 ζεσθαι ὥς στρατευσομένους. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν, τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν
 5 ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον ἐς
 6 τὴν Ἐπίδαυρίαν καὶ ἐδήουν. Ἐπίδαυριοι δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν τινες οἱ μὲν τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπίδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

LV. Καὶ καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπίδαυρῳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν, ἐς Μαντίνειαν πρεσβεῖαι ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ξυνῆλθον, Ἀθηναίων παρακαλεσάντων. καὶ γενομένων¹ λόγων Εὐφαιμίδας ὁ Κορίνθιος οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις ὁμολογεῖν· σφεῖς μὲν γὰρ περὶ εἰρήνης ξυγκαθῆσθαι, τοὺς δ' Ἐπίδαυρίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους μεθ' ὅπλων ἀντιτετάχθαι· διαλύσαι οὖν πρῶτον χρῆ-

¹ MSS. *γενομένων*, Hude *γενομένων*.

¹ The sacrifices offered to Zeus by the Spartan kings before crossing the border.

² Corresponding to the Attic Metageitnion, nearly our August.

of their own motion, to invade Epidaurus for the exaction of the offering.

LIV. About the same time the Lacedaemonians, too, marched out with all their forces to Leuctra, a place on their own borders opposite Mt. Lycaenum, under the command of King Agis son of Archidamus; and no one knew whither they were marching, not even the cities from which they were sent. But as the sacrifices for crossing the border¹ were not favourable, they went back home themselves, and sent word to their allies, after the coming month—the Carneian month;² a holiday among the Dorians—to prepare to take the field. When they withdrew, the Argives set out on the twenty-seventh of the month preceding the Carneian, and continuing to observe that day during the whole time,³ invaded Epidaurus and proceeded to ravage it. The Epidaurians called upon their allies for help; but some of these made the month an excuse, while the rest went merely to the borders of Epidauria and there remained quiet.

LV. While the Argives were in Epidaurian territory envoys from the different cities came together at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. And in the course of the conference Euphamidas the Corinthian said that their words did not agree with their deeds; for they were sitting in council on the question of peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives were arrayed in arms against each other; they ought to go

¹ They called every day the 27th as long as they were in Epidaurian territory and thus postponed the beginning of the following month until their work was done. Probably the Argives, on religious grounds (as Dorians), took holiday as soon as the Carneian month began.

ναι ἐφ' ¹ ἐκατέρων ἐλθόντας τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ
 2 οὕτω πάλιν λέγειν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. καὶ πεισ-
 θέντες ὥχοντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἀπήγαγον ἐκ
 τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. ὕστερον δὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ξυνελ-
 θόντες οὐδ' ὥς ἐδυνήθησαν ξυμβῆναι, ἀλλ' οἱ
 Ἀργεῖοι πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν ἐσέβαλον καὶ
 3 ἐδήουν. ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
 ἐς Καρύας· καὶ ὥς οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὰ διαβυτήρια
 4 αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐπανεχώρησαν. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ τεμόν-
 τες τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ὥς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἀπήλθον
 ἐπ' οἴκου. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοή-
 θησαν ὀπλίται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός, πυθό-
 μενοι δὲ ² τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι·
 καὶ ὥς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπήλθον. καὶ τὸ
 θέρος οὕτω διήλθεν.

LVI. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαι-
 μόνιοι λαθόντες Ἀθηναίους φρουροὺς τε τριακο-
 σίους καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν ἄρχοντα κατὰ θάλασσαν
 2 ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον ἐσέπεμψαν. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἐλθόντες
 παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι, γεγραμμένον ἐν
 ταῖς σπονδαῖς διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐκάστους μὴ εἶναι
 πολεμίους διέναι, εὔσειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν παρα-
 πλεῦσαι· καὶ εἰ μὴ κάκεῖνοι ἐς Πύλον κομιοῦσιν
 ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς Μεσσηνίους καὶ Εἰλωτας,
 3 ἀδικίσεσθαι αὐτοί. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου
 πείσαντος τῇ μὲν Λακωνικῇ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι
 οὐκ ἐνέμειναν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς ὄρκοις, ἐς δὲ

¹ *supra*scr. g₂, all other MSS. ἀφ'.

² Hude's correction for δὲ of the MSS.

¹ Or, reading *πυθόμενοι* δέ, with the MSS., "but learning that the Lacedaemonians *had left the field*"—which the verb means now here else—"and that there was no further need of them."

first to the camps of the two parties and disband them, and then they might come back and talk about peace. Adopting this suggestion, they went and induced the Argives to depart from Epidauria. Afterwards they came together again, but not even then were they able to agree, and the Argives again invaded Epidauria and began to ravage it. The Lacedaemonians, too, marched out to Caryae; but as not even there the sacrifices for crossing the boundaries proved favourable, they returned. And the Argives, having ravaged about a third part of Epidauria, also went back home. Moreover, there had come to their aid one thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of Alcibiades, on learning that the Lacedaemonians had taken the field; as now there was no longer any need of them these withdrew.¹ And so the summer ended.

LVI. During the following winter, the Lacedaemonians, eluding the vigilance of the Athenians, sent a garrison of three hundred men, under the command of Agesippidas, by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argives, coming to Athens, made complaint that, although it was written in the treaty that they were not to allow enemies to go through their respective territories,² the Athenians had permitted the Lacedaemonians to go past their territory³ by sea; unless, then, the Athenians should bring the Messenians and Helots to Pylos to annoy the Lacedaemonians, they themselves would feel aggrieved. So the Athenians, on the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the bottom of the Laconian column that the Lacedaemonians had not kept their oaths, and they brought to Pylos

¹ cf. ch. xlvii. 5.

² i.e. past Aegina, now Athenian territory.

Πύλον ἐκόμισαν τοὺς ἐκ Κρανίων Εἴλωτας λή-
 4 ζεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον. τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα
 τοῦτον πολεμούντων Ἀργείων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων
 μάχη μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο ἐκ παρασκευῆς, ἐνέδραι
 δὲ καὶ καταδρομαί, ἐν αἷς ὡς τύχοιεν ἐκατέρων
 5 τινὲς διεφθείροντο. καὶ τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος
 πρὸς ἕαρ ἤδη κλίμακας ἔχοντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦλθον
 ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ὡς ἐρήμου οὔσης διὰ τὸν πό-
 λεμον βία αἰρήσουντες· καὶ ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον.
 καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ τρίτον καὶ δέκατον
 ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LVII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους μεσοῦντος
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἷ τε Ἐπιδαύριοι ξύμ-
 μαχοι ὄντες ἐταλαιπώρουν καὶ τὰλλα ἐν τῇ Πελο-
 ποννήσῳ τὰ μὲν ἀφειστήκει, τὰ δ' οὐ καλῶς εἶχε,
 νομίσαντες, εἰ μὴ προκαταλήψονται ἐν τάχει, ἐπὶ
 πλέον χωρήσεσθαι αὐτά, ἐστράτευον αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ
 Εἴλωτες πανδημεὶ ἐπ' Ἄργος· ἠγείτο δὲ Ἄγρις ὁ
 Ἀρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. ξυνεστρά-
 2 τευον δ' αὐτοῖς Τεγεαῖται τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἀρκά-
 δων Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς
 ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου ξύμμαχοι καὶ οἱ ἔξωθεν ἐς
 Φλειοῦντα ξυνελέγοντο, Βοιωτοὶ μὲν πεντακισχί-
 λιοι ὀπλίται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἵππῃς πεν-
 τακόσιοι καὶ ἄμιπποι ἴσοι, Κορίνθιοι δὲ δισχίλιοι
 ὀπλίται, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι, Φλειάσιοι δὲ
 πανστρατιᾷ, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἦν τὸ στράτευμα.

the Helots from Cranii,¹ to plunder the country ; but in other respects they kept quiet. During this winter, although the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, there was no pitched battle, but there were ambuscades and forays, in which some perished on either side as the chance might be. As winter was closing and spring at hand, the Argives came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, supposing, as it was stripped of its defenders by the war, that they could take it by assault ; but they accomplished nothing and went back home. And the winter ended and with it the thirteenth year of the war.

LVII. In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in distress, and of the other states in the Peloponnesus some had revolted, while others were not well-disposed, and thinking that if measures of precaution were not taken quickly the evil would go yet further, marched against Argos with all their forces, themselves and their Helots, under the leadership of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. And with them went the Tegeates and all the rest of the Arcadians that were allies of the Lacedaemonians. But the allies from the rest of the Peloponnesus and those from outside mustered at Phlius—five thousand Boeotian hoplites and as many light-armed troops, with five hundred cavalry each with his foot-soldier ;² two thousand Corinthian hoplites ; the rest of the allies in varying numbers, but the Phliasians with their whole force, since the armament was assembled in their territory. 418 B.C.

¹ cf. ch. xxxv. 7.

² ἄμικτοι, light-armed men, one with each horseman, running alongside or riding behind.

LVIII. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ προαισθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον
 τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς
 τὸν Φλειοῦντα βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἄλλοις προσμεῖξαι
 ἐχώρου, τότε δὴ ἐξεστράτευσαν καὶ αὐτοί. ἐβοή-
 θησαν δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Μαντινῆς ἔχοντες τοὺς
 σφετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἡλείων τρισχίλιοι
 2 ὀπλῖται. καὶ προιόντες ἀπαντῶσι τοῖς Λακεδαι-
 μονίοις ἐν Μεθυδρίῳ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας. καὶ κατα-
 λαμβάνουσιν ἐκάτεροι λόφον· καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι
 ὥς μεμονωμένοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις παρεσκευά-
 ζοντο μάχεσθαι, ὁ δὲ Ἄγισ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναστήσας
 τὸν στρατὸν καὶ λαθὼν ἐπορεύετο ἐς Φλειοῦντα
 3 παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους. καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι
 αἰσθόμενοι ἅμα ἔφ' ἐχώρου, πρῶτον μὲν ἐς Ἄργος,
 ἔπειτα δὲ ἢ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
 μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταβῆσεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ
 4 Νεμέαν ὁδόν. Ἄγισ δὲ ταύτην μὲν ἦν προσε-
 δέχοντο οὐκ ἐτράπετο, παραγγείλας δὲ τοῖς Λακε-
 δαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἄλλην
 ἐχώρησε χαλεπὴν καὶ κατέβη ἐς τὸ Ἀργείων
 πεδίον· καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι
 ὄρθιον ἐτέραν ἐπορεύοντο· τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ
 Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις εἴρητο τὴν ἐπὶ Νεμέας
 ὁδὸν καταβαίνειν, ἢ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐκάθηντο, ὅπως,
 εἰ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰόντας¹ ἐς τὸ πεδῖον
 5 βοηθοῖεν, ἐφεπόμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις χρῶντο. καὶ ὁ
 μὲν οὕτω διατάξας καὶ ἐσβαλὼν ἐς τὸ πεδῖον
 ἐδήου Σάμινθόν τε καὶ ἄλλα.

LIX. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γιγόντες ἐβοήθουν ἡμέρας
 ἤδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ περιτυχόντες τῷ Φλειασίων

¹ Badham's correction for *ιδόντες* of the MSS.

LVIII. The Argives had been aware of the preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first, and when the latter were on the march to Phlius where they intended to join the rest, they now took the field themselves. And the Mantineans came to their aid with their own allies and three thousand Elean hoplites. As they were going forward they came upon the Lacedaemonians at Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party took position on a hill, and the Argives prepared to fight with the Lacedaemonians, thinking to find them still isolated; but Agis, rousing up his force during the night and eluding detection, marched to Phlius to join the rest of the allies. The Argives, perceiving this, set out at daybreak, marching first to Argos and then taking the road to Nemea, where they expected the Lacedaemonians with their allies to come down. Agis, however, did not take the way they were expecting him to follow, but giving the word to the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he advanced by a more difficult route and descended to the Argive plain. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians advanced by another steep road; while the Boeotians, Megarians and Sicyonians had been told to come down by the road to Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order that if the Argives should attack their main force as it advanced into the plain, they might hang on their rear and use their cavalry against them. Having, then, so disposed his troops, Agis came down into the plain and proceeded to ravage Saminthus and other places.

LIX. The Argives discovered this and, it being now day, came to the rescue from Nemea and falling in with the force of the Phliasians and Corinthians

καὶ Κορινθίων στρατοπέδῳ τῶν μὲν Φλειασίων
 ὀλίγους ἀπέκτειναν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων αὐτοὶ οὐ
 2 πολλῷ πλείους διεφθάρησαν. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οἱ
 Μεγαρῆς καὶ οἱ Σικυνῶνιοι ἐχώρουν, ὥσπερ εἴρητο
 αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους οὐκέτι
 κατέλαβον, ἀλλὰ καταβάντες, ὡς ἐώρων τὰ ἑαυτῶν
 3 δρῶμενα, ἐς μάχην παρετάσσοντο. ἀντιπαρε-
 σκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ
 ἀπειλημμένοι ἦσαν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
 πεδίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶργον τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ
 μετ' αὐτῶν, καθύπερθεν δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Φλειάσιοι
 καὶ Πελληνῆς, τὸ δὲ πρὸς Νεμέας Βοιωτοὶ καὶ
 Σικυνῶνιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς. ἵπποι δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐ παρ-
 ἦσαν· οὐ γάρ πω οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνοι τῶν ξυμ-
 4 μάχων, ἦκον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πλήθος τῶν Ἀργείων
 καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οὐχ οὕτω δεινὸν τὸ παρὸν
 ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ' ἐν καλῷ ἐδόκει ἡ μάχη ἔσεσθαι,
 καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπειληφέναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν
 τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει. τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων δύο
 ἄνδρες, Θράσυλλός τε, τῶν πέντε στρατηγῶν εἰς
 ὧν, καὶ Ἀλκίφρων, πρόξενος Λακεδαιμονίων, ἤδη
 τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅσον οὐ ξυνιόντων προσελθόντε
 Ἄγιδι διελεγέσθην μὴ ποιεῖν μάχην· ἐτοίμους
 γὰρ εἶναι Ἀργεῖους δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι
 ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας, εἴ τι ἐπικαλοῦσιν Ἀργεῖοις
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰρήνην ἄγειν σπον-
 δὰς ποιησαμένους.

LX. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα εἰπόντες τῶν Ἀργείων
 ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ πλήθους κελεύσαντος εἶπον·

slew a few of the Phliasians, but had rather more of their own men slain by the Corinthians. Meanwhile the Boeotians, Megarians and Sicyonians advanced toward Nemea as they had been ordered, but found the Argives no longer there; for these had gone down and, seeing their country being ravaged, were forming for battle, while the Lacedaemonians were preparing to meet them. The Argives were hemmed in on all sides: in the direction of the plain the Lacedaemonians and their associates shut them off from the city; above were the Corinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians; towards Nemea were the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians. They had no cavalry at hand, for the Athenians¹ alone of their allies had not yet arrived. The main body of the Argives and their allies thought their present situation was not so very dangerous, but that the battle was likely to be fought under favourable circumstances, and that the Lacedaemonians had been cut off in their country and close to the city of Argos. But two of the Argives—Thrasylus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, proxenus of the Lacedaemonians—when the two armies were all but in collision, went to Agis and urged him not to bring on a battle; for the Argives were ready to offer as well as to accept a fair and impartial arbitration of any complaint which the Lacedaemonians had against the Argives, and for the future to make a treaty and keep the peace.

LX. Those of the Argives who said these things spoke on their own authority and not by order of

¹ Upon their cavalry the Argives had relied. Their coming is announced ch. lxi. 1.

καὶ ὁ Ἄγρις δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτός, καὶ οὐ
 μετὰ τῶν πλειόνων οὐδὲ αὐτὸς βουλευσάμενος
 ἄλλ' ἢ ἐνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας τῶν ἐν τέλει ξυστρα-
 τευομένων, σπένδεται τέσσαρας μῆνας ἐν οἷς ἔδει
 ἐπιτελέσαι αὐτοὺς τὰ ῥηθέντα. καὶ ἀπήγαγε τὸν
 στρατὸν εὐθύς, οὐδενὶ φράσας τῶν ἄλλων ξυμ-
 2 μάχων.¹ οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι
 εἶποντο μὲν ὥς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτία δ'
 εἶχον κατ' ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἄγριν, νομίζοντες,
 ἐν καλῷ παρατυχὸν σφίσι ξυμβαλεῖν καὶ παν-
 ταχόθεν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκλημένων καὶ ὑπὸ ἰππέων
 καὶ πεζῶν, οὐδὲν δράσαντες ἄξιον τῆς παρασκευῆς
 3 ἀπιέναι. στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον
 Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν· ὥφθη δὲ
 μάλιστα ἕως ἔτι ἦν ἀθρόον ἐν Νεμέᾳ, ἐν ᾧ Λακε-
 δαιμόνιοί τε πανστρατιᾷ ἦσαν καὶ Ἀρκάδες καὶ
 Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Σικυῶνιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς
 καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, καὶ οὗτοι πάντες
 λογάδες ἀφ' ἐκάστων, ἀξιόμαχοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι
 οὐ τῇ Ἀργείων μόνον ξυμμαχίᾳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῃ
 4 ἔτι προσγενομένῃ. τὸ μὲν οὖν στρατόπεδον οὕτως
 ἐν αἰτία ἔχοντες τὸν Ἄγριν ἀνεχώρουν τε καὶ
 5 διελύθησαν ἐπ' οἴκου ἕκαστοι· Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ
 αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλείονι αἰτία εἶχον τοὺς σπει-
 σαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους, νομίζοντες κάκεινοι
 μὴ ἂν σφίσι ποτὲ κάλλιον παρασχὼν Λακεδαι-
 μονίους διαπεφευγῆναι· πρὸς τε γὰρ τῇ σφετέρᾳ
 πόλει καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων

¹ ξυμμάχων, Hude deletes, after Kruger.

the people; and Agis, receiving the proposals for himself alone, not conferring with the majority, and without any deliberation on his own part further than to communicate the matter to a single one of the magistrates who accompanied the expedition, made a truce with the Argives for four months, within which time they were to fulfil their agreement. And so he led off his army at once, without explanation to any of the allies. The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed his guidance out of respect for the law, but among themselves they loudly blamed Agis, considering that when there was opportunity for them to join battle under favourable conditions, and the Argives were cut off on all sides both by cavalry and infantry, they were going back home without doing anything worthy of their preparations. For this was indeed the finest Hellenic force that had come together up to that time; and this was seen especially while it was still united at Nemea, including the Lacedaemonians in full force, the Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, all of them picked men from each nation, who felt themselves to be a match, not for the Argive confederacy only, but even for another such force in addition. The army, then, thus blaming Agis, withdrew and dispersed severally to their homes. But the Argives also on their part held in far greater blame those who had made the truce without consulting the people, as they too thought that the Lacedaemonians had escaped, though circumstances could never be more favourable for themselves; for the contest would have been near their own city and

6 τὸν ἀγῶνα ἂν γίγνεσθαι. τὸν τε Θράσυλλον ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ Χαράδρῳ, οὐπερ τὰς ἀπὸ στρατείας δίκας πρὶν ἐσιέναι κρίνουσιν, ἤρξαντο λεύειν. ὁ δὲ καταφυγὼν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν περιγίγνεται· τὰ μέντοι χρήματα ἐδήμευσαν αὐτοῦ.

LXI. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀθηναίων βοηθησάντων χιλίων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, ὧν ἑστρατήγουν Λάχης καὶ Νικόστρατος, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι (ὅμως γὰρ τὰς σπονδὰς ὥκνουν λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους) ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οὐ προσήγον βουλομένους χρηματίσαι, πρὶν δὴ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἡλείοι (ἔτι γὰρ 2 παρῆσαν) κατηνάγκασαν δεόμενοι. καὶ ἔλεγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀλκιβιάδου πρεσβευτοῦ παρόντος ἔν τε τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων καὶ γένοιτο, καὶ νῦν (ἐν καιρῷ γὰρ παρεῖναι σφεῖς) 3 ἄπτεσθαι χρήναι τοῦ πολέμου. καὶ πείσαντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ξυμμάχους εὐθύς ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν πάντες πλην Ἀργείων· οὗτοι δὲ ὅμως καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπελείποντο 4 πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δ' ὕστερον καὶ οὗτοι ἦλθον. καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν πάντες ἐπολιόρκουν καὶ προσβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι ἄλλως τε προσγενέσθαι σφίσι καὶ ὄμηροι ἐκ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἦσαν αὐτόθι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κεί- 5 μενοι. οἱ δὲ Ὀρχομένιοι δείσαντες τὴν τε τοῦ τείχους ἀσθένειαν καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὥς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθει, μὴ προαπόλονται,

in concert with numerous and brave allies. And so on their return they began to stone Thrasyllus in the bed of the Charadrus,¹ where before they enter the city all causes are tried that arise from an expedition. But he fled for refuge to the altar and was saved ; his property however was confiscated.

LXI. After this, when Athenian reinforcements arrived, consisting of one thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives—for they shrunk in spite of all from breaking off the truce with the Lacedaemonians—bade them go away, and would not comply with their wish to be brought before the people for negotiations, until the Mantineans and Eleans, who were still present, constrained them by their entreaties to do so. The Athenians, then, through Alcibiades, who was present as ambassador, protested before the Argives and their allies that it was not right even to have made the truce without the consent of the rest of the allies, and now, since they themselves were present opportunely, they ought to resume the war. Having persuaded the allies by their arguments, all of them except the Argives proceeded at once against Orchomenus in Arcadia ; the Argives, though convinced, remained behind at first, then later came on too. Taking post before Orchomenus, they all proceeded to besiege it and to make assaults, being especially desirous of getting possession of it because hostages from Arcadia were deposited there by the Lacedaemonians. But the Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of the wall and the number of the enemy, and being apprehensive lest they might perish before relief came, capitulated on

¹ Close under the north-east wall of the city.

ξυνέβησαν ὥστε ξύμμαχοί τε εἶναι καὶ ὁμήρους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν δοῦναι Μαντινεῦσι καὶ οὓς κατέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι παραδοῦναι.

LXII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔχοντες ἤδη τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐφ' ὃ τι χρὴ πρῶτον ἰέναι τῶν λοιπῶν. καὶ Ἡλεῖοι μὲν ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐκέλευον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἐπὶ Τεγέαν· καὶ προσέθεντο οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἡλεῖοι ὀργισθέντες ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐψηφίσαντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἶκον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Μαντινείᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ Τεγέαν ἰόντες, καὶ τινες αὐτοῖς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν¹ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεδίδοσαν τὰ πράγματα.

LXIII. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ Ἀργους τὰς τετραμηνους σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, Ἄγιν ἐν μεγάλῃ αἰτία εἶχον οὐ χειρωσάμενον σφίσιν Ἀργος, παρασχὼν καλῶς ὡς οὐπω πρότερον αὐτοὶ ἐνόμιζον· ἀθρόους γὰρ τοσοῦτους ξυμμάχους καὶ τοιοῦτους οὐ ράδιον εἶναι λαβεῖν. 2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ περὶ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἠγγέλλετο ἐαλωκέναι, πολλῶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ ἐβούλευον εὐθύς ὑπ' ὀργῆς παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὡς χρὴ τὴν τε οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ κατασκάψαι 3 καὶ δέκα μυριάσι δραχμῶν ζημιῶσαι. ὁ δὲ παρητεῖτο μηδὲν τούτων δρᾶν· ἔργῳ γὰρ ἀγαθῶ ρύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος, ἣ τότε 4 ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ὃ τι βούλονται. οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ζημίαν καὶ τὴν κατασκηφὴν ἐπέσχον, νόμον δὲ ἔθεντο ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὃς οὐπω πρότερον ἐγένετο

¹ Stahl and van Herwerden's correction for αὐτῶν Τεγεατῶν of the MSS.

condition that they should be received as allies, should give hostages for themselves to the Mantineans, and should deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them.

LXII. After this, being now in possession of Orchomenus, the allies deliberated which of the remaining places they should next proceed against. The Eleans were urging them to go against Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans. The Eleans, then, becoming angry because they did not vote to go against Lepreum, went off home; but the rest of the allies began to make preparations at Mantinea to go against Tegea; and there were even some of the inhabitants of the town who were in favour of yielding the place to them.

LXIII. But the Lacedaemonians, on their return from Argos after making the four months' truce, blamed Agis severely for not subduing Argos, when, in their judgment, the happy opportunity was such as had never been offered before; for it was not an easy matter to get together allies so many and so good. But when the tidings came about the capture of Orchomenus also, they were far more angry, and in their wrath, contrary to their habit, at once resolved to raze his house and to fine him in the sum of ten thousand drachmas.¹ But he besought them to do none of these things, promising that he would wipe out the charges by some brave deed when he took the field again; if not, they might then do what they wished. So they refrained from the fine and the razing of his house, but for the present enacted a law which had no precedent

¹ About £6,730, \$32,000.

αὐτοῖς· δέκα γὰρ ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν προσείλοντο αὐτῷ ξυμβούλους, ἄνευ ὧν μὴ κύριον εἶναι ἀπάγειν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

- LXIV. Ἐν τούτῳ δ' ἀφικνεῖται αὐτοῖς ἀγγελία παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐκ Τεγέας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρέσονται ἐν τάχει, ἀποστήσεται αὐτῶν Τεγέα πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἀφίστηκεν.
- 2 ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων πανδημεὶ
- 3 ὀξεῖα καὶ οἷα οὐπω πρότερον. ἐχώρουν δὲ ἐς Ὀρεσθεῖον τῆς Μαιναλίας· καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀρκάδων σφετέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις προεῖπον ἄθροισθεῖσιν ἵεναι κατὰ πόδας αὐτῶν ἐς Τεγέαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ὀρεσθείου πάντες ἐλθόντες, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τὸ ἕκτον μέρος σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀποπέμψαντες ἐπ' οἶκον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἦν, ὥστε τὰ οἶκοι φρουρεῖν, τῷ λοιπῷ στρατεύματι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Τεγέαν. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀπ' Ἀρκάδων παρήσαν.
- 4 πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας καὶ Λοκρούς, βοηθεῖν κελεύοντες κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μαντίνειαν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγου τε ἐγίγνετο καὶ οὐ ῥάδιον ἦν μὴ ἀθρόοις καὶ ἀλλήλους περιμείνασι διελθεῖν τὴν πολεμίαν (ξυνέκληε γὰρ διὰ μέσου), ὅμως δὲ ἠπείγοντο.
- 5 Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τοὺς παρόντας Ἀρκάδων ξυμμάχους ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μαντινικήν, καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι πρὸς τῷ Ἡρακλείῳ ἐδήουν τὴν γῆν.

¹ Compare similar proceedings in II. lxxxv. 1 ; III. lxix. 1 ; VIII. xxxix. 2.

among them; for they chose ten of the Spartiates as counsellors¹ for him without whose consent it was not lawful for him to lead an army out of the city.

LXIV. Meanwhile word came from their friends² in Tegea that, unless they should come quickly, Tegea would go over to the Argives and their allies, and already had all but done so. Whereupon succour was sent, both of the Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Helots, in full force, promptly and on such a scale as never before. These advanced to Orestheum in Maenalia, and gave orders to their allies among the Arcadians to get together and come close upon their heels to Tegea. After going, all together, as far as the Orestheum, they sent home from there a sixth part of their force—in which were included the older and younger men—to keep guard at home, and with the remainder of their army reached Tegea, where not long afterwards the allies from Arcadia arrived. They sent also to Corinth and to the Boeotians, Phocians and Locrians, bidding them bring aid in all haste to Mantinea. But to some this was a sudden call, and it was not easy for them, except in a body and after waiting for one another, to go through the enemy's country; for that closed the way, lying just between. Nevertheless they hurried on. But the Lacedaemonians, taking up the allies of the Arcadians that were present, invaded Mantinea, and encamping at the sanctuary of Heracles proceeded to ravage the country.

¹ As opposed to the faction mentioned at the end of ch. lxii.

LXV. Οἱ δ' Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὥς εἶδον
 αὐτούς, καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐρυμνὸν καὶ δυσ-
 2 πρόσοδον παρετάξαντο ὥς ἐς μάχην. καὶ οἱ
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπῆσαν· καὶ μέχρι
 μὲν λίθου καὶ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν· ἔπειτα
 τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἀγιδι ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν
 πρὸς χωρίον καρτερόν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι διανοεῖται
 κακὸν κακῶ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἀργους ἐπαι-
 3 τίου ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προ-
 θυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλομένην εἶναι. ὁ δέ, εἴτε
 καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιβόημα εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλο τι ἢ¹
 κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δόξαν ἐξαίφνης, πάλιν τὸ στρά-
 4 τευμα κατὰ τάχος πρὶν ξυμμεῖξαι ἀπῆγεν. καὶ
 ἀφικόμενος πρὸς τὴν Τεγεᾶτιν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν
 ἐς τὴν Μαντινικὴν, περὶ οὐπὲρ ὥς τὰ πολλὰ
 βλάπτοντος ὁποτέρωσέ ἂν ἐσπίπτῃ Μαντινῆς καὶ
 Τεγεᾶται πολεμοῦσιν· ἐβούλετο δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ
 λόφου βοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος ἐκτροπὴν,
 ἐπειδὰν πύθωνται, καταβιβάσαι² καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμαλῷ
 5 τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν
 ταύτην μέINAS αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν· οἱ
 δ' Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατα-
 πλαγέοντες τῇ ἐξ ὀλίγου αἰφνιδίῳ αὐτῶν ἀναχω-
 ρήσει οὐκ εἶχον ὃ τι εἰκάσωσιν· εἴτ' ἐπειδὴ
 ἀναχωροῦντες ἐκείνοί τε ἀπέκρυσαν καὶ σφεῖς
 ἡσύχαζον καὶ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθουν, ἐνταῦθα τοὺς
 ἑαυτῶν στρατηγούς αὐθις ἐν αἰτία εἶχον τό τε

¹ But Hude deletes ἢ, making the sense to be, "had altered his views in a like manner."

² τοὺς Ἀργεῖους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, in MSS. after καταβιβάσαι, deleted by van Herwerden.

LXV. But the Argives and their allies, on seeing them, took up a position that was steep and difficult of access, and drew up for battle. The Lacedaemonians went against them at once, advancing within a stone's throw or a javelin's cast; then one of the older men, seeing that they were going against a strong place, called out to Agis that he thought to cure one ill with another, meaning that the motive of his present unseasonable eagerness was to make amends for the culpable retreat from Argos.¹ Agis, then, whether on account of this call, or because it suddenly struck him, too, that some other course was better than the one he was following, led his army back again in all haste without coming into conflict. Then when he had reached Tegean territory he set about diverting into Mantinean territory the stream of water about which the Mantineans and Tegeates are always warring, on account of the harm it commonly does to whichever country it empties into. He wished to make the troops on the hill² come down to prevent the diversion of the water as soon as they should hear about it, and thus force them to fight the battle in the plain. So he lingered for that day in the neighbourhood of the stream and set about diverting it; but the Argives and their allies were at first amazed at their opponents' sudden withdrawal after coming close, and were at a loss what to make of it; afterwards, however, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight, while they themselves kept quiet and did not follow after them, they began again to find fault with their own generals

¹ cf. ch. lxi. 1; lxiii. 2.

² i.e. χωρίον ἐρυμνόν mentioned above.

πρότερον καλῶς ληφθέντας πρὸς Ἄργει Λακεδαιμόνιους ἀφεθῆναι καὶ νῦν ὅτι ἀποδιδράσκοντας οὐδεὶς ἐπιδιώκει, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡσυχίαν οἱ μὲν
 6 σφίζονται, σφεῖς δὲ προδίδονται. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ παραντίκα, ὕστερον δὲ ἀπάγουσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου καὶ προελθόντες ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ὡς ἰόντες ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους.

LXVI. Τῇ δ' ὕστεραίᾳ οἳ τε Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ξυνετάξαντο, ὥς ἔμελλον μαχεῖσθαι, ἦν περιτύχωσιν· οἳ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον ἰόντες ὁρῶσι δι' ὀλίγου τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν τάξει τε ἤδη πάντας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου
 2 προεληλυθότας. μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς δ' ἐμέμνηντο ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν (διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἢ παρασκευῇ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο), καὶ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα
 3 ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον. βασιλέως γὰρ ἄγοντος ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάντα ἄρχεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράζει τὸ δέον, οἱ δὲ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοῖς πεντηκοντῆρσιν, αὗτις δ' οὗτοι τοῖς ἐνωμοτάρχαις, καὶ οὗτοι τῇ ἐνωμοτίᾳ.
 4 καὶ αἱ παραγγέλσεις, ἣν τι βούλονται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ χωροῦσι καὶ ταχεῖαι ἐπέρχονται· σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὀλίγου¹ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν

¹ πλὴν ὀλίγου, deleted by Hude, after Badham.

because on a previous occasion the Lacedaemonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been allowed to escape, and now when they were running away no one pursued them; on the contrary, the enemy were quietly making good their safety, while they themselves were being betrayed. The generals were confounded for the moment by the outcry, but afterwards they moved the troops from the hill and going forward into the plain encamped there, with the intention of advancing against the enemy.

LXVI. On the next day the Argives and their allies drew up in the order in which they intended to fight if they fell in with the enemy; and the Lacedaemonians, going away from the stream and back to their old camp at the sanctuary of Heracles, suddenly saw the enemy close at hand, all by that time in order of battle and occupying an advanced position away from the hill. Never had the Lacedaemonians, as far back as they remembered, been in such consternation as on this occasion. Their preparation had to be made on short notice; and at once in haste they fell into their own array, king Agis directing each movement as the law prescribed. For when a king leads all orders are given by him: he himself gives the necessary order to the polemarchs,¹ they to the commanders of battalions, these to the captains of companies, these again to the commanders of platoons, and these to the platoons. So the special orders, if they wish to give any, proceed in the same way, and reach their destination quickly; for almost the whole army of the Lacedaemonians consists of officers over

¹ Commanders of the six *morae*, according to Xen. *Resp. Lac.* XI. IV.

Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

LXVII. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, αἰεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες· παρὰ δ' αὐτοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Θράκης Βρασιδείοι στρατιῶται καὶ νεοδαμῶδεις μετ' αὐτῶν· ἔπειτ' ἤδη Λακεδαιμόνιοι αὐτοὶ ἐξῆς καθίστασαι τοὺς λόχους καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδων Ἡραιῆς, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Μαινάλιοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρα Τεγεᾶται καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὀλίγοι τὸ ἔσχατον ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ 2 ἱππῆς αὐτῶν ἐφ' ἐκατέρῳ τῷ κέρα. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὕτως ἐτάξαντο· οἱ δ' ἐναντίοι αὐτοῖς δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Μαντινῆς εἶχον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων τὸ ἔργον ἐγίγνετο, παρὰ δ' αὐτοῖς οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρκάδων ἦσαν, ἔπειτα Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρείχε, καὶ ἐχόμενοι αὐτῶν οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν, Κλεωναῖοι καὶ Ὀρνεᾶται, ἔπειτα Ἀθηναῖοι ἔσχατοι τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας ἔχοντες καὶ ἱππῆς μετ' αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι.

LXVIII. Τάξις μὲν ἦδε καὶ παρασκευὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεῖζον ἐφάνη. ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι, ἣ καθ' ἐκάστους ἐκατέρων ἢ ξύμπαντας, οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἠγροεῖτο, τῶν δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλήθη ἠπι-

officers, and the responsibility for the execution of orders devolves upon many.

LXVII. On this occasion there were posted on the left wing the Sciritae,¹ who alone of the Lacedaemonians always have that post by themselves; next to them the soldiers who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, and with them the Neodamodes; next the Lacedaemonians themselves, with their battalions posted one after another, and by them the Heraeans of Arcadia; after these the Maenaliens; on the right wing the Tegeates, with a few of the Lacedaemonians holding the end of the line; and on either wing the cavalry. The Lacedaemonians were thus arrayed. On their enemy's side the Mantineans had the right wing, because the action was to be fought in their country; by their side were their Arcadian allies; then the thousand picked men of the Argives, for whom the state had for a long time furnished at public expense training in matters pertaining to war; next to them the rest of the Argives; after these their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneates; then the Athenians last, on the left wing, and with them their own cavalry.

LXVIII. Such was the order and the composition of the two sides. The army of the Lacedaemonians appeared the larger; but the number, either of the separate contingents or of the total on either side, I could not possibly state accurately. For on account of the secrecy of their polity the number of the Lacedaemonians was unknown; and that claimed for the others, on account of men's tendency to boast with regard to their own numbers, was discredited.

¹ Inhabitants of the rough hilly country towards the territory of Tegea.

στείτο. ἐκ μέντοι τοιούδε λογισμοῦ ἔξεστί τῳ σκοπεῖν τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τότε παραγενόμενον πλήθος· λόχοι μὲν γὰρ ἐμάχοντο ἑπτὰ ἄνευ Σκιριτῶν 3 ὄντων ἑξακοσίων, ἐν δὲ ἐκάστῳ λόχῳ πεντηκοστύες ἦσαν τέσσαρες, καὶ ἐν τῇ πεντηκοστῷ ἐνωμοτίαι τέσσαρες. τῆς τε ἐνωμοτίας ἐμάχοντο ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ζυγῷ τέσσαρες· ἐπὶ δὲ βύθος ἐτάξαντο μὲν οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ὥς λοχαγὸς ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο, ἐπὶ πᾶν δὲ κατέστησαν ἐπὶ ὀκτώ. παρὰ δὲ ἅπαν πλὴν Σκιριτῶν τετρακόσιοι καὶ δυοῖν δέοντες πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες ἡ πρώτη τάξις ἦν.

LXIX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνιέναι ἔμελλον ἤδη, ἐνταῦθα καὶ παραινέσεις καθ' ἐκάστους ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων στρατηγῶν τοιαῖδε ἐγίγνοντο, Μαντινεῦσι μὲν ὅτι ὑπὲρ τε πατρίδος ἢ μάχη ἔσται καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἅμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τῆς δὲ μὴ αὐθις πειρᾶσθαι· Ἀργείοις δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τε παλαιᾶς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ποτὲ ἰσομοιρίας μὴ διὰ παντὸς στερισκομένους ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἅμα ἐχθροὺς καὶ ἀστυγείτορας ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀμύνεσθαι· τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις, καλὸν εἶναι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἀγωνιζομένους μηδενὸς λείπεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους νικήσαντες τὴν τε ἀρχὴν βεβαιωτέραν καὶ μείζω ἔξουσιν, καὶ οὐ μὴ ποτέ τις αὐτοῖς ἄλλος ἐς 2 τὴν γῆν ἔλθῃ. τοῖς μὲν Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις

¹ The sum-total of the whole army was 4,184 men ($7 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 448 \times 8 = 3,584 + 600 = 4,184$).

However, from the following mode of computation it is allowable to estimate the number of the Lacedaemonians that were then present. There were engaged in the battle seven battalions, without the Sciritae, who numbered six hundred, and in each battalion were four companies of fifty, in each company four platoons. In the first rank of each company fought four men; in depth, however, they were not all drawn up alike, but as each battalion-commander preferred—on the average eight deep. Along the whole line, then, exclusive of the Sciritae, the first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.¹

LXIX. When they were on the point of engaging, exhortations were made to the several contingents by their own generals to the following effect: The Mantineans were reminded that the battle would be for fatherland, and, moreover, for dominion or servitude—that they should not be deprived of the one after having made trial of it, and should not again experience the other; the Argives, that the contest would be both for their ancient hegemony² and for their old equality of influence³ in the Peloponnese, that they must not brook being deprived of it forever, and at the same time must avenge themselves for many wrongs on men who were enemies and near neighbours at that; the Athenians, that it was glorious, contending along with many and brave allies, to be inferior to none, and that if they should conquer the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnese they would have a greater empire and hold it more securely, and no one would ever invade their country again. Such were the admonitions

² Under Agamemnon.

³ Before the Persian Wars.

τοιαῦτα παρηγέθη· Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ' ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σῶζουσιν ἢ λόγων δι' ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθεῖσαν παραίνεσιν.

LXX. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν, Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμῳ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν¹ καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

LXXI. Ξυνιόντων δ' ἔτι Ἄγρις ὁ βασιλεὺς τοιόνδε ἐβουλεύσατο δρᾶσαι. τὰ στρατόπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἅπαντα τοῦτο· ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ κέρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ξυνόδοις μᾶλλον ἐξωθεῖται, καὶ περιέσχουσι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐώνυμον ἀμφοτέροι τῷ δεξιῷ, διὰ τὸ φοβουμένους προσστέλλειν τὰ γυμνὰ ἕκαστον ὥς, μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ ἐν δεξιᾷ παρατεταγμένου ἀσπίδι καὶ νομίζειν τὴν πυκνότητα τῆς συγκλήσεως εὐσκεπαστότατον εἶναι· καὶ ἡγεῖται μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης ὁ πρωτοστάτης τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως, προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν, ἔπονται δὲ διὰ τὸν
 2 αὐτὸν φόβον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τότε περιέσχον μὲν οἱ Μαντινῆς πολὺ τῷ κέρα τῶν Σκιριτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πλέον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Τεγεᾶται τῶν
 3 Ἀθηναίων, ὅσῳ μείζον τὸ στράτευμα εἶχον. δείσας δὲ Ἄγρις μὴ σφῶν κυκλωθῇ τὸ εὐώνυμον, καὶ

¹ With Gellius and the Schol. for προέλθοιεν of the MSS.

addressed to the Argives and their allies; the Lacedaemonians, however, exhorted one another man by man, using also their war-songs—as brave men to remember what they had learned, knowing that long-continued actual practice meant more for their salvation than any brief admonition, however well spoken.

LXX. After this the conflict commenced, the Argives and their allies advancing eagerly and impetuously, but the Lacedaemonians slowly and to the music of many flute-players placed among them according to custom, not with any religious motive, but in order that they might march up with even step and keeping time without breaking their order, as large armies are apt to do in going into battle.

LXXI. But while they were still closing, King Agis resolved to make the following manœuvre. All armies are apt, on coming together, to thrust out their right wing too much; and both sides extend with their right beyond their opponents' left wing, because in their fear each man brings his uncovered side as close as possible to the shield of the man stationed on his right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better is the protection. And it is the first man on the right wing who is primarily responsible for this, since he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own uncovered side, and the rest, from a like fear, follow his example. And so on this occasion the Mantineans extended with their right wing far beyond the Sciritæ; and the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates further still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was larger. So Agis, in fear that his left might be encircled, and thinking that

νομίσας ἄγαν περιέχειν τοὺς Μαντινέας, τοῖς μὲν Σκιρίταις καὶ Βρασιδείοις ἐσήμηνεν ἐπεξαγαγόντας ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς Μαντινεύσιν, ἐς δὲ τὸ διάκενον τοῦτο παρήγγελλεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως δύο λόχους τῶν πολεμάρχων Ἴππονοῖδα καὶ Ἀριστοκλεῖ ἔχουσι παρελθεῖν καὶ ἐσβαλόντας πληρῶσαι, νομίζων τῷ θ' ἑαυτῶν δεξιῷ ἔτι περιουσίαν ἔσσεσθαι καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας βεβαιότερον τετάξεσθαι.

LXXII. Ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτῷ ἅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐφόδῳ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου παραγγείλαντι τὸν τε Ἀριστοκλέα καὶ τὸν Ἴππονοῖδαν μὴ ῥηθῆναι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰτίημα ὕστερον φεύγειν ἐκ Σπάρτης, δόξαντας μαλακισθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς πολέμους φθᾶσαι τῇ προσμείξει, καὶ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκιρίτας ὡς οὐ παρήλθον οἱ λόχοι, πάλιν αὖ σφίσι προσμείξαι, μὴ δυνηθῆναι ἔτι
 2 μὴδὲ τούτους ξυγκλῆσαι. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἥσσον περιγεγόμενοι.
 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ γὰρ ἐν χερσὶν ἐγίγνοντο τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τὸ μὲν τῶν Μαντινέων δεξιὸν τρέπει αὐτῶν τοὺς Σκιρίτας καὶ τοὺς Βρασιδείους, καὶ ἐσπεσόντες οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες κατὰ τὸ διάκενον καὶ οὐ ξυγκλησθὲν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους διέφθειρον καὶ κυκλωσάμενοι ἔτρεψαν καὶ ἐξέωσαν ἐς τὰς ἀμάξας καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων ἀπέ-

the Mantineans were extending too far beyond it, gave orders to the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas to move out, away from his main body, and make the line equal to that of the Mantineans; then he directed two polemarchs, Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to cross over with two companies from the right wing, throw themselves in and fill up the gap thus created, thinking that his own right wing would still have more than enough men, and that the line opposed to the Mantineans would be strengthened.

LXXII. It turned out, then, as he gave this order at the very moment of the attack and on a sudden, that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to move over—for which offence they were afterwards exiled from Sparta, as they were considered to have acted as cowards; and that the enemy were too quick for him in coming to close quarters; and then, when the companies did not move over to replace the Sciritae, and he gave orders to the Sciritae to join the main body again, even these were now no longer able to close up the line. Yet in the most striking way the Lacedaemonians, although they were in all respects proved inferior in point of tactical skill, did on this occasion show that they were none the less superior in courage. For when they came to close quarters with the foe, the right wing of the Mantineans routed, it is true, the Sciritae and the Brasideans, and then the Mantineans and their allies and the thousand picked men of the Argives, rushing into the gap that had not been closed, played havoc with the Lacedaemonians; for they surrounded and put them to rout, and drove them in among the wagons, slaying some of the older men

4 κτεινάν τινας. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν ἡσσῶντο οἱ Λακε-
 δαιμόνιοι· τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ μάλιστα
 τῷ μέσῳ, ἥπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἦν Ἄγις καὶ περὶ
 αὐτὸν οἱ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καλούμενοι, προσπε-
 σόντες τῶν τε Ἀργείων τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις καὶ
 πεντελόχοις ὠνομασμένοις καὶ Κλεωναίοις καὶ
 Ὀρειταῖς καὶ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις
 ἔτρεψαν οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας,
 ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπῆσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας
 καὶ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι
 τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

LXXIII. Ὡς δὲ ταύτῃ ἐνεδεδώκει τὸ τῶν
 Ἀργείων καὶ ξυμμάχων στράτευμα, παρερρή-
 γνυντο ἤδη ἅμα καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἅμα τὸ
 δεξιὸν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Τεγεατῶν ἐκυ-
 κλοῦτο τῷ περιέχοντι σφῶν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ
 ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς κίνδυνος περιειστήκει, τῇ
 μὲν κυκλουμένους, τῇ δὲ ἤδη ἡσσημένους. καὶ
 μάλιστα ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐταλαιπώρησαν, εἰ
 2 μὴ οἱ ἱππῆς παρόντες αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμοι ἦσαν. καὶ
 ξυνέβη τὸν Ἄγιν, ὥς ἦσθετο τὸ εὐώνυμον σφῶν
 ποιοῦν τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων
 τοὺς χιλίους, παραγγεῖλαι παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι
 3 χωρῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ νικώμενον. καὶ γενομένου τούτου
 οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὥς παρῆλθε καὶ ἐξέ-
 κλινεν ὑπὸ σφῶν τὸ στράτευμα, καθ' ἡσυχίαν

stationed there. In this quarter, then, the Lacedaemonians were worsted; but in the rest of the army, and especially in the centre, where King Agis was, and about him the three hundred who were called knights,¹ they fell upon the older men of the Argives, the so-called five companies, and upon the Cleonaeans, the Orneates, and those of the Athenians that were arrayed with them, and routed them. Most of the enemy did not even wait to come to blows, but when the Lacedaemonians came on gave way at once, some of them being trodden underfoot in their effort to get out of the way before being hemmed in by the Lacedaemonians.

LXXIII. When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way in this quarter, their line was on the point of being broken in both directions; and at the same time the right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeates was beginning to encircle the Athenians with the outflanking part of their own line; and so danger beset them on both sides, for they were being surrounded in one quarter and had been already defeated in the other. And they would have suffered more than any part of the whole army if their cavalry had not been present and proved helpful to them. It happened, too, that Agis, perceiving that the left of his own forces, which was opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, was in distress, gave orders for the whole army to go to the assistance of the part that was in danger of defeat. When this was done, the Athenians, as the enemy's force passed on and moved away from them, quietly made their escape,

¹ Chosen from the flower of the Spartan youth and serving as a royal body-guard, on foot as well as on horseback.

ἐσώθησαν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων μετ' αὐτῶν τὸ ἦσση-
θέν. οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν
Ἀργείων οἱ λογάδες οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ἐγκεῖσθαι τοῖς
ἐναντίοις τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, ἀλλ' ὁρῶντες τοὺς τε
σφετέρους νενικημένους καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
4 ἐπιφερομένους ἐς φυγὴν ἐτράποντο. καὶ τῶν μὲν
Μαντινέων καὶ πλείους διεφθάρησαν, τῶν δὲ
Ἀργείων λογάδων τὸ πολὺ ἐσώθη. ἡ μέντοι
φυγὴ καὶ ἀποχώρησις οὐ βίαιος οὐδὲ μακρὰ ἦν·
οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ τρέψαι χρο-
νίους τὰς μάχας καὶ βεβαίους τῷ μέρειν ποιοῦνται,
τρέψαντες δὲ βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς
διώξεις.

LXXIV. Καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι
ἐγγύτατα τούτων ἐγένετο, πλείστου δὲ χρόνου
μεγίστη δὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀξιο-
2 λογωτάτων πόλεων ξυιελθούσα. οἱ δὲ Λακε-
δαιμόνιοι προθέμενοι τῶν πολεμίων νεκρῶν τὰ
ὄπλα τροπαῖον εὐθὺς ἵστασαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς
ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνείλοντο καὶ ἀπή-
γαγον ἐς Τεγέαν, οὐπερ ἐτάφησαν, καὶ τοὺς τῶν
πολεμίων ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδεσαν. ἀπέθανον δὲ
Ἀργείων μὲν καὶ Ὀρνεατῶν καὶ Κλεωναίων
ἐπτακόσιοι, Μαντινέων δὲ διακόσιοι, καὶ Ἀθη-
ναίων ξὺν Αἰγινίταις διακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ
ἀμφοτέροι. Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ οἱ μὲν ξύμμαχοι
οὐκ ἐταλαιπώρησαν ὥστε καὶ ἀξιόλογόν τι ἀπο-
γενέσθαι· αὐτῶν δὲ χαλεπὸν μὲν ἦν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν πυθέσθαι, ἐλέγοντο δὲ περὶ τριακοσίου
ἀποθανεῖν.

LXXV. Τῆς δὲ μάχης μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι καὶ

and with them the part of the Argives that had been worsted. The Mantineans and their allies, on the other hand, and the picked men of the Argives, were no longer disposed to press home the attack on their opponents, but seeing their own side defeated and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon them, turned to flight. On the part of the Mantineans the losses were more serious, but of the picked men of the Argives the greater part was saved. The flight, however, was not hotly pursued, nor did the retreat extend to any great distance; for the Lacedaemonians fight their battles long and stubbornly, standing their ground until they rout their foes, but when they have routed them their pursuits are brief and only for a little distance.

LXXIV. Such, then, was the battle—or as like as possible to this description—being the greatest that had occurred within a very long time between Hellenic forces, and fought by the most famous states. The Lacedaemonians, halting in front of their enemies' dead, straightway set up a trophy and stripped the slain, then took up their own dead and withdrew to Tegea, where they buried them, giving up under truce those of the enemy. There were slain, of the Argives, Orneates and Cleonaeans seven hundred, of the Mantineans two hundred, of the Athenians, together with the Aeginetans,¹ two hundred, and both their generals. On the side of the Lacedaemonians, the allies did not suffer so that any number worth mentioning was missing; about themselves it was difficult to learn the truth, but near three hundred were said to have been killed.

LXXV. As the battle was about to take place,

¹ Athenian colonists settled in Aegina; cf. II. xxvii. 1.

- Πλειστοάναξ ὁ ἕτερος βασιλεὺς ἔχων τοὺς τε
 πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους ἐβοήθησε, καὶ μέχρι
 μὲν Τεγέας ἀφίκετο, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην
 2 ἀπεχώρησεν. καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ ἔξω
 ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους ἀπέτρεψαν πέμψαντες οἱ
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ
 τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφέντες (Κάρνεια γὰρ αὐτοῖς
 3 ἐτύγχανον ὄντα) τὴν ἐορτὴν ἤγον. καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ
 τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε
 μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν καὶ ἔς
 τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτήτα ἐνὶ ἔργῳ
 τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο, τύχη μὲν ὡς ἐδόκουν κακι-
 ζόμενοι, γνώμη δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες.
 4 Τῇ δὲ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ξυνέβη τῆς μάχης
 ταύτης καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαυρίους πανδημεὶ ἐσβαλεῖν
 ἐς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν ὡς ἐρήμον οὖσαν καὶ τοὺς
 ὑπολοίπους φύλακας τῶν Ἀργείων ἐξελθόντων
 5 αὐτῶν διαφθεῖραι πολλούς. καὶ Ἡλείων τρισχι-
 λίων ὀπλιτῶν βοηθησάντων Μαντινεῦσιν ὕστερον
 τῆς μάχης καὶ Ἀθηναίων χιλίων πρὸς τοῖς προ-
 τέροις, ἐστράτευσαν ἅπαντες οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὗτοι
 εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαυρον, ἕως οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κάρ-
 νεια ἤγον, καὶ διελόμενοι τὴν πόλιν περιετείχιζον.
 6 καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐξεπαύσαντο, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ,
 ὥσπερ προσετάχθησαν, τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Ἡραιον
 εὐθὺς ἐξειργάσαντο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ξυγκαταλι-
 πόντες ἅπαντες τῷ τειχίσματι φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρη-
 σαν κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

¹ cf. ch. lxiv. 3.

² cf. ch. lxiv. 4.

BOOK V. LXXV. 1-6

Pleistoanax, the other king, set out with the older and younger men ¹ to bring succour, and got as far as Tegea; but learning there of the victory he returned. The allies, too, from Corinth and from outside the Isthmus ² were turned back by messengers sent by the Lacedaemonians, who then likewise withdrew and, dismissing their allies, celebrated the festival of the Carneia; for it happened to fall at that time. And the charge brought against them at that time by the Hellenes, both of cowardice because of the calamity on the island of Sphacteria, and of general bad judgment and dilatoriness, they had wiped out by this one action; they were thought to have incurred disgrace through ill-luck, but to be still the same in spirit.

Aug.
418 B.C.

The day before this battle it happened also that the Epidaurians in full force invaded the territory of Argos, thinking to find it now undefended, and slew many of those who had been left behind as guards when the main body of the Argives had taken the field. And now, since three thousand Elean hoplites had come to the aid of the Mantineans after the battle, and also one thousand Athenians in addition to their former contingent, all these allies marched at once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedaemonians were celebrating the Carneia, and proceeded to build a wall round the city, dividing up the work. The rest indeed left off, but the Athenians soon finished the fortification of the promontory on which stood the Heraeum, which was the part that had been assigned to them. In this part of the fortification they left a garrison, to which all contributed, and then withdrew to their several cities. And so the summer ended.

LXXVI. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἀρχομένου εὐθὺς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι¹ ἐξεστράτευσαν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Τεγέαν λόγους προύπεμπον ἐς
 2 τὸ Ἄργος ξυμβατηρίους. ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πρότερόν τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ βουλόμενοι τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἀργεὶ καταλῦσαι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μάχῃ ἐγεγένητο, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐδύναντο πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ἐβούλοντο δὲ
 3 πρῶτον σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐθις ὕστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται πρόξενος ὢν Ἀργείων Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δύο λόγῳ φέρων ἐς τὸ Ἄργος, τὸν μὲν καθότι εἰ βούλονται πολεμεῖν, τὸν δ' ὥς εἰ εἰρήνην ἄγειν. καὶ γενομένης πολλῆς ἀντιλογίας (ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρών) οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πρᾶσσοντες, ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τολμῶντες, ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους προσδέξασθαι τὸν ξυμβατήριον λόγον. ἔστι δὲ ὅδε.

LXXVII.² “Καττάδε δοκεῖ τᾷ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμβαλέσθαι ποττῶς Ἀργείως.

“Ἀποδιδόντας τὼς παῖδας τοῖς Ὀρχομενίοις καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τοῖς Μαιναλίοις, καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τὼς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀποδιδόντας.

2 “Καὶ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρῳ ἐκβῶντας καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναιροῦντας. αἱ δὲ κα μὴ εἴκωντι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρῳ, πολεμίως εἶμεν τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ

¹ ἐπειδὴ τὰ Κίρνεα ἤγαγον, in the MSS. after οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, bracketed by Hude, following Kruger.

² The dialect in chs. lxxvii. and lxxix. is Doric.

LXXVI. At the very beginning of the following winter, the Lacedaemonians led out an army and came to Tegea, whence they sent on to Argos proposals for peace. There had been before this partisans of theirs at Argos who wished to put down the democracy there, and after the battle had been fought they were far better able to persuade the people to come to an agreement with Sparta. They wished, after they had first made a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to conclude later an alliance also, and having done so to attack the democracy. And now there arrived at Argos Lichas son of Arcesilaus, proxenus of the Argives, bringing from the Lacedaemonians two proposals: the one stating on what conditions they should make war, if they wished that; the other, how they should keep the peace, if they preferred that. And after much opposition—for Alcibiades chanced to be present—the men who were working for the Lacedaemonians, venturing now to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the proposal for peace, which was as follows:

LXXVII. "It seems good to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians to make an agreement with the Argives on the following terms:

1. "The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians¹ their children and to the Maenalians² their men, and to the Lacedaemonians³ the men they deposited at Mantinea.

2. "They shall evacuate Epidaurus and demolish the fortification there. And if the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be enemies

¹ *cf.* ch. lxi. 5.

² *cf.* ch. lxi. 4, though the Maenalians are not expressly mentioned there.

³ *cf.* ch. lxi. 5.

τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων
 ξυμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ξυμμάχοις.

3 “Καὶ αἷ τινα τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παῖδα ἔχοντι,
 ἀποδόμεν ταῖς πολίεσσι πάσαις.

4 “Περὶ δὲ τῷ σιῷ σύματος, αἷ μὲν λήν, τοῖς
 Ἐπιδαυρίοις ὄρκον δόμεν, αἷ δέ, αὐτῶς ὁμόσαι.

5 “Τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ
 μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως εἶμεν πάσας
 κατὰ πάτρια.

6 “Αἷ δέ κα τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσῳ τις ἐπὶ τὰν
 Πελοπόννησον γὰν ἦ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀλεξέμεναι
 ἀμόθι βουλευσαμένως, ὅπα κα δικαιοτάτα δοκῇ
 τοῖς Πελοποννασίοις.

7 “Ὅσοι δ’ ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσῳ τῶν Λακεδαι-
 μονίων ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσοῦνται ἐν
 τῷ περ καὶ τοὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τοὶ τῶν
 Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

8 “Ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέ-
 σθαι, αἷ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ. αἷ δέ τι δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμ-
 μάχοις, οἷκαδ’ ἀπιάλλην.”

LXXVIII. Τοῦτον μὲν τὸν λόγον προσεδέξαντο
 πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ
 στράτευμα ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκ τῆς Τεγέας ἐπ’ οἴκου·
 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιμειξίας οὔσης ἤδη παρ’ ἀλλή-
 λους, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἔπραξαν αὐθις οἱ αὐτοὶ
 ἄνδρες ὥστε τὴν Μαντινέων καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ
 Ἠλείων ξυμμαχίαν ἀφέντας Ἀργεῖους σπονδὰς

to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies of the Argives.

3. "If the Lacedaemonians have in custody any children, they shall restore these in all cases to their cities.

4. "As to the offering to the god,¹ if they wish they shall impose an oath upon the Epidaurians; but if not, they shall swear it themselves.

5. "The cities in the Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall all be independent according to their hereditary usages.

6. "If anyone from outside the Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, they shall repel the invader, taking counsel together, in whatever way shall seem to the Peloponnesians most just.

7. "Such states as are allies of the Lacedaemonians outside of the Peloponnesus shall be on the same footing as are the other allies of the Lacedaemonians and of the Argives, all retaining their own territory.

8. "They shall communicate this agreement to their allies and make terms with them, if it seem best. But if the allies prefer, they may send the treaty home for consideration."²

LXXVIII. The Argives accepted this proposal at first, and the army of the Lacedaemonians returned home from Tegea. But not long after this, when there was now intercourse between them, the same men again brought it about that the Argives renounced the alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans,

¹ Apollo Pythaeus; cf. ch. liii.

² i.e. may refer it back to the states for their decision.

καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.
καὶ ἐγένοντο αἶδε.

LXXIX. “Καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν εἶμεν πεν-
τήκοντα ἔτη.

“Ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας
κατὰ πάτρια· ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλεις ταὶ ἐν
Πελοποννήσῳ κοινανέοντων τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ
τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν
αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς
ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας.

2 “Ὅσοι δὲ ἔξω Πελοποννήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίοις
ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσσοῦνται τοῖσπερ
καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων
ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσοῦνται τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ
Ἀργεῖοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες.

3 “Αἱ δὲ ποι στρατείας δέῃ κοινᾶς, βουλευέσθαι
Λακεδαιμονίως καὶ Ἀργείως ὅπῃ καὶ δικαιοτάτα
κρίναντας τοῖς ξυμμάχοις.

4 “Αἱ δὲ τινι τῶν πολίων ἢ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τῶν
εἰτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσῳ, αἵτε περὶ ὄρων
αἵτε περὶ ἄλλου τινός, διακριθῆμεν. αἱ δὲ τις
τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλις πόλιν ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθεῖν,
ἂν τινα ἴσαν ἀμφοῖν ταῖς πολίεσσι δοκεῖοι.

“Τὼς δὲ ἕτας¹ κατὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι.”

LXXX. Αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία αὕτη
ἐγεγέννητο· καὶ ὅποσα ἀλλήλων πολέμῳ ἢ εἴ τι
ἄλλο εἶχον, διελύσαντο. κοινῇ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πράγ-

¹ Poppo's correction for τοῖς δὲ ἕταις of the MSS.

and Athenians and concluded a treaty and an alliance with the Lacedaemonians to this effect :

LXXIX. "It has seemed good to the Lacedaemonians and the Argives to conclude a treaty and an alliance for fifty years on the following terms :

1. "They shall offer settlements by law under conditions that are fair and impartial, according to hereditary usage. The rest of the cities in the Peloponnesus shall share in the treaty and alliance, being independent and self-governed, retaining their own territory, and offering settlements by law that are fair and impartial according to hereditary usage.

2. "Such states as are allies of the Lacedaemonians outside of the Peloponnesus shall stand upon the same footing as the Lacedaemonians ; and the allies of the Argives shall be upon the same footing as the Argives, all retaining their own territory.

3. "If there be need to send a common expedition to any quarter, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult and adjudge to the allies their allotments in whatever way is fairest.

4. "If there be any dispute on the part of any one of the cities, either of those within the Peloponnesus or without, whether about boundaries or anything else, the matter shall be judicially decided. But if any city of the allies quarrel with another, they shall appeal to some city which both deem to be impartial.

5. "Individual citizens shall conduct their suits according to hereditary usage."

LXXX. Such was the treaty and alliance that was concluded ; and all the places which either side had acquired from the other in war they restored, or if there was any other ground of difference between them, they came to an agreement about it. Acting

ματα τιθέμενοι ἐψηφίσαντο κήρυκα καὶ πρεσβείαν παρὰ Ἀθηναίων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἣν μὴ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐξίωσι τὰ τεῖχη ἐκλιπόντες, καὶ μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῷ μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ ἅμα.
 2 καὶ τά τε ἄλλα θυμῷ ἔφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία καὶ ὡς Περδίκκαν ἔπεμψαν ἀμφοτέροι πρέσβεις. καὶ ἀνέπεισαν Περδίκκαν ξυνομόσαι σφίσιν· οὐ μέντοι εὐθύς γε ἀπέστη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλὰ διανοεῖτο, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ἐώρα· ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐξ Ἀργους. καὶ τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι τοὺς τε παλαιοὺς ὅρκους
 3 ἀνενεώσαντο καὶ ἄλλους ὥμοσαν. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις, τὸ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου τεῖχος κελεύοντες ἐκλιπεῖν· οἱ δ' ὀρώντες ὀλίγοι πρὸς πλείους ὄντες τοὺς ξυμφύλακας ἔπεμψαν Δημοσθένη τοὺς σφετέρους ἐξάξοντα. ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀγῶνά τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικὸν ἔξω τοῦ φρουρίου ποιήσας, ὡς ἐξῆλθε τὸ ἄλλο φρούριον, ἀπέκλησε τὰς πύλας. καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τεῖχισμα.

LXXXI. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ' οὐκ ἀντάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων, ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
 2 καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφείσαν τῶν πόλεων. καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρα-

¹ cf. II. xcix. 3.

² cf. ch. lxxv. 6.

now in concert in their affairs, they voted not to receive herald or embassy from the Athenians, unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from the Peloponnesus; also not to make peace or carry on war with anyone except together. And not only did they prosecute other matters with energy, but both of them sent envoys to the places in Thrace and to Perdiccas. And they persuaded Perdiccas to swear alliance with them. He, however, did not desert the Athenians at once, but was thinking of it, because he saw the Argives had done so; for he was himself of Argive descent.¹ With the Chalcidians, too, they renewed their ancient oaths, and swore new ones. The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians bidding them evacuate the fortress at Epidaurus;² and these, seeing that their contingent was small in comparison with the rest, sent Demosthenes to bring away their men. On his arrival he made a pretext of some gymnastic contest outside the fort, and when the rest of the garrison had gone out closed the gates behind them. Afterwards the Athenians renewed the treaty with the Epidaurians and of their own accord gave up the fortress.

LXXXI. After the withdrawal of the Argives from the alliance, the Mantineans also, although at first opposed to this course, afterwards, finding themselves unable to hold out without the Argives, likewise made an agreement with the Lacedaemonians and relinquished their sovereignty over the cities.³ And now the Lacedaemonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, made a joint

¹ i.e. over the Parthians and others in Arcadia; cf. ch. xxix. 1; xxxiii. 1; lxii. 1.

τεύσαντες, τά τ' ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνα ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἀργεὶ δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεῖα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη. καὶ πρὸς ἕα ἤδη ταῦτα ἦν τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος, καὶ τέταρτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Διῆς τε οἱ ἐν Ἀθῷ ἀπέστησαν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Χαλκιδέας καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐν Ἀχαιῖα οὐκ ἐπιτηδεῖως
 2 πρότερον ἔχοντα καθίσταντο. καὶ Ἀργείων ὁ δῆμος κατ' ὀλίγον ξυνιστάμενός τε καὶ ἀναθαρσήσας ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ὀλίγοις, τηρήσαντες αὐτὰς τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπεκράτησεν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ
 3 τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὺς μετεπέμποντο οἱ φίλοι, οὐκ ἦλθον ἐκ πλείονος, ἀναβαλόμενοι δὲ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἐβοήθουν. καὶ ἐν Τεγέᾳ πυθόμενοι ὅτι νενίκηνται οἱ ὀλίγοι, προελθεῖν μὲν οὐκέτι ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν διαπεφευγόντων, ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπ' οἴκου τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας
 4 ἤγον. καὶ ὕστερον ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τε τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀγγέλων¹ τῶν ἔξω Ἀργείων, παρόντων τε τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ῥηθέντων πολλῶν

¹ Muller-Strubing's order, for ἀγγέλων καὶ of the MSS.

expedition, the Lacedaemonians first going alone and setting up a more oligarchical form of government in Sicyon, afterwards both together putting down the democracy at Argos and establishing an oligarchy favourable to the Lacedaemonians. These things occurred when the winter was closing and spring was now near at hand ; and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

LXXXII. The next summer the people of Dium¹ 417 B.C. on Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians and went over to the Chalcidians ; and the Lacedaemonians arranged matters in Achaea, which had before this not been favourable to their interests. And now the popular party at Argos, gradually consolidating its strength and recovering boldness, waited for the celebration of the Gymnopaediae² by the Lacedaemonians and attacked the oligarchs. A battle occurred in the city and the popular party got the better of it, slaying some of their enemies and expelling others. The Lacedaemonians, although their friends kept sending for them, did not come for a long time ; but at last they put off the Gymnopaediae and went to their aid. But hearing at Tegea that the oligarchs had been conquered, they refused to go further, in spite of the entreaties of the oligarchs who had escaped, and returning home proceeded with the celebration of the Gymnopaediae. Later, when envoys had come from the Argives in the city and messengers from those who had been driven out, and their allies were present, and much had been said on either side, they

¹ cf. ch. xxxv. 1.

² A festival in which boys and men danced naked. While it lasted the Lacedaemonians (as at the Carneia, cf. chs. liv. and lxxv.) abstained from war.

ἀφ' ἑκατέρων ἔγνωσαν μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς στρατεύειν ἐς Ἄργος, 5 διατριβαὶ δὲ καὶ μελλήσεις ἐγίγνοντο. ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀργείων ἐν τούτῳ, φοβούμενος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν πάλιν προσαγόμενός τε καὶ νομίζων μέγιστον ἂν σφῶς ὠφελῆσαι, τειχίζει μακρὰ τεῖχην ἐς θάλασσαν, ὅπως, ἣν τῆς γῆς εἵργονται, ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν σφῶς μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴ τῶν 6 ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ. ξυνήδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεῖ, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον· καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς ἦλθον τέκτονες καὶ λιθουργοί. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXIII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὡς ἦσθοντο τειχίζοντων, ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἄργος αὐτοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων· ὑπῆρχε δέ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους¹ αὐτόθεν πρασσόμενον. ἦγε δὲ τὴν στρατίαν Ἄγρις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. 2 καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δοκοῦντα προϋπάρχειν οὐ προухώρησεν ἔτι· τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομούμενα τεῖχην ἐλόντες καὶ καταβαλόντες καὶ Ὑσιᾶς χωρίον τῆς Ἀργείας λαβόντες καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἅπαντας οὓς ἔλαβον ἀποκτείναντες ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. ἐστράτευσαν δὲ μετὰ 3 τοῦτο καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν, καὶ δηώσαντες ἀπῆλθον, ὅτι σφῶν τοὺς φυγάδας ὑπέδεχοντο· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα κατώκηντο. 4 κατέκλησαν δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Μακε-

¹ ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους deleted by Huker, followed by Hude.

decided that those in the city ¹ were in the wrong and determined to make an expedition to Argos; but delays and postponements occurred. Meanwhile, the democracy at Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians and again courting the alliance of the Athenians, because they believed that it would be of the greatest benefit to themselves, proceeded to build long walls down to the sea, in order that, should they be cut off from the land, they might with the help of the Athenians have the advantage of importing supplies by sea. Some of the cities in the Peloponnesus, too, were privy to their fortifying. The whole Argive people, men, women, and slaves, set to work upon the walls; and from Athens also there came to them carpenters and stone masons. So the summer ended.

LXXXIII. The following winter, when the Lacedaemonians became aware that they were fortifying Argos, they made an expedition thither, themselves and their allies, except the Corinthians; and there was also a party in Argos itself that was working in their interest. The commander of the army was Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. The support from the city which they expected to find ready failed them, but they seized and demolished the walls that were being built; and they also seized Hysiae, a place in Argive territory, slew all the free men whom they caught, and then withdrew and dispersed to their several cities. After this the Argives in their turn invaded Phliasia and ravaged it before they returned home, because the Phliasians had received fugitives of theirs, most of whom had settled there. Also during the same winter the Athenians

¹ The popular party.

δόνας Ἀθηναῖοι, Περδίκκα ἐπικαλοῦντες τὴν τε πρὸς Ἀργεῖους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν καὶ ὅτι παρασκευασμένων αὐτῶν στρατιὰν ἄγειν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγούντος ἔψευστο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ μάλιστα διελύθη ἐκείνου ἀπάραντος.¹ πολέμιος οὖν ἦν καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

LXXXIV. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης τε πλεύσας ἐς Ἄργος ναυσὶν εἴκοσι Ἀργείων τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἔτι ὑπόπτους εἶναι καὶ τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονεῖν ἔλαβε, τριακοσίουσ ἀνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὰς ἐγγυς νήσους ὧν ἦρχον· καὶ ἐπὶ Μήλον τὴν νήσον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τριάκοντα, Χίαις δὲ ἕξ, Λεσβίαιν δὲ δυοῖν, καὶ ὀπλίταις ἑαυτῶν μὲν διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις καὶ τοξόταις τριακοσίοις καὶ ἵπποτοξόταις εἴκοσι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων καὶ νησιωτῶν ὀπλίταις μάλιστα 2 πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις. οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν εἰσιν ἄποικοι, τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἤθελον ὑπακούειν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι νησιῶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδετέρων ὄντες ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ὥς αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκαζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δηοῦντες τὴν 3 γῆν, ἐς πόλεμον φανερόν κατέστησαν. στρατοπεδευσάμενοι οὖν ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Κλεομήδης τε ὁ Λυκομήδους καὶ Τεισίας ὁ Τεισιμάχου, πρὶν ἀδικεῖν τι τῆς γῆς, λόγους πρῶτον ποιησομένους ἔπεμψαν πρέσβεις. οὓς οἱ Μήλιοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλήθος οὐκ

¹ ἀπάραντος is probably corrupt.

shut off the Macedonians from the sea, charging Perdiccas with the league which he had made with the Argives and the Lacedaemonians; also that when they had prepared to lead an army against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, he had been false to the alliance, and the expedition had been broken up chiefly because of his defection. Accordingly, he was regarded as an enemy. So this winter ended and with it the fifteenth year of the war.

LXXXIV. The next summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships and seized such Argives as seemed to be still open to suspicion and to favour the side of the Lacedaemonians, to the number of three hundred men; and these the Athenians deposited in the adjacent islands over which they had sway. The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos¹ with thirty ships of their own, six Chian and two Lesbian, and twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred bowmen, and twenty mounted archers, and from their allies and the islanders about fifteen hundred hoplites. Now the Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians, and were unwilling to obey the Athenians like the rest of the islanders. At first they remained quiet as neutrals; then when the Athenians tried to force them by ravaging their land, they went to war openly. Accordingly, having encamped in their territory with the forces just mentioned, the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes and Teisias son of Teisimachus, before doing any harm to the land, sent envoys to make proposals to the Melians. These envoys the Melians did not bring before the popular

March,
416 B.C.

¹ cf. III. xci. 1; xciv. 2.

THUCYDIDES

ἤγαγον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις λέγειν ἐκέλευον περὶ ὧν ἤκουσιν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

LXXXV. “Ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίνονται, ὅπως δὴ μὴ ξυνεχεῖ ῥήσει οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα ἐς ἅπαξ ἀκούσαντες ἡμῶν ἀπατηθῶσι (γιννώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή), ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε. καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ καὶ μηδ’ ὑμεῖς ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθύς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε. καὶ πρῶτον εἰ ἀρέσκει ὥς λέγομεν εἴπατε.”

LXXXVI. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Μηλίων ξύνεδροι ἀπεκρίναντο. “Ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ’ ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου, παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα, διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τε κριτὰς ἤκοντας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἶκός περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι’ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέουσιν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν.”

LXXXVII. ΑΘ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπονοίας τῶν μελλόντων λογιούμενοι ἢ ἄλλο τι ξυνήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὁράτε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλευσόντες τῇ πόλει, παυοίμεθ’ ἂν· εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, λέγοιμεν ἂν.

¹ Probably the chief governing body, a chamber of oligarchs, to which the magistrates (αἱ ἀρχαί) belonged.

assembly, but bade them tell in the presence of the magistrates and the few¹ what they had come for. The Athenian envoys accordingly spoke as follows :

LXXXV. "Since our proposals are not to be made before the assembly, your purpose being, as it seems, that the people may not hear from us once for all, in an uninterrupted speech, arguments that are seductive and untested,² and so be deceived—for we see that it is with this thought that you bring us before the few—do you who sit here adopt a still safer course. Take up each point, and do not you either make a single speech, but conduct the inquiry by replying at once to any statement of ours that seems to be unsatisfactory. And first state whether our proposal suits you."

LXXXVI. The commissioners of the Melians answered : "The fairness of the proposal, that we shall at our leisure instruct one another, is not open to objection, but these acts of war, which are not in the future, but already here at hand, are manifestly at variance with your suggestion. For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what is to be said here, and that the outcome of the discussion will in all likelihood be, if we win the debate by the righteousness of our cause and for that very reason refuse to yield, war for us, whereas if we are persuaded, servitude."

LXXXVII. ATH. "Well, if you have met to argue from suspicions about what may happen in the future, or for any other purpose than to consult for the safety of your city in the light of what is present and before your eyes, we may as well stop ; but if you have this end in view, we may speak on."

¹ i.e. not questioned or put to the proof.

LXXXVIII. ΜΗΛ. Εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ξυγγνώμη ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι· ἡ μὲντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἥδε πάρεστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος ᾧ προκαλείσθε τρόπῳ, εἰ δοκεῖ, γιγνέσθω.

LXXXIX. ΑΘ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἡ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἡδίκηκατε λέγοντας οἶεσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἶδους ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

XC. ΜΗΛ. Ἡ μὲν δὴ νομιζομέν γε, χρήσιμον (ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ συμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε) μὴ καταλύειν ὑμᾶς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια¹ καὶ τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσαντά τινα ὠφελῆσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἦσσον τοῦτο, ὅσῳ καὶ ἐπὶ

¹ καὶ δίκαια deleted by Hude, after G. Hermann.

¹ cf. vi. lxxxiii. 2.

² ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς, lit. "short of exactness."

BOOK V. LXXXVIII.—XC.

LXXXVIII. MEL. "It is natural and pardonable for men in such a position as ours to resort to many arguments and many suppositions. This conference, however, is here to consider the question of our safety; so let the discussion, if it please you, proceed in the way that you propose."

LXXXIX. ATH. "Well, then, we on our part will make use of no fair phrases, saying either that we hold sway justly because we overthrew the Persians,¹ or that we now come against you because we are injured, offering in a lengthy speech arguments that would not be believed; nor, on the other hand, do we presume that you will assert, either that the reason why you did not join us in the war was because you were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, or that you have done us no wrong. Rather we presume that you aim at accomplishing what is possible in accordance with the real thoughts of both of us, since you know as well as we know that what is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the necessity on both sides is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must."

XC. MEL. "As we think, at any rate, it is expedient (for we are constrained to speak of expediency, since you have in this fashion, ignoring the principle of justice, suggested that we speak of what is advantageous) that you should not rule out the principle of the common good, but that for him who is at the time in peril what is equitable should also be just, and though one has not entirely² proved his point he should still derive some benefit therefrom. And this is not less for your interest than for our own, inasmuch as you, if you shall

THUCYDIDES

μεγίστη τιμωρία σφαλέντες ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε.

XCI. ΑΘ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς, ἣν καὶ παυσθῇ, οὐκ ἀθυμοῦμεν τὴν τελευτήν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὗτοι δεινοὶ τοῖς νικηθεῖσιν (ἔστι δὲ οὐ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών), ἀλλ' ἦν οἱ ὑπήκοοί που
 2 τῶν ἀρξάντων αὐτοὶ ἐπιθέμενοι κρατήσωσιν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἡμῖν ἀφείσθω κινδυνεύεσθαι· ὥς δὲ ἐπ' ὠφελία τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνως μὲν ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ' ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι.

XCII. ΜΗΛ. Καὶ πῶς χρήσιμον ἂν ξυμβαίῃ ἡμῖν δουλεῦσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμῖν ἄρξαι;

XCIII. ΑΘ. "Οτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἂν.

XCIV. ΜΗΛ. "Ωστε δὲ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε;

XCV. ΑΘ. Οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον.

¹ i.e. cruel conduct on your part would justify others in inflicting like punishment upon you should you ever be defeated.

BOOK V. xc.-xcv.

ever meet with a reverse, would not only incur the greatest punishment, but would also become a warning example to others." ¹

XCI. ATH. "But we on our part, so far as our empire is concerned, even if it should cease to be, do not look forward to the end with dismay. For it is not those who rule over others, as the Lacedaemonians also do—though our quarrel is not now with the Lacedaemonians—that are a terror to the vanquished, but subject peoples who may perchance themselves attack and get the better of their rulers. And as far as that is concerned, you must permit us to take the risk. But that it is for the benefit of our empire that we are here, and also the safety of your city that we now propose to speak, we shall make plain to you, since what we desire is to have dominion over you without trouble to ourselves, and that you should be saved to the advantage of both."

XCII. MEL. "And how could it prove as advantageous for us to become slaves, as it is for you to have dominion?"

XCIII. ATH. "Because it would be to your advantage to submit before suffering the most horrible fate, and we should gain by not destroying you."

XCIV. MEL. "And so, you mean, you would not consent to our remaining at peace and being friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither combatant?"

XCV. ATH. "No; for your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our subjects that would be a proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is a proof of our power."

THUCYDIDES

XCVI. ΜΗΛ. Σκοποῦσι δ' ὑμῶν οὕτως οἱ ὑπήκοοι τὸ εἶκος, ὥστε τοὺς τε μὴ προσήκοντας καὶ ὅσοι ἄποικοι ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποστάντες τινὲς κεχείρονται ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ τιθέασιν;

XCVII. ΑΘ. Δικαιώματι γὰρ οὐδετέρους ἐλλείπειν ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ τοὺς μὲν περιγίγνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ φόβῳ οὐκ ἐπιέναι. ὥστε ἔξω καὶ τοῦ πλεόνων ἄρξαι καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε, ἄλλως τε καὶ νησιῶται ναυκρατόρων, καὶ ἀσθενέστεροι ἐτέρων ὄντες, εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε.

XCVIII. ΜΗΛ. Ἐν δ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν; δεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς τῶν δικαίων λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβάσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ξυμφόρῃ ὑπακούειν πείθετε, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ ἡμῖν χρήσιμον διδάσκοντας, εἰ τυγχάνει καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμβαῖνον, πειρᾶσθαι πείθειν. ὅσοι γὰρ νῦν μηδετέροις ξυμμαχοῦσι, πῶς οὐ πολεμώσεσθε αὐτούς, ὅταν ἐς τάδε βλέψαντες ἡγήσωνταί ποτε ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἥξειν; κἂν τούτῳ τί ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς μὲν ὑπάρχοντας πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε, τοὺς δὲ μηδὲ μελλήσαντας¹ γενέσθαι ἄκοντας ἐπάγεσθε;

XCIX. ΑΘ. Οὐ γὰρ νομίζομεν ἡμῖν τούτους δεινότερους, ὅσοι ἡπειρώται που ὄντες τῶν ἐλευθέρων² πολλὴν τὴν διαμέλλησιν τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς

¹ Reiske's correction, for μελλήσαντας of the MSS.

² For τῶν ἐλευθέρων of the MSS., Stahl following the Schol.

BOOK V. xcvi.—xcix.

xcvi. MEL. "Do your subjects regard equity in such a way as to put in the same category those that do not belong to you at all and those—your own colonists in most cases and in others revolted subjects—who have been subdued by you?"

xcvii. ATH. "As to pleas of justice, they think that neither the one nor the other lacks them, but that those who preserve their freedom owe it to their power, and that we do not attack them because we are afraid. So that, to say nothing of our enlarging our empire, you would afford us security by being subdued, especially if you, an insular power, and weaker than other islanders, should fail to show yourselves superior to a power which is master of the sea."

xcviii. MEL. "But do you not think there is security in the other course?¹ For here also it is necessary, just as you force us to abandon all pleas of justice and seek to persuade us to give ear to what is to your own interests, that we, too, tell you what is to our advantage and try to persuade you to adopt it, if that happens to be to your advantage also. How, we say, shall you not make enemies of all who are now neutral, as soon as they look at our case and conclude that some day you will come against them also? And in this what else are you doing but strengthening the enemies you already have, and bringing upon you, against their inclination, others who would never have thought of becoming your enemies?"

xcix. ATH. "Not so, for we do not reckon those as the more dangerous to us who, dwelling somewhere on the mainland and being free men, will defer for a

¹ i.e. in neutrality, referred to in ch. xciv.

φυλακῆς ποιήσονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νησιώτας τέ που ἀνάρκτους, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τῆς ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ παροξυνομένους. οὗτοι γὰρ πλείστ' ἂν τῷ ἀλογίστῳ ἐπιτρέψαντες σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς προὔπτον κίνδυνον καταστήσειαν.

C. ΜΗΛ. Ἡ που ἄρα, εἰ τοσαύτην γε ὑμεῖς τε μὴ παυσθῆναι ἀρχῆς καὶ οἱ δουλεύοντες ἤδη ἀπαλλαγῆναι τὴν παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέροις πολλή κακότης καὶ δειλία μὴ πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπεξελθεῖν.

CI. ΑΘ. Οὐκ, ἦν γε σωφρόνως βουλευέσθαι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὄφλειν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἢ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῷ μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.

CII. ΜΗΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐπιστάμεθα τὰ τῶν πολέμων¹ ἔστιν ὅτε κοινοτέρας τὰς τύχας λαμβάνοντα ἢ κατὰ τὸ διαφέρον ἑκατέρων πλῆθος. καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν εἶξαι εὐθὺς ἀνέλπιστον, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου ἔτι καὶ στήναι ἐλπίς ὀρθῶς.

CIII. ΑΘ. Ἐλπίς δέ, κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὔσα, τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτῇ, καὶ βλάβῃ, οὐ καθεῖλε, τοῖς δὲ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι (δάπανος γὰρ φύσει) ἅμα τε γιγνώσκεται σφαλέντων καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ ἔτι φυλά-

¹ For πολέμων of the MSS., with Valla.

BOOK V. xcix.—ciii.

long time taking any precautions against us, but rather those who dwell in some of the islands, both those who, like you, are subject to no control, and those who are already exasperated by the necessity of submission to our rule. For it is these who are most likely to give way to recklessness and bring both themselves and us into danger which they cannot but foresee."

C. MEL. "Surely, then, if you and your subjects brave so great a risk, you in order that you may not lose your empire, and they, who are already your slaves, in order that they may be rid of it, for us surely who still have our freedom it would be the height of baseness and cowardice not to resort to every expedient before submitting to servitude."

CI. ATH. "No, not if you take a sensible view of the matter; for with you it is not a contest on equal terms to determine a point of manly honour, so as to avoid incurring disgrace; rather the question before you is one of self-preservation—to avoid offering resistance to those who are far stronger than you."

CII. MEL. "But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial and not in accord with the difference in numbers. And for us, to yield is at once to give up hope; but if we make an effort, there is still hope that we may stand erect."

CIII. ATH. "Hope is indeed a solace in danger, and for those who have other resources in abundance, though she may injure, she does not ruin them; but for those who stake their all on a single throw—hope being by nature prodigal—it is only when disaster has befallen that her true nature is recognized, and when at last she is known, she leaves the victim no

ξεταιί τις αὐτὴν γνωρισθεῖσαν οὐκ ἐλλείπει. ὁ ὑμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ ἐπὶ ῥοπῆς μιᾶς ὄντες μὴ βούλεσθε παθεῖν, μηδὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς παρὸν ἀνθρωπεύως ἔτι σῶζεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται, μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμούς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ' ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται.

CIV. ΜΗΛ. Χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς, εὖ ἴστε, νομίζομεν πρὸς δύναμιν τε τὴν ὑμετέραν καὶ τὴν τύχην, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἔσται, ἀγωνίζεσθαι. ὅμως δὲ πιστεύομεν τῇ μὲν τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ ἐλαστώσεσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἰστάμεθα, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως τῷ ἐλλείποντι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡμῖν ξυμμαχίαν προσέσεσθαι, ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν, καὶ εἰ μὴ του ἄλλου, τῆς γε ξυγγενείας ἔνεκα καὶ αἰσχύνη βοηθεῖν. καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω ἀλόγως θρασυνόμεθα.

CV. ΑΘ. Τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμενείας οὐδ' ἡμεῖς οἴομεθα λελείψεσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως τῶν δ' ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως δικαιοῦμεν ἢ
2 πρᾶσσομεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξη, τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὐ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ κατα-

resource wherewith to take precautions against her in future. This fate, we beg of you, weak as you are and dependent on a single turn of the scale, do not willingly incur; nor make yourselves like the common crowd who, when it is possible still to be saved by human means, as soon as distress comes and all visible grounds of hope fail them, betake themselves to those that are invisible—to divination, oracles, and the like, which, with the hopes they inspire, bring men to ruin."

CIV. MEL. "We, too, be well assured, think it difficult to contend both against your power and against fortune, unless she shall be impartial; but nevertheless we trust that, in point of fortune, we shall through the divine favour be at no disadvantage because we are god-fearing men standing our ground against men who are unjust; and as to the matter of power, that the alliance of the Lacedaemonians will supply what we lack, since that alliance must aid us, if for no other reason, because of our kinship with them and for very shame. So our confidence is not altogether so irrational as you may suppose."

CV. ATH. "Well, as to the kindness of the divine favour, neither do we expect to fall short of you therein. For in no respect are we departing from men's observances regarding that which pertains to the divine or from their desires regarding that which pertains to themselves, in aught that we demand or do. For of the gods we hold the belief, and of men we know, that by a necessity of their nature wherever they have power they always rule. And so in our case since we neither enacted this law nor when it was enacted were the first to use it, but found it in existence and expect to leave it in existence for

λείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ
 ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶν-
 3 τας ἂν ταυτό. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ θεῖον οὕτως ἐκ
 τοῦ εἰκότος οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσωσέσθαι· τῆς δὲ
 ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους δόξης, ἣν διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δὴ
 βοηθήσειν ὑμῖν πιστεύετε αὐτούς, μακαρίσαντες
 ὑμῶν τὸ ἀπειρόκακον οὐ ζηλοῦμεν τὸ ἄφρον.
 Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς σφᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ
 ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται· πρὸς
 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἂν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς
 προσφέρονται, ξυνελὼν μάλιστα ἂν δηλώσειεν ὅτι
 ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομί-
 ζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια. καίτοι οὐ πρὸς
 τῆς ὑμετέρας νῦν ἀλόγου σωτηρίας ἢ τοιαύτη
 διάνοια.

CVI. ΜΗΛ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἤδη
 καὶ μάλιστα πιστεύομεν τῷ ξυμφέροντι αὐτῶν
 Μηλίους ἀποίκους ὄντας μὴ βουλήσεσθαι προ-
 δόντας τοῖς μὲν εἵνοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπίστους
 καταστήναι, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὠφελίμους.

CVII. ΑΘ. Οὐκ οἶσθε τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν
 μετὰ ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν
 μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι· ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἥκιστα
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν τολμῶσιν.

CVIII. ΜΗΛ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τε
 ἡμῶν ἔνεκα μᾶλλον ἡγούμεθ' ἂν ἐγχειρίσασθαι

all time, so we make use of it, well aware that both you and others, if clothed with the same power as we are, would do the same thing. And so with regard to the divine favour, we have good reason not to be afraid that we shall be at a disadvantage. But as to your expectation regarding the Lacedaemonians, your confident trust that out of shame forsooth they will aid you—while we admire your simplicity, we do not envy you your folly. We must indeed acknowledge that with respect to themselves and the institutions of their own country, the Lacedaemonians practise virtue in a very high degree; but with respect to their conduct towards the rest of mankind, while one might speak at great length, in briefest summary one may declare that of all men with whom we are acquainted they, most conspicuously, consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is expedient just. And yet such an attitude is not favourable to your present unreasonable hope of deliverance."

CVI. MEL. "But we find in this very thing our strongest ground of confidence—that in their own interest the Lacedaemonians will not be willing to betray the Melians who are their colonists, and so incur, on the one hand, the distrust of all the Hellenes who are well-disposed towards them, and, on the other, give aid to their enemies."

CVII. ATH. "Do you not think, then, that self-interest goes hand in hand with security, while justice and honour are practised with danger—a danger the Lacedaemonians are in general the least disposed to risk?"

CVIII. MEL. "Nay, but even the dangers we believe they would be more ready to incur for our

αὐτοὺς καὶ βεβαιότερους ἢ ἐς ἄλλους νομιεῖν, ὅσῳ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐγγὺς κείμεθα, τῆς δὲ γνώμης τῷ ξυγγενεῖ πιστότεροι ἐτέρων ἐσμέν.

CIX. ΑΘ. Τὸ δ' ἐχυρόν γε τοῖς ξυναγωνιουμένοις οὐ τὸ εὖνουν τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἦν τῶν ἔργων τις δυνάμει πολὺ προύχῃ· ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων σκοποῦσι (τῆς γοῦν οἰκείας παρασκευῆς ἀπιστία καὶ μετὰ ξυμμάχων πολλῶν τοῖς πέλας ἐπέρχονται), ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐς νῆσόν γε αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν ναυκρατόρων ὄντων περαιωθῆναι.

CX. ΜΗΛ. Οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους ἂν ἔχοιεν πέμψαι· πολὺ δὲ τὸ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος, δι' οὗ τῶν κρατούντων ἀπορώτερος ἢ λήψις ἢ τῶν
2 λαθεῖν βουλομένων ἢ σωτηρία. καὶ εἰ τοῦδε σφάλλοιντο, τράποιντ' ἂν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσους μὴ Βρασίδας ἐπῆλθε, καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς οἰκειοτέρας ξυμμαχίδος τε καὶ γῆς ὁ πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται.

CXI. ΑΘ. Τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἂν τι γένοιτο, καὶ ὑμῖν¹ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμησιν ὅτι οὐδ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι' ἄλλων
2 φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν. ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φή-

¹ καὶ in MSS. before οὐκ, deleted by Stahl.

sakes, and that they would consider them less hazardous than if incurred for others, inasmuch as we lie close to the Peloponnesus when anything is to be undertaken there and on account of affinity of sentiment are more to be trusted than any others."

CIX. ATH. "But for men who are about to take part in a struggle, that which inspires their confidence is clearly not the good will of those who call them to their aid, but such marked superiority in actual power of achievement as they may possess; and to this superiority the Lacedaemonians give heed rather more than do the rest of mankind. At any rate, they so mistrust their own resources that they always associate themselves with many allies when they attack their neighbours; so that it is not likely they will ever cross over to an island while we are masters of the sea."

CX. MEL. "But there are others whom they might send; besides, the Cretan sea is wide, so that upon it the capture of a hostile squadron by the masters of the sea will be more difficult than it would be to cross over in security for those who wish to elude them. And if they should fail in this attempt they could turn against your territory and against any of the rest of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and then you would have to exert yourselves, not for the acquisition of territory that never belonged to you, but for the preservation of your own confederacy, aye, and your own country."

CXI. ATH. "Of these contingencies one or another might indeed happen; but they would not be new to our experience, and you yourselves are not unaware that the Athenians have never in a single instance withdrawn from a siege through fear of any foe.

THUCYDIDES

σαντες περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσειν οὐδὲν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε ὃ ἄνθρωποι ἂν πιστεύσαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρότατα ἐλπιζόμενα μέλλεται, τὰ δ' ὑπάρχοντα βραχέα πρὸς τὰ ἤδη ἀντιτεταγμένα περιγίγνεσθαι. πολλήν τε ἀλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μεταστησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο
 3 τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψετε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγῇ δυνάμει ἐπεσπίασατο, ἥσσηθείσι τοῦ ῥήματος, ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἐκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχύω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ
 4 τύχης¹ προσλαβεῖν. ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἦν εὖ βουλευήσθε, φυλάξεσθε καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἰρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας μὴ τὰ χεῖρῳ φιλονικῆσαι· ὥς οὔτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσ-

¹ Hude reads *τύχη*, after Schol.

¹ See chs. lxxxvii., lxxxviii.

² i.e. men who expect to be saved by human means, not by divine intervention; cf. ch. civ. f.

However, we cannot but reflect that, although you said¹ that you would take counsel concerning your deliverance, you have not in this long discussion advanced a single argument that ordinary men² would put their confidence in if they expected to be delivered. On the contrary, your strongest grounds for confidence are merely cherished hopes whose fulfilment is in the future, whereas your present resources are too slight, compared with those already arrayed against you, for any chance of success. And you exhibit a quite unreasonable attitude of mind if you do not even now, after permitting us to withdraw, come to some decision that is wiser than your present purpose. For surely you will not take refuge in that feeling which most often brings men to ruin when they are confronted by dangers that are clearly foreseen and therefore disgraceful—the fear of such disgrace. For many men, though they can still clearly foresee the dangers into which they are drifting, are lured on by the power of a seductive word—the thing called disgrace—until, the victims of a phrase, they are indeed plunged, of their own act, into irretrievable calamities, and thus incur in addition a disgrace that is more disgraceful, because associated with folly rather than with misfortune. Such a course you will avoid, if you take wise counsel, and you will not consider it degrading to acknowledge yourselves inferior to the most powerful state when it offers you moderate terms—to become allies, keeping your own territory but paying tribute—and, when a choice is given you of war or safety, not to hold out stubbornly for the worse alternative. Since those who, while refusing to submit to their equals, yet comport themselves wisely towards their superiors

σοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἡσσους
 5 μέτριοί εἰσι, πλείστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖντο. σκοπεῖτε οὖν
 καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμείσθε πολλάκις
 ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος βουλευέσθε, ἥς¹ μιᾶς πέρι καὶ
 εἰς μίαν βουλὴν τυχούσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώ-
 σασαν ἔσται.

CXII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι μετεχώρησαν ἐκ
 τῶν λόγων· οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
 γενομένοι, ὥς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ
 2 ἀντέλεγον, ἀπεκρίναντο τάδε. “Οὐτε ἄλλα δοκεῖ
 ἡμῖν ἢ ἅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὧ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐτ' ἐν
 ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πόλεως ἐπτακόσια ἔτη ἤδη οἴκου-
 μένης τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ τε
 μέχρι τοῦδε σωζούσῃ τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτὴν
 καὶ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ² Λακεδαιμονίων
 τιμωρίᾳ πιστεύοντες πειρασόμεθα σώζεσθαι.
 3 προκαλούμεθα δὲ ὑμᾶς φίλοι μὲν εἶναι, πολέμιοι
 δὲ μηδετέροις, καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡμῶν ἀναχωρῆσαι
 σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους αἵτινες δοκοῦσιν ἐπιτή-
 δειοι εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις.”

CXIII. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Μήλιοι τοσαῦτα ἀπεκρί-
 ναντο· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι διαλυόμενοι ἤδη ἐκ τῶν
 λόγων ἔφασαν· “Ἄλλ' οὖν μόνοι γε ἀπὸ τούτων
 τῶν βουλευμάτων, ὥς ἡμῖν δοκεῖτε, τὰ μὲν μέλ-
 λοντα τῶν ὀρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε, τὰ δὲ
 ἀφαιρῇ τῷ βούλεσθαι ὥς γιγνόμενα ἤδη θεᾶσθε·
 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τύχῃ καὶ ἐλπίσι πλείστον

¹ ἥς for ἥν, as the Schol. seems to have read.

² καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων deleted by Hude, after Stahl.

and are moderate towards their inferiors—these, we say, are most likely to prosper. Consider, then, once more after our withdrawal, and reflect many times in your deliberations that your fatherland is at stake, your one and only fatherland, and that upon one decision only will depend her fate for weal or woe.”

CXII. So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, after consulting together in private, finding themselves of much the same opinion as they had expressed before, answered as follows: “Men of Athens, our opinion is no other than it was at first, nor will we in a short moment rob of its liberty a city which has been inhabited already seven hundred years¹; but trusting to the fortune which by divine favour has preserved her hitherto, and to such help as men, even the Lacedaemonians, can give, we shall try to win our deliverance. But we propose to you that we be your friends, but enemies to neither combatant, and that you withdraw from our territory, after making such a truce as may seem suitable for both of us.”

CXIII. Such was the answer of the Melians; and the Athenians, as they were quitting the conference, said: “Then, as it seems to us, judging by the result of these deliberations of yours, you are the only men who regard future events as more certain than what lies before your eyes, and who look upon that which is out of sight, merely because you wish it, as already realized. You have staked your all, putting your trust in the Lacedaemonians, in fortune

¹ Evidently a merely general statement, carrying us back to the time of the Dorian invasion. Canon, *Narrat.* 36, mentions the Spartan Philonomus as founder of Melos, soon after the Dorians settled at Sparta. See Muller, *Orchomenos*, p. 317.

δὴ παραβεβλημένοι καὶ πιστεύσαντες πλείστον καὶ σφαλήσεσθε.”

CXIV. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ στράτευμα· οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς οὐδὲν ὑπῆκουον οἱ Μήλιοι, πρὸς πόλεμον εὐθὺς ἐτρέποντο καὶ διελλόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις
2 περιετείχισαν κύκλῳ τοὺς Μηλίους. καὶ ὕστερον φυλακὴν σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταλιπόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ πλείονι τοῦ στρατοῦ. οἱ δὲ λειπόμενοι παραμένοντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ χωρίον.

CXV. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ λοχισθέντες ὑπὸ τε Φλειασίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων
2 διεφθάρησαν ὡς ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον. καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δι’ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ’ ὥς ἀφέντες ἐπολέμουν αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δέ, εἴ τις
3 βούλεται παρὰ σφῶν, Ἀθηναίους λήξεσθαι. καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἐπολέμησαν ἰδίῳι τινῶν διαφορῶν ἕνεκα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις· οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι Πελοποννήσιοι ἡσύ-
4 χαζον. εἶλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτειχίσματος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προσβαλόντες νυκτός, καὶ ἄνδρας τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐσπενγκάμενοι σῖτόν τε καὶ ὅσα πλείστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιμα ἀναχωρήσαντες ἡσύχαζον· καὶ οἱ Ἀθη-
ναῖοι ἄμεινον τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἔπειτα παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

CXVI. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι μελλήσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν στρα-

and in fond hopes ; and with your all you will come to ruin."

CXIV. So the Athenian envoys returned to the army ; and their generals, as the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced hostilities, and drew a wall round about the city of Melos, distributing the work among the several states. Afterwards, leaving some of their own troops and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, they withdrew with the greater part of the army, while the rest remained behind and besieged the place.

CXV. About the same time the Argives invaded Phliasia ; but being ambushed by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles they lost about eighty men. Also the Athenians at Pylos took much booty from the Lacedaemonians ; but even this did not move the Lacedaemonians to renounce the treaty and make war upon them. They made proclamation, however, that any one of their own people who wished might make reprisals upon the Athenians. The Corinthians also went to war with the Athenians on account of some private differences ; but the rest of the Peloponnesians kept quiet. The Melians, too, took the part of the Athenian wall over against the market-place by a night assault ; then having slain some of the men and brought in grain and as many other necessities as they could, they withdrew and kept quiet. After that the Athenians maintained a better watch. So the summer ended.

CXVI. The following winter the Lacedaemonians were on the point of invading Argive territory, but

THUCYDIDES

τεύειν, ὥς αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια¹ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο,
 ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλ-
 λησιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποπτεύσαντες² τοὺς
 2 μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον. καὶ οἱ
 Μήλιοι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αὖθις καθ'
 ἕτερόν τι τοῦ περιτειχίσματος εἶλον τῶν Ἀθη-
 3 ναίων, παρόντων οὐ πολλῶν τῶν φυλάκων. καὶ
 ἐλθούσης στρατιᾶς ὕστερον ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν
 ἄλλης, ὥς ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, ἧς ἦρχε Φιλοκράτης
 ὁ Δημέου, καὶ κατὰ κράτος ἤδη πολιορκούμενοι,
 γενομένης καὶ προδοσίας τινὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν, ξυνε-
 χώρησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε ἐκείνους περὶ αὐτῶν
 4 βουλευσάιν. οἱ δὲ ἀπέκτειναν Μηλίων ὅσους
 ἰβήντας ἔλαβον, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἡνδρα-
 πόδισαν. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ὥκισαν,³ ἀποίκους
 ὕστερον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες.

¹ *ἰερὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρίοις*, in MSS. after *διαβατήρια*, deleted by Cobet as a gloss on that word. cf. ch. liv. 2, lv. 3.

² Meineke's conjecture for *ὑποποπήσαντες* of the MSS.

³ *ῥέκισαν*, several good MSS. for the Vulgate *ῥέκησαν*.

as the sacrifices for crossing the boundaries were not favourable they returned home. On account of this intention on the part of the Lacedaemonians, the Argives, suspecting certain men in their city, seized some of them, but the rest escaped. About the same time the Melians again at another point took a part of the Athenian encompassing wall, the garrison not being numerous. But later, in consequence of these occurrences, another force came from Athens, of which Philocrates son of Demeas was commander, and the Melians, being now closely besieged—some treachery, too, having made its appearance among them—capitulated to the Athenians on the condition that these should determine their fate. The Athenians thereupon slew all the adult males whom they had taken and made slaves of the children and women. But the place they then peopled with new settlers from Athens, sending thither at a later time five hundred colonists.

BOOK VI

I. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλοντο αὐθις μείζονι παρασκευῇ τῆς μετὰ Λάχητος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιτο, ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλῆθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῷ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον ἀνηροῦντο ἢ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους. Σικελίας γὰρ περί-
 2 πλους μὲν ἐστὶν ὀλκάδι οὐ πολλῷ τινι ἔλασσοι ἢ ὀκτὼ ἡμερῶν, καὶ τοσαύτη οὔσα ἐν εἰκοσισταδίῳ¹ μάλιστα μέτρῳ² τῆς θαλάσσης διείργεται τὸ μὴ ἥπειρος εἶναι.³

II. Ὡκίσθη δὲ ὧδε τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ τοσάδε ἔθνη ἔσχε τὰ ξύμπαντα. παλαιῆται μὲν λέγονται ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωπες καὶ Λαιστρυγόνες οἰκῆσαι, ὧν ἐγὼ οὔτε γένος ἔχω εἰπεῖν οὔτε ὁπόθεν ἐσηλθον ἢ ὅποι ἀπεχώρησαν· ἀρκείτω δὲ ὡς ποιηταῖς τε εἴρηται καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός πη
 2 γιγνώσκει περὶ αὐτῶν. Σικανοὶ δὲ μετ' αὐτοὺς

¹ For the usual εἰκοσι σταδίων (CF corrected, f₂) adopted after M and Schol. Patin., εἰκοσι σταδίοις AB

² μέτρῳ deleted by Hude as not read by Schol. Patm.

³ εἶναι, so nearly all recent editors following H (*supra*scr. man. pr.), Demetrius and Procopius, for οὔσα of the MSS. Shilleto, Badham, and others prefer ἡπειροῦσθαι.

BOOK VI

I. DURING the same winter the Athenians wished to sail again to Sicily with a larger armament than that conducted by Laches and Eurymedon,¹ and subdue it, if they could, most of them being ignorant of the great size of the island and of the large number of its inhabitants, Hellenic as well as Barbarian, and that they were undertaking a war not very much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily, for a merchantman, is one of not much less than eight days; and although it is so large only a distance of about twenty stadia of the sea divides the island from the mainland. 416 B.C.

II. Sicily was settled originally in the following manner, and the whole number of the nations that occupied it were these. Most ancient of all those who are reported to have settled in any part of the island were the Cyclopes and Laestrygonians, as to whom, however, I am able to tell neither their stock nor whence they came nor whither they went; let it suffice as the story has been told by the poets,² and as each man has formed his opinion about them. The Sicanians appear to have been the first to settle

¹ Two separate earlier expeditions, one under Laches and Charoeades, 427 B.C. (III. lxxxvi. 1), the other under Pythodorus, Sophocles and Eurymedon, 424 B.C. (IV. ii.), are here comprised under the one formula

² Homer, no doubt, especially, as also in I. x. 1; xi. 3; xxi. 1.

- πρῶτοι φαίνονται ἐνοικισάμενοι, ὥς μὲν αὐτοὶ φασι, καὶ πρότεροι διὰ τὸ αὐτόχθονες εἶναι. ὥς δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια εὐρίσκεται, Ἰβηρες ὄντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικανοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ ὑπὸ Λιγύων ἀναστάντες. καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν Σικανία τότε ἡ νῆσος ἐκαλεῖτο, πρότερον Τρινακρία καλουμένη· οἰκοῦσι δὲ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν τὴν Σικελίαν.
- 3 Ἰλίου δὲ ἀλίσκομένου τῶν Τρώων τινὲς διαφυγόντες Ἀχαιοὺς πλοίοις ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ ὁμοροὶ τοῖς Σικανοῖς οἰκήσαντες ξύμπαντες μὲν Ἑλυμοὶ ἐκλήθησαν, πόλεις δ' αὐτῶν Ἐρυξ τε καὶ Ἐγεστα. προσξυνώκησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Φωκέων τινὲς τῶν ἀπὸ Τροίας τότε χειμῶνι ἐς Λιβύην πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπ' αὐτῆς
- 4 κατενεχθέντες. Σικελοὶ δὲ ἐξ Ἰταλίας (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ὤκουν) διέβησαν ἐς Σικελίαν, φεύγοντες Ὀπικους, ὥς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται, ἐπὶ σχεδιῶν, τηρήσαντες τὸν πορθμὸν κατιόντος τοῦ ἀνέμου, τάχα ἂν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐσπλεύσαντες. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ Σικελοί· καὶ ἡ χώρα ἀπὸ Ἰταλοῦ, βασιλέως τινὸς Σικελῶν, τοῦνομα τοῦτο
- 5 ἔχοντος, οὕτω Ἰταλία ἐπωνομάσθη. ἐλθόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν στρατὸς πολὺς τοὺς τε Σικανοὺς κρατοῦντες μάχῃ ἀνέστειλαν πρὸς τὰ μεσημβρινὰ καὶ ἑσπέρια αὐτῆς καὶ ἀντὶ Σικανίας Σικελίαν τὴν νῆσον ἐποίησαν καλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς γῆς ὤκησαν ἔχοντες, ἐπεὶ διέβησαν, ἔτη ἐγγὺς τριακόσια πρὶν Ἑλλήνας ἐς Σικελίαν ἐλθεῖν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὰ μέσα καὶ τὰ πρὸς βορρᾶν τῆς νήσου
- 6 ἔχουσιν. ὤκουν δὲ καὶ Φοίνικες περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν Σικελίαν ἄκρας τε ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀπολαβόντες καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα νησίδια ἐμπορίας ἕνεκα τῆς

BOOK VI. II. 2-6

there after them, indeed, as they themselves assert, even before them, as being indigenous, but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians and were driven by the Ligurians from the River Sicanus in Iberia. From them the island was then called Sicania, having been called Trinacria before; and they still inhabit the western parts of Sicily. But on the capture of Ilium some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achaeans, came in boats to Sicily, and settling on the borders of the Sicanians were called, as a people, Elymi, while their cities were named Eryx and Egesta. And there settled with them also some of the Phocians, who on their return at that time from Troy were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily. The Sicels, again, crossed over from Italy, where they dwelt, to Sicily, fleeing from the Opicans—as is probable and indeed is reported—on rafts, having waited for their passage till the wind was from the shore; or perhaps they sailed thither in some other way also. Even now there are Sicels still in Italy; and the country was named Italy after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had this name. These crossed over to Sicily in a vast horde and conquering the Sicanians in battle forced them back to the southern and western parts of the island, causing it to be called Sicily instead of Sicania. They settled there after they had crossed and held the best parts of the land for nearly three hundred years before the Hellenes came to Sicily; and even now they still hold the central and northern parts of the island. Phoenicians, too, had settlements all round Sicily, on promontories along the sea coast, which they walled off, and on the adjacent islets, for the sake

πρὸς τοὺς Σικελούς· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπεσέπλεον, ἐκλιπόντες τὰ πλείω Μοτύην καὶ Σολόεντα καὶ Πανόρμον ἐγγὺς τῶν Ἐλύμων ξυγοικίσαντες ἐνέμοντο, ξυμμαχία τε πίσυνοι τῇ τῶν Ἐλύμων καὶ ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἐλαχιστον πλοῦν Καρχηδῶν Σικελίας ἀπέχει. βάρβαροι μὲν οὖν τοσοῖδε Σικελίαν καὶ οὕτως ᾤκησαν.

III. Ἑλλήνων δὲ πρῶτοι Χαλκιδῆς ἐξ Εὐβοίας πλεύσαντες μετὰ Θουκλέους οἰκιστοῦ Νάξου ᾤκησαν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀρχηγέτου βωμόν, ὅστις νῦν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν, ἰδρύσαντο, ἐφ' ᾧ, ὅταν ἐκ Σικελίας θεωροὶ πλέωσι, πρῶτον θύουσιν. Συρακούσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔτους Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ᾤκισε, Σικελούς ἐξελάσας πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νήσου, ἐν ᾗ νῦν οὐκέτι περικλυζομένη¹ ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντὸς ἐστίν· ὕστερον δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἔξω προστειχισθεῖσα πολυάνθρωπος ἐγένετο. 3 Θουκλῆς δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἐκ Νάξου ὀρμηθέντες ἔπει πέμπτῳ μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθεῖσας Λεοντίνας τε, πολέμῳ τοὺς Σικελούς ἐξελάσαντες, οἰκίζουσι καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς Κατάνην· οἰκιστὴν δὲ αὐτοὶ Καταναῖοι ἐποιήσαντο Εὐαρχον.

IV. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ Λάμις ἐκ Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων ἐς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ

¹ With CG, the other MSS. περικλυζομένη.

¹ On the little island of S. Pantaleon near the promontory of Lilybaeum

² East of Palermo, now Salanto

³ Now Palermo.

⁴ 735 B.C. The site was the best point for landing from Hellas, near Tauromenium (Taormina).

⁵ A leader appointed by a state to conduct the people sent out to establish a colony. He probably received material

of trade with the Sicels. But when the Hellenes also began to come in by sea in large numbers, the Phoenicians left most of these places and settling together lived in Motya,¹ Soloeis² and Panormus³ near the Elymi, partly because they trusted in their alliance with the Elymi and partly because from there the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. These, then, were the barbarians and such was the manner in which they settled in Sicily.

III. Of the Hellenes, on the other hand, the first to sail over were some Chalcidians from Euboea who settled Naxos⁴ with Thucles as founder,⁵ and built an altar in honour of Apollo Archegetes.⁶ This is now outside of the city, and on it the sacred deputies,⁷ when they sail from Sicily, first offer sacrifice. The following year Syracuse⁸ was founded by Archias, one of the Heracleidae from Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island, no longer surrounded by water, on which now stands the inner city; and at a later period also the outer city was connected with it by walls and became populous. In the fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidians, setting forth from Naxos, drove out the Sicels in war and settled Leontini, and after it Catana.⁹ The Catanaeans, however, chose for themselves Evarchus as founder.

IV. About the same time Lamis also came to Sicily with a colony from Megara and settled in a

privileges and grants while alive, and certainly was paid divine honours—sacrifices and games—after death. If a colony afterwards founded another colony, it was customary to ask a leader from the mother city.

⁶ So called as "founder" or protector of a new settlement.

⁷ On missions to games or oracles.

⁸ 734 B.C.

⁹ 729 B.C.

- ὑπὲρ Παντακίου τε ποταμοῦ Τρώτιλόν τι ὄνομα
χωρίον οἰκίσας καὶ ὕστερον αὐτόθεν τοῖς Χαλκι-
δεῦσιν ἐς Λεοντίους ὀλίγον χρόνον συμπολιτεύσας
καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπεσὼν καὶ Θάψον οἰκίσας αὐτὸς
μὲν ἀποθνήσκει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἀνα-
στάντες, Ὑβλωνος βασιλέως Σικελοῦ παραδόντος
τὴν χώραν καὶ καθηγησαμένου, Μεγαρέας ὥκισαν
2 τοὺς Ὑβλαίους κληθέντας. καὶ ἔτη οἰκήσαντες
πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος
τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ
χώρας. πρὶν δὲ ἀναστήναι, ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἑκατὸν
ἢ αὐτοὺς οἰκίσαι, Πάμμιλον πέμψαντες Σελι-
νοῦντα κτίζουσι, καὶ ἐκ Μεγάρων τῆς μητροπόλεως
3 οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼν ξυγκατῳίκησεν. Γέλαν δὲ
Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἐντιμος ἐκ Κρήτης
ἐποίκουσ ἀγαγόντες κοινῇ ἔκτισαν ἔτι πέμπτῳ
καὶ τεσσαρακοστῷ μετὰ Συρακουσῶν οἰκισιν. καὶ
τῇ μὲν πόλει ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέλα ποταμοῦ τοῦνομα
ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ χωρίον οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ
πρῶτον ἐτειχίσθη Λίνδιοι καλεῖται· νόμιμα δὲ
4 Δωρικὰ ἐτέθη αὐτοῖς. ἔτεσι δὲ ἐγγύτατα ὀκτῶ
καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ τὴν σφετέραν οἰκισιν Γελῶοι
Ἀκράγαντα ὥκισαν, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀκρά-
γαντος ποταμοῦ ὀνομάσαντες, οἰκιστὰς δὲ ποιή-
σαντες Ἀριστόνουν καὶ Πυστίλον, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ
5 Γελῶων εἶναι. Ζήγκλη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ
Κύμης τῆς ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ Χαλκιδικῆς πόλεως ληστῶν
ἀφικομένων ὥκισθη, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Εὐβοίας πληθὸς ἐλθὼν ξυγκατενεί-

¹ A peninsula just north of Syracuse (now called Isola di Maguisi).

place called Trotilus, beyond the river Pantacæyas; but afterwards, having removed from there and joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at Leontini, he was a little later driven out by them, and then after colonizing Thapsus¹ met his death. His followers were expelled from Thapsus and settled then at a place called Megara Hyblæa,² since Hyblon, a Sicel king, gave up the land to them and led them to the site. After dwelling there two hundred and forty-five years, they were driven out of the town and country by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. But before they were driven out, a hundred years after they had settled there, they founded Selinus,³ sending thither Pammilus, who came from the mother-city Megara and joined in the settlement. In the forty-fifth year after the settlement of Syracuse Gela⁴ was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who together led out the colony. The city got its name from the river Gela, but the place where the acropolis now is and which was the first to be fortified is called Lindii.⁵ The institutions given it were Dorian. Just about one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, the Geloans colonized Acragas⁶; and they named the city after the river Acragas, making Aristonous and Pystilus founders, and giving it the institutions of the Geloans. Zancle was settled, in the beginning, by pirates who came from Cyme, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; but afterwards a large number of colonists came from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa and shared the land with them,

¹ 728 B.C.² 628 B.C.³ 689 B.C.⁴ So called evidently from Lindus in Rhodes; cf. Hdt. vii. cliii.⁶ 581 B.C.

μαντο τὴν γῆν· καὶ οἰκισταὶ Περιήρης καὶ Κρα-
 ταιμένης ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς, ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ Κύμης, ὁ δὲ
 ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος. ὄνομα δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ζάγκλη
 ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Σικελῶν κληθεῖσα, ὅτι δρεπανοειδὲς
 τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστί (τὸ δὲ δρέπανον οἱ Σικελοὶ
 ζάγκλον καλοῦσιν), ὕστερον δ' αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ Σα-
 μίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἰώνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἱ Μήδους
 φεύγοντες προσέβαλον Σικελίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους
 6 Ἀναξίλας Ῥηγίνων τύραννος οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον
 ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώ-
 πων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον
 πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν.

V. Καὶ Ἰμέρα ἀπὸ Ζάγκλης ᾠκίσθη ὑπὸ
 Εὐκλείδου καὶ Σίμου καὶ Σάκωνος, καὶ Χαλκιδῆς
 μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦλθον ἐς τὴν ἀποικίαν, ξυνώκισαν
 δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ Συρακουσῶν φυγάδες στάσει
 νικηθέντες, οἱ Μυλητίδαι καλούμενοι· καὶ φωνῇ
 μὲν μεταξὺ τῆς τε Χαλκιδέων καὶ Δωρίδος
 ἐκράθη, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ Χαλκιδικὰ ἐκράτησεν.
 2 Ἀκραι δὲ καὶ Κασμέναι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾠκί-
 σθησαν, Ἀκραι μὲν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτεσι μετὰ
 Συρακούσας, Κασμέναι δ' ἐγγὺς εἴκοσι μετὰ
 3 Ἀκρας. καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακο-
 σίων ᾠκίσθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριά-
 κοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν·
 οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέ-
 κωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων
 πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων δι' ἀπόστασιν, χρόνῳ
 Ἰπποκράτης ὕστερον Γέλας τύραννος, λύτρα ἀν-
 δρῶν Συρακοσίων αἰχμαλώτων λαβὼν τὴν γῆν τὴν
 Καμαριναίων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς γενόμενος κατᾠκίσε

BOOK VI. iv. 5-v. 3

the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes, the one from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. Its name at first was Zancle, and it was so called by the Sicels because the place is sickle-shaped: for the Sicels call a sickle "zancleon." Afterwards these settlers were driven out by Samians and other Ionians, who in their flight before the Persians landed in Sicily¹; but the Samians were expelled not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, who colonized the place with a mixed population and changed its name to Messene² after his own original fatherland.

V. Himera³ was colonized from Zancle by Euclideanes, Simus and Sacon. Most of the colonists were Chalcidians; but there settled with them also fugitives from Syracuse who had been vanquished in a factional quarrel, the Myletidae as they were called. Their language was a mixture of Chalcidic and Doric, but Chalcidic institutions prevailed. Acrae and Casmenae were colonized by the Syracusans: Acrae⁴ seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenae⁵ nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina⁶ was first colonized by the Syracusans, just about one hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse, its founders being Dascon and Meneclus. But the Camarinaeans were driven out by the Syracusans in a war which arose from a revolt, and some time later Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela,⁷ receiving the territory of the Camarinaeans as ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, himself became founder and recolonized Camarina.

¹ cf. Hdt. vi. xxii., xxiii. ² 730 B.C.

³ 648 B.C. ⁴ 664 B.C. ⁵ 644 B.C.

⁶ 599 B.C. ⁷ Dates 498-491.

Καμάριναν. καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος
γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατωκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶων.¹

VI. Τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων
Σικελίαν ᾧκει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσῇδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμητο, ἐφίεμενοι μὲν τῇ
ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν
δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγ-
γενέσι καὶ τοῖς προγεγενημένοις² ξυμμάχοις.
2 μάλιστα δ' αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἑγεσταίων³ πρέσ-
βεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι.
ὁμοροι γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον
καθέστασαν περὶ τε γαμικῶν τινων καὶ περὶ γῆς
ἀμφισβητήτου, καὶ οἱ Σελινούντιοι Συρακοσίους
ἐπαγαγόμενοι ξυμμάχους κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῷ
πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν· ὥστε
τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχης καὶ τοῦ προτέρου
πολέμου Λεοντίνων⁴ οἱ Ἑγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν
ἀναμνησκόντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι
ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμῦναι, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε
πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακόσιοι Λεοντίνους
τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται καὶ τοὺς
λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες⁵
αὐτοὶ τὴν ἅπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχή-
σουσι, κίνδυνον εἶναι μὴ ποτε μεγάλη παρασκευὴ
Δωριῆς τε Δωριεῦσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ ἅμα
ἄποικοι τοῖς ἐκπέμψασι Πελοποννησίοις⁶ βοη-

¹ Dodwell's conjecture for Γέλωνος of the MSS.

² With EGM and Valla; Hude reads *προσγεγενημένοις* with the other MSS.

³ τε after Ἑγεσταίων omitted with three inferior MSS.

⁴ Λεοντίνων, Hude deletes, following Clas-en.

⁵ διαφθείροντες, Hude reads *διαφθείραντες* with Cod. Clarend.

⁶ Πελοποννησίοις, Hude deletes, following Cobet.

And again the place was depopulated by Gelon, and was then colonized for the third time by the Geloans.

VI. Such were the nations, Hellenic and barbarian, 416 B.C. that inhabited Sicily; and such was the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were bent upon invading. To give the truest explanation, they were eager to attain to empire of the whole of it, but they wished at the same time to have the fair pretext of succouring their own kinsmen and their old allies.¹ But most of all they were instigated by envoys of the Egestaeans who were present and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For bordering as they did on the Selinuntians they had got into war with them about certain marriage rights and about disputed territory; and the Selinuntians, bringing in the Syracusans as allies, were pressing them hard in the war both by land and by sea. And so the Egestaeans, reminding the Athenians of their alliance which had been made with the Leontines in the time of Laches and the former war,² begged them to send ships to their relief; saying many other things but chiefly this, that if the Syracusans should go unpunished for depopulating Leontini, and by destroying those of their allies that were still left should get the whole of Sicily into their power, there was danger that some time, lending aid with a great force, both as Dorians to Dorians on account of kinship, and at the same time as colonists to the Peloponnesians that had sent them out, they might

¹ Or, reading *προσγεγενημένοις*,—"the allies they had acquired besides"—the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines (v. iv. 6) and some of the Sicels (iii. ciii. 1).

² cf. iii. lxxxvi. 1.

θήσαντες καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν ξυγκαθέλωσιν·
σῶφρον δ' εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμ-
μάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἄλλως τε καὶ
χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά.

3 ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν
τε Ἐγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυνα-
γορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο πρέσβεις πέμψαι
πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Ἐγεσταν περὶ τε τῶν χρημάτων
σκεψομένους εἰ ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἐν τῷ
κοινῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα
πρὸς τοὺς Σελινουντίους ἐν ὅτῳ ἐστὶν εἰσομένους.

VII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπε-
στάλησαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κο-
ρινθίων στρατεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν τῆς τε
γῆς ἔτεμον οὐ πολλὴν καὶ σῖτον ἀνεκομίσαντό
τινα ζεύγη κομίσαντες, καὶ ἐς Ὀρνεὰς κατοικί-
σαντες τοὺς Ἀργείων φυγάδας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
στρατιᾶς παρακαταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ὀλίγους, καὶ
σπεισάμενοί τινα χρόνον ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν Ὀρνεά-
τας καὶ Ἀργεῖους τὴν ἀλλήλων, ἀπεχώρησαν τῷ
2 στρατῷ ἐπ' οἴκου. ἐλθόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐ
πολλῷ ὕστερον ναυσὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑξακοσίοις
ὀπλίταις, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παν-
στρατιᾷ ἐξελθόντες τοὺς μὲν ἐν Ὀρνεαῖς μίαν
ἡμέραν ἐπολιόρκουν· ὑπὸ δὲ νύκτα, αὐλισαμένου
τοῦ στρατεύματος ἄπωθεν, ἐκκιδράσκουσιν οἱ ἐκ
τῶν Ὀρνεῶν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς
ἦσθοντο, κατασκάψαντες τὰς Ὀρνεὰς ἀνεχώρησαν
καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὕστερον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπ' οἴκου.

3 Καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τὴν ὁμορον Μακεδονία ἰππέας

help to pull down the power of the Athenians. It would be wise, therefore, with their allies that were still left, to oppose the Syracusans, especially as the Egestaeans would furnish money sufficient for the war. And the Athenians, hearing in their assemblies these arguments of the Egestaeans and their supporters, who constantly repeated them, voted first to send envoys to Egesta to see whether the money was on hand, as they said, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to ascertain how matters stood with reference to the war with the Selinuntians.

VII. Accordingly the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily. But during the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, invaded the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land and carried off some corn in wagons which they had brought with them; then having settled the Argive fugitives at Orneae, leaving with them also a small body of troops, after they had made a truce for a certain time, on condition that the Orneates and Argives were not to injure one another's land, they went home with the rest of their force. When the Athenians came not long afterwards with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites, the Argives, in company with the Athenians, went out in full force and besieged the garrison at Orneae for a single day; but under cover of night, when the besieging army had bivouacked at a distance, the garrison of Orneae escaped. The next day the Argives, on learning this, razed Orneae to the ground and withdrew, and later the Athenians also went home with their ships.

The Athenians also conveyed by sea some of their

κατὰ θάλασσαν κομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι φυγάδας
 4 ἐκακούργουν τὴν Περδίκκου. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πέμψαντες παρὰ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης, ἄγοντας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους δεχημέρους σπονδάς, ξυμπολεμεῖν ἐκέλευον Περδίκκα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἤθελον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕκτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

VIII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα ἦρι οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἦκον ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ οἱ Ἑγεσταῖοι μετ' αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἐξήκοντα
 2 καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσαντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε Ἑγεσταίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων πρέσβεων τά τε ἄλλα ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἶη ἐτοῖμα ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ἐψηφίσαντο ναὺς ἐξήκοιτα πέμπειν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ στρατηγούς αὐτοκράτορας Ἀλκιβιάδην τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου καὶ Λάμαχον τὸν Ξενοφάνους, βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἑγεσταίοις πρὸς Σελινούντιους, ξυγκατοικίσαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἣν¹ τι
 3 Ἀθηναίοις. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡμέρᾳ πέμπτῃ ἐκκλησία αὐθις ἐγίγνετο, καθ' ὃ τι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς

¹ Hude inserts τε after ἣν.

own cavalry and the Macedonian exiles that were with them to Methone, which borders on Macedonia, and ravaged the country of Perdiccas. And the Lacedaemonians sent to the Chalcidians in Thrace, who were observing a truce renewable every ten days with the Athenians, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they were unwilling. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

VIII. The next year at the opening of spring the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily, and with them the Eggestaeans, bringing sixty talents¹ of uncoined silver as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask the Athenians to send. And the Athenians, calling an assembly and hearing from the Eggestaeans and their own envoys other things that were enticing but not true, and that the money was ready in large quantity in the temples and in the treasury, voted to send to Sicily sixty ships, with Alcibiades son of Cleinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes as generals with full powers, to aid the Eggestaeans against the Selinuntians, and also to join in restoring Leontini, in case they should have any success in the war; and further to settle all other matters in Sicily as they might deem best for the Athenians. But on the fifth day after this a meeting of the assembly was again held, to determine in what way the ships could be equipped most speedily, and in case the generals should need anything further for the

March,
415 B.C.

¹ £12,000, \$57,360.

4 τὸν ἔκπλουν. καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ἡρη-
μένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς
βεβουλευθῆναι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχεία καὶ εὐ-
πρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου,
ἐφίεσθαι, παρελθὼν ἀποτρέψαι ἐβούλετο καὶ
παρήνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοιάδε.

IX. “Ἡ μὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἤδε ξυνελέγη, καθ’ ὃ τι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν
ἐκπλεῖν· ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου
ἔτι χρῆναι σκέψασθαι, εἰ καὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν
ἐκπέμπειν τὰς ναῦς, καὶ μὴ οὕτως βραχεία βουλῇ
περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοφύλοις
πειθομένους πόλεμον οὐ προσήκοντα αἶρεσθαι.

2 καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ
ἦσσαν ἐτέρων περὶ τῷ ἑμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ,
νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι ὅς ἂν καὶ
τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῇται· μά-
λιστα γὰρ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως δι’
ἑαυτὸν βούλοιτο ὀρθοῦσθαι. ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ
πρότερον χρόνῳ διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι εἶπον παρὰ
γνώμην οὔτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν¹ γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα
3 ἐρῶ. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους
ἀσθενὴς ἂν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα
σώζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐτοίμοις περὶ τῶν
ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν· ὥς δὲ οὔτε ἐν

¹ ἀλλὰ ἢ ἂν, with the MSS., Hude adopts ἀλλ’ ἢ ἂν from Reiske and Madvig.

expedition, to vote it for them. And Nicias, who had been elected to the command against his will, and thought the city had not come to a right decision, but that, with a slight and specious pretext, it was the conquest of all Sicily, a great undertaking, at which they aimed, came forward with the purpose of averting this, and advised the Athenians as follows:—

IX. "This assembly was convoked with reference to our armament, to consider in what way we should make the expedition to Sicily; to me, however, it seems that we ought to consider yet again this very question, whether it is best to send the ships at all, and that we ought not, on such slight deliberation about matters of great importance, at the instigation of men of alien race, to undertake a war that does not concern us. And yet from such an enterprise I for my part get honour, and have less dread than others about my life,¹ although I consider that he is quite as good a citizen who takes some forethought for his life and property; for such an one would, for his own sake, be most desirous that the affairs of the city should prosper. But nevertheless neither in the past have I, for the sake of being preferred in honour, spoken contrary to my judgment, nor shall I do so now, but I shall speak just as I deem best. Against tempers, indeed, like yours my words would be unavailing, if I should exhort you to preserve what you have already and not to hazard present possessions for things that are unseen and in the future; that, however, neither is your haste timely,

¹ He may have been suffering already from the kidney trouble of which he complained the next summer in his letter to the Athenians (VII. xv. 1).

καιρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ῥαδιὰ ἐστὶ κατασχεῖν ἐφ' ἃ ὥρμησθε, ταῦτα διδάξω.

X. “ Φημὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ ἐτέρους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκείσε πλεύ-
 2 σαντας δεῦρο ἐπαγαγέσθαι. καὶ οἴεσθε ἴσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπονδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον· αἱ ἡσυχάζοντων μὲν ὑμῶν ὀνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσονται (οὕτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἄνδρες ἔπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων), σφαλέντων δέ που ἀξιόχρεω δυνάμει ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιήσονται, οἷς πρῶτον μὲν διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἢ ξύμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχύονος ἢ ἡμῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἔπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ
 3 ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ οὐδὲ ταύτην πω τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἐδέξαντο, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχη-
 4 μέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται. τάχα δ' ἂν ἴσως, εἰ δίχα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὅπερ νῦν σπευδομεν, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ξυνεπίθοιντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν, οὓς πρὸ πολλῶν ἂν ἐτιμήσαντο ξυμ-
 5 μάχους γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ. ὥστε χρὴ σκοπεῖν τινα αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τῇ πόλει ἀξιοῦν κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἢν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θρίκης, ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφεστῶτες ἡμῶν, ἔτι ἀχείρωτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἡπείρους

nor is it easy to attain what you are striving for, this I shall show.

X. "I say, then, that you, leaving behind you many enemies here, are bent upon sailing there and bringing upon you here still other enemies. And you think perhaps that the treaty which has been made affords you some security—a treaty which indeed, as long as you are quiet, will be a treaty in name (for so certain men here and among our enemies have managed these matters); but should you perchance suffer defeat with a considerable force, our foes will be quick to make their attack upon us. For the compact in the first place was concluded by them under compulsion through stress of misfortune and with less credit to them than to us; and, besides, in the compact itself there are many disputed points. There are also some states which have not as yet accepted even this agreement, and these not the weakest; on the contrary, some of them are at open war with us, while others again, merely because the Lacedaemonians still keep quiet, are themselves also kept in restraint by a truce renewable every ten days. But very probably, if they should find our power divided—the very thing we are now so anxious to bring about—they would eagerly join in an attack upon us along with the Siceliot, whose alliance they would heretofore have given much to obtain. And so we must consider these matters and resolve not to run into danger while the state is still amid the waves, and reach out after another empire before we have secured that which we have, seeing that the Chalcidians in Thrace, after so many years of revolt from us, are still unsubdued, while others at various points on

ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀκροῶνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὔσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν, ὑφ' ὧν δ' αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

XI. “Καίτοι τοὺς μὲν κατεργασάμενοι καὶν κατὰ-
σχοιμεν· τῶν δ' εἰ καὶ κρατήσαιμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε
καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα.
ἀνόητον δ' ἐπὶ τοιοῦτους ἰέναι ὧν κρατήσας τε μὴ
κατασχῆσει τις καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας μὴ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ
2 καὶ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἔσται. Σικελιῶται δ' ἂν
μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὥς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἦσσαν
δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρξειαν αὐτῶν Συρακούσιοι,
ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσιν.
3 νῦν μὲν γὰρ καὶν ἔλθοιεν ἴσως Λακεδαιμονίων ἕκα-
στοι χάριτι, ἐκείνως δ' οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν
στρατεῦσαι· ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν μετὰ
Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλονται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαιρεθῆναι.
4 ἡμᾶς δ' ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπε-
πληγμένοι εἶεν, εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ
εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι' ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν
(τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα
καὶ τὰ πείραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα)· εἰ δὲ
σφαλεῖμέν τι, τάχιστ' ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν

the mainland render us a dubious allegiance. But we, it seems, must rush to bring aid to Egestaeans, being, forsooth, our allies, on the ground that they are wronged, while on those by whose revolt we ourselves have long been wronged we still delay to inflict punishment.

XI. "And yet these, if once brought under control, we might also keep under control; but the Siceliots, even if we should get the better of them, we should find it hard to govern, far off as they are and formidable in numbers. But it is folly to go against men when victory will not bring control over them and failure will not leave matters in the same condition as before the attack was made. The Siceliots, moreover, it seems to me, at least as things now stand, would be even less dangerous to us if the Syracusans should acquire rule over them—that prospect with which the Egestaeans especially try to terrify us. For now they might perhaps come against us singly out of regard for the Lacedaemonians, but in the other case,¹ it is not likely that an imperial city would make war against an imperial city; for by whatsoever means they, in concert with the Peloponnesians, might despoil us of our sway, by the same means very likely would their own empire be pulled down by these same Peloponnesians. And as to us, the Hellenes there would be most in awe, first, if we should not come at all; next, if after showing our power we should after a brief interval depart. For it is, as we all know, things that are farthest off and least allow a test of their reputation which excite wonder; but if we should suffer a defeat, they would very quickly

¹ i.e. in case the Syracusans acquired sway over them.

5 ἐνθάδε ἐπίθουντο. ὅπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς
 Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πεπόνθατε,
 διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ
 πρῶτον περιγεγενῆσθαι καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ
 6 Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε.¹ χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας
 τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας
 κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, μηδὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἄλλο
 τι ἡγήσασθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν ὅτῳ
 τρόπῳ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἣν δύνωνται, σφήλαντες ἡμᾶς
 τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὖ θήσονται, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ
 πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελε-
 7 τῶσιν. ὥστε οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἑγεσταίων
 ἡμῖν, ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων, ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν,
 ἀλλ' ὅπως πόλιν δι' ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσιν
 ὀξέως φυλαξ' μεθα.

XII. “Καὶ μεμνήσθαι χρὴ ἡμῶς ὅτι νεωστί
 ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου βραχὺ τι λε-
 λωφῆκαμεν, ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν
 ἠϋξῆσθαι· καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δίκαιον ἐνθάδε
 αἰαλοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων τῶνδε
 ἐπικουρίας ἰεομένων, οἷς τό τε ψεύσασθαι καλῶς
 χρήσιμοι, καὶ τῷ τοῦ πέλας κινδύνῳ, αὐτοὺς
 λόγους μόνον παρασχομένους, ἢ κατορθώσαντας
 χάριν μὴ ἀξίαν εἰδέναι ἢ πταίσαντάς που τοὺς
 2 φίλους ξυναπολέσαι.² εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος
 αἰρεθεὶς παραινεί ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον

¹ For ἐφίεσθαι of the MSS., after Schol.

² For ξυναπολέσθαι of the MSS., Reiske's correction.

despise us and join our enemies here in attacking us. And just this has been your experience, men of Athens, with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: because you have got the better of them beyond your expectation—in comparison with what you feared at first—you despise them now and aim even at the conquest of Sicily. You have no right, however, to be elated at the misfortunes of your opponents, but only when you have mastered their spirits should you feel confidence; nor must you believe that the Lacedaemonians, on account of their humiliation, have anything else in view than to discover in what way they may even yet defeat us and retrieve their own dishonour—the more so as they have been in the highest degree and for the longest time courting a reputation for valour. And so the issue before us, if we are prudent, is not the fate of the Egestaeans, a barbaric people in Sicily, but how we shall keep a sharp watch upon a state which is intriguing against us with the devices of oligarchy.

XII. “And we should remember that we have but lately recovered somewhat from a great pestilence and war, so as to recruit our strength both in money and in men; and these resources it is but right to expend for ourselves here, and not for these fugitives that are begging our aid, whose interest it is to lie cleverly, and, at their neighbour’s cost, supplying nothing but words themselves, either, in case of success, to show no proper gratitude, or, in the event of failure, to involve their friends in ruin. And if there be anyone here who, elated at being chosen to command, exhorts you to sail, considering—especially as he is too

σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἵπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἶον νεωτέρῳ¹ βουλευσασθαι τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσαι.

XIII. “Οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνοθῆναι, εἴ τῷ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἂν μὴ ψηφίζεται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ', ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται,² προνοία δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, ὥς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης, ἀντιχειροτονεῖν καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἷσπερ νῦν ὄροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ, παρὰ γῆν ἣν τις πλὴν, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ, διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὐτῶν νεμομένους καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ
2 ξυμφέρεσθαι· τοῖς δὲ Ἑγεσταίοις ἰδίᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἄνει Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνῆψαν πρὸς Σελινουντίους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καταλύεσθαι· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμμάχους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πρά-

¹ MSS.; Hude adopts Pluygers' correction, νεωτέρους.

² κατορθοῦνται MSS., κατορθοῦται Goeller's conjecture.

young to command—only his own interest, how he may get admiration for his raising of fine horses, and then, because that is very expensive, how he may also get some profit from his command, do not afford this man, at the cost of the state, opportunity to make a personal display, but rather consider that such men damage the public interest while they waste their own property, and that the matter is one of great seriousness, and not such as a youth may decide and rashly take in hand.

XIII. “It is of such youths, when I see them sitting here in answer to the appeal of this same man, that I am afraid; and I make a counter-appeal to the older men, if any of you sit by one of these, not to be shamed into fear lest he may seem to be a coward if he do not vote for war, and not, though that may be *their* feeling, to have a morbid craving for what is out of reach, knowing that few successes are won by greed, but very many by foresight; on the contrary, on behalf of our country, which is now running the greatest risk it has ever run, hold up your hands in opposition and vote that the Siceliots, keeping the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries no one can find fault with—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along the coast, and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep—shall enjoy their own possessions and settle their own quarrels among themselves. But tell the Eggestaeans in particular that, as they went to war with the Selinuntians in the first place without the Athenians, so they must bring it to an end by themselves; and for the future let us not make allies, as we are wont to do, whom we must assist when they fare ill, but from whom

THUCYDIDES

ξασιν ἀμυννοῦμεν, ὠφελίας δ' αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευξόμεθα.

XIV. “Καὶ σύ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφισε καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ¹ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ' ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως βουλευσαμένης² ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι, ὅς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὥς πλεῖστα ἢ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβῃ.”

XV. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα εἶπεν· τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων παριόντες οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι στρατεύειν παρήνουν καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα μὴ λύειν, οἱ δέ τινες² καὶ αἰτέλεγον. ἐνήγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιῶσθαι, ὣν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ³ ὠφελήσειν. ὦν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστών, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήτο ἕς τε τὰς ἵπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας· ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλει ὕστερον τὴν⁴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. φοβηθέντες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίκαιαν καὶ τῆς διανοίας

¹ τὸ μὲν λύειν, Hude substitutes τοῦ, following van Herwerden.

² βουλευσαμένης, inferior MSS. and the Scholiast κακῶς βουλευσαμένης.

we shall get no help when we are ourselves in need.

XIV. "And do you, Mr. President, if you think it your duty to care for the state and you wish to prove yourself a good citizen, bring these matters again to a vote and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you fear to put the issue to vote again, reflect that it would involve no guilt to break the law in the presence of so many witnesses, but that you would thus become a physician for the state when it has taken evil counsel; and remember that this is the part of a good governor - to benefit his country as much as possible, or willingly at least to do it no harm."

XV. Thus Nicias spoke. Most of the Athenians that came forward advised the people to make the expedition and not to rescind the vote, while some spoke against it. But most zealous in urging the expedition was Alcibiades son of Cleinias, wishing as he did to oppose Nicias, because, along with their general political disagreement, Nicias had made invidious reference to him,¹ and above all he was eager to be made general and hoped thereby to subdue both Sicily and Carthage, and in case of success to promote at the same time his private interests in wealth as well as in glory. For being held in high esteem by his townsmen, he indulged desires beyond his actual means, in keeping horses as well as in his other expenses. And it was precisely this sort of thing that most of all later destroyed the Athenian state. For the masses, afraid of the greatness of his lawless and sensual self-indulgence in his manner of living, as also of his

¹ *cf.* ch. xii. 2.

ὦν καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὥς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἑκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν. τότε δ' οὖν παρελθὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρήνει τοιαύδε.

XVI. “Καὶ προσήκει μοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄρχειν (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδὴ μου Νικίας καθήψατο), καὶ ἄξιός ἑμα νομίζω εἶναι. ὦν γὰρ πέρι ἐπιβότης εἰμι, τοῖς μὲν προγόνοις μου καὶ ἐμοὶ δόξαν φέρει ταῦτα, τῇ
 2 δὲ πατρίδι καὶ ὠφελίαν. οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι, διότι ἄρματα μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καθήκα, ὅσα οὐδεὶς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησα δὲ καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην καὶ τᾶλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην. νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου
 3 καὶ δύναμις ἑμα ὑπονοεῖται. καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθορεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξείνους καὶ

¹ Probably 416 B.C.; though Thirlwall assumes 424, Grote 420.

² i.e. at the public festivals and especially at dramatic exhibitions. Choruses were provided by well-to-do public-spirited citizens, called Choregi, appointed to this duty by the state, these securing the choristers and their trainers

designs as revealed in every single intrigue in which he was involved, became hostile to him on the ground that he was aiming at a tyranny; and, though publicly he managed the affairs of the war most excellently, in his private life every man had been offended at his practices, and so entrusting the city to other hands after no long time they brought it to ruin. He now came forward and advised the Athenians as follows:—

XVI. "It belongs to me more than to others, Athenians, to have command—for I must needs begin with this, since Nicias has attacked me—and I think, too, that I am worthy to command. For those things for which I am raised at bring glory to my ancestors and myself, as well as advantage to my country. For the Hellenes, who had previously hoped that our state had been exhausted by the war, conceived an idea of its greatness that even transcended its actual power by reason of the magnificence of my display as sacred deputy at Olympia,¹ because I entered seven chariots, a number that no private citizen had ever entered before, and won the first prize and the second and the fourth, and provided everything else in a style worthy of my victory. For by general custom such things do indeed mean honour, and from what is done men also infer power. And again, although whatever display I made in the city, by providing choruses² or in any other way, naturally causes jealousy among my townsmen, yet in the eyes of strangers this too gives an impression of

and defraying all their expenses for dress, maintenance and training. As choregi generally vied with each other in bringing out choruses with all possible splendour, such service was costly, sometimes exhausting a man's whole patrimony.

αὕτη ἰσχὺς φαίνεται. καὶ οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἦδ' ἡ
 ἄνοια, ὅς ἂν τοῖς ἰδίοις τέλεσι μὴ ἑαυτὸν μόνον,
 1 ἄλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῇ, οὐδέ γε ἄδικον ἐφ'
 ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονούντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ
 κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἰσο-
 μοιρεῖ· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ προσαγο-
 ρευόμεθα, ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τις ἀνεχέσθω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
 εὐπραγούντων ὑπερφρονούμενος, ἢ τὰ ἴσα νέμων
 5 τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνταξιούτω. οἶδα δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ
 ὅσοι ἐν τινος λαμπρότητι προέσχον, ἐν μὲν τῷ
 κατ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τοῖς ὁμοίοις μὲν
 μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνόντας, τῶν
 δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποιήσιν τε ξυγγενείας
 τισὶ καὶ μὴ οὔσαν καταλιπόντας, καὶ ἥς ἂν ὧσι
 πατρίδος, ταύτῃ αὖχῃσιν, ὥς οὐ περὶ ἀλλοτρίων
 οὐδ' ἁμαρτόντων, ἀλλ' ὥς περὶ σφετέρων τε καὶ
 6 καλὰ πραξάντων. ὦν ἐγὼ ὀρεγόμενος καὶ διὰ
 ταῦτα τὰ ἴδια ἐπιβοώμενος τὰ δημόσια σκοπεῖτε
 εἴ του χεῖρον μεταχειρίζω. Πελοποννήσου γὰρ
 τὰ δυνατώτατα ξυστήσας ἄνευ μεγάλου ὑμῖν
 κινδύνου καὶ δαπάνης Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς μίαν
 ἡμέραν κατέστησα ἐν Μαντινείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἀπάν-
 των ἀγωνίσασθαι· ἐξ οὗ καὶ περιγεγόμενοι τῇ
 μάχῃ οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν βεβαίως θαρσοῦσιν.

XVII. “Καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἄνοια
 παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων
 δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπουσιν ὠμίλησε καὶ ὀργῇ

strength. And that is no useless folly, when a man by his private expenditures benefits not himself only but also his state. Nor is it unfair, either, that one who has a high opinion of himself should refuse to be on an equality with others, since he who fares ill finds no one to be an equal participator in his evil plight. On the contrary, just as in misfortune we receive no greetings, in like manner let a man submit even though despised by those who prosper; or else, let him mete out equal measure to all, and then claim the like in turn. I know, however, that men of this stamp, and all others who have in any way stood out as illustrious, are indeed in their own lifetime an offence, most of all to their equals, then also to others, while still among them, but that they leave behind to those who come after the claiming of kinship even where there is none; and, whatever their fatherland, to it they leave exultant pride in them, as men who are not aliens or offenders, but who are their own and have done well. And such being my ambition and these the grounds on which I am decried in my private life, look at my public acts and see whether I execute them worse than another. I brought together the greatest powers¹ of the Peloponnesus without great danger to you or expense and forced the Lacedaemonians to stake all upon a single day at Mantinea²; and in consequence of this, though victorious in the field, even yet they have not firm confidence.

XVII. "Thus did my youthfulness and my seemingly abnormal folly cope with the power of the Peloponnesians in fitting words and with a spirit that

¹ Argos, Mantinea and Elis; cf. v. xlvi., lii.

² cf. v. lxvi. ff.

πίστιν παρασχομένη ἔπεισε· καὶ νῦν μὴ πεφό-
 βησθε αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ἕως ἐγὼ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ'
 αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχῆς δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρή-
 2 σασθε τῇ ἐκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελίᾳ. καὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν
 Σικελίαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγιγνώσκετε ὥς ἐπὶ μεγά-
 λην δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις
 πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥαδίας ἔχουσι τῶν
 3 πολιτῶν¹ τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς· καὶ οὐδεὶς
 δι' αὐτὸ ὥς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μονί-
 μοις² κατασκευαῖς, ὃ τι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ
 λέγων πείθειν οἴεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ
 λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκίσειν, ταῦτα
 4 ἐτοιμάζεται. καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄμιλον
 οὔτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα
 κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι· ταχὺ δ' ἂν ὥς ἕκαστοι, εἴ τι
 καθ' ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 5 εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα. καὶ μὴν
 οὐδ' ὀπλῖται οὔτ' ἐκείνοις ὅσοι περ κομποῦνται,
 οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες διεφάνησαν τοσοῦτοι ὄντες
 ὅσους ἕκαστοι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡρίθμουν, ἀλλὰ μέ-
 γιστον δὴ αὐτοὺς ἐψευσμένη ἡ Ἑλλὰς μόλις ἐν
 6 τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἱκανῶς ὥπλίσθη. τά τε οὖν ἐκεῖ
 ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔτι εὐπο-

¹ With E, the rest of the MSS. πολιτειῶν.

² Hude adopts νομίμοις, Dukas' conjecture, which is sup-
 ported by the Schol., who explains νομίμοις by οὐ ταῖς
 νομιζομέναις, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἱκαναῖς· οὕτω καὶ νόμιμον ῥήτορα τὸν
 ἱκανὸν καὶ νόμιμον ἀθλητὴν φάμεν.

inspired faith win assent. And now be not afraid of it, but while I am still in the flower of youth, and Nicias has the reputation of good luck, make the most of the services of us both. And as to the voyage to Sicily, do not change your minds on the ground that you are going against a formidable power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that the cities there¹ are populous, and changes and accessions in the body of their citizens² are easy. And for this reason no one is equipped, as he would be in behalf of his own country, either with arms for personal protection or with permanent improvements for the cultivation of his land; but whatever each one thinks he can obtain from the common stock by persuasive oratory or by sedition, in the expectation that if he fails he will settle in some other land, this he provides himself with. And it is not likely that a rabble of this kind would either listen to counsel with one mind or turn to action with a common purpose; but quickly, if anything were said to please them,³ they would each for himself come over to our side, especially if they are in a state of revolution as we hear. Further, as regards hoplites neither have they as many as they boast; nor have the rest of the Hellenes proved to have such numbers as they each reckon; on the contrary, Hellas has been very greatly deceived in its estimates of hoplites and in this war has with difficulty been adequately equipped with them. Such, then, is the situation in Sicily, to judge from what I learn by report, and it is likely to be

¹ Referring to Syracuse and its dependencies.

² Or, reading *πολιτειῶν*, "changes in old forms of government and adoption of new."

³ *i.e.* by Athenian representatives.

ρώτερα ἔσται (βαρβάρους¹ γὰρ πολλοὺς ἔξομεν οἱ Συρακοσίων μίσει ξυνεπιθήσονται αὐτοῖς), καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπικωλύσει, ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς βουλευ-
 7 ησθε. οἱ γὰρ πατέρες ἡμῶν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους οὕσπερ νῦν φασι πολεμίους ὑπολιπόντας ἂν ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ προσέτι τὸν Μῆδον ἐχθρὸν ἔχοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τῇ περιουσίᾳ
 8 τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἰσχύοντες. καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴ τε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν ἐσβάλλειν, κἂν μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἱκανοὶ εἰσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο βλάπτειν· ὑπόλοιπον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔστιν ἀντίπαλον ναυτικόν.

XVIII. "Ὡστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; οἷς χρεῶν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἐπαμύνειν καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέσθαι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα δεῦρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι προσεθέμεθα αὐτούς, ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὄντες δεῦρο κωλύωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπ-
 2 ιέναι. τὴν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἥρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἑλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ, εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιμεν πάντες² ἢ φυλοκρinoῖμεν οἷς χρεῶν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἂν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. τὸν γὰρ πρoύχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ³ ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει.

¹ τε of the MSS. after βαρβάρους bracketed by Haacke.

² πάντες, Hude emends the MSS reading to πάντως.

³ Transposing μὴ ὅπως of the MSS., after Krüger.

still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians, who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; and matters here will be no actual hindrance, if you are rightly advised. For our fathers had as enemies these same men whom, as they say, you would be leaving behind if you should sail thither, and the Persian besides as a foe, yet acquired their empire without being strong in anything else than in the superiority of their fleet. As for the present, never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless against us; and let them be never so confident, they can invade us only by land—and that they can do even if we do not make this expedition; but with their fleet they cannot hurt us, for we have in reserve a fleet that is a match for them.

XVIII. “On what reasonable plea, then, can we hold back ourselves, or make excuse to our allies there for refusing to aid them? We ought to assist them, especially as we have actually sworn to do so, and may not object that they did not help us, either. For we took them into our alliance, not that they might bring aid here, but in order that by annoying our enemies there they might hinder them from coming hither against us. It was in this way that we acquired our empire—both we and all others that have ever won empire—by coming zealously to the aid of those, whether barbarians or Hellenes, who have at any time appealed to us; whereas, if we should all keep quiet or draw distinctions of race as to whom we ought to assist, we should add but little to our empire and should rather run a risk of losing that empire itself. For against a superior one does not merely defend oneself when he attacks, but even takes precaution that he shall not attack at all.

- 3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ' ἐτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε.
- 4 “Λογισάμενοι οὖν τάδε μᾶλλον αὐξήσιν, ἐπ' ἐκείνα ἣν ἴωμεν, ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἥσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι, καὶ ἅμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων, πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξωμεν, ἢ κακώσωμέν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ
- 5 οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελήσομεθα. τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἣν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν· ναυκρίτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων
- 6 Σικελιωτῶν. καὶ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἢ Νικίου τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰωθότι κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἅμα νέοι γεραιτέροις βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦσαν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειρᾶσθε προαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομί-

¹ The other Hellenic states, it would seem, were preaching the doctrine of non-interference or self-determination; Athens, according to Alcibiades, cannot accept this doctrine

And it is not possible for us to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits we would set to our empire; but, since we are placed in this position, it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others, should we not ourselves hold empire over other peoples. And you cannot regard a pacific policy in the same light as other states might, unless you will change your practices also to correspond with theirs.¹

“Calculating, then, that we shall rather strengthen our power here if we go over there, let us make the voyage, that we may lay low the haughty spirit of the Peloponnesians, as we shall if we let men see that in contempt of our present peaceful condition² we even sail against Sicily; and that we may, at the same time, either acquire empire over all Hellas, as in all probability we shall, when the Hellenes there have been added to us, or may at least cripple the Syracusans, whereby both ourselves and our allies will be benefited. And as to safety—both to remain, if things go well, and to come away—our ships will provide that; for we shall be masters of the sea even against all the Siceliots combined. And let not the policy of inaction that Nicias proposes, or his putting the younger at variance with the older men, divert you from your purpose; but in our usual good order, just as our fathers, young men taking counsel with older men, raised our power to its present height, do you now also in the same way strive to

without accepting the consequences and relinquishing her empire.

² Which was in reality an armed truce renewable every ten days.

σατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἂν ἰσχύειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἂν μὲν ἡσυχάζῃ, τρίψεσθαι τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσσεσθαι, ἀγωνιζομένην δὲ αἰεὶ προσλήψεσθαι τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ξύνηθες ἔξειν.

7 παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστ' ἂν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἱ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἦθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἣν καὶ χεῖρω ἢ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύουσιν."

XIX. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπεν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν Ἑγεσταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φηγίδων, οἱ παρελθόντες ἐδέοντό τε καὶ τῶν ὀρκίων ὑπομιμνήσκοντες ἰκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὠρμηντο στρατεύειν. καὶ ὁ Νικίας γινούς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ' ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτούς, παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς αὖθις ἔλεγε τοίαδε.

XX. "Ἐπειδὴ πάντως ὀρῶ ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὠρμημένους στρατεύειν, ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἂ γιγνώσκω σημανῶ.
2 ἐπὶ γὰρ πόλεις, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, μέλλομεν ἰέναι μεγάλας καὶ οὐθ' ὑπηκύους ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ δεομένης μεταβολῆς, ἢ ἂν ἐκ βιαίου τις δουλείας ἄσμενος ἐς ῥάω μετάστασιν χωροίῃ, οὐτ' ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν εἰκότως ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας

advance the state. And consider that youth and age without one another avail nothing, but that the simple, the mediocre, and the very subtle tempered together will have most strength; and that the state, if she remain at peace, will, like anything else, wear herself out upon herself, and her skill in all pursuits will grow old; whereas, if she is continually at conflict, she will always be adding to her experience, and will acquire more, not in word but in deed, the habit of defending herself. In short, I declare that a state which is accustomed to activity would very quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity; and that those men live most securely whose political action is least at variance with existing habits and institutions, even when these are not the best."

XIX. Thus Alcibiades spoke. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who coming forward, besought them and implored them for succour, reminding them of their oaths, the Athenians were far more eager for the expedition than before. And Nicias, seeing that he could no longer deter them with the same arguments, but thinking that by the magnitude of the armament, if he insisted upon a large one, he might possibly change their minds, came forward and spoke as follows:

XX. "Since I see, men of Athens, that you are wholly bent upon the expedition, I pray that these matters may turn out as we wish; for the present juncture, however, I will show what my judgment is. The cities we are about to attack are, as I learn by report, large, and neither subject to one another nor in need of any such change as a person might be happy to accept in order to escape from enforced servitude to an easier condition, nor likely to accept our rule in

προσδεξαμένας, τό τε πλήθος, ὡς ἐν μιᾷ νήσῳ,
3 πολλὰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας. πλὴν γὰρ Νάξου καὶ
 Κατάνης, ἃς ἐλπίζω ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ Λεοντίνων ξυγ-
 γενὲς προσέσεσθαι, ἄλλαι εἰσὶν ἐπτά, καὶ παρε-
 σκευασμέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοιοτρόπως μάλιστα τῇ
 ἡμετέρᾳ δυνάμει, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ ἃς μᾶλλον
4 πλέομεν, Σελινούς καὶ Συράκουσαι. πολλοὶ μὲν
 γὰρ ὀπλῖται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί,
 πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτάς.
 χρήματά τ' ἔχουσι, τὰ μὲν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἱεροῖς ἔστι Σελινουντίοις. Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ
 βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φέρεται.¹ ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα
 ἡμῶν προύχουσιν, ἵππους τε πολλοὺς κέκτηνται
 καὶ σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ χρώνται.

XXI. “ Ἰπρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐ ναυ-
 τικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πεζὸν πολὺν ξυμπλεῖν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς
 διανοίας δρᾶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἵργε-
 σθαι τῆς γῆς, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις
 φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡμῖν φίλοι
 τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀμυνόμεθα
2 ἱππικόν. αἰσχροὺς δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστε-
 ρον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βου-
 λευσαμένους. αὐτόθεν δὲ ² παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεον
 ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας

¹ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φέρεται, the reading of G (adopted by some of the best editors), for ἀπαρχῆς φέρεται ABCEFM, ἀπαρχὴ ἐσφέρεται vulg.

² Understanding δεῖ from § 1, which Hude inserts with van Herwerden and Madvig.

place of liberty; and the number is large, for a single island, of cities of Hellenic origin. For except Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on account of their kinship to the Leontines, there are seven others;¹ and these are equipped with everything in a style very like to our own armament, and not least those against which our expedition is more immediately directed, Selinus and Syracuse. For they can supply many hoplites, archers and javelin-men, and possess many triremes and a multitude of men to man them. They have wealth, too, partly in private possession and partly in the temples at Selinus; and to the Syracusans tribute has come in from time immemorial from certain barbarians also; but their chief advantage over us is in the fact that they have many horses, and use grain that is home-grown and not imported.

XXI. "To cope with such a power we need not only a naval armament of such insignificant size, but also that a large force for use on land should accompany the expedition, if we would accomplish anything worthy of our design and not be shut out from the land by their numerous cavalry; especially if the cities become terrified and stand together, and some of the others, besides Egesta, do not become our friends and supply us cavalry with which to defend ourselves against that of the enemy. And it would be shameful to be forced to return home, or later to send for fresh supplies, because we had made our plans at first without due consideration. So we must start from home with an adequate armament, realizing that we are about to sail, not only far from our

¹ Syracuse, Selinus, Gela, Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, Camarina (Schol.).

αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρα-
τευσόμενοι καὶ ¹ εἰ τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις ξύμμαχοι
ἦλθετε ἐπὶ τινα, ὅθεν ῥάδισαι αἱ κομιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς
φιλίας ὧν προσέδει, ἀλλὰ ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν
ἀπαρτήσαντες, ² ἐξ ἧς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν
χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥάδιον ἐλθεῖν.

XXII. “Ὅπλίτας τε οὖν πολλοὺς μοι δοκεῖ
χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
ξυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἦν τινα ἐκ Πελο-
ποννήσου δυνώμεθα ἢ πείσαι ἢ μισθῷ προσαγα-
γέσθαι, καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας,
ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἰππικὸν ἀντέχωσι, ναυσί
τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾶον
ἐσκομιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὑλκάσι,
πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς, ἄγειν καὶ σιτο-
ποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν μυλῶνων πρὸς μέρος ἡναγκασμένους
ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἦν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμ-
βανώμεθα, ἔχη ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλή
γὰρ οὐσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι),
τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατόν ἐτοιμάσασθαι καὶ μὴ
ἐπὶ ἐτέροις γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα αὐτό-
θεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ παρ’ Ἑγεσταίων,
ἃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἐτοῖμα, νομίσατε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν
μάλιστα ἐτοῖμα εἶναι.

XXIII. “Ἦν γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἔλθωμεν ἐνθένδε μὴ
ἀντίπαλον μόνον παρασκευασάμενοι, πλήν γε πρὸς
τὸ μάχιμον αὐτῶν τὸ ὀπλιτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπερ-

¹ καὶ εἰ for καὶ οὐκ ἐν of the MSS., with Classen.

² ἀπαρτήσαντες, with ABF and Schol. (ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπαρτηθέντες, ἀπελθόντες), ἀπαρτήσαντες CEM.

own land, but also on a campaign that will be carried on under no such conditions as if you had gone against an enemy as allies of your subject-states over here, where it would be easy to get whatever further supplies you needed from the friendly territory; nay, you will have removed into an utterly alien land, from which during the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come even in four months.

XXII. "And so it seems to me that we ought to take hoplites in large numbers, both of our own and of our allies, and from our subjects, as well as any from the Peloponnesus that we can attract by pay or persuade; many bowmen, and also slingers, in order that they may withstand the cavalry of the enemy. And in ships we must have a decided superiority, in order that we may bring in our supplies more easily. And we must also take with us in merchantmen the grain in our stores here, wheat and parched barley, together with bakers requisitioned for pay from the mills in proportion to their size, in order that, if perchance we be detained by stress of weather, the army may have supplies. For the force will be large, and it will not be every city that can receive it. And all other things so far as possible we must get ready for ourselves, and not come to be at the mercy of the Siceliots; but we must especially have from here as much money as possible; for as to that of the Eggestaeans, which is reported to be ready there, you may assume that it is indeed chiefly by report that it will ever be ready.

XXIII. "For if we go from here provided with an equipment of our own that is not only equal to theirs—except indeed as regards their fighting troops of heavy-armed men—but that even surpasses it in all

βάλλοντες τοῖς πᾶσι, μόλις οὕτως οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα
 2 τῶν μὲν κρατεῖν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διασῶσαι. πόλιν τε
 νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἄλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκι-
 οῦντας ἰέναι, οὓς πρέπει τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ἂν
 κατάσχωσιν εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς ἢ εἰδέναι ὅτι,
 3 ἢν σφάλλωνται, πάντα πολέμια ἔξουσιν. ὅπερ
 ἐγὼ φοβούμενος καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον εὖ
 βουλευσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι, χαλεπὸν
 δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παρα-
 δούς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ
 4 ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλῆς.¹ ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε
 ξυμπᾶσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς
 στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια. εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλως δοκεῖ,
 παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν."

XXIV. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα εἶπε, νομίζων
 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ
 ἀποτρέψειν ἢ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεῦεσθαι, μά-
 2 λιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι. οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν
 ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξηρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ
 ὀχλώδους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρ-
 μηντο καὶ τοῦναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ· εὖ τε γὰρ
 παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλή
 3 ἔσεσθαι. καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως
 ἐκπλεῦσαι, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὥς ἢ κατα-
 στρεψομένοις ἐφ' ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν
 μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπού-

¹ ἐκπλεῦσαι of the MSS., after ἀσφαλῆς, deleted by KENNEDY.

respects, scarcely even so shall we be able to conquer Sicily or indeed to preserve our own army. It is, in fact, as you must believe, a city that we are going forth to found amid alien and hostile peoples, and it behooves men in such an enterprise to be at once, on the very day they land, masters of the soil, or at least to know that, if they fail in this, everything will be hostile to them. Fearing, then, this very result, and knowing that to succeed we must have been wise in planning to a large extent, but to a still larger extent must have good fortune—a difficult thing, as we are but men—I wish, when I set sail, to have committed myself as little as possible to fortune, but so far as preparation is concerned to be, in all human probability, safe. For these precautions I regard as not only surest for the whole state but also as safeguards for us who are to go on the expedition. But if it seem otherwise to anyone, I yield the command to him.”

XXIV. So much Nicias said, thinking that he would deter the Athenians by the multitude of his requirements, or, if he should be forced to make the expedition, he would in this way set out most safely. They, however, were not diverted from their eagerness for the voyage by reason of the burdensomeness of the equipment, but were far more bent upon it; and the result was just the opposite of what he had expected; for it seemed to them that he had given good advice, and that now certainly there would be abundant security. And upon all alike there fell an eager desire to sail—upon the elders, from a belief that they would either subdue the places they were sailing against, or that at any rate a great force could suffer no disaster; upon those in the flower of their

σης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὄμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οὔσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύιαμιν ὅθεν αἰδίου μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν.
 4 ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλειόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν.

XXV. Καὶ τέλος παρελθὼν τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν, ἀλλ' ἐναντίον ἀπάντων ἤδη λέγειν ἥντινα αὐτῷ παρασκευὴν
 2 Ἀθηναῖοι ψηφίσωνται. ὁ δὲ ἄκων μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυναρχόντων καθ' ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον βουλευσοίτο, ὅσα μέντοι ἤδη δοκεῖν αὐτῷ, τριήρεσι μὲν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ¹ ἑκατὸν πλευστέα εἶναι (αὐτῶν δ' ² Ἀθηναίων ἔσεσθαι ὀπλιταγωγούς ὅσαι ἂν δοκῶσι, καὶ ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ξυμμάχων μεταπεμπτέας εἶναι), ὀπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεντακισχιλίων μὲν οὐκ ἐλάσσοσιν, ἣν δέ τι δύνωνται, καὶ πλείουσιν· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον καὶ τοξοτῶν τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν καὶ ἦν τι ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι ἐτοιμασάμενοι ἄξιν.

XXVI. Ἀκούσαντες δ' οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγούς

¹ ἢ Hude omits with E.

² δ' Hude brackets and inserts & after Ἀθηναίων, on Kruger's suggestion.

age, through a longing for far-off sights and scenes, in good hopes as they were of a safe return; and upon the great multitude—that is, the soldiers¹—who hoped not only to get money for the present, but also to acquire additional dominion which would always be an inexhaustible source of pay. And so, on account of the exceeding eagerness of the majority, even if anyone was not satisfied, he held his peace, in the fear that if he voted in opposition he might seem to be disloyal to the state.

XXV. Finally a certain Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to be making excuses and causing delays, but should say at once before them all what force the Athenians should vote him. He then, though reluctantly, said that he would prefer to deliberate with his colleagues more at their leisure; so far, however, as he could see at present, they must sail with not fewer than one hundred triremes—there would also have to be as many transports as should be determined upon, furnished by the Athenians themselves and others they must call upon their allies to supply—and with hoplites, both of the Athenians and their allies, in all not fewer than five thousand, and more if possible; and the rest of the armament which they must get ready and take with them must be in proportion—bowmen from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else should be determined upon.

XXVI. Upon hearing this, the Athenians straightway voted that the generals should have full powers, with regard both to the size of the armament

¹ Taking *στρατιώτης* as predicate; or, “the great multitude and the soldiery were hoping to get money for the present,” etc.

THUCYDIDES

πράσσειν ἢ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι Ἀθηναί-
 2 οῖς. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ παρασκευὴ ἐγίγνετο, καὶ
 ἔς τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἔπεμπον καὶ αὐτόθεν κατα-
 λόγους ἐποιοῦντο. ἄρτι δ' ἀνειλήφει ἡ πόλις
 ἐαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ ξυνεχοῦς πολέμου
 ἔς τε ἡλικίας πλήθος ἐπιγεγενημένης καὶ ἔς χρημά-
 των ἄθροισιν διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, ὥστε ῥᾶον πάντα
 ἐπορίζετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν.

XXVII. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ, ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι
 ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων (εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώ-
 ριον ἢ τετράγωνος ἐργασία¹ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις
 προθύροις καὶ ἐν ἱεροῖς) μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι
 2 περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. καὶ τοὺς δρᾶσαντας
 ἦδει οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ μεγάλοις μηνύτροις δημοσίᾳ
 οὗτοί τε ἐζητοῦντο καὶ προσέτι ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ
 εἴ τις ἄλλο τι οἶδεν ἀσέβημα γεγενημένον, μηνύειν
 ἀδεῶς τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ
 3 δούλων. καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ
 τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνω-
 μοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου κατα-
 λύσεως γεγενῆσθαι. XXVIII. μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ
 μετοίκων τέ τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων περὶ μὲν τῶν
 Ἑρμῶν οὐδέν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαί-
 τινες πρότερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ
 οἴνου γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἅμα ὥς ποιεῖ-
 ται ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ' ὕβρει· ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην
 2 ἐπητιῶντο. καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα

¹ ἢ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, deleted by Hude, as not read by Schol. Patm.

and to the whole expedition, to act in whatever way might seem to them best for Athens. After this the preparation was begun; and they sent notice to their allies and made levies at home. Now the city had just recovered from the plague and from the continuous war, both in point of the multitude of young men who had grown up and of the money that had accumulated in consequence of the truce, so that everything was provided more easily. So the Athenians were engaged in preparation.

XXVII. But in the meantime the stone statues of Hermes in the city of Athens—they are the pillars of square construction which according to local custom stand in great numbers both in the doorways of private houses and in sacred places—nearly all had their faces mutilated on the same night. No one knew the perpetrators, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection; and it was voted, besides, that if anyone, citizen or stranger or slave, knew of any other profanation that had been done, whoever would might fearlessly give information. The matter was taken very seriously; for it seemed to be ominous for the expedition and to have been done withal in furtherance of a conspiracy with a view to a revolution and the overthrow of the democracy. XXVIII. Accordingly, information was given by certain metics and serving-men, not indeed about the statues of Hermes, but to the effect that before this there had been certain mutilations of other statues perpetrated by younger men in drunken sport, and also that the mysteries were being performed in private houses in mockery; and Alcibiades, among others, was implicated in the charges. They

τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδὼν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς τοῦ δήμου βεβαίως προεστάναι, καὶ νομίσαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσειαν, πρῶτοι ἀνείναι, ἐμεγάλυνον καὶ ἐβόων ὥς ἐπὶ δῆμον καταλύσει τά τε μυστικά καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἑρμῶν περικοπὴ γένοιτο καὶ οὐδὲν εἴη αὐτῶν ὃ τι οὐ μετ' ἐκείνου ἐπράχθη, ἐπιλέγοντες τεκμήρια τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν.

XXIX. Ὁ δ' ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τὰ μηνύματα ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἐτοῖμος ἦν πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν κρίνεσθαι, εἴ τι τούτων εἰργασμένος ἦν (ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπεπόριστο), καὶ εἰ μὲν τούτων τι εἵργαστο, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δ' ἀπολυθείη, 2 ἄρχειν. καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρετο μὴ ἀπόντος περὶ αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἀποκτείνειν, εἰ ἀδικοῖ, καὶ ὅτι σωφρονέστερον εἴη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνώσι, πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ 3 τοσοῦτῳ στρατεύματι. οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ δεδιότες τότε στράτευμα μὴ εὖνουν ἔχῃ, ἣν ἤδη ἀγωνίζεται, ὃ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζεται, θεραπεύων ὅτι δι' ἐκείνους οἳ τ' Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινές, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπενδον, ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀναγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μεί-

¹ Notably a certain Androcles (VIII. lxx. 2); cf. Plut. Alcib. 19.

were taken up by those who were most jealous of him¹ as an obstacle in the way of their secure preeminence among the people; and these men, thinking that if they could get rid of him they would have first place, magnified the matter and shouted that both the mockery of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae had been committed with a view to the overthrow of the democracy, and that there was none of these things but had been done in collusion with him, citing as further proofs other instances of his undemocratic lawlessness of conduct.

XXIX. He defended himself at the time against the informers' charges, and was ready before sailing—for already the preparations had been completed—to be tried on the question of his having done any of these things, and if he had been guilty of any of them to pay the penalty, but demanded that if he were acquitted he should keep his command. And he protested that they should not accept slanderous charges against him in his absence, but should put him to death at once if he were guilty, and that it was wiser not to send him at the head of so great an army, under such an imputation, until they had decided the question. But his enemies, fearing that the army might be favourable to him if he were brought to trial at once and that the populace might be lenient, inasmuch as it favoured him because it was through his influence that the Argives and some of the Mantineans were taking part in the campaign, were eager to postpone the trial, suborning other orators who insisted that he should sail now and not delay the departure of the expedition, but that he should come back and be tried at an appointed time. Their purpose was to have a more slanderous charge

ζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾶον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι. καὶ ἔδοξε πλεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

XXX. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θέρους μεσοῦντος ἤδη ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἐγίνετο εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ξυμμάχων τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ὀλκάσι καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ ξυνείπετο πρότερον εἴρητο εἰς Κέρκυραν ξυλλέγεσθαι, ὡς ἐκείθεν ἀθρόοις ἐπὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν τὸν Ἰόνιον διαβαλοῦσιν· αὐτοὶ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ εἴ τινες τῶν ξυμμάχων παρήσαν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταβάντες ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἔφ' ἐπλήρουν τὰς
2 ναῦς ὡς ἀναξόμενοι. ξυγκατέβη δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄμιλος ἅπας ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, οἱ μὲν ἐπιχώριοι τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι προπέμποντες, οἱ μὲν ἐταίρους, οἱ δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, οἱ δὲ υἱεῖς, καὶ μετ' ἐλπίδος τε ἅμα ἰόντες καὶ ὀλοφυρμῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς κτήσονται, τοὺς δ' εἴ ποτε ὄψοιντο, ἐνθυμούμενοι ὅσον πλοῦν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ἀπεστέλλοντο. καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἤδη ἔμελλον μετὰ κινδύνων ἀλλήλους ἀπολιπεῖν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐοῆει τὰ δεινὰ ἢ ὅτε ἐψηφίζοντο πλεῖν· ὅμως δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκάστων ὧν ἐώρων τῇ ὄψει¹ ἀνεθάρσουν. οἱ δὲ ξένοι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄχλος κατὰ θέαν ἦκεν ὡς ἐπὶ ἀξιόχρεων καὶ ἀπιστον διάνοιαν.

¹ τῇ ὄψει, Hude inserts ἐν.

—and this they would find it easier to procure in his absence—and then to have him recalled and brought home for trial. So it was determined that Alcibiades should sail.

XXX. After that, when it was already midsummer, the departure for Sicily was made. Orders had been given beforehand for most of the allies, as well as for the provision-ships and smaller boats and all the rest of the armament that went with them, to assemble at Corcyra, with the intention that from there they should all cross the Ionian Gulf to the promontory of Iapygia in one body. But the Athenians themselves and the allies that were present went down to the Peiræus at dawn on a day appointed and proceeded to man the ships for the purpose of putting to sea. And with them went down also all the general throng, everyone, we may almost say, that was in the city, both citizens and strangers, the natives to send off each their own, whether friends or kinsmen or sons, going at once in hope and with lamentations—hope that they would make conquests in Sicily, lamentations that they might never see their friends again, considering how long was the voyage from their own land on which they were being sent. And at this crisis, when under impending dangers they were now about to take leave of one another, the risks came home to them more than when they were voting for the expedition; but still their courage revived at the sight of their present strength because of the abundance of everything they saw before their eyes. The strangers on the other hand and the rest of the multitude had come for a spectacle, in the feeling that the enterprise was noteworthy and surpassing belief.

XXXI. Παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἢ¹ πρώτη ἐκ-
 πλεύσασα μιᾷ πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ²
 πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς
 2 ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. ἀριθμῶ δὲ νεῶν
 καὶ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἢ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον μετὰ Περι-
 κλέους καὶ ἢ αὐτῇ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν μετὰ Ἀγνωνος
 οὐκ ἐλάσσων ἦν· τετράκισ γὰρ χίλιοι ὀπλί-
 ται αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τριακόσιοι ἵππῆς καὶ
 τριῆρεις ἑκατὸν καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Χίων πεντή-
 κοντα καὶ ξύμμαχοι ἔτι πολλοὶ ξυνέπλευσαν·
 3 ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τε βραχεὶ πλῶ ὥρμήθησαν καὶ παρα-
 σκευῇ φαύλῃ, οὗτος δὲ ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνιός τε
 ἐσόμενος καὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα, οὗ ἂν δέη, καὶ ναυσὶ
 καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐξαρτυθείς, τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγά-
 λαις δαπάναις τῶν τε τριηράρχων καὶ τῆς πόλεως
 ἐκποινηθέν, τοῦ μὲν δημοσίου δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας
 τῷ ναύτῃ ἐκάστῳ διδόντος καὶ ναῦς παρασχόντος
 κενὰς ἐξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ
 ὀπλιταγωγούς καὶ ὑπηρεσίας ταύταις τὰς κρατί-
 στας, τῶν δὲ³ τριηράρχων ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς
 τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρα-
 νίταις τῶν ναυτῶν⁴ καὶ τὰλλα σημείοις καὶ
 κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, καὶ ἐς τὰ
 μακρότατα προθυμηθέντος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ὅπως
 αὐτῷ τινι εὐπρεπεῖα τε ἢ ναῦς μάλιστα προέξει
 καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε
 χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθὲν καὶ ὅπλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα σκευῶν μεγάλῃ σπουδῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους

¹ ἢ added by Dobree.

² Ἑλληνικῇ, Hude writes Ἑλληνικῆς, after Haacke.

³ δὲ adopted from Schol. Patm.

⁴ καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις after τῶν ναυτῶν is deleted as not read by the Scholiast.

XXXI. For this first armament that sailed for Sicily was the costliest and most splendid, belonging to a single city and with a purely Hellenic force, that had ever up to that time set sail. In number of ships, however, and of hoplites the expedition against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same one afterwards under Hagnon against Potidaea, was not inferior; for in that voyage four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred knights and one hundred triremes had participated, and from Lesbos and Chios fifty triremes, and allied troops besides in large numbers. But they had set off for a short voyage with a poor equipment; whereas this expedition, as one likely to be of long duration, was fitted out for both kinds of service, according as there might be need of either, with ships and also with land-forces. The fleet was built up at great expense on the part both of the trierarchs and of the city: the state giving a drachma per day for each sailor and furnishing sixty empty¹ warships and forty transports, with crews to man them of the very best; the trierarchs giving bounties to the *thranitae*² or uppermost bench of the sailors in addition to the pay from the state, and using, besides, figure-heads and equipments that were very expensive; for each one strove to the utmost that his own ship should excel all others both in fine appearance and in swiftness of sailing. The land-forces were picked out of the best lists, and there was keen rivalry among the men in the

¹ *i.e.* empty hulls without equipment, which the trierarch was to furnish.

² In the trireme there were three ranks of oars: the *thranites* rowed with the longest oars; the *zygites* occupied the middle row; the *thalamites* the lowest row, using the shortest oars and drawing least pay.

THUCYDIDES

4 ἀμιλληθέν. ξυνέβη δὲ πρὸς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἅμα
 ἔριν γενέσθαι, ὃ τις ἕκαστος προσετάχθη, καὶ ἐς
 τοὺς ἄλλους "Ἕλληνας ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον εἰκα-
 σθῆναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολεμίους
 5 παρασκευήν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τήν τε τῆς
 πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δημοσίαν καὶ τῶν στρατευσ-
 μένων τὴν ἰδίαν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ὅσα τε ἤδη
 προυτετελέκει καὶ ἃ ἔχοντας τοὺς στρατηγούς
 ἀπέστελλε, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτῶν ἃ τε περὶ τὸ σῶμά τις
 καὶ τριήραρχος ἐς τὴν ναῦν ἀνηλώκει καὶ ὅσα ἔτι
 ἔμελλεν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ' ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνευ
 τοῦ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευά-
 σασθαι ἐφόδιον ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνιον στρατείαν, καὶ ὅσα
 ἐπὶ μεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἔμπορος ἔχων
 ἔπλει, πολλὰ ἂν τάλαντα ἠϋρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
 6 τὰ πάντα ἐξαγόμενα. καὶ ὁ στόλος οὐχ ἦσσαν
 τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι περι-
 βόητος ἐγένετο ἢ στρατιᾶς πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν
 ὑπερβολῇ, καὶ ὅτι μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ
 τῆς οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελ-
 λόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

XXXII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ νῆες πλήρεις ἦσαν καὶ
 ἐσέκειτο πάντα ἤδη ὅσα ἔχοντες ἔμελλον ἀνά-
 ξεσθαι, τῇ μὲν σάλπιγγι σιωπῇ ὑπεσημάνθη,
 εὐχὰς δὲ τὰς νομιζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς οὐ

matter of arms and personal equipment. And so it came about that among themselves there was emulation, wherever each was assigned to duty, and the whole thing seemed more like a display of wealth and power before the rest of the Hellenes than an undertaking against enemies. For if one had reckoned the public expenditure on the part of the state and the private outlay of those who made the expedition—on the part of the city, both what it had already advanced and what it was sending in the hands of the generals, and on the part of private individuals whatever a man had expended on his own person or, if trierarch, on his ship, and what they were going to spend still, and, besides, the money we may suppose that everyone, even apart from the pay he received from the state, provided for himself as travelling expenses, counting upon an expedition of long duration, and all the articles for barter and sale merchant or soldier took with him on the voyage—it would have been found that many talents in all were taken from the city. And the fame of the armament was noised abroad, not less because of amazement at its boldness and the splendour of the spectacle than on account of its overwhelming force as compared with those whom they were going against; and also because it was the longest voyage from home as yet attempted and undertaken with the highest hopes for the future as compared with their present resources.

XXXII. When the ships had been manned and everything had at last been put aboard which they were to take with them on the voyage, the trumpeter proclaimed silence, and they offered the prayers that were customary before putting out to sea, not

κατὰ ναῦν ἐκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐποιοῦντο, κρατῆράς τε κεράσαντες παρ' ἅπαι τὸ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκπώμασι χρυσοῖς τε καὶ ἀργυροῖς οἳ τε ἐπιβάται καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες σπένδοντες.
 2 ξυνεπηύχοντο δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄμιλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εὖνους παρῆν σφίσιν. παιανίσαντες δὲ καὶ τελεώσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἀνήγοντο, καὶ ἐπὶ κέρως τὸ πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαντες ἄμιλλαν ἤδη μέχρι Αἰγίνης ἐποιοῦντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἔνθα περ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυνελέγετο, ἠπείγοντο ἀφικέσθαι.

3 Ἐς δὲ τὰς Συρακούσας ἠγγέλλετο μὲν πολλὰ χόθεν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου, οὐ μέντοι ἐπιστεύετο ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἐλέχθησαν τοιοῖδε λόγοι ἀπὸ τε ἄλλων, τῶν μὲν πιστευόντων τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία λεγόντων, καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἑρμῶνος παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς ὡς σαφῶς οἰόμενος εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔλεγε καὶ παρῆναι τοιάδε.

XXXIII. “Ἀπιστα μὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, δόξω ὑμῖν περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν, καὶ γινώσκω ὅτι οἱ τὰ μὴ πιστὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ἢ λέγοντες ἢ ἀπαγγέλλοντες οὐ μόνον οὐ πείθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄφρονες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. ὅμως δὲ οὐ καταφοβηθεὶς ἐπισχίσω κινδυνευούσης τῆς πόλεως, πείθων γε ἑμαυτὸν σαφέστερόν τι
 2 ἑτέρου εἰδὼς λέγειν. Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς, ὁ

ship by ship but all together, led by a herald, the mariners as well as the officers throughout the whole army making libations with golden and silver cups from wine they had mixed. And the rest of the throng of people on the shore, both the citizens and all others present who wished the Athenians well, also joined in the prayers. And when they had sung the pæan and had finished the libations, they put off, and sailing out at first in single column they then raced as far as Aegina. The Athenian fleet, then, was pressing on to reach Corcyra, where the rest of the armament of the allies was assembling.

But meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming to Syracuse from many quarters, but were not believed at all for a long time. Nay, even when an assembly was held speeches to the following effect¹ were made on the part of others, some crediting the reports about the expedition of the Athenians, others contradicting them, and Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward, in the conviction that he knew the truth of the matter, and spoke, exhorting them as follows:

XXXIII. "Possibly it will seem to you that what I and certain others say about the reality of the expedition against us is incredible, and I am aware that those who either make or repeat statements that seem not credible not only do not carry conviction but are also regarded as foolish; but nevertheless I will not be frightened into holding my tongue when the state is in danger, persuaded as I am that I speak with more certain knowledge than my opponents. For it is indeed against you, much

¹ i.e. like those of Hermocrates and Athenagoras.

- πανυ θαυμάζετε, πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ὄρμηνται καὶ
 ναυτικῇ καὶ πεζικῇ, πρόφασιν μὲν Ἐγεσταίων
 ξυμμαχία καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει, το δὲ ἀληθὲς
 Σικελίας ἐπιθυμία, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας
 πόλεως, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ ταύτην σχοίεν, ῥαδίως καὶ
 3 τᾶλλα ἔξειν. ὥς οὖν ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων, ὁρᾷτε
 ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κάλλιστα
 ἀμυνεῖσθε αὐτοὺς καὶ μήτε καταφρονήσαντες
 ἄφαρκοι ληφθήσεσθε μήτε ἀπιστήσαντες τοῦ
 4 ξύμπαντος ἀμελήσετε. εἰ δέ τῳ καὶ πιστά, τὴν
 τόλμαν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἐκπλαγῇ. οὔτε γὰρ
 βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλείω οἰοί τ' ἔσονται ἢ πᾶσχειν,
 οὔθ' ὅτι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπέρχονται, ἀνωφελές,¹
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τε τοὺς ἄλλους Σικελιώτας πολὺν
 ἄμεινον (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐθελήσουσιν ἐκπλαγέστες
 ἡμῖν ξυμμαχεῖν), καὶ ἦν ἄρα ἡ κατεργασώμεθα
 αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀπράκτους ὧν ἐφίενται ἀπώσωμεν (οὐ
 γὰρ δὴ μὴ τύχῳσί γε ὧν προσδέχονται φοβοῦμαι),
 κάλλιστον δὴ ἔργων ἡμῖν συμβήσεται καὶ οὐκ
 5 ἀνέλπιστον ἔμοιγε. ὀλίγοι γὰρ δὴ στόλοι μεγάλοι
 ἢ Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν
 ἀπάραντες κατώρθωσαν. οὔτε γὰρ πλείους τῶν
 ἐνοικούντων καὶ ἀστυγειτόνων ἔρχονται (πάντα
 γὰρ ὑπὸ δέους ξυνίσταται), ἦν τε δι' ἀπορίαν τῶν
 ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γῇ σφαλῶσι, τοῖς ἐπι-
 βουλευθεῖσιν ὄνομα, καὶ περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ

¹ ἀνωφελές, Dobree's correction, for ἀνωφελείς of the MSS., which Hude retains.

as you wonder at it, that the Athenians have set out with a large armament for use on land as well as on the sea, on the pretext of an alliance with the Egestaeans and the restoration of the Leontines, but in truth with a covetous desire for Sicily, and above all for our city, thinking that once in possession of it they would easily get possession of the rest also. With the certainty, then, that they will soon be here, consider in what way with your present resources you can best ward them off, and may neither by despising them be caught off your guard nor through incredulity neglect the whole matter. If, however, anyone does find my words credible, let him not be dismayed at their daring and power. For neither will they be able to inflict more injury upon us than they will suffer, nor is it without advantage for us that they are coming with a great armament; on the contrary, it is far better so as regards the rest of the Siceliots, for in their consternation they will be more inclined to join our alliance; and if in the end we either overpower them or drive them off baffled in their designs—for I certainly have no fear as to their attaining the success they anticipate—it will prove the most glorious of achievements for us, and one which I at least do not despair of. For few great armaments, whether of Hellenes or of barbarians, when sent far from their own land, have been successful. The reason is that they are not, in the first place, superior in numbers to the people against whom they go and the neighbours of these—for fear always brings about union; and if, in the second place, they fail on account of lack of supplies in a foreign land, they leave a proud name to those whom they plotted against, even though their failure

6 πλείω παίσωσιν, ὅμως καταλείπουσιν. ὅπερ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ¹ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι, τοῦ Μήδου παρὰ λόγον πολλὰ σφαλέντος, ἐπὶ τῷ διόματι ὡς ἐπὶ Ἀθήνας ἦει ηὐξήθησαν, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον τὸ τοιούτου συμβῆναι.

XXXIV. “Θαρσύντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζόμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις, δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἡ ξυμμαχίδα ποιῶμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχονται

2 Ἀθηναίους. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ διὰ φόβον εἰσὶ μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὥστε τάχ’ ἂν ἴσως νομίσαντες, εἰ τάδε προήσονται, καὶ ἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι, ἐθελήσειαν ἡμῖν ἥτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερώς ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς γέ του τρόπου ἀμῦναι. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουλευθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλείστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὃ τε πόλεμος

3 καὶ τᾶλλα εὐπορεῖ. πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον, δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν.

4 ὁ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγὼ τε νομίζω ἐπικαίρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται. Σικελιῶται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅτι πλείστοι μεθ’ ἡμῶν,

¹ Ἀθηναῖοι, Hude deletes with Badham.

be due chiefly to themselves. These very Athenians, for example, when the Persians contrary to expectation signally failed, grew great on the repute that it was Athens they went against; so in our case a like issue is not beyond hope.

XXXIV. "With confidence, then, let us make our preparations here, but also send envoys to the Sicels, to confirm the allegiance of some and to endeavour to make friendship and alliance with others; and let us despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to show that the danger is a common one, and to Italy, that we may either secure their alliance for ourselves or else prevent their receiving the Athenians. And to me it seems best to send also to Carthage. For the Carthaginians are not without expectation, or rather they are always in fear, that some time the Athenians may come against their city; and so they will probably feel that if they shall leave things here to their fate, they may be in trouble themselves, and therefore will be inclined to assist us, secretly perhaps, or openly, or by some means or other. And they, of all men of the present day, are the most able to do so, if they will; for they have an abundance of gold and silver, by which war and everything else is expedited. And let us send also to Lacedaemon and to Corinth, begging them to bring aid here with all speed, and to stir up the war over there. And now the measure which I think would be most opportune, but which you on account of your habitual love of ease would be least likely to adopt promptly, shall nevertheless be proposed. If we Siceliots—all together, or, in default of this, as many as will join us—were willing to launch all our

THUCYDIDES

καθελκύσαντες ἄπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ
 δυοῖν μηνοῖν τροφῆς ἀπαντῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις ἐς
 Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν, καὶ δῆλον ποιῆσαι
 αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας¹ πρότερον ἔσται
 ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἴόνιον,
 μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξαιμεν καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν
 καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα μὲν ἐκ φιλίας
 χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας), τὸ
 δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πύσης
 τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν
 τάξει μεῖναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά
 5 τε καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα. εἰ δ' αὖ τῷ
 ταχυναυτοῦντι ἄθροωτέρῳ κουφίσαντες προσβά-
 λοιεν, εἰ μὲν κώπαις χρῆσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθ' ἂν
 κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι
 ἡμῖν ἐς Τάραντα· οἱ δὲ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐφοδίῳ ὥς
 ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ
 χωρία ἐρήμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ
 πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν
 ἀπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέζαια
 6 ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυμοῖεν. ὥστ' ἔγωγε
 · τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἡγοῦμαι ἀποκληρομένους αὐτοὺς
 οὐδ' ἂν ἀπᾶραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ' ἢ διαβουλευ-
 σαμένους καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους ὅποσοι τ'
 ἔσμεν καὶ ἐν ᾧ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς

¹ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας, Duker's correction for περὶ τῇ Σικελίᾳ of the MSS.

¹ The Athenians would naturally expect to cross from Corcyra to Tarentum, then follow the coast to Messene. By

available naval force and with two months' provisions go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, and make plain to them that the contest will not be first for Sicily, but before that for their passage across the Ionian Sea, we should mightily astound them and force them to reflect that we have as our base a friendly country from which to keep watch and ward—for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament,¹ and it is difficult on account of the length of the voyage to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and few at a time, they would be at the mercy of our attack. But if on the other hand they should lighten their ships and attack with the swift-sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body, then, in case they used their oars, we should set upon them when weary with rowing; or if it did not seem wise to attack them, we could retire to Tarentum again. They, however, having crossed with slender supplies in the prospect of a naval engagement, would be in distress in uninhabited regions, and either would remain and be blockaded, or trying to sail along the coast would leave behind the rest of their equipment, and, having no certainty as to the temper of the cities, whether they would receive them or not, would be discouraged. And so I for my part am of opinion that, deterred by this consideration, they would not even put out from Corcyra, but either, after taking time for deliberation and spying out how many we are and in what position, would be driven into winter-quarters

making Tarentum their base the Siceliots would force the Athenians to cross the open sea—a hazardous undertaking.

- χειμῶνα, ἥ καταπλαγέοντας τῷ ἀδοκίῳ κατα-
 λῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμ-
 πειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω,
 ἄκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν
 λαβόντος, εἴ τι ἀξιόχρεων ἀφ' ἡμῶν ὀφθείη.
- 7 ἀγγελλοίμεθα δ' ἂν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν· τῶν
 δ' ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γινώμαι
 ἴστανται, καὶ τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς γε
 ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμννοῦνται μᾶλλον
 πεφόβηνται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι. ὅπερ ἂν νῦν
- 8 Ἀθηναῖοι πάθοιεν. ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ
 ἀμννουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ
 μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν· εἰ δ' ἴδοιεν παρὰ
 γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκίῳ μᾶλλον ἂν
 καταπλαγείεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει.
- 9 “Πείθεσθε οὖν, μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμή-
 σαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τὰλλα εἰς τὸν
 πόλεμον ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ παραστήναι παντὶ τὸ
 μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ
 ἀλκῇ δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ' ἤδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου
 παρασκευὰς ἀσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ
 κινδύνου πράσσειν χρησιμώτατον ἂν ξυμβῆναι.
 οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῶ εὖ οἶδ'
 ὅτι ἤδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὔπω πάρεισιν.”

by the lateness of the season, or in dismay at the unexpected turn of events would abandon the expedition, especially as the most experienced of their generals takes command, as I hear, against his will, and would gladly seize upon an excuse to abandon it if any considerable opposition on our part were observed. And reports of our strength would, I am convinced, be exaggerated; the opinions of men are apt to veer according to what they are told; and those who are first to attack, or those at any rate who in advance make it clear to the aggressors that they will defend themselves, inspire the greater fear in the foe, who thinks them equal to the emergency. And precisely this would be the effect at this time upon the Athenians. For they are coming against us in the belief that we shall not defend ourselves, rightly contemning us because we did not join the Lacedaemonians in the effort to destroy them. But if they should see us unexpectedly displaying courage, they would be more dismayed by this unlooked for resistance than by our real power.

“Be persuaded, then, as best of all to take this bold step, but if not that, to make all other preparations for the war with all speed; and let it come home to everyone that contempt of invaders is shown by valour in actual conflict,¹ but that at this present time, realizing that preparations made with fear are safest, it would prove most advantageous so to act as though in imminent danger. For the Athenians are surely coming against us; they are, I am quite certain, already under sail, and all but here.”

¹ Or, “by an energetic defence.”

XXXV. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἑρμοκράτης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν ὥς οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπον ἔλθοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγεται, οἱ δέ, εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσειαν αὐτοὺς ὃ τι οὐκ ἂν μείζον ἀντιπάθοιεν; ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πάννυ καταφρονούντες ἐς γέλωτα ἔτρεπον τὸ πρᾶγμα. ὀλίγον δ' ἦν τὸ πιστεῦον τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει καὶ
2 φοβούμενον τὸ μέλλον. παρελθὼν δ' αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δῆμον τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιαῦτα.

XXXVI. “Τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βούλεται οὕτως κακῶς φρονῆσαι καὶ ὑποχειρίους ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἢ δειλὸς ἐστὶν ἢ τῇ πόλει οὐκ εὖνους· τοὺς δὲ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ
2 οἴονται ἐνδηλοὶ εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ δεδιότες ἰδία τι βούλονται τὴν πόλιν ἐς ἑκπληξιν καθιστάναι, ὅπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸ σφέτερον ἐπηλυγάζωνται. καὶ νῦν αὖται αἱ ἀγγελίαι τοῦτο δύνανται, αἱ¹ οὐκ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, ἐκ δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵπερ αἰεὶ
3 τάδε κινοῦσι ξύγκεινται. ὑμεῖς δὲ ἦν εὖ βουλευήσθε, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οὔτοι ἀγγέλλουσι σκοποῦντες λογιεῖσθε τὰ εἰκότα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἄνθρωποι δεινοὶ καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειροι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Ἀθηναίους
4 ἀξιῶ, δράσειαν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς Πελοποννησίους τε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον μήπω βεβαίως καταλελυμένους ἐπ' ἄλλον πόλεμον οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἐκόντας ἐλθεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε

¹ αἱ added by Classen.

XXXV. Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the Syracusan people were at great strife among themselves: some maintained that the Athenians would not come at all and that the reports were not true; others asked, even if they did come, what could they do to them that they would not themselves suffer still more; others quite contemptuously turned the matter into ridicule. There were, however, a few who believed Hermocrates and feared what was coming. But Athenagoras, who was a popular leader and at the present time most influential with the masses, came forward and addressed them as follows:—

XXXVI. “As to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so ill witted as to come here and fall into our hands, is either a coward or not loyal to the state; as to the men, however, who tell such stories and fill you with fear, I do not wonder at their audacity so much as at their simplicity, if they fancy we do not see through them. For men who have some private grounds of fear wish to plunge the city into consternation, in order that in the common fear their own may be overshadowed. So now this is the meaning of these reports, which are not spontaneous, but have been concocted by men who are always stirring up trouble here. But you, if you are well advised, will examine and form your estimate of what is probable, not from what these men report, but from what shrewd men of much experience, such as I deem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. For it is not probable that they would leave the Peloponnesians behind them before they have yet brought the war there surely to an end, and voluntarily come here to prosecute

ἀγαπᾶν οἶομαι αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἐρχόμεθα, πόλεις τοσαῦται καὶ οὕτω μεγάλαι.

XXXVII. “Εἰ δὲ δὴ, ὥσπερ λέγονται, ἔλθοιεν, ἱκανωτέραν ἡγοῦμαι Σικελίαν Πελοποννήσου διαπολεμῆσαι ὅσω κατὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐξήρτυται, τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῆς νῦν στρατιᾶς, ὥς φασιν, ἐπιούσης, καὶ εἰ δις τοσαύτη ἔλθοι, πολὺν κρείσσω εἶναι· οἷς γ' ἐπίσταμαι οὐθ' ἵππους ἀκολουθήσοντας οὐδ' αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένους εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τινὰς παρὰ Ἑγεσταίων, οὐθ' ὀπλίτας ἰσοπλήθεις τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπὶ νεῶν γε ἐλθόντας (μέγα γὰρ τὸ καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεῦρο κομισθῆναι), τὴν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν, ὅσῃν δεῖ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσὴνδε πορισθῆναι, οὐκ ὀλίγην οὔσαν. ὥστε (παρὰ τοσοῦτον γιγνώσκω) μόλις ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαί εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὁμοροὶ οἰκήσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι διαφθαρῆναι, ἣ πού γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ Σικελία (ξυστήσεται γάρ) στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἰδρυθέντι καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ ἀναγκαιᾶς παρασκευῆς, οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἐξιόντες. τό τε ξύμπαν οὐδ' ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι· τοσοῦτῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

XXXVIII. “Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἷ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι σφύζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν, οὕς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον,

another war quite as great; for I myself think that they are content that we do not come against them, being so numerous and so powerful.

XXXVII. "If, however, they should come, as it is reported, I think Sicily more competent to carry the war through than the Peloponnesus, inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects, and that our city by itself is much stronger than this army which now, as they say, is coming on—aye, even if it should come in twice the number. For I know that neither horses will accompany them—and from here also none will be provided, except a few from Eggesta—nor hoplites equal in number to ours, since they have to come on ships; for it is a great thing to make the long voyage to Sicily even with their ships alone, lightly laden. And the rest of the equipment which must be provided against so large a city as ours is not small. So much, then, do I differ in my judgment from these men that it seems to me, if they brought with them another city as large as Syracuse and settling here on our borders should wage the war, they would hardly fail to be utterly destroyed; much less, then, when all Sicily is hostile—for it will be united—and they are in a camp pitched just after landing from the ships and cannot venture far from their wretched tents and meagre supplies by reason of our cavalry. In short, I think they would not even get a foothold on the land; so much do I judge our forces to be superior.

XXXVIII. "But of these things, as I maintain, the Athenians are aware and they are, I am quite sure, taking care of their own interests, and men from here are fabricating stories neither true nor possible, men whom not now for the first time but always I have

THUCYDIDES

- 2 ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐπίσταμαι ἥτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε καὶ
 ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις ἢ ἔργοις βουλομένους
 καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς
 πόλεως ἄρχειν. καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μή ποτε πολλὰ
 πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ κακοί,
 πρὶν ἐν τῷ παθεῖν ὤμεν, προφυλάξασθαί τε καὶ
 3 αἰσθόμενοι ἐπεξελθεῖν. τοιγάρτοι δι' αὐτὰ ἡ πόλις
 ἡμῶν ὀλιγάκις μὲν ἡσυχάζει, στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς
 καὶ ἀγῶνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πλείονας ἢ
 πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀναιρεῖται, τυραννίδας δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ
 4 δυναστείας ἀδίκους. ὦν ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἣν γε
 ὑμεῖς ἐθέλιτε ἔπεσθαι, μήποτε ἐφ' ἡμῶν τι περι-
 δεῖν γενέσθαι, ὑμᾶς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς πείθων
 τοὺς δὲ¹ τὰ τοιαῦτα μηχανωμένους κολάζων, μὴ
 μόνον αὐτοφώρους (χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν),
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὦν βούλονται μὲν δύνανται δ' οὐ (τὸν
 γὰρ ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ὦν δρᾷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς
 διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρή, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυ-
 λαξάμενός τις προπείσεται), τοὺς δ' αὖ ὀλίγους
 τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχων, τὰ δὲ φυλάσσων, τὰ δὲ καὶ διδά-
 σκων· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκῶ ἄν μοι οὕτως ἀπο-
 5 τρέπειν τῆς κακουργίας. καὶ δῆτα, ὃ πολλάκις
 ἐσκεψάμην, τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ὦ νεώτεροι; πότερον
 ἄρχειν ἤδη; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔννομον. ὁ δὲ νόμος ἐκ τοῦ
 μὴ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ δυναμένους ἐτέθη
 ἀτιμάζειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ μετὰ τῶν² πολλῶν ἰσο-

¹ Hude follows Weil in bracketing δέ and changing κολά-
 ζων to κολάζειν.

² τῶν added by Hude as probably read by the Scholiast.

known to be wishing, either by reports such as these and still more mischievous than these, or by overt acts, to frighten the mass of you and themselves dominate the city. And I fear, moreover, that some day, by dint of repeated attempts, they may actually succeed ; for we are poor hands at taking precautions before we are at their mercy, and, if we have discovered their plots, at dealing conclusively with the plotters. Therefore it is on this very account that our city is seldom quiet, but is subject to frequent feuds and conflicts—not so much with the enemy as with itself—and sometimes to tyrannies and wicked oligarchies. But if you will only follow me, I will try to see to it that never in our time shall any of these things come to pass, persuading you who are the mass of the people, but chastising the men who devise such things, not only when they are caught in the act—as it is difficult to come upon them—but even for what they would but cannot do. For an enemy one must forestall, not only in what he does, but even in his designs, since indeed a man who is not first to safeguard himself will be first to suffer. As to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall sometimes expose them, and sometimes watch them, but sometimes also I shall instruct them, for in this way I think I could best deter them from evil-doing. And now—a question which I have often asked myself—what do you want, you young men ? To hold office already ? But that is not lawful ; and the law was enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than to keep you from office when competent. Well, then, you do not want to be on an

νομείσθαι; καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

XXXIX. “Φήσκει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ’ ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίους. ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευσάσθαι δ’ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρίναι δ’ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα
2 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ’ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντ’ ἀφελομένη ἔχει· ἂ ὑμῶν οἳ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν.

XI. “Ἄλλ’ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὧ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Ἑλλήνων, εἰ μὴ μανθάνετε κακὰ σπεύδοντες,¹ ἢ ἀδικώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες τολμάτε, ἀλλ’ ἦτοι μαθόντες γε ἢ μεταγνόντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως ξύμπανσι κοινὸν αὔξετε, ἡγησάμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἂν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεόν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὑμῶν ἤπερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος² μετασχεῖν, εἰ δ’ ἄλλα βουλήσεσθε, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς κινδυνεῦσαι στερηθῆναι· καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγγελιῶν ὥς πρὸς αἰσθανομένους καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀπαλλάγητε. ἢ γὰρ πόλις ἦδε, καὶ εἰ ἔρχονται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀμυνεῖται αὐτοὺς ἀξίως αὐτῆς, καὶ στρατηγοὶ εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ

¹ ἢ ἀμαθέστατοί ἐστε, before ἢ ἀδικώτατοι in the MSS., deleted by Dobree and Madvig.

² ἢ περ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος, Hude deletes, following Krüger.

equality with the many? And how is it right that the same folk should not be deemed worthy of the same privileges?

XXXIX. "Some will say that a democracy is neither wise nor equitable, and that those that have property are more competent to rule best. But I say, first, that democracy is a name for all, oligarchy for only a part; next, that while the wealthy are the best guardians of property, the wise would be the best counsellors, and the many, after hearing matters discussed, would be the best judges; and that these classes, whether severally or collectively, enjoy a like equality in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, gives the many a share of the dangers, but of the advantages it not merely claims the lion's share, but even takes and keeps all. And this is what the powerful among you and the young men are bent upon—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

XL. "Still, even now, O ye most senseless of all Hellenes that I know, if you do not see that your designs are wicked, or most criminal, if you know and yet dare to persist in them,—even now, I say, either learn wisdom or repent of your folly and strive to advance the common interests of the state for the good of all, reflecting that the good among you would share this in equal or larger measure than the mass of the people, whereas if you have other aims you will run the risk of losing all. So have done with such reports, understanding that you are dealing with men who are aware of your designs and will not put up with them. For this city, even if the Athenians come, will ward them off in a manner worthy of herself; and we have generals who will

σκέψονται αὐτά. καὶ εἰ μή τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶμαι, οὐ πρὸς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἀγγελίας καταπλαγεῖσα καὶ ἐλομένη ὑμᾶς ἄρχοντας αὐθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται, αὐτὴ δ' ἐφ' αὐτῆς σκοποῦσα τοὺς τε λόγους ἀφ' ὑμῶν ὡς ἔργα βουλομένους κρινεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐλευθερίαν οὐχὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἀφαιρεθήσεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἔργῳ φυλασσομένη μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν πειράσεται σῶζειν."

XLI. Τοιαῦτα δὲ Ἀθηναγόρας εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν εἰς ἀναστὰς ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα ἔτι εἶασε παρελθεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἔλεξε 2 τοιαῦδε. "Διαβολὰς μὲν οὐ σῶφρον οὔτε λέγειν τινὰς ἐς ἀλλήλους οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὑποδέχεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐσαγγελλόμενα μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως εἰς τε ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις καλῶς 3 τοὺς ἐπιόντας παρασκευασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι. καὶ ἦν ἄρα μηδὲν δεήσῃ, οὐδεμία βλάβη τοῦ τε τὸ κοινὸν κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὄπλοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται (τὴν δ' ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ἐξέτασιν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν) καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις διαπομπῶν ἅμα ἔς τε κατασκοπὴν καὶ ἦν τι ἄλλο φαίνεται ἐπιτήδειον. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη καὶ ὅ τι ἂν αἰσθώμεθα ἐς ὑμᾶς οἴσομεν."

Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τοσαῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ διελύθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ξυλλόγου.

XLII. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ αὐτοῖ τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅπαντες ἦσαν καὶ πρῶτον

look after these matters. And if none of these things be true—as indeed I think they are not—the state will not, through terror at your reports and by choosing you as rulers, place on her neck, of her own choice, the yoke of slavery, but looking at the matter for herself she will pass judgment on your words as if they were deeds ; and will not by listening to such reports be deprived of her present liberty, but will try to preserve it by taking active precautions so as to frustrate your designs.”

XLI. Such was the speech of Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose up and forbade any one else to come forward, but himself spoke as follows with reference to the matter in hand : “ Personal imputations it is not wise either for any speaker to utter against another or for those who hear to tolerate ; but in view of the reports that are coming in, we should rather see how we, each person and the city as a whole, shall prepare to defend ourselves effectively against the invaders. And if after all there shall be no need of it, there is no harm in the commonwealth being equipped with horses and arms and all other things wherein war takes pride—the provision and inspection of such equipment we shall have in charge—and in sending men round to the cities for observation as well as for any other purpose that may seem expedient. These provisions we have in part already made, and whatever we find out we will bring before you.”

And the Syracusans, when the general had said thus much, dispersed from the assembly.

XLII. Meanwhile the Athenians themselves and all their allies also were already at Corcyra. And

ἐπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῶ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούσῃ ἱππέας.

- XLIV. Τοσαύτῃ ἢ πρώτῃ παρασκευῇ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον διέπλει, τούτοις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄγουσαι ὀλκάδες μὲν τριάκοντα σιταγωγοί, καὶ τοὺς σιτοποιοὺς ἔχουσαι καὶ λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ὅσα ἐς τειχισμὸν ἐργαλεῖα, πλοῖα δὲ ἑκατόν, ἃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετὰ τῶν ὀλκάδων ξυνέπλει· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοῖα καὶ ὀλκάδες ἐκούσιοι ξυνηκολούθουν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐμπορίας ἕνεκα· ἃ τότε πάντα ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ξυν-
- 2 διέβαλλε τὸν Ἴόνιον κόλπον. καὶ προσβαλοῦσα ἢ πᾶσα παρασκευῇ πρὸς τε ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἠνυπόρησαν, παρεκομίζοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν, τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ ὄρμῳ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτοις, ἕως
- 3 ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἠθροίζοντο, καὶ ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ὡς αὐτοὺς ἔσω οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, στρατόπεδόν τε κατεσκευάσαντο ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερῷ, οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρέιχον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνελκύσαντες ἠσύχασαν. καὶ πρὸς¹ τοὺς Ῥηγίνους λόγους ἐποιήσαντο, ἀξιοῦντες Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Χαλκιδεῦσιν οὖσι Λεοντίνοις βοηθεῖν· οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων ἔφασαν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ἂν καὶ τοῖς
- 4 ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ, τοῦτο ποιήσιν. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ἐσκόπουν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα προσοίσονται· καὶ τὰς πρό-

¹ τε of the MSS., after πρὸς, deleted by Krüger.

hundred and twenty light-armed Megarian exiles; and one horse-transport carrying thirty cavalry.

XLIV. Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war.¹ And for these, thirty food-bearing transports brought supplies, having also bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all tools for wall-building; and there sailed also one hundred boats that were pressed into service, along with the transports. But many boats besides, as well as transports, voluntarily accompanied the expedition, for the sake of trade. All these, at that time, sailed together from Coreyra across the Ionian Gulf. And when the whole armament reached the Iapygian promontory, or Tarentum, or wherever they severally found opportunity to make land, they sailed along the coast of Italy—some of the cities not receiving them with a market nor into the town, though furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even with these—until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. There they now assembled, and, as the Rhegians did not admit them within the walls, they pitched a camp outside of the town in the precinct of Artemis, where a market also was provided for them; and so drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. And they also held a conference with the Rhegians, claiming that they as Chalcidians² should aid the Leontines who were Chalcidians. They, however, said that they would be neutral, but would do whatever the rest of the Italiots should decide. The Athenians now considered what would be the best course to take with reference to affairs in Sicily; and at the same time

¹ cf. ch. xxxi. 1.

² cf. Strabo vi. 257 ο, κτίσμα ἐστὶ τὸ Ῥήγιον Χαλκιδέων.

THUCYDIDES

πλους ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης ἅμα προσέμενον, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἰ ἔστιν ἃ ἔλεγον ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οἱ ἄγγελοι.

XLV. Τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις ἐν τούτῳ πολλαχόθεν τε ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων σαφῇ ἠγγέλλετο ὅτι ἐν Ῥηγίῳ αἱ νῆες εἰσι, καὶ ὥς ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεσκευάζοντο πάσῃ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκέτι ἠπίσταντο. καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς Σικελοὺς περιέπεμπον, ἔνθα μὲν φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἔς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμιζον, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ὅπλων ἐξετάσει καὶ ἵππων ἐσκόπουν εἰ ἐντελὴ ἔστι, καὶ τᾶλλα ὥς ἐπὶ ταχεῖ πολέμῳ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντι καθίσταντο.

XLVI. Αἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης τρεῖς νῆες αἱ πρόπλοι παραγίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, ἀγγέλλουσai ὅτι τᾶλλα μὲν οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα ἃ ὑπέσχοντο, τριάκοντα δὲ τάλαντα
2 μόνον φαίνεται. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εὐθύς ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ἦσαν ὅτι αὐτοῖς τοῦτό τε πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει καὶ οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι οὐκ ἐβελήσαντες ξυστρατεύειν, οὓς πρῶτον ἥρξαντο πείθειν καὶ εἰκὸς ἦν μάλιστα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας καὶ σφίσιν αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδεῖους. καὶ τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων, τοῖν δὲ ἐτέροις καὶ ἀλογώ-
3 τερα. οἱ δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοι τοιόνδε τι ἐξετεχνήσαντο τότε ὅτε οἱ πρῶτοι πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦλθον

they were awaiting the arrival from Egesta of the ships that had been sent ahead, wishing to know about the money, whether there actually was what the messengers had reported at Athens.

XLV. Meanwhile, through spies, as well as from many other sources, positive information was already coming in to the Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium; and under these conditions they began to make preparations with all zeal, and were no longer incredulous. They sent around also to the Sicels, to some places guards, to others envoys; they brought garrisons into the forts in the outlying districts; as to affairs in the city, they made an inspection of arms and of horses, to see whether everything was up to full strength; and all other matters they were arranging with a view to a war that was imminent and all but upon them.

XLVI. The three ships that had gone ahead to Egesta met the Athenians at Rhegium, announcing that the rest of the money which the Egestaeans had promised was not there, but only thirty talents were to be found. And the generals were at once out of spirits, both because this had turned out contrary at the start, and because the Rhegians, the first people whom they had tried to persuade to join the expedition and with whom it was most likely they should succeed, seeing that they were kinsmen of the Leontines and always friendly to the Athenians, refused their consent. Nicias, indeed, was expecting this news from the Egestaeans, but for the other two it was actually somewhat of a surprise. The fact was that the Egestaeans had resorted to the following device at the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to see about

αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν κατασκοπὴν τῶν χρημάτων. ἔς τε τὸ ἐν Ἑρυκί ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀγαγόντες αὐτοὺς ἐπέδειξαν τὰ ἀναθήματα, φιάλας τε καὶ οἰνοχόας καὶ θυμιατήρια καὶ ἄλλην κατασκευὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην, ἃ ὄντα ἀργυρᾷ πολλῷ πλείω τὴν ὄψιν ἀπ' ὀλίγης δυνάμεως χρημάτων παρείχετο, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ξενίσαις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἑγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾷ καὶ ἀργυρᾷ ξυλλέξαντες καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεία
 4 ἕκαστοι. καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων μεγάλην τὴν ἐκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρείχε, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας
 5 διεθρόνησαν ὡς χρήματα πολλὰ ἴδοιεν. καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτοὶ τε ἀπατηθέντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τότε πείσαντες, ἐπειδὴ διῆλθεν ὁ λόγος ὅτι οὐκ εἴη ἐν τῇ Ἑγέστη τὰ χρήματα, πολλὴν τὴν αἰτίαν εἶχον ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν· οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐβουλεύοντο.

XLVII. Καὶ Νικίου μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινούντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ' ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἦν μὲν παρέχωσι χρήματα παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι Ἑγεσταῖοι, πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ταῖς ἐξήκοντα ναυσίν, ὅσας περ ἤτήσαντο, ἀξιούν διδόναι αὐτοὺς τροφήν καὶ παραμείναντας Σελινουντίους ἢ βία ἢ ξυμβάσει διαλλάξαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω, παραπλεύσαντας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας

the money : they brought them into the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the dedicatory offerings—bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and not a little other table-furniture, which being of silver made, though of small value in money, a much greater display. And in giving private entertainments for the crews of the triremes, they not only collected the gold and silver drinking-cups from Egesta itself, but borrowed those from the neighbouring cities, both Phœnician and Hellenic, and brought them each to the banquets as though they were their own. And as all used for the most part the same vessels and there was a great display of them everywhere, it caused great astonishment to the Athenians from the triremes, and they on returning to Athens spread the report of how much treasure they had seen. And these men who had been themselves deceived and had at the time persuaded the rest, later, when the story got out that the money was not at Egesta, were much blamed by the soldiers. The generals, however, took counsel in view of the present situation.

XLVII. It was the judgment of Nicias that they should sail with their whole armament against Selinus, which was the object for which they had chiefly been sent out, and if the Egestæans should furnish money for the whole army, they should then determine accordingly ; otherwise, they should demand that they give maintenance for sixty ships, the number they had asked for, and remaining there they should reconcile the Selinuntians to the Egestæans, either by force or by agreement. This being accomplished, the Athenians should sail along by the other cities, displaying the power of the city of Athens and making manifest their zeal towards their

δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ συμμάχους προθυμίαν, ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε, ἣν μὴ τι δι' ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδοκίτου ἢ Λεοντίνους οἰοί τε ὥσιν ὠφελῆσαι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ πόλεων προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεία μὴ κινδυνεύειν.

XLVIII. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι τοσ-
αύτῃ δυνάμει ἐκπλεύσαντας αἰσχυρῶς καὶ ἀπράκ-
τους ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐς τε τὰς πόλεις ἐπικη-
ρυκεύεσθαι πλὴν Σελινούντος καὶ Συρακουσῶν
τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς τοὺς
μὲν ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ
φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν παρέ-
χωσι, πρῶτον δὲ πείθειν Μεσσηνίους (ἐν πόρῳ
γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ προσβολῇ εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῆς
Σικελίας, καὶ λιμένα καὶ ἐφόρμησιν τῇ στρατιᾷ
ἱκανωτάτην ἔσεσθαι), προσαγαγομένους δὲ τὰς
πόλεις, εἰδύτας μεθ' ὧν τις πολεμήσει, οὕτως ἤδη
Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινούντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἣν μὴ οἱ
μὲν Ἑγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους
ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.

XLIX. Λάμαχος δὲ ἀντικρυς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν
ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὡς τάχιστα
τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι, ἕως ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοί τέ
2 εἰσι καὶ μάλιστα ἐκπεπληγμένοι. τὸ γὰρ πρῶ-
τον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι· ἣν δὲ χρο-
νίσῃ πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας
ἀνθρώπους καὶ¹ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον.

¹ καί. Hude reads *κάν* after van Herwerden.

friends and allies, and then should sail back home—unless perchance they should be able quickly and unexpectedly either to aid the Leontines, or to bring over some of the other cities—and not imperil the safety of the state at the expense of their own resources.¹

XLVIII. Alcibiades insisted that they ought not, after sailing out with so great an armament, to go back in disgrace without effecting anything; but urged rather that they send heralds to the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the Syracusans, and to make friends of others, in order that these might furnish grain and troops, but first of all that they try to persuade the Messenians; for their city, he urged, was most conveniently situated on a line of traffic² and at the approach to Sicily and would be a harbour and a most suitable watch-station for the armament. Then, after they had brought over these cities and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, they should proceed to attack Syracuse and Selinus, unless the latter came to terms with the Egestaeans, and the former permitted them to restore the Leontines.

XLIX. Lamachus maintained that they ought to sail direct for Syracuse and as soon as possible make the fight near the city, while the Syracusans were still unprepared and their consternation was at its height. For every army, he argued, is always most formidable at first, but if it delay before coming into sight, men recover their spirit and even at the sight of it are more inclined to despise than to fear it. But

¹ As opposed to those of the Egestaeans.

² ἐν πόντῳ is used of the position of Corinth, I. cxv. 2.

αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἦν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς
 προσδέχονται, μάλιστ' ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ
 κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει
 (πλείστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φαῖναι) καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ
 ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δ' ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ
 3 τῆς μάχης. εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς
 πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς
 μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν
 οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἣν πρὸς τῇ πόλει
 κρατοῦσα καθέξεται. τοὺς τε ἄλλους Σικελιώτας
 οὕτως ἤδη μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν
 καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλήσειν περι-
 4 σκοποῦντας ὅποτεροι κρατήσουσιν. ναύσταθμον δὲ
 ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφόρμησιν τὰ¹ Μέγαρα
 ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα
 Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.

Ι. Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὅμως προσέθετο
 αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο
 Ἀλκιβιάδης τῇ αὐτοῦ νηὶ διαπλεύσας ἐς Μεσ-
 σήνην καὶ λόγους ποιησάμενος περὶ ξυμμαχίας
 πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίναντο
 πόλει μὲν ἂν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ' ἔξω παρέξειν,
 2 ἀπέπλει ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. καὶ εὐθὺς συμπληρώσαν-
 τες ἐξήκοι τα ναῦς ἐκ πασῶν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὰ
 ἐπιτιγδεια λαβύντες παρέπλεον ἐς Νάξον, τὴν
 ἄλλην στρατιὰν ἐν Ῥηγίῳ καταλιπόντες καὶ ἓνα
 3 σφῶν αὐτῶν. Ναξίων δὲ δεξαμένων τῇ πόλει
 παρέπλεον ἐς Κατάνην. καὶ ὥς αὐτοὺς οἱ Κατα-

¹ ἐφόρμησιν τὰ, Boehme's correction for ἐφορμηθέντας of the MSS. Schaefer's conjecture, ἐφορμισθένται, gives the same sense.

if it attack suddenly, while the enemy are still in terror of its coming, it will have the best chance for victory and in every way will strike fear into them, both by the sight of it—for at this moment it would appear most numerous—and by the expectation of the fate in store for them, but most of all by the immediate peril of the battle. And, he added, probably many people have been left behind on their farms outside the city on account of the disbelief that the Athenians will come, and while they are bringing in their property the army will not lack supplies, if it once controls the land and invests the city. And as for the rest of the Siceliots, if we follow this course they will at once be more likely, not to make an alliance with the enemy, but to come over to us, and not to make delays, looking about to see which side will be the stronger. And he said, finally, that they should return and make a naval base and a watch-station at Megara, since it was uninhabited, and not far from Syracuse either by sea or by land.

L. Lamachus, though speaking to this effect, nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own ship over to Messene and made proposals to the Messenians for an alliance; but as they could not be persuaded, answering that they would not receive him within the city, but would furnish a market outside, he sailed back to Rhegium. Then the generals straightway manned sixty ships out of their whole number, and taking provisions sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving at Rhegium the rest of the army and one of the generals. The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on then to Catana. When

ναῖοι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο (ἐνῆσαν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἄνδρες τὰ Συρακοσίων βουλόμενοι), ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμόν, καὶ αὐλισάμενοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ κέρως ἔχοντες τὰς
 4 ἄλλας ναῦς· δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προὔπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαί τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἴ τι ναυτικόν ἐστι καθειλκυσμένον, καὶ κηρύξαι ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν προσπλεύσαντας ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἤκουσι Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατοικιοῦντες κατὰ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ξυγγένειαν· τοὺς οὖν ὄντας ἐν Συρακούσαις Λεοντίνων ὥς παρὰ φίλους καὶ
 5 εὐεργέτας Ἀθηναίους ἀδεῶς ἀπιέναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκηρύχθη καὶ κατεσκέψαντο τὴν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὀρμωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς Κατάνην.

LI. Καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης τὴν μὲν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Καταναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς ἐσελθόντας ἐκέλευον, εἴ τι βούλονται, εἰπεῖν. καὶ λέγοντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τετραμμένων οἱ στρατιῶται πυλίδα τινὰ ἐνφοδομημένην κακῶς ἔλαθον διε-
 2 λόντες καὶ ἐσελθόντες ἠγόραζον.¹ τῶν δὲ Καταναίων οἱ μὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονούντες ὥς εἶδον τὸ στράτευμα ἔνδον, εὐθὺς περιδоеῖς γερόμενοι ὑπεξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί τινες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐψηφίσαντό τε ξυμμαχίαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὸ ἄλλο
 3 στράτευμα ἐκέλευον ἐκ Ῥηγίου κομίζειν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πλεusanτες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, πύσῃ

¹ ἐς τὴν πόλιν, after ἠγόραζον in the MSS., deleted by van Herwerden.

the Catanaeans would not receive them—for there were in that place men who favoured the cause of the Syracusans—they moved on to the river Terias, and having bivouacked there sailed next day to Syracuse with all their ships in single file, except ten, for this number they had sent forward to sail into the Great Harbour and observe whether any fleet was launched. After sailing up the commanders of these were to proclaim from the ships that the Athenians had come to reinstate the Leontines in their own country on the ground of alliance and kinship; any Leontines therefore who were in Syracuse should come over without fear to the Athenians as friends and benefactors. When this proclamation had been made and they had observed the city and the harbours and the features of the country which they would have to make their base for warlike operations, they sailed back to Catana.

LI. An assembly being held there, the Catanaeans would not receive the army but bade the generals come in and say what they wanted. While, then, Alcibiades was speaking, and the attention of the people in the city was wholly directed to the assembly, the soldiers, breaking unobserved through a postern-gate that had been badly built into the wall, entered and were walking about in the market-place. Those Catanaeans who were partisans of the Syracusans, seeing the soldiers inside, at once became much frightened and slipped away, not in any large numbers; the others voted alliance with the Athenians and bade them bring the rest of their army from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed back to Rhegium, then putting out from there with their whole

ἤδη τῇ στρατιᾷ ἄραντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο, κατεσκευάζοντο τὸ στρατόπεδον.

LII. Ἐσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκ τε Καμαρίνης ὥς, εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἂν καὶ ὅτι Συρακόσιοι πληροῦσι ναυτικόν. ἀπάσῃ οὖν τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπλευσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας· καὶ ὥς οὐδὲν ἡὔρον ναυτικόν πληρούμενον, παρεκομίζοντο αὐθις ἐπὶ Καμαρίνης καὶ σχόντες ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὄρκια εἶναι μιᾷ νηὶ καταπλεόντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἣν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους
2 μεταπέμπωσιν. ἄπρακτοι δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλεον· καὶ ἀποβάντες κατὰ τι τῆς Συρακοσίας καὶ ἄρπαγὴν ποιησάμενοι καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱππέων βοηθησάντων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐσκεδασμένους διαφθειράντων ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς Κατάνην.

LIII. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἤκουσαν ἐπὶ τε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὥς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐνεκάλει, καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τῶν μὲν¹ μετ' αὐτοῦ μεμνημένων περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ὥς ἀσεβούντων, τῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ
2 τῶν Ἑρμῶν. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσεν, οὐδὲν ἥσσον ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν περὶ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς δρασθέντων, καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς,

¹ μὲν added by Hude.

armament for Catana, on their arrival they set about arranging their camp.

LII. Meanwhile news came from Camarina that if the Athenians would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. Accordingly they proceeded with their whole army along the coast, first to Syracuse; and when they found no fleet was being manned, they again continued along the coast to Camarina and putting to shore sent forward a herald. The Camarinaeans, however, would not receive them, saying that the terms of their oath were to receive the Athenians only if they put in with a single ship, unless they themselves sent for more. So the Athenians sailed away without accomplishing anything; and after landing at a point in Syracusan territory and making raids, when the Syracusan cavalry had come to the rescue and killed some of their light-armed troops that were straggling they went back to Catana.

LIII. There they found that the galley *Salaminia*¹ had come from Athens for Alcibiades—to order him to come home and make his defence against the charges which the city was bringing—and for certain of the soldiers also, some of them having been denounced with him as guilty of profanation with regard to the mysteries, and some also with regard to the *Hermae*. For after the armament sailed, the Athenians had been pursuing with no less zeal than before their investigation of what had been done in the matter of the mysteries as well as the *Hermae*; and as they did not test the witnesses, but in their

¹ One of the two swift Athenian state triremes kept always manned ready for extraordinary occasions and purposes.

ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασιαίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὐρεῖν ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα
 3 εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν. ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῇ τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τῶν παίδων τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην καὶ προσέτι οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἀρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανεν.

LIV. Τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἀρμοδίου τόλμημα δι' ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη, ἣν ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλέον διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς
 2 οὐδὲν λέγοντας. Πεισιστράτου γὰρ γηραιοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι οὐχ' Ἰππαρχος, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλὰ Ἰππίας πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. γενομένου δὲ Ἀρμοδίου ὥρα ἡλικίας λαμπροῦ Ἀριστογείτων, ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀστῶν,
 3 μέσος πολίτης, ἐραστὴς ὢν εἶχεν αὐτόν. πειραθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἀρμόδιος ὑπὸ Ἰππάρχου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου καὶ οὐ πεισθεὶς καταγορεύει τῷ Ἀριστογείτονι. ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικῶς περιαλήσας καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὴν Ἰππάρχου δύναμιν μὴ βία προσαγάγηται αὐτόν, ἐπιβουλεύει εὐθύς ὥς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώ-
 4 σεως κατάλυσιν τῇ τυραννίδι. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ

state of suspicion accepted everything, on the credit of bad men they arrested and threw into prison very excellent citizens, thinking it more expedient to sift the matter to the bottom and find out the truth, than that anybody, even one reputed to be good and accused only through the villainy of an informer, should escape without close investigation. For the people, knowing by tradition that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons had become galling at the last, and moreover had been put down, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians,¹ were in constant fear and regarded everything with suspicion.

LIV. Now the daring deed of Aristogeiton² and Harmodius was undertaken on account of a love affair, and by relating this at some length I shall prove that neither the Hellenes at large nor even the Athenians themselves give an accurate account about their own tyrants or about this incident. For when Peisistratus died,³ as an old man, in possession of the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as most suppose, but Hippias, as eldest son, that succeeded to the sovereignty. And Harmodius, being then in the flower of youthful beauty, had as his lover Aristogeiton, a citizen of the middle class. An attempt to seduce him having been made by Hipparchus son of Peisistratus without success, Harmodius denounced him to Aristogeiton. And he, lover-like, deeply resented it, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he might take Harmodius by force, at once plotted, with such influence as he possessed, to overthrow the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus,

¹ Under Cleomenes, 510 B.C.

² 514 B.C.

³ Probably 527 B.C.

THUCYDIDES

"Ἰππαρχος ὡς αὐθις πειράσας οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἔπειθε
 τὸν Ἀρμόδιον, βίαιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο δρᾶν, ἐν
 τρόπῳ¹ δέ τιμι ἀφανεῖ ὡς οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ παρε-
 5 σκευάζετο προπηλακιῶν αὐτόν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν
 ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐπαχθῆς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλ'
 ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο· καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ
 πλείστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν,
 καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰκοστὴν υἰόνον πρᾶσσόμενοι τῶν
 γιγνομένων τὴν τε πόλιν αὐτῶν καλῶς διεκόσμη-
 σαν καὶ τοὺς πολέμους διέφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ
 6 ἔθουν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις
 νόμοις ἐχρήτο, πλήν καθ' ὅσον αἰεὶ τινα ἐπεμέλοντο
 σφῶν αἰτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλοι τε
 αὐτῶν ἥρξαν τὴν ἐνιαύσιον Ἀθηναίοις ἀρχὴν καὶ
 Πεισίστρατος ὁ Ἰππίου τοῦ τυραννεύσαντος υἱός,
 τοῦ πάππου ἔχων τοῦνομα, ὃς τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν
 βωμὸν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἀρχῶν ἀνέθηκε καὶ τὸν
 7 τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐν Πυθίου. καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐν τῇ
 ἀγορᾷ προσοικοδομήσας ὕστερον ὁ δῆμος Ἀθη-
 ναίων μείζον μῆκος² ἠφάνισε τοῦπίγραμμα· τοῦ
 δὲ ἐν Πυθίου ἔτι καὶ νῦν δηλὸν ἐστὶν ἀμυδροῖς
 γράμμασι λέγον τάδε·

μνημα τόδ' ἥς ἀρχῆς Πεισίστρατος Ἰππίου υἱὸς
 θῆκεν Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθίου ἐν τεμένει.

LV. "Ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὦν Ἰππίας ἥρξεν, εἰδὼς
 μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι,

¹ Levesque's correction for τόπῳ of the MSS.

² τοῦ βωμοῦ, in the MSS. after μῆκος, deleted by Kruger.

¹ This seems to point to a near relationship of the historian with the family of the Peisistratidae, so that more

having in a second attempt met with no better success in persuading Harmodius, although he had no intention of offering violence, yet laid a plan to insult him in some covert way, as though it were not for this reason. For he did not generally so exercise his authority as to be oppressive to the mass of the people, but maintained it without giving offence. And indeed the Peisistratidae carried the practice of virtue and discretion to a very high degree, considering that they were tyrants, and although they exacted from the Athenians only five per cent. of their incomes, not only had they embellished their city, but they also carried on its wars and provided sacrifices for the temples. In other respects the city itself enjoyed the laws before established, except in so far that the tyrants took precaution that one of their own family should always be in office. Amongst others of them who held the annual archonship at Athens was Peisistratus, a son of the Hippias who had been tyrant. He was named after his grandfather and, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the Agora and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The people of Athens afterwards, in extending the length of the altar in the Agora, effaced the inscription; but that on the altar of the Pythian Apollo can still be seen in indistinct letters, reading as follows:

“This memorial of his office Peisistratus son of Hippias

Set up in the precinct of Pythian Apollo.”

LIV. That it was Hippias who, as eldest son, succeeded to the sovereignty I positively affirm because I know it even by tradition more accurately than others,¹

exact knowledge had come to him by word of mouth (καὶ ἀκοῇ); cf. Marcellinus, § 18, and Schol. on I. xx. 2.

γνολή δ' ἂν τις καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ· παῖδες γὰρ αὐτῷ
μόνον φαίνονται τῶν γνησίων ἀδελφῶν γενόμενοι,
ὥς ὃ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς
τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας, ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκρο-
πόλει σταθεῖσα, ἐν ᾗ Θεσσαλοῦ μὲν οὐδ' Ἴπ-
πάρχου οὐδεὶς παῖς γέγραπται, Ἴππίου δὲ πέντε,
οἱ αὐτῷ ἐκ Μυρσίνης τῆς Καλλίου τοῦ Ὑπερο-
χίδου θυγατρὸς ἐγένοντο· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἦν τὸν
2 πρεσβύτατον πρῶτον γῆμαι. καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ
στήλῃ πρῶτος γέγραπται μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, οὐδὲ
τοῦτο ἀπεικότως διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τε ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
3 καὶ τυραννεῦσαι. οὐ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν κατασχεῖν μοι
δοκεῖ ποτε Ἴππίας τὸ παραχρῆμα ῥαδίως τὴν
τυραννίδα, εἰ Ἴππαρχος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὧν ἀπέ-
θανεν, αὐτὸς δὲ αὐθημερὸν καθίστατο· ἀλλὰ διὰ
τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερὸν,
ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ἀκριβές, πολλῷ τῷ περιόντι
τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς κατεκράτησε, καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἀδελφὸς
νεώτερος ὧν ἠπόρησεν, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς
4 ὠμιλήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ. Ἴππάρχῳ δὲ ξυνέβη τοῦ πά-
θους τῇ δυστυχίᾳ ὀνομασθέντα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς
τυραννίδος ἐς τὰ ἔπειτα προσλαβεῖν.

LVI. Τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν
πεῖρασιν, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο, προυπηλάκισεν· ἀδελ-
φὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κόρην ἐπαγγείλαντες ἤκειν κανοῦν
οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινι, ἀπῆλασαν λέγοντες οὐδὲ
2 ἐπαγγεῖλαι τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι. χαλε-
πῶς δὲ ἐνεγκύντος τοῦ Ἀρμοδίου πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον

and anyone might be convinced of it also by this simple fact—he alone of the legitimate brothers appears to have had children, as not only the altar signifies, but also the column commemorating the wrong-doing of the tyrants that was set up on the acropolis of Athens, on which no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is inscribed, but of Hippias five, who were borne to him by Myrrhine daughter of Callias son of Hyperochidas; for it was natural for the eldest to marry first. And on this same column his name is written first after his father's, this also not unnaturally, as he was the eldest after him and had been tyrant. Nor yet again would Hippias, as it seems to me, have obtained the tyranny at once with ease, if Hipparchus had been in power when killed, and had had to establish himself therein on the same day. Nay, it was owing to the habitual fear which before that he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline he had maintained in the bodyguard, that he got the upper hand with superabundant security and was at no loss, as a younger brother would have been, since in that case he would not previously have been regularly used to power. Hipparchus, however, as it fell out, having become famous by his tragic fate, obtained in after-time the credit also of having been tyrant.

LVI. So, then, when Harmodius had repulsed his suit, Hipparchus insulted him, as he intended. For after summoning a maiden-sister of his to serve as a basket-bearer¹ in some procession, they rejected her, declaring they had never summoned her at all, because she was unworthy. As Harmodius was indignant at

¹ This service of carrying at festivals baskets containing the requisites for religious ceremonies was a great distinction, so that the rejection of the maiden was regarded as a bitter insult to the family.

δι' ἐκείνους καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων παρωξύνετο. καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεπιθησομένους τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπέπρακτο, περιέμενον δὲ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν ἧ μύον ἡμέρᾳ οὐχ ὑποπτον ἐγίγνετο ἐν ὅπλοις τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς τὴν πομπὴν πέμψοντας ἀθρόους γενέσθαι· καὶ ἔδει ἄρξαι μὲν αὐτούς, ξυνεπαμύνειν δὲ εὐθύς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δορυφόρους ἐκεί-
 3 νους. ἦσαν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ οἱ ξυνομωμοκότες ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα· ἥλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὅποσοι οὖν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα, ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν.

LVII. Καὶ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν ἡ ἑορτή, Ἰππίας μὲν ἔξω ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ καλουμένῳ μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων διεκόσμει ὡς ἕκαστα ἐχρῆν τῆς πομπῆς προιέναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρμόδιος καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἔχοντες ἤδη τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἐς τὸ ἔργον προῆσαν.
 2 καὶ ὡς εἰδόν τινα τῶν ξυνωμοτῶν σφίσι διαλεγόμενον οἰκείως τῷ Ἰππία (ἣν δὲ πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος ὁ Ἰππίας), ἔδεισαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν μεμνηῦσθαί τε
 3 καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ξυλληφθήσεσθαι. τὸν λυπήσαντα οὖν σφᾶς καὶ δι' ὄνπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνουν ἐβούλοντο πρότερον, εἰ δύναιντο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ εἶχον ὥρμησαν ἔσω τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἰππάρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον. εὐθύς δ' ¹ ἀπερισκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα δι' ὀγῆς, ὁ μὲν

¹ δ' added by Pontus.

this, Aristogeiton for his sake was far more exasperated. And now the details had been arranged by them with those who were to take part in the execution of their scheme; but they were waiting for the great Panathenaea, for on that day only it excited no suspicion for the citizens who were to take part in the procession to be assembled in arms. They were themselves to begin the attack, but the others were to join them at once in dealing with the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better security; for they hoped that, if ever so few made the bold attempt, at once even those who were not before privy to it, having arms in their hands, would be inclined to bear a part in winning their own freedom.

LVII. And when the festival came on, Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the walls, in the place called the Cerameicus, arranging the order in which the several parts of the procession were to go forward; and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped forward to put their scheme in effect. But when they saw one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who was accessible to all, they took fright, thinking that they had been informed upon and would in a moment be arrested. So wishing first to take vengeance, if they could, upon the one who had aggrieved them and because of whom they were risking all, they rushed, just as they were, within the gates and came upon Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium.¹ And at once falling upon him recklessly and as men will in extreme wrath, the one

¹ The sanctuary of the daughters of Leos, an ancient Attic king, who in a famine were sacrificed for the state. It was in the Inner Cerameicus, near the temple of Apollo Patrons.

ἔρωτικῆς, ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος, ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι αὐτόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς δορυφόρους τὸ αὐτίκα διαφεύγει, ὁ Ἀριστογείτων, ξυνδραμόντος τοῦ ὄχλου, καὶ ὕστερον ληφθεὶς οὐ ῥαδίως διετέθη. Ἀρμόδιος δὲ αὐτοῦ παραχρήμα ἀπόλλυται.

LVIII. Ἀγγεληθέντος δὲ Ἰππία ἐς τὸν Κεραικόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πομπέας τοὺς ὀπλίτας, πρότερον ἢ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτοὺς ἄπωθεν ὄντας, εὐθὺς ἐχώρησε, καὶ ἀδήλως τῇ ὄψει πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτούς, δείξας τι χωρίον, ἀπελθεῖν ἐς αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῶν ὅπλων. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν οἰόμενοί τι ἐρεῖν αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἐπικούροις φράσας τὰ ὅπλα ὑπολαβεῖν ἐξελέγετο εὐθὺς οὐς ἐπητιᾶτο καὶ εἴ τις ἡνέρεθη ἐγχειρίδιον ἔχων· μετὰ γὰρ ἀσπίδος καὶ δόρατος εἰώθεσαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν.

LIX. Τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ δι' ἐρωτικὴν λύπην ἢ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἢ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα περιδεοῦς Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι ἐγένετο. τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη, καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὢν τῶν τε πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἅμα διεσκοπεῖτο, εἴ ποθεν ἀσφάλειάν τινα ὀρώῃ μεταβολῆς γενομένης ὑπάρχουσάν οἱ. Ἰππόκλου γοῦν τοῦ Λαμψακηνοῦ τυράννου Αἰαντίδῃ τῷ παιδί θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀρχεδίκην, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν Λαμψακηνῷ, ἔδωκεν,

inflamed by jealousy, the other by insult, they smote and slew him. Aristogeiton, indeed, escaped the guards for the moment, as the crowd ran together, but afterwards was caught and handled in no gentle manner; but Harmodius perished on the spot.

LVIII. When the news was brought to Hippias in the Cerameicus, he went at once, not to the scene of action, but to the hoplites in the procession, before they, being some distance away, had become aware of what had happened, and, disguising his looks so as to betray nothing in regard to the calamity, pointed to a certain place and ordered them to go thither without their arms. So they withdrew, thinking that he had something to say to them; while he, ordering the mercenaries to take up the arms of the others, immediately picked out those whom he held guilty, and anyone besides who was found with a dagger; for it was customary to march in the processions armed with shield and spear only.

LIX. It was in such wise, for an affront in love, that the plot of Harmodius and Aristogeiton was first conceived and their reckless attempt made under the influence of their momentary alarm. After this the tyranny became harsher for the Athenians, and Hippias, being now in greater apprehension, not only put to death many of the citizens, but also began to look abroad, to see if in any quarter he might find any door of safety open to him in case of a revolution. At any rate after this he gave his own daughter Archedice in marriage to Aeantides son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus—an Athenian to a Lampsacene!—perceiving that this family had

αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ
δύνασθαι. καὶ αὐτῆς σῆμα ἐν Λαμψάκῳ ἐστὶν
ἐπίγραμμα ἔχον τόδε·

ἄνδρὸς ἀριστεύσαντος ἐν Ἑλλάδι τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
Ἰππίου Ἀρχεδίκην ἦδε κέκευθε κόνις·

ἢ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὔσα τυράννων
παίδων τ' οὐκ ἦρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.

4 τυραννεύσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἰππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων
καὶ παυσθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων
καὶ Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχώρει ὑπό-
σπονδος ἐς τε Σίγειον καὶ παρ' Αἰαντίδην ἐς
Λάμψακον, ἐκείθεν δὲ ὡς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον, ὅθεν
καὶ ὀρμώμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ὕστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ
ἤδη γέρων ὦν μετὰ Μήδων ἐστράτευσεν.

LX. Ὡν ἐνθυμούμενος ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
καὶ μιμνησκόμενος ὅσα ἀκοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἠπίστατο,
χαλεπὸς ἦν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτῃς ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν
μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοῖς
ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ
2 πεπρᾶχθαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀργιζο-
μένων πολλοὶ τε καὶ ἀξιόλογοι ἄνθρωποι ἤδη ἐν
τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ἐν παύλῃ ἐφαίνετο,
ἀλλὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπεδίδοσαν μᾶλλον ἐς τὸ
ἀγριώτερόν τε καὶ πλείους ἔτι ξυλλαμβάνειν,
ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ

¹ Ascribed to Simonides of Ceos (Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 9).

² 510 B.C.

BOOK VI. LIX. 3-LX. 2

great influence with King Darius. And there is at Lampsacus a monument of her bearing this inscription :¹

“This dust covers Archedice daughter of Hippias,
Who was foremost in Hellas among the men of his
time :

Her father and husband, her brothers and children
were tyrants,

Yet was not her mind lifted up to vainglory.”

Hippias, however, after being tyrant for three years more at Athens, was then deposed² in the fourth year by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae, and retired under truce to Sigeium, from there to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and thence to the court of King Darius; whence twenty years later, being already an old man, he went with the Persians on the expedition to Marathon.

LX. With these events in mind and recalling all that they knew of them by report, the Athenian people were in an ugly temper at this time and suspicious towards those who had incurred blame in the matter of the mysteries; and the whole thing seemed to them to have been done in connection with a conspiracy that aimed at an oligarchy or a tyranny. So when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many noteworthy men were already imprisoned and there seemed to be no end of the matter, but day by day they were growing more savage and still more men were being arrested, then at last one of the men in confinement,³ the one in fact who

¹ The orator Andocides, who gives his account of the matter in his speech *De Mysteriis*. The man who persuaded him was, according to Andocides, his cousin Charmides; according to Plutarch (*Alcib. ii*), it was Timaeus.

THUCYDIDES

- ἰδόμενος αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδесμωτῶν
 τινος εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι εἴτε καὶ οὐ
 ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ εἰκάζεται, τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς
 οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῷ
 3 δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. λέγων δὲ ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν
 ὡς χρή, εἰ μὴ καὶ δέδρακεν, αὐτόν τε ἄδειαν
 ποιησάμενον σῶσαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῆς παρούσης
 ὑποψίας παῦσαι· βεβαιωτέραν γὰρ αὐτῷ σωτη-
 ρίαν εἶναι ὁμολογήσαντι μετ' ἀδείας ἢ ἀρνηθέντι
 4 διὰ δίκης ἐλθεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτός τε καθ' ἑαυτοῦ
 καὶ κατ' ἄλλων μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν· ὁ δὲ δῆμος
 ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων¹ ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ
 σαφὲς καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον, εἰ τοὺς
 ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται,
 τὸν μὲν μηνυτὴν εὐθὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετ'
 αὐτοῦ ὅσων μὴ κατηγορήκει ἔλυσαν, τοὺς δὲ
 καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν
 ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοι ξυνελήφθησαν, τῶν δὲ διαφυ-
 γόντων θάνατον καταγόντες ἐπανείπον ἀργύριον
 5 τῷ ἀποκτείναντι. κἂν τούτῳ οἱ μὲν παθόντες
 ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρητο, ἢ μέντοι ἄλλη
 πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο.

LXI. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐναγόντων τῶν
 ἐχθρῶν, οἵπερ καὶ πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπέθεντο,
 χαλεπῶς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάμβανον· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ
 τῶν Ἑρμῶν ᾤοντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον
 καὶ τὰ μυστικά, ὧν ἐπαίτιος ἦν, μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ

¹ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.

was regarded as the most guilty, was persuaded by one of his fellow-prisoners to make a confession, which may have been true or not; for there are conjectures both ways, but no one has been able, either then or afterwards, to tell the truth with reference to those who did the deed. At any rate, the other prisoner persuaded this man that, even if he had not done the deed, he ought, having first secured immunity,¹ to save himself and free the state from the prevailing suspicion; for, he said, he had a surer chance of saving his life by confessing, with the promise of immunity, than by denying the charge and undergoing trial. Accordingly he informed against himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the people, delighted at getting the truth, as they thought, and already making much ado that they should not discover those who were plotting against the democracy, at once set free the informer and with him all the rest whom he had not denounced; but with regard to those who were accused they instituted trials and put to death all who had been arrested, while on those who had fled they passed sentence of death, offering a reward in money to anyone who killed them. And in all this it was uncertain whether those who suffered had not been punished unjustly; the city at large, however, at the time was clearly benefited.

LXI. With regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians took the matter seriously, being urged on by his enemies, the men who had attacked him before he sailed. And thinking now that they had the truth about the Hermae, they were far more convinced that the profanation of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated,

¹ i.e. promise of a free pardon.

- λόγου καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ’
 2 ἐκείνου ἐδόκειπραχθῆναι. καὶ γάρ τις καὶ
 στρατιὰ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ πολλὴ ἔτυχε κατὰ
 τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ περὶ ταῦτα ἐθορυβοῦντο
 μέχρι ἰσθμοῦ προελθοῦσα πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς τι
 πράσσοντες. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐκείνου πράξαντος καὶ
 οὐ Βοιωτῶν ἔνεκα ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος ἦκειν, καὶ εἰ
 μὴ ἔφθασαν δὴ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸ μήνυμα ξυλλα-
 βόντες τοὺς ἄνδρας, προδοθῆναι ἂν ἡ πόλις. καί
 τινα μίαν νύκτα καὶ κατέδαρθον ἐν Θησεῖῳ τῷ ἐν
 3 πόλει ἐν ὅπλοις. οἳ τε ξένοι τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου οἱ
 ἐν Ἀργεὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὑπωπτεύθησαν
 τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι· καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους τῶν Ἀρ-
 γείων τοὺς ἐν ταῖς νήσοις κειμένους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
 τότε παρέδωκαν τῷ Ἀργείῳ δήμῳ διὰ ταῦτα δια-
 4 χρήσασθαι. πανταχόθεν τε περιειστῆκει ὑποψία
 ἐς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. ὥστε βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν ἐς
 κρίσιν ἀγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι, πέμπουσιν οὕτω
 τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπὶ τε
 5 ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὧν πέρι ἄλλων ἐμεμήνυτο. εἴρητο δὲ
 προειπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ξυλ-
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, θεραπεύοντες τό τε πρὸς τοὺς
 ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατιώτας τε σφετέρους καὶ πο-
 λεμίους μὴθορυβεῖν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Μαν-
 τινέας καὶ Ἀργεῖους βουλόμενοι παραμεῖναι, δι’
 ἐκείνου νομίζοντες πεισθῆναι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν.
 6 καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν καὶ οἱ ξυνδια-

had been committed by him with the same intent, that is of conspiring against the people. For it so happened that a small Lacedaemonian force, at the moment when they were in commotion about these matters, had come as far as the Isthmus in pursuance of some arrangement with the Boeotians. The opinion prevailed, therefore, that it had come on agreement at his instigation, and not in the interest of the Boeotians; and that, if they had not themselves been beforehand in arresting the men on the strength of the information given, the city would have been betrayed. And once for a whole night they lay under arms in the precinct of Theseus within the walls. Furthermore, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were at the same time suspected of a design to attack the people; and on this account the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands¹ were at that time delivered by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death. Thus from all sides suspicion had gathered about Alcibiades. And so, wishing to bring him to trial and put him to death, they had sent the Salaminia to Sicily for him and for the others who had been informed upon. And the orders were to give him formal summons to follow, that he might make his defence, but not to arrest him; for they were solicitous about both their own soldiers in Sicily and the enemy, not wishing to stir up excitement among them, and they were especially desirous that the Mantineans and Argives should remain with them, thinking that it was through him that they had been persuaded to join in the expedition. So he, in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, sailed off in

¹ cf. v. lxxxiv. 1.

βεβλημένοι ἀπέπλεον μετὰ τῆς Σαλαμινίας ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ὥς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο ἐν Θουρίοις, οὐκέτι ξυνείποντο, ἀλλ' ἀπελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς νεῶς οὐ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, δείσαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ ἐς δίκην καταπλεῦσαι.
 7 οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Σαλαμινίας τέως μὲν ἐζήτουν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ· ὥς δ' οὐδαμοῦ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, ὥχοντο ἀποπλέοντες. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἤδη φυγὰς ὦν οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπὶ πλοίου ἐπεραιώθη ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας· οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐρήμη δίκη θάνατον κατέγνωσαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου.

LXII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ λαχὼν ἑκάτερος, ἔπλεον ξύμπαντι ἐπὶ Σελινούντος καὶ Ἐγέστης, βουλόμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι τὰ χρήματα εἰ δώσουσιν οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι, κατασκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ διάφορα μαθεῖν τὰ
 2 πρὸς Ἐγεσταίους. παραπλέοντες δ' ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Σικελίαν, τὸ μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν κόλπον, ἔσχον ἐς Ἰμέραν, ἥπερ μόνῃ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς Σικελίας Ἑλλὰς πόλις ἐστίν· καὶ ὥς
 3 οὐκ ἐδέχοντο αὐτοὺς, παρεκομίζοντο. καὶ ἐν τῇ παράπλῳ αἰρούσιν Ὅτκαρα, πόλισμα Σικανικὸν μὲν, Ἐγεσταίοις δὲ πολέμιον· ἦν δὲ παραθαλασσίδιον. καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες τὴν πόλιν παρέδωκαν Ἐγεσταίοις (παρεγένοντο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱππῆς), αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῷ μὲν πεζῷ ἐχώρουν διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν,

company with the Salaminia from Sicily, as if for Athens. When, however, they reached the territory of the Thurians, they followed no further, but left their ship and disappeared, being afraid to sail home for trial in the face of the existing prejudice. The crew of the Salaminia sought for Alcibiades and his companions for some time; but when these were nowhere to be found, they sailed home. Alcibiades, however, being now an outlaw, not long afterwards crossed over by boat from Thurii to the Peloponnesus; and the Athenians through a judgment by default¹ sentenced him and his companions to death.

LXII. After this the two generals who were left in Sicily, making two divisions of the army and each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to know whether the Egestaeans would give the promised money, and to look into the affairs of the Selinuntians and learn their points of contention with the Egestaeans. So sailing along the coast, with Sicily—that is, the part of it which faces the Tyrrhenian gulf—on their left hand, they put into Himera, which is the only Hellenic city in that part of Sicily; and as Himera would not receive them, they proceeded along the coast. On their passage they took Hyccara, a petty town by the seaside, which, though Sicanian, was yet hostile to the Egestaeans. They enslaved the inhabitants, and turned the town over to the Egestaeans, some of whose cavalry had joined them, but themselves went back with their land-force through the territory of the Sicels until they came to Catana,

¹ Given in cases where the person indicted failed to appear for trial

ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Κατάνην, αἱ δὲ νῆες περιέπλευσαν
 4 τὰ ἀνδράποδα ἄγουσai. Νικίας δὲ εὐθύς ἐξ
 Ὑκκάρων ἐπὶ Ἐγέστης παραπλεύσας καὶ τὰλλα
 χρηματίσας καὶ λαβὼν τάλαντα τριάκοντα παρῆν
 ἐς τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ τὰνδράποδα ἀπέδωσαν, καὶ
 ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα.
 5 καὶ ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους περιέπλευσαν,
 στρατιὰν κελεύοντες πέμπειν· τῇ τε ἡμισείᾳ τῆς
 ἑαυτῶν ἦλθον ἐπὶ Ὑβλαν τὴν Γελεᾶτιν πολεμίαν
 οὖσαν καὶ οὐχ εἶλον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

LXIII. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθύς
 τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Συρακούσας παρε-
 σκευάζοντο, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὥς ἐπ'
 2 ἐκείνους ἰόντες. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν
 πρῶτον φόβον καὶ τὴν¹ προσδοκίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι
 οὐκ εὐθύς ἐπέκειντο, κατὰ τε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκάστην
 προῖοῦσαν ἀνεθάρσουν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλέ-
 οντές τε τὰ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς Σικελίας πολὺ ἀπὸ
 σφῶν ἐφαίνοντο καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ὑβλαν ἐλθόντες
 καὶ πειράσαντες οὐχ εἶλον βία, ἔτι πλέον κατε-
 φρόνησαν καὶ ἡξίουσαν τοὺς στρατηγούς, οἷον δὲ
 ὄχλος φιλεῖ θαρσῆσας ποιεῖν, ἄγειν σφᾶς ἐπὶ
 Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἔρχονται.
 3 ἱππῆς τε² προσελαύνοντες αἰεὶ κατάσκοποι τῶν
 Συρακοσίων πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων
 ἐφύβριζον ἄλλα τε καὶ εἰ ξυνοικήσουντες σφίσιν
 αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἤκοιεν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἢ Λεοντίνους
 ἐς τὴν οἰκίαν κατοικιοῦντες.

LXIV. Ἄ γινγνώσκοντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν
 Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄγειν πανδημεῖ

¹ τὴν, Hude deletes with E.

² τε is indispensable, but omitted in all MSS.

BOOK VI. LXII. 3-LXIV. 1

while the ships sailed round to Catana with the captives. Nicias, however, had sailed at once¹ from Hyccara for Eggesta, and after transacting his other business and receiving thirty talents had rejoined the army. Their slaves they sold, receiving for them one hundred and twenty talents. They sent round also to their allies among the Sicels, bidding them send troops; and with half of their own force went against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, but failed to take it. And so the summer ended.

LXIII. The following winter the Athenians began at once to prepare for the advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, to go against them. For when the Athenians did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, at once attack them, with each successive day their courage revived; and when the Athenians sailed along the opposite coast of Sicily and showed themselves only at a distance from Syracuse, and going against Hybla failed in the attempt to take it by storm, the Syracusans had still greater contempt for them, and, as a crowd is wont to do when it has become elated, demanded that their generals should lead them against Catana, since the Athenians would not come against them. Moreover, mounted Syracusan scouts constantly rode up to the Athenian army and amongst other insults asked them: "Are you come to settle yourselves here with us, on land which belongs to other people, instead of resettling the Leontines on their own?"

LXIV. The Athenian generals were aware of all this and purposed to draw the whole of the Syra-

¹ i.e. without waiting for Hyccara to be reduced and its inhabitants disposed of.

THUCYDIDES

ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὅτι πλείστον, αὐτοὶ δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐν τοσοῦτῳ ὑπὸ νύκτα παραπλεύσαντες στρατόπεδον καταλαμβάνειν ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ καθ' ἡσυχίαν, εἰδότες οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες,¹ εἰ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν πρὸς παρεσκευασμένους ἐκβιβάζοιεν ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἰόντες γνωσθεῖεν (τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψιλοὺς τοὺς σφῶν καὶ τὸν ὄχλον τῶν Συρακοσίων τοὺς ἰππέας πολλοὺς ὄντας, σφίσι δ' οὐ παρόντων ἰππέων, βλάπτειν ἂν μέγала· οὕτω δὲ λήψεσθαι χωρίου ὅθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἰππέων οὐ βλάφονται ἄξια λόγου· ἐδίδασκον δ' αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ Ὀλυμπείῳ χωρίου, ὅπερ καὶ κατέλαβον, Συρακοσίων φυγάδες οἱ ξυνείποντο), τοιόνδε τι οὖν πρὸς ἃ ἐβούλονται οἱ

2 στρατηγοὶ μηχανῶνται. πέμπουσιν ἄνδρα σφίσι μὲν πιστόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς τῇ δοκῇσιν οὐχ ἡσσον ἐπιτήδειον. ἦν δὲ Καταναῖος ὁ ἀνὴρ, καὶ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης ἦκειν ἔφη ὧν ἐκείνοι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐγίγνωσκον καὶ ἠπίσταντο ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔτι ὑπολοίπους ὄντας τῶν

3 σφίσιν εὖνων. ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους αὐλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλων ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰ βούλονται ἐκείνοι πανδημεὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἔφ' ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐλθεῖν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀποκλήσειν τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐμπρήσειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ῥαδίως τὸ στράτευμα προσβαλόντας τῷ σταυρώματι αἰρήσειν· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ξυνδράσοντας πολλοὺς Καταναίων καὶ ἡτοιμάσθαι ἥδη, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς ἦκειν.

¹ καὶ, before εἰ in MSS., ignored by Valla and the Scholiast.

BOOK VI. LXIV. 1-3

cusan force as far as possible away from the city, and themselves meanwhile to sail down under cover of night and undisturbed to occupy a camp at a suitable place, knowing that they would not be able to do this so well if they should disembark from their ships in the face of an enemy prepared to meet them, or should be detected going by land. For being without horsemen themselves, their own light-armed troops and their mob of camp-followers would, they thought, suffer great harm at the hands of the numerous Syracusan cavalry; but in the way proposed they would take a position where they would not suffer any harm worth mentioning from the cavalry; and certain Syracusan exiles who were with them gave them information as to the position close to the Olympieum, which in fact they subsequently occupied. So then, in furtherance of their plan, the generals devised some such scheme as this: They sent a man loyal to themselves, but in the opinion of the Syracusan generals no less a friend of theirs. The man was a Catanaean, and said that he had come from men at Catana whose names they recognized and whom they knew to be the remnant of those who were still loyal to them in the city. He said that the Athenians were in the habit of passing the night in the city away from their arms, and if the Syracusans would come in full force at dawn on an appointed day against their army, they would close the gates on the Athenians in their city and set fire to the ships, and the Syracusans could attack the stockade and easily take the whole army; for there were many Catanaeans who would help them in this undertaking, and the men from whom he himself had come were ready now.

THUCYDIDES

LXV. Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα θαρσεῖν καὶ εἶναι ἐν διανοίᾳ καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἰέναι¹ ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπίστευσάν τε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολλῷ ἀπερισκεπτότερον καὶ εὐθὺς ἡμέραν ξυνθέμενοι ἢ παρέσονται ἀπέστειλαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτοὶ (ἥδη γὰρ καὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν Σελινούντιοι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς παρήσαν) προείπον πανδημεὶ πᾶσιν ἐξιέναι Συρακοσίοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐτοῖμα αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἦν καὶ αἱ ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς ξυνέθεντο ἥξειν ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, πορευόμενοι ἐπὶ Κατάνης ἠϋλίσαντο ἐπὶ τῷ Συμαίθῳ ποταμῷ ἐν
2 τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἦσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσιόντας, ἀναλαβόντες τό τε στράτευμα ἅπαν τὸ ἐαυτῶν καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλος τις προσεληλύθει καὶ ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, ὑπὸ νύκτα ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὰς Συρα-
3 κούσας. καὶ οἳ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα ἕω ἐξέβαινον ἐς τὸ² κατὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὡς στρατόπεδον καταληψόμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ Συρακοσίων πρῶτοι προσελάσαντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην³ καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ὅτι τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν ἀνῆκται, ἀποστρέψαντες ἀγγέλλουσι τοῖς πεζοῖς, καὶ ξύμπαντες ἥδη ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν.

LXVI. Ἐν τούτῳ δ' οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μακρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ὁδοῦ αὐτοῖς, καθ' ἡσυχίαν καθίσαν τὸ στράτευμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον καὶ ἐν ᾧ μάχης τε ἄρξαιν ἔμελλον ὅποτε βούλονται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἥκιστ'⁴ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ

¹ παρεσκευάσθαι, in MSS. after ἰέναι, deleted by Dobree.

² With E, all other MSS. τὸν.

³ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, Hude corrects to τῇ Κατάνῃ.

⁴ ἄν, after ἥκιστ' in MSS., deleted by Stahl.

BOOK VI. LXV. I—LXVI. I

LXV. And the Syracusan generals, who were already confident as to the general situation, and intended even without this help to go against Catana, trusted the fellow much too incautiously, and at once, agreeing upon a day on which they would be there, sent him back; and themselves—the Selinuntians and some others of their allies being already present—made proclamation for the whole force of the Syracusans to take the field. And when their preparations were made and the days were near on which they had agreed to come, they proceeded towards Catana and bivouacked at the River Simaethus in the territory of Leontini. But the Athenians, when they learned of their approach, took all their own army and such of the Sicels or others as had joined them, and embarking on their ships and boats sailed under cover of night against Syracuse. And they disembarked at daybreak at a point opposite the Olympieium, where they proposed to occupy a camping-place; but the Syracusan horsemen, who were the first to reach Catana and found there that the whole army was gone, turned about and announced this to the infantry, and all then turned back at once and hastened to bring aid to the city.

LXVI. Meanwhile the Athenians, undisturbed, as the Syracusans had a long way to go, settled their army in a suitable position, where they could begin a battle whenever they wished and the Syracusan horsemen would annoy them the least either in the

πρὸ αὐτοῦ λυπήσειν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ τειχία τε καὶ οἰκίαι εἶργον καὶ δένδρα καὶ λίμνη, παρὰ δὲ τὸ
 2 κρημνοί. καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς δένδρα κόψαντες καὶ κατενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρά τε τὰς ναῦς σταύρωμα ἔπηξαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Δάσκωνι ἔρυμά τε, ἣ εὐεφοδώτατον ἦν τοῖς πολεμίοις, λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξύλοις διὰ ταχέων ὥρθωσαν καὶ τὴν
 3 τοῦ Ἀνάπου γέφυραν ἔλυσαν. παρασκευαζομένων δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδεὶς ἐξιὼν ἐκώλυε, πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων προσεβοήθησαν, ἔπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ πεζὸν ἅπαν ξυνελέγη. καὶ προσῆλθον μὲν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δέ, ὥς οὐκ ἀντιπροῆσαν αὐτοῖς, ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ διαβάντες τὴν Ἐλωρίνην ὁδὸν ἠύλισαντο.

LXVII. Τῇ δ' ὕστεραία οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὥς ἐς μάχην καὶ ξυνετάξαντο ὧδε. δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Ἀργεῖοι εἶχον καὶ Μαντινῆς, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ αὐτοῖς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἦν, τεταγμένον ἐπὶ ὀκτώ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐναῖς ἐν πλαισίῳ, ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ καὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένον· οἷς εἶρητο, ἣ ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματός τι πονῇ μάλιστα, ἐφορῶντας παραγίγνεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς σκευοφόρους ἐντὸς τού-
 2 των τῶν ἐπιτάκτων ἐποιήσαντο. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἔταξαν τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας πάντας ἐφ' ἑκαίδεκα, ὄντας πανδημεὶ Συρακοσίου καὶ ὅσοι ξύμμαχοι παρήσαν (ἐβοήθησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς Σελινούντιοι μὲν

actual fighting or before; for on one side walls and houses and trees and a swamp furnished a barrier, on the other side a line of cliffs. They also cut down the trees near at hand and bringing them down to the sea built a stockade by the ships; and at Dascon, where the place was most accessible to the enemy, they quickly erected a bulwark of stones picked up in the fields and of timbers, and pulled down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were making these preparations nobody came out from the city to hinder them; the first that came against them were the horsemen of the Syracusans, but afterwards the infantry also gathered in full force. And at first they drew near the Athenian camp, but later, when these did not come out against them, they withdrew across the Elorine road and spent the night.

LXVII. On the next day the Athenians and their allies made preparations for battle, and were drawn up in the following order: On the right were the Argives and Mantineans, the Athenians had the centre, the other allies the rest of the line. Half of their army was in the van, arrayed eight deep; the other half near their sleeping-places, formed in a hollow square, these too arrayed eight deep; and the orders of the latter were, to be on the alert to support any part of the army that was most in distress. And the baggage-carriers they put inside the body of reserves. The Syracusans, on the other hand, arranged all their hoplites sixteen deep, that is, the whole force of the Syracusans and as many of their allies as were present; for they had received some reinforcements, chiefly from the Selinuntians,

THUCYDIDES

μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ Γελώων ἵππῆς, τὸ ξύμπαν
 ἐς διακοσίους, καὶ Καμαριναίων ἵππῆς ὅσον εἴκοσι
 καὶ τοξόται ὥς πεντήκοντα), τοὺς δὲ ἵππέας ἐπε-
 τάξαντο ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ, οὐκ ἔλασσον ὄντας ἢ
 διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, παρὰ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς
 3 ἀκοντιστάς. μέλλουσι δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις προ-
 τέροις ἐπιχειρήσειν ὁ Νικίας κατὰ τε ἔθνη
 ἐπιπαριῶν ἕκαστα καὶ ξύμπασι τοιάδε παρεκε-
 λεύετο.

LXVIII. “Πολλῇ μὲν παραινέσει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί
 δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἳ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν¹ ἀγῶνα;
 αὕτη γὰρ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἱκανωτέρα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
 θάρσος παρασχεῖν ἢ καλῶς λεχθέντες λόγοι μετὰ
 2 ἀσθενοῦς στρατοπέδου. ὅπου γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
 Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν οἱ πρῶτοί
 ἐσμεν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ μετὰ τοιῶνδε καὶ τοσῶνδε
 ξυμμάχων πάντα τινὰ μεγάλῃν τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς
 νίκης ἔχειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεῖ
 τε ἀμυνομένους καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἡμᾶς, καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἳ ὑπερφρονοῦσι
 μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομενοῦσι δὲ οὐ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
 3 τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν. παραστήτω δέ τινα καὶ
 τόδε, πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ
 πρὸς γῇ οὐδεμιᾷ φιλίᾳ, ἥντινα μὴ αὐτοὶ μαχόμενοι
 κτήσεσθε. καὶ τοῦναντίον ὑπομιμνήσκω ὑμᾶς ἢ
 οἳ πολέμιοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι παρακελεύ-
 ονται· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν,
 ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ
 4 ραδίως ἀποχωρεῖν· οἳ γὰρ ἵππῆς πολλοὶ ἐπικεί-
 σονται. τῆς τε οὖν ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν ἀξίας μνη-

¹ τὸν αὐτὸν, Hude changes to τοιοῦτον.

but next to them some cavalry from the Geloans, about two hundred in all, and also from the Camarinaeans about twenty horsemen and fifty bowmen. Their cavalry, which was not less than twelve hundred in number, they placed on the right, and on its flank the javelin-men. As the Athenians were on the point of beginning the attack, Nicias went along the line and exhorted them, nation by nation as well as all together, in the following manner :

LXVIII. "What need is there, soldiers, of long exhortation, when we are all here for one and the same contest? Our array of itself seems to me more calculated to inspire confidence than well chosen words with a weak army. For where are Argives and Mantineans and Athenians and the best of the islanders, why should not everyone, in company with allies so brave and so numerous, have great hope of victory, especially against men that meet us in a mob and are not picked men as we ourselves are, and against Siceliots, moreover, who scorn us, indeed, but do not stand their ground against us, because the skill they have is not equal to their daring. This, too, must be fixed in the mind of everyone, that we are far from our own land and not near to any friendly country, unless you shall win such by your own swords. And my admonition is the opposite of the exhortation which, I am sure, the enemy is addressing to his troops; for they urge that the contest will be for fatherland, but I remind you that it will be, not in our fatherland, but where you either must win victory or may not easily get away; for their cavalry will be upon us in great numbers. Be mindful, therefore, of your own repu-

THUCYDIDES

σθέντες ἐπέλθετε τοῖς ἐναντίοις προθύμως καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἀπορίαν φοβερωτέραν ἡγησάμενοι τῶν πολεμίων.”

LXIX. Ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος ἐπῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον εὐθύς. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπροσδόκητοι μὲν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ ἦσαν ὥς ἤδη μαχούμενοι, καὶ τινες αὐτοῖς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως οὔσης καὶ ἀπεληλύθεσαν· οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς προσβοηθοῦντες δρόμῳ ὑστέριζον μὲν, ὥς δὲ ἕκαστός πη τοῖς πλείοσι προσμείξειε καθίσταντο. οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμία ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμη οὔτ' ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς ὅσον ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν· ὁμῶς δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφίσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προτέρους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τάχους ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀμύνασθαι
2 ἀναλαμβάνοντες τὰ ὅπλα εὐθύς ἀντεπῆσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκατέρων οἳ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφειδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπάς, οἷας εἰκὸς ψιλούς, ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν· ἔπειτα δὲ μάντις τε σφάγια προύφερων τὰ νομιζόμενα καὶ σαλπικταὶ ξύνοδον ἐπώτρυνον τοῖς ὀπλίταις, οἱ
3 δ' ἐχώρουν, Συρακόσιοι μὲν περὶ τε πατρίδος μαχούμενοι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστος τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ μέλλον ἐλευθερίας, τῶν δ' ἐναντίων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ τε τῆς ἀλλοτρίας οἰκείαν σχεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν μὴ βλάψαι ἡσώμενοι, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οἱ αὐτόνομοι

tation, and attack the enemy with spirit and with the thought that our present necessity and the straits in which we stand are more to be feared than our foes."

LXIX. After such an exhortation Nicias straightway led on his army; but the Syracusans were not expecting to fight at just that moment, and some of them, as the city was near them, had even gone home; and these, though they came running to the lines as fast as they could, were late, and had to fall in wherever each one happened to reach the main body. For they were not lacking in zeal nor in daring either in this battle or in those which followed; nay, in bravery they were not inferior to their enemies, so far as they had experience, but through their lack of experience in spite of themselves they failed to do justice to their good intentions. Nevertheless, though they did not expect the Athenians to be the first to attack, and though they were forced to defend themselves in haste, they took up their arms at once and went against them. And at first the stone-throwers and slingers and bowmen skirmished, driving each other back, first one side and then the other, as light-armed troops would be likely to do. Afterwards the soothsayers brought forward the customary sacrifices and trumpeters stirred the hoplites to the charge. So they advanced—the Syracusans, to fight for fatherland and every man for his own present safety and future freedom; on the other side the Athenians, to fight for an alien land in order to win it for their own and to save their own land from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and those of the allies that were independent, to help the Athenians in securing

ξυγκτήσασθαί τε ἐκείνοις ἐφ' ᾧ ἦλθον καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφίσι πατρίδα νικήσαντες πάλιν ἐπιδεῖν· τὸ δ' ὑπήκοον τῶν ξυμμάχων μέγιστον μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτίκα ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἣν μὴ κρατῶσι, τὸ πρόθυμον εἶχον, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ξυγκαταστρεψάμενον ῥᾶον αὐτοῖς ὑπακούσεται.

LXX. Γενομένης δ' ἐν χερσὶ τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ξυνέβη βροντάς τε ἅμα τινὰς γενέσθαι καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ ὕδωρ πολὺ, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένοις καὶ ἐλάχιστα πολέμῳ ὠμίληκύσι καὶ τοῦτο ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι τοῦ φόβου, τοῖς δ' ἐμπειροτέροις τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας πολὺ μείζω ἔκπληξιν μὴ
2 νικωμένους παρέχειν. ὡσαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων πρῶτον τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, παρερρήγνυτο ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν
3 Συρακοσίων καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστη. καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐδίωξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι (οἱ γὰρ ἰππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀήσσητοι εἶργον καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τοὺς ὀπλίτας αὐτῶν, εἴ τινας προδιώκοντας ἴδοιεν, ἀνέστελλον), ἐπακολουθή-
4 ῃσαιτες δὲ ἀθρόοι ὅσον ἀσφαλῶς εἶχε πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν καὶ τροπαῖον ἵστασαν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀθροισθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἐλωρίνην ὁδὸν καὶ ὥς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνταξάμενοι ἔς τε τὸ Ὀλυμ-

the objects for which they had come, and having won victory to see again their own fatherland; the subject-allies, above all zealous for their own immediate safety, for which there was no hope unless they conquered, then also with the secondary motive that having helped the Athenians to overthrow another power they might find the terms of their own subjection milder.

LXX. When they had come to close combat, they held out for a long time against one another; and there chanced to occur at the same time some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning and much rain, so that this too contributed to the fear of those who were fighting for the first time and were but little conversant with war, whereas to those who were more experienced¹ the storm seemed of course to be due merely to the season of the year, but the fact that their antagonists were not overcome caused them far greater alarm. When, however, the Argives had first driven back the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians had repulsed their own opponents, then the rest also of the Syracusan line began to break and was reduced to flight. But the Athenians did not pursue far; for the Syracusan cavalry, being numerous and undefeated, held them in check, and falling upon their hoplites, if they saw any ahead in pursuit, drove them back. They only followed up in a body as far as it was safe, and then drew back and set up a trophy. The Syracusans, on the other hand, collecting on the Elorine road and drawing up as well as possible under the circumstances, in spite of their defeat sent some of their

¹ i. e. the Athenians.

πιείουν ὁμως σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακὴν, δείσαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἃ ἦν αὐτόθι κινήσωσι, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπανεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

LXXI. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον, ξυγκομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς ἐαυτῶν νεκροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὰν ἐπιθέντες ἠϋλίσαντο αὐτοῦ. τῇ δ' ὑστεραία τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἀπέδοσαν ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς ἰεκρούς (ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων περὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους), τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τὰ ὅσῃ ἀνέλεξαν (ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὡς πεντήκοντα), καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκῦλα ἔχοντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κατάνην.

2 χεიმῶν τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτόθεν ποιεῖσθαι οὐπω ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἰππέας τε μεταπέμψωσιν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἀγείρωσιν, ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἱπποκρατῶνται, καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἅμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ' Ἀθηναίων ἔλθῃ, τῶν τε πόλεων τινὰς προσαγάγωνται, ἃς ἤλπιζον μετὰ τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον σφῶν ὑπακούσεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα, καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι, παρασκευάζονται, ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρήσοντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις.

LXXII. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Νάξον καὶ Κατάνην διαχειμάζοντες· Συρακόσιοι δὲ τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν νεκροὺς θάψαντες

2 ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν. καὶ παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἑρμωνος, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τὰλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρία τε ἰκανὸς γεγόμενος καὶ ἀνδρεία ἐπιφανής, ἐθάρ-

own men to the Olympieum as a guard, fearing that the Athenians might disturb some of the treasures which were there; and the rest withdrew to the city.

LXXI. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collecting their own dead and placing them on a pyre they passed the night where they were. But on the next day they gave back under truce the Syracusan dead, of whom and of their allies about two hundred and sixty were slain; then gathering up the bones of their own dead—of themselves and their allies about fifty—and taking with them the spoils of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana. For it was winter, and it seemed as yet impossible to carry on the war from this base until they should send to Athens for horsemen, besides collecting them from their allies in Sicily, that they might not be altogether at the mercy of the enemy's cavalry. And they wanted at the same time to collect money from the island itself, and to have a supply come from Athens; also to bring over some of the cities, which they hoped would be more ready to listen to them since the battle; and to prepare other things, both food and whatever was needed, with a view to attacking Syracuse the next spring.

LXXII. With this purpose they sailed away to Naxos and Catana to spend the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their own dead, called an assembly. And there came before them Hermocrates son of Hermon,¹ a man who was in general second to none in point of intelligence, and had shown himself in this war both competent by reason of experience and conspicuous for courage.

¹ cf. IV. lviii. ; VI. xxxiii.

THUCYDIDES

- σ *νέ* τε καὶ οὐκ εἶα τῷ γεγενημένῳ ἐνδιδόναι·
- 3 τὴν μὲν γὰρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσήσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψαι. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτόν γε λειφθῆναι ὅσον εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλως τε τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπειρία, ἰδιώτας ὥς εἰπεῖν χειρο-
- 4 τέχναις, ἀνταγωνισαμένους. μέγα δὲ βλάψαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ ¹ τὴν πολυαρχίαν (ἦσαν γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα οἱ στρατηγοὶ αὐτοῖς), τῶν τε πολλῶν τὴν ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχίαν. ἦν δὲ ὀλίγοι τε στρατηγοὶ γένωνται ἔμπειροι καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ παρασκευάσωσι τὸ ὀπλιτικόν, οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστιν ἐκπορίζοντες, ὅπως ὥς πλείστοι ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ μελέτῃ προσαναγκάζοντες, ἔφη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κρατήσῃ σφᾶς τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνδρείας μὲν σφίσιν ὑπαρχούσης, εὐταξίας δ' ἐς τὰ ἔργα προσγενομένης· ἐπιδώσειν γὰρ ἀμφότερα αὐτά, τὴν μὲν μετὰ κινδύνων μελετωμένην, τὴν δ' εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς
- 5 ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσεσθαι. τοὺς τε στρατηγούς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἐλέσθαι καὶ ὁμόσαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄρκιον ἢ μὴν εὔσειν ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐπίστωνται· οὕτω γὰρ ἅ τε κρύπτεσθαι δεῖ μᾶλλον ἂν στέγεσθαι καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ἀπροφασίστως παρασκευασθῆναι.

¹ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ deleted by van Heerwaarden, followed by Hude.

He encouraged them and protested against their giving way because of what had happened: their spirit, he told them, was not defeated; it was their lack of discipline that had done mischief. They had not, however, been so much inferior as might have been expected, especially as they had been pitted against troops who were the foremost among the Hellenes in experience, mere tiros so to speak against skilled craftsmen. Much mischief had also been caused by the large number of the generals and the division of command—for they had fifteen generals—and the disorder and anarchy among the troops. If only a few men of experience should be chosen as generals, and during this winter they should get the hoplite-force ready, providing arms for those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible, and enforcing the general training, in all likelihood, he said, they would get the better of the enemy, if to courage, which they had already, discipline were added when it came to action. For both these things would improve of themselves; their discipline would be practised in the midst of dangers, and their courage, in proportion as their confidence in their skill increased, would prove more self-reliant than ever. The generals, then, whom they should elect ought to be few in number and clothed with full powers and they should give them their oath that they would in very truth allow them to command according to their judgment; for in this way whatever ought to be kept secret would be better concealed, and their preparations in general would be made in an orderly way and without evasions.

LXXIII. Καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αὐτοῦ ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τε πάντα ὡς ἐκέλευε καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν τε εἴλοντο τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ Σικανὸν τὸν Ἐξηκέστου, 2 τούτους τρεῖς, καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ξυμμαχία τε αὐτοῖς παραγένηται καὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμον βεβαιότερον πείθωσι ποιεῖσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὑπὲρ σφῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἵνα ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπαγάγῳσιν αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στράτευμα ἦσσον ὠφελίαν ἄλλην ἐπιπέμπωσιν.

LXXIV. Τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ Κατάνῃ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπλευσεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ὡς προδοθησομένην. καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο· Ἀλκιβιάδης γὰρ ὅτ' ἀπῆει ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἤδη μετάπεμπτος, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι φεύξειτο, μηνύει τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ ξυνειδῶς τὸ μέλλον· οἱ δὲ τοὺς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντες ἐπεκρίτουν μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 2 οἱ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι. ἡμέρας δὲ μέιναντες περὶ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἐχειμάζοντο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκ εἶχον καὶ προυχώρει οὐδέν, ἀπελθόντες ἐς Νάξον καὶ ὄρια καὶ σταυρώματα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ποιησάμενοι αὐτοῦ διεχείμαζον· καὶ τριήρη ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ τε χρήματα καὶ ἰππέας, ὅπως ἅμα τῷ ἡρι παραγίνονται.

LXXV. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χεῖμῳι πρὸς τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς

LXXIII. The Syracusans, when they had heard him, voted everything as he advised, and chose three generals, Hermocrates himself, Heracleides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestus. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to induce an allied force to join them, and to persuade the Lacedaemonians to prosecute the war with the Athenians openly in their behalf and more persistently, in order that they might either draw them away from Sicily, or else to some extent prevent their sending reinforcements to their army in Sicily.

LXXIV. The Athenian army at Catana, directly after its return,¹ sailed to Messene, in the hope that it would be betrayed to them. But the negotiations were not successful. For as soon as Alcibiades left his command under summons from home, knowing that he would be an exile, he gave information of the plot, of which he was cognizant, to the friends of the Syracusans at Messene; these had previously put the conspirators to death, and at this time, when the Athenians arrived, those who were of this faction, being already in revolt and under arms, were strong enough to prevent their admission. So the Athenians stayed there about thirteen days, and as they were vexed by storms and without provisions and were making no progress at all, they retired to Naxos, and constructing dock-yards and building stockades round their camp, went into winter-quarters there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, that these might be on hand at the opening of spring.

LXXV. During this winter the Syracusans also proceeded to build a wall next to the city, along

¹ *cf.* ch. lxxii. 1.

THUCYDIDES

ποιησάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπι-
 πολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσορος εὐαποτείχιστοι
 ᾧσιν, ἣν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρού-
 ριον καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιεῖ ἄλλο· καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν
 2 προυσταύρωσαν πανταχῇ ἥ ἀποβάσεις ἦσαν. καὶ
 τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰδότες ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ χειμάζοντας
 ἐστράτευσαν παιδημεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν Κατάνην, καὶ τῆς
 τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων
 σκηναὺς καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσαντες ἀνεχώ-
 3 ρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου. καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναί-
 ους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος
 γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἴ πως προσ-
 αγάγοιντο αὐτούς, ἀντεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ αὐτοί·
 ἦσαν γὰρ ὑποπτοὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προ-
 θύμως σφίσι μῆτ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι
 ἃ ἔπεμψαν, ἐς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐκέτι βούλονται
 ἀμύνειν, ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εὖ
 πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προ-
 4 τέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες. ἀφικομένων οὖν ἐκ μὲν
 Συρακουσῶν Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἄλλων ἐς τὴν
 Καμάριναν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Εὐφύμου μεθ'
 ἐτέρων, ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ξυλλόγου γενομένου τῶν
 Καμαριναίων βουλόμενος προδιαβάλλειν τοὺς
 Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXVI. “Οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν
 Ἀθηναίων, ᾧ Καμαριναῖοι, μὴ αὐτὴν καταπλα-

the entire extent that faces Epipolae, taking in the Temenites precinct,¹ in order that, in case of a possible reverse, they might not be so easily shut in as if the circuit of the town were smaller; and they also put a garrison at Megara and another at the Olympieium, and fixed palisades on the sea-shore at all points where landings were possible. And knowing that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they went out with all their forces against Catana and ravaged some of its territory, then having set fire to the tents and the camp of the Athenians they returned home. Moreover, on learning that the Athenians had, in accordance with an alliance concluded with the Camarinaeans in the time of Laches,² sent envoys to these, in the hope that they might win them to their side, they themselves sent a counter-embassy; for they had suspicions that the Camarinaeans had not been zealous in sending such help as they had sent for the first battle, and might not wish to aid them in future, seeing that the Athenians had fared well in the fight, but might rather be induced, on the plea of their former friendship, to go over to the Athenians. Accordingly, when Hermocrates and others had arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and from the Athenians Euphemus and the rest, an assembly of the Camarinaeans was held and Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them against the Athenians, spoke as follows:

LXXVI. "We have come on this embassy, men of Camarina, not because we feared that you will be

¹ The temple of Apollo Temenites and the suburb which had grown up about it, the later Neapolis.

² 427 B.C.; cf. III. LXXXVI. 2.

THUCYDIDES

γῆτε δείσαντες ἐπρεσβευσάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀπ' αὐτῶν λόγους, πρὶν τι καὶ
 2 ἡμῶν ἀκοῦσαι, μὴ ὑμᾶς πείσωσιν. ἤκουσι γὰρ
 εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ἢ πυνθάνεσθε,
 διανοία δὲ ἦν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν· καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν
 οὐ Λεοντίους βούλεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς
 μᾶλλον ἐξοικίσαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εὖλογον τὰς μὲν
 ἐκεῖ πόλεις ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἐνθάδε
 κατοικίζειν, καὶ Λεοντίνων μὲν Χαλκιδέων ὄντων
 κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς κήδεσθαι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ τοὺς
 ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ὧν οἶδε ἄποικοί εἰσι, δουλωσαμένους
 3 ἔχειν. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκείνᾳ τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ
 ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται· ἡγεμόνες γὰρ γενόμενοι
 ἐκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ σφῶν ἦσαν
 ξύμμαχοι ὥς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία, τοὺς μὲν
 λιποστρατίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν,
 τοῖς δ' ὥς ἐκάστοις τινὰ εἶχον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπῇ
 4 ἐπενεγκόντες κατεστρέψαντο. καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς
 ἐλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὔτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ' οἱ
 Ἕλληνες τῆς ἑαυτῶν τῷ Μήδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ
 δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως,
 οἱ δ' ἐπὶ δεσπότου μεταβολῇ οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου,
 κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ.

LXXVII. “Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων
 εὐκατηγόρητον οὔσαν πόλιν νῦν ἤκομεν ἀποφα-

dismayed by the presence of the Athenian force, but rather through fear of the words that are going to be said on their part, lest these persuade you before you hear anything from us. For they are come to Sicily on the pretext that you hear, but with the design that we all suspect; and to me they seem to wish, not to resettle the Leontines, but rather to unsettle us. For surely it is not reasonable to suppose that, while desolating the cities in their own country, they are resettling the cities of Sicily, and that they care for the Leontines, on the score of kinship, as being Chalcidians, while holding in slavery the Chalcidians in Euboea, of whom these are colonists. Nay, one and the same design has guided them in acquiring their possessions over there and is now guiding them in their endeavour to acquire possessions here: after they had become leaders, by the free choice of their associates, both of the Ionians and of all those, descendants of the Ionians, who were members of the alliance that was concluded, avowedly, for revenge upon the Persians, they charged some with refusal to serve, others with warring upon one another, others with whatever specious charge they had at hand, and so reduced them to subjection. And so, after all, it was not for 'freedom' that they withstood the Persians, neither the Athenians to win it for the Hellenes nor the Hellenes to win it for themselves, but they fought for the enslavement of the rest to themselves, and the Hellenes for a change of master, not to one more unwise, but more wickedly wise.

LXXVII. "But we are not come now, easy though it be to denounce the Athenian state, to declare before those who know already how many are its mis-

THUCYDIDES

ροῦντες ἐν εἰδόσιν ὅσα ἀδικεῖ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς
 αὐτοὺς αἰτιασόμενοι ὅτι ἔχοντες παραδείγματα
 τῶν τ' ἐκεῖ Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐδουλώθησαν, οὐκ ἀμύ-
 νοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ νῦν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ταῦτα
 παρόντα σοφίσματα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενῶν
 κατοικίσεις καὶ Ἑγεσταίων ξυμμάχων ἐπικουρίας,
 οὐ ξυστραφέντες βουλόμεθα προθυμότερον δεῖξαι
 αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐκ Ἴωνες τάδε εἰσὶν οὐδ' Ἑλλησπόν-
 τιοι καὶ νησιῶται, οἳ δεσπότην ἢ Μῆδον ἢ ἓνα
 γέ τινα αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντες δουλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ
 Δωριῆς, ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ' αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοπον-
 2 ἰήσου τὴν Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. ἢ μένομεν ἕως ἂν
 ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν, εἰδότες ὅτι ταύτη
 μόνον ἀλωτοί ἐσμεν καὶ ὀρώντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο
 τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε τοὺς μὲν λόγοις ἡμῶν
 διστάναι, τοὺς δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλπίδι ἐκπολεμοῦν
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἐκάστοις τι προσηνὲς
 λέγοντες δύνανται κακουργεῖν; καὶ οἰόμεθα τοῦ
 ἄπωθεν ξυνοίκου προαπολλυμένου οὐ καὶ ἐς αὐτόν
 τινα ἥξειν τὸ δεινόν, πρὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν
 πᾶσχοντα καθ' ἑαυτὸν δυστυχεῖν;

LXXVIII. “Καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄρα παρέστηκεν τὸν μὲν
 Συρακούσιον, ἑαυτὸν δ' οὐ πολέμιον εἶναι τῷ Ἀθη-
 ναίῳ, καὶ δεινὸν ἡγεῖται ὑπέρ γε τῆς ἐμῆς κινδυ-
 νεύειν, ἐνθυμηθήτω οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς μᾶλλον, ἐν
 ἴσῳ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ μαχοόμενος,
 τοσοῦτῳ δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ὅσῳ οὐ προδιεφθαρ-

deeds ; but much more to blame ourselves, because, though we have warning examples in the way that the Hellenes over there have been enslaved because they would not defend one another, and though the same sophisms are now practised upon us—restorings of Leontine kinsmen and succourings of Egestæan allies!—we are unwilling to combine together and with more spirit show them that here are not Ionians nor yet Hellespontines and islanders, who are always taking some new master, Persian or whoever it may be, and continue in a state of slavery, but Dorians, free men sprung from independent Peloponnesus, and now dwelling in Sicily. Or are we waiting until we shall be taken one at a time, city by city, when we know that in this way only can we be conquered, and when we see them resorting to this policy, endeavouring to cause division among some of us by means of cunning words, to set others at war one with another by the hope of obtaining allies, and to ruin others in whatever way they can by saying something alluring to each ? And do we think that, when a distant compatriot perishes before us, the same danger will not come also to ourselves, but rather that whoever before us meets with disaster merely incurs misfortune by himself alone ?

LXXVIII. “And if the thought has occurred to anyone that it is the Syracusans, not himself, who are enemies to the Athenians, and thinks it preposterous that he should incur danger for our country, let him reflect that it will not be chiefly for our country, but equally for his own at the same time that he will fight in our land, and with the greater safety, too, inasmuch as he will enter the contest, not when we have already been ruined,

μένου ἐμοῦ, ἔχων δὲ ξύμμαχον ἐμὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐρήμος¹
 ἀγωνιεῖται, τὸν τε Ἀθηναῖον μὴ τὴν τοῦ Συρα-
 κοσίου ἔχθραν κολάσασθαι, τῇ δ' ἐμῇ προφάσει
 τὴν ἐκείνου φιλίαν οὐχ ἡσσον βεβαιώσασθαι
 2 βούλεσθαι. εἴ τέ τις φθονεῖ μὲν ἢ καὶ φοβεῖται
 (ἀμφότερα γὰρ τάδε πάσχει τὰ μείζω), διὰ δὲ
 αὐτὰ τὰς Συρακούσας κακωθῆναι μὲν, ἵνα σωφρο-
 νισθῶμεν, βούλεται, περιγενέσθαι δὲ ἔνεκα τῆς
 αὐτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως βού-
 λησιν ἐλπίζει. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυ-
 μίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν
 3 γενέσθαι. καὶ εἰ γνώμη ἀμάρτοι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ
 κακοῖς ὀλοφυρθεῖς τάχ' ἂν ἴσως καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς
 ἀγαθοῖς ποτε βουλευθείη αὐτὸς φθονῆσαι. ἀδύ-
 νατον δὲ προεμένῳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους,
 οὐ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων,
 ἐβελήσαντι προσλαβεῖν· λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡμε-
 τέραν δύναμιν σωζοι ἂν τις, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 4 σωτηρίαν. καὶ μάλιστα εἰκὸς ἦν ὑμᾶς, ὧ Καμα-
 ριναῖοι, ὁμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύ-
 σοντας, προορᾶσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μαλακῶς ὥσπερ
 νῦν ξυμμαχεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον
 ἰόντας, ἅπερ, εἰ ἐς τὴν Καμαριναίαν πρῶτον
 ἀφίκοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεόμενοι ἂν ἐπεκαλεῖσθε,
 ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ νῦν παρακελευομένους,
 ὅπως μηδὲν ἐνδώσομεν, φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐθ'
 ὑμεῖς νῦν γέ πω οὐθ' οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὥρμησθε.
 LXXIX. “Δειλία δὲ ἴσως τὸ δίκαιον πρὸς τε
 ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιόντας θεραπεύσετε, λέγοντες

¹ ἐρήμος, the reading of some inferior MSS., seems to be rightly preferred by Bekker, Stahl, and Hude to ἐρήμον of all the better MSS.

and not isolated himself, but having us as allies; and that the object of the Athenians is not to punish the enmity of the Syracusans, but having us as a pretext to make your 'friendship' still more secure. If, moreover, anyone is envious, or even afraid of us—for greater states are exposed to both these passions—and for this reason wishes that the Syracusans shall be humbled, indeed, in order that we may be sobered, but shall survive for the sake of his own safety, he indulges a wish that is not within human power to attain. For it is not possible for the same person to be in like measure the controller of his own desires and of Fortune; and if he should err in judgment, when he has to lament his own ills he may perhaps some day wish once more to become envious of our good fortune. But that will be impossible, if he abandons us and does not consent to incur the same dangers, which are not about names but about facts; for though nominally a man would be preserving our power, in fact he would be securing his own safety. And most of all it were fitting that you, men of Camarina, who are on our borders and will incur danger next, should have foreseen these things and not be, as now, slack in your alliance, but rather should have come to us of yourselves, and just as you, in case the Athenians had come against Camarina first, would be calling upon us and begging us not to yield an inch, so should you be seen in like manner now also using the same exhortation. But neither you, so far at least, nor the rest have bestirred yourselves for this.

LXXIX. "But through timidity, perhaps, you will make much of the point of right as between us and

ξυμμαχίαν εἶναι ὑμῖν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους· ἦν γε οὐκ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἦν τις
 ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἱη, καὶ τοῖς γε Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν, ὅταν
 ὑπ' ἄλλων, καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς πέλας
 ἀδικῶσιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι ὄντες Χαλκιδῆς
 Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Λεοντίους ἐθέλουσι ξυγκατοικί-
 2 ζειν. καὶ δεινὸν εἰ ἐκείνοι μὲν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ καλοῦ
 δικαίωματος ὑποπτεύοντες ἀλόγως σωφρονοῦσιν,
 ὑμεῖς δ' εὐλόγῳ προφάσει τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολε-
 μίους βούλεσθε ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον φύσει
 3 ξυγγενεῖς μετὰ τῶν ἐχθίστων διαφθεῖραι. ἀλλ'
 οὐ δίκαιον, ἀμύνειν δὲ καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν
 παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν· οὐ γάρ, ἦν ἡμεῖς ξυστῶμεν
 πάντες, δεινὴ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἦν, ὅπερ οὔτοι σπεύ-
 δουσι, τὰναντία διαστῶμεν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 μόνους ἐλθόντες καὶ μάχῃ περιγενόμενοι ἔπραξαν
 ἃ ἐβούλοντο, ἀπήλθον δὲ διὰ τάχους.

LXXX. “Ὡστε οὐχ ἀθρόους γε ὄντας εἰκὸς
 ἀθυμεῖν, ἰέναι δὲ εἰς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου παρεσομένης
 ὠφελίας, οἱ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ
 πολέμια· καὶ μὴ ἐκείνην τὴν προμηθίαν δοκεῖν
 τῷ ἡμῖν μὲν ἴσην εἶναι, ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλῇ, τὸ
 μηδετέροις εἰ ὥς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους
 2 βοηθεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἔργῳ ἴσον ὥσπερ τῷ δικαίωματί

¹ ἀδικῶνται is to be understood. For similar ellipses, cf.
 I. LXXVIII. 10; II. XL. 34; VII. LXXI. 3.

the invaders, alleging that you have an alliance with the Athenians. That alliance, however, you made, not against your friends, but in the event of any of your enemies attacking you; and you were to aid the Athenians only when they were wronged¹ by others, and not when, as now, they are themselves wronging their neighbours. Why, not even the Rhegians, themselves Chalcidians, are willing to help to restore the Leontines who are Chalcidians. And it is monstrous if they, suspicious of what this fine plea of right really means in practice, are unreasonably prudent,² while you, on a speciously reasonable pretext, desire to aid those who by nature are your enemies, and in concert with your bitterest foes to ruin those who by a still closer tie of nature are your kinsmen.³ Nay, that is not right; but it is right to aid us and not be afraid of their armament. For if we all stand together, it is not formidable. The only danger is—and this is just what they are eager for—that we may stand opposed to each other; for not even when they came against us alone and proved superior in battle did they effect what they wished, but quickly went away.

LXXX. "So then, if only we be united, we have reason not to be disheartened, but rather to enter into the proposed alliance more heartily, especially as aid is sure to come from the Peloponnesians, who are altogether superior to these people in matters of war. And no one should regard as fair to us, while safe for you, that prudent course of yours—to aid neither, forsooth, as being allies of both. Indeed it is not as fair in fact, as when urged to justify

² *i.e.* discard logic and obey policy.

³ As Dorians and Sicilians.

ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ δι' ὑμᾶς μὴ ξυμμαχήσαντας ὃ τε παθὼν σφαλῆσεται καὶ ὁ κρατῶν περιέσται, τί ἄλλο ἢ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἡμύνατε σωθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύσατε κακοὺς γενέσθαι; καίτοι κάλλιον τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ ἅμα ξυγγενέσι προσθεμένους τὴν τε κοινὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ Σικελίᾳ φυλάξαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας μὴ ἐᾶσαι ἀμαρτεῖν.

- 3 “Ἐυνελόντες τε λέγομεν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκδιδάσκειν μὲν οὐδὲν ἔργον εἶναι σαφῶς οὔτε ὑμᾶς οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν χεῖρον γιγνώσκετε· δεόμεθα δὲ καὶ μαρτυρόμεθα ἅμα, εἰ μὴ πείσομεν, ὅτι ἐπιβουλευόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ Ἰώνων αἰεὶ πολεμίῳ, προδιδόμεθα δὲ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Δωριῆς
4 Δωριῶν. καὶ εἰ καταστρέφονται ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῖς μὲν ὑμετέραις γνώμαις κρατήσουσι, τῷ δ' αὐτῶν ὀνόματι τιμηθήσονται, καὶ τῆς νίκης οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ ἄθλον ἢ τὸν τὴν ἰίκην παρασχόντα λήψονται· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἡμεῖς περιεσόμεθα, τῆς αἰτίας τῶν κινδύνων οἱ αὐτοὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὑφέ-
5 ξετε. σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ αἰρεῖσθε ἥδη ἢ τὴν αὐτίκα ἀκινδύνως δουλείαν ἢ καὶ περιγενόμενοι μεθ' ἡμῶν τούσδε τε μὴ αἰσχροῦς δεσπότας λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχθραν μὴ ἂν βραχεῖαν γενομένην διαφυγεῖν.”

LXXXI. Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης εἶπεν, ὁ

BOOK VI. LXXX. 2—LXXXI.

you.¹ For if through your failure to take sides as allies the sufferer shall be defeated and the conqueror shall prevail, what else have you done by this selfsame standing aloof but refused to aid the one to secure his salvation and to prevent the other from incurring guilt? And yet it were more honourable for you, by siding with those who are being wronged² and are at the same time your kinsmen, at once to guard the common interest of Sicily and not suffer the Athenians, seeing that they are your 'good friends,' to make a serious mistake.

"Summing up, then, we Syracusans say that it is no hard matter to demonstrate, either to you or to others, what you yourselves know as well as we; but we do entreat you, and at the same time we protest, if we fail to persuade you, that while we are plotted against by Ionians,³ our inveterate enemies, we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if the Athenians shall subdue us, it is by your decisions that they will prevail, but it is in their own name that they will be honoured, and the prize of victory they will take will be none other than those who procured them the victory; if, on the other hand, we shall conquer, you also will have to pay the penalty of being the cause of our perils. Reflect, therefore, and choose here and now, either immediate slavery with no danger or, if you join us and prevail, the chance of not having to take, with disgrace, these men as masters, and also, as regards us, of escaping an enmity that would not be transitory."

LXXXI. Such was the speech of Hermocrates;

¹ Or, "as the plea of right represents it."

² The Syracusans. ³ The Athenians.

δ' Εὐφημος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρεσβευτῆς μετ' αὐτὸν τοιάδε.

LXXXII. “Ἀφικόμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς πρότερον οὔσης ξυμμαχίας ἀναιεώσει, τοῦ δὲ Συρακοσίου καθαψαμένου ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπεῖν
 2 ὥς εἰκότως ἔχομεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον μαρτύριον αὐτὸς εἶπεν, ὅτι οἱ Ἴωνες αἰεὶ ποτε πολέμιοι τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν εἰσιν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὕτως. ἡμεῖς γὰρ Ἴωνες ὄντες Πελοποννησίοις Δωριεῦσι, καὶ πλείοσιν οὔσι καὶ παροικούσιν, ἐσκεψάμεθα ὅτῳ
 3 τρόπῳ ἥκιστα¹ ὑπακουσόμεθα· καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ ταῦς κτησάμενοι τῆς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὐδὲν προσήκον μᾶλλον τι ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἢ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνοις ἐπιτάσσειν, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι μεῖζον ἴσχυον, αὐτοῖς² δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ πρότερον ὄντων ἡγεμόνες καταστάντες οἰκοῦμεν, νομίσαντες ἥκιστ' ἂν ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίοις οὕτως εἶναι, δύναμιν ἔχοντες ἣ ἀμυνούμεθα, καὶ ὥς τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ ἀδίκως καταστρεψάμενοι τοὺς τε Ἴωνας καὶ νησιώτας, οὓς ξυγγενεῖς φασιν ὄντας ἡμᾶς Συρα-
 4 κῶσιοι δεδουλῶσθαι. ἦλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρόπολιν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν ἀπυστάντες τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν, δουλείαν δὲ αὐτοῖς τε ἐβούλοντο καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπενεγκεῖν.

¹ αὐτῶν, in MSS. before ἥκιστα, deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude

² αὐτοί, Hude emends to αὐτόνομοι.

after him Euphemus, the envoy of the Athenians, spoke as follows :—

LXXXII. "We had come here for the renewal of the alliance¹ which formerly existed, but as the Syracusan has attacked us it is necessary to speak also about our empire, showing how rightly we hold it. Now the strongest proof of this the speaker himself stated—that Ionians have always been enemies to the Dorians. It is even so. Accordingly, we, being Ionians, considered in what way we should be least subject to the Peloponnesians who are Dorians and not only more numerous than we but our near neighbours.² And after the Persian wars we acquired a fleet and rid ourselves of the rule and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, it being not in any way more fitting that they give orders to us than we to them, except in so far as they at the time were stronger. Having, then, ourselves become leaders of those who were before subject to the King, we so continue, thinking that we should in this way be least subject to the Peloponnesians, because we have power with which to defend ourselves. And to say the exact truth, not unjustly, either, did we subdue both the Ionians and the islanders, whom the Syracusans say we have enslaved though they are our kinsmen. For they came against us, their mother-city, along with the Persians, and had not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city, but chose slavery for themselves and wished to impose the same condition upon us.

¹ *cf.* ch. lxxv. 3.

² Or, retaining ἀντὶν, "For we, being Ionians in the eyes of Peloponnesians who are Dorians, not only more numerous than we but also our near neighbours, considered in what way we should be least subject to them"

LXXXIII. “*Ἄνθ' ὧν ἄξιοί τε ὄντες ἅμα ἄρχομεν, ὅτι τε ναυτικὸν πλείστον τε καὶ προθυμίαν ἀπροφάσιστον παρεσχόμεθα ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ διότι καὶ τῷ Μήδῃ ἐτοίμως τοῦτο δρῶντες οὗτοι ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἅμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους*
2 ἰσχύος ὀρεγόμενοι. καὶ οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα ὥς ἡ τὸν βάρβαρον μόνοι καθελόντες εἰκότως ἄρχομεν ἢ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ τῇ τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ξυμπάντων τε καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες. πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσφαλείας ἔνεκα καὶ ἐνθάδε παρόντες ὀρώμεν καὶ ὑμῖν ταῦτᾳ
3 ξυμφέροντα· ἀποφαίνομεν δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἶδε τε διαβάλλουσι καὶ ὑμεῖς μάλιστα ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερώτερον ὑπονοεῖτε, εἰδότες τοὺς περιδεῶς ὑποπτεύοντάς τι λόγου μὲν ἡδονῇ τὸ παραυτίκα τερπομένους, τῇ δ' ἐγχειρήσει ὕστερον τὰ ξυμφέροντα πράσσοντας.
4 τὴν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι, καὶ οὐ δουλωσόμενοι, μὴ παθεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο κωλύσοντες.

LXXXIV. “*Ὑπολάβῃ ἐξ μηδεὶς ὥς οὐδὲν προσήκον ὑμῶν κηδόμεθα, γνοὺς ὅτι σφζομένων ὑμῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὑμᾶς ὄντας ἀντέχειν Συρακοσίοις ἦσσαν ἂν τούτων πεμψάντων τινὰ δύναμιν Πελοποννησίοις ἡμεῖς βλαπτοίμεθα. καὶ*
2 ἐν τούτῳ προσήκετε ἤδη ἡμῖν τὰ μέγιστα. δι'

LXXXIII. "We have dominion, therefore, both because we are worthy of it—seeing that we furnished the largest fleet and unhesitating zeal toward the Hellenes, and that they, readily taking the course they did in the interest of the Persians, were doing us harm—and at the same time because we aimed at strength with which to resist the Peloponnesians. And we do not say in fine phrases that we deserve to rule either because we alone overthrew the Barbarian or because we incurred danger for the liberty of these men more than for that of all the Hellenes, including our own. But no one can be reproached because he makes provision for his proper safety. And now when for the sake of our own security we have come here also, we see that your interests also are the same as ours. And this we prove to you both from these men's calumnies and from those suspicions of yours which most tend to undue alarm, because we know that those who are suspicious through excessive fear may indeed take delight for the moment in seductive speech, but afterwards when it comes to action consult their own interests. For just as we have said that we hold our dominion over there because of fear, so we say that for the same reason we have come here with the help of our friends to place your affairs on a footing of safety for us, and not to enslave you, but rather to prevent your being enslaved.

LXXXIV. "And let no one object that we are solicitous for you when it does not concern us; let him reflect that, if you are preserved and by not being weak are able to offer resistance to the Syracusans, we should be less liable to injury through their sending a force to aid the Peloponnesians. And herein you become at once our chief concern

ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς Λεοντίνους εὖλογον κατοικίζειν, μὴ
 ὑπηκόους ὥσπερ τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν
 Εὐβοίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνατωτάτους, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς σφε-
 τέρας ὁμοροὶ ὄντες τοῖσδε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ
 3 ὦσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρκοῦμεν πρὸς
 τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃν ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς
 φησι δουλωσαμένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἐλευθεροῦν,
 ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὢν καὶ χρήματα
 μόνον φέρων, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ
 οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.

LXXXV. “Ἄνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν
 ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅ τι ξυμφέρων οὐδ' οἰκεῖον
 ὅ τι μὴ πιστόν· πρὸς ἕκαστα δὲ δεῖ ἢ ἐχθρὸν ἢ
 φίλον μετὰ καιροῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο
 ὠφελεῖ ἐνθάδε, οὐκ ἦν τοὺς φίλους κακώσωμεν,
 ἀλλ' ἦν οἱ ἐχθροὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν φίλων ῥώμην
 2 ἀδύνατοι ὦσιν. ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ χρή· καὶ γὰρ
 τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους ὡς ἕκαστοι χρήσιμοι ἐξηγού-
 μεθα, Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ
 αὐτονόμους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς χρημάτων βιαιό-
 τερον φορᾶ, ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάντῃ ἐλευθέρως ξυμ-
 μαχοῦντας, καίπερ νησιώτας ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους,
 διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελο-
 3 πόνησον. ὥστε καὶ τὰνθαδὲ εἰκὸς πρὸς τὸ
 λυσιτελοῦν καί, ὃ λέγομεν, ἐς Συρακοσίους δέος
 καθίστασθαι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἐφίενται ὑμῶν καὶ

For this very cause, too, it is reasonable that we should restore the Leontines, so that they shall not be subjects like their kinsmen in Euboea, but shall be as powerful as possible, in order that, bordering as they do on the Syracusans, they may from their own territory be troublesome to these in our behalf. For as to matters in Hellas, we by ourselves are a match for our enemies, and in regard to the Chalcidians, whom he says we are inconsistent in freeing here after enslaving them at home, it is to our interest that they should possess no armament and should contribute money only; but as to matters here, it is to our interest that both the Leontines and our other friends should enjoy the fullest measure of independence.

LXXXV. "To an autocrat or an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is to its interest, nor is anyone a kinsman who cannot be trusted; in every case one must be enemy or friend according to circumstances. And in Sicily it is to our advantage, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our enemies should be powerless because of the strength of our friends. And you must not mistrust us; for we lead our allies in Hellas as they are each useful to us: the Chians and Methymnaeans as independent, on the condition of furnishing ships; the majority on more compulsory terms, with payment of tribute in money; others, though islanders and easy to be reduced, on terms of absolute freedom as our allies, because they occupy strategic positions along the coast of the Peloponnese. So that it is natural that matters here also should be ordered with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they aim at

βούλονται ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ, βία ἢ καὶ κατ' ἐρημίαν, ἀπράκτων ἡμῶν ἀπελθόντων, αὐτοὶ ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. ἀνάγκη δέ, ἣν ξυστήτε πρὸς αὐτούς· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἔσται ἰσχύς τοσαύτη ἐς ἐν ξυστᾶσα εὐμεταχείριστος, οὔθ' οἷδ' ἀσθενεῖς ἂν ἡμῶν μὴ παρόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶεν.

- LXXXVI. "Καὶ ὅτῳ ταῦτα μὴ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον ἐλέγχει. τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγάγεσθε οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον ἢ, εἰ περιοψόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις γενέ-
 2 σθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν. καὶ νῦν οὐ δίκαιον, ὥπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἤξιούτε λόγῳ πείθειν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπιστεῖν, οὔδ' ὅτι δυνάμει μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶνδε ἰσχὺν πάρεσμεν ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πολὺ
 3 δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖσδε ἀπιστεῖν. ἡμεῖς μὲν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ' ὑμῶν, εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορία φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ ἡπειρωτίδων· οἶδε δὲ οὐ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας ἐποικοῦντες ὑμῖν αἰεὶ τε ἐπιβουλεύουσι καί, ὅταν καιρὸν λάβωσιν ἐκάστου, οὐκ ἀνιᾶσιν (ἔδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἐς Λεοντίνους),
 4 καὶ νῦν τολμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ταῦτα κωλύοντας καὶ

¹ In 427 B.C., when Camarina stood with the Leontines and other Chalcidians against Syracuse; cf. III. lxxxvi. 2.

² i.e. with infantry and cavalry, our forces being purely naval.

dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you with themselves on the ground of your suspicion of us, then by force, or because of your isolation when we shall have gone away unsuccessful, themselves to rule Sicily. And that is sure to happen if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, if once combined, be any longer easy for us to handle, nor would the Syracusans lack strength to deal with you if we should not be present.

LXXXVI. "And if there be anyone who does not accept this view, that which has taken place will itself prove his error. For you brought us over before,¹ flaunting in our faces no other terror but this, that we ourselves should be in danger if we should permit you to come under the power of the Syracusans. And it is not right for you now to distrust the very argument by which you thought it right to persuade us then, nor to be suspicious because we are present with a force out of all proportion to the strength of the Syracusans; far more should you distrust them. We certainly are not able to maintain ourselves in Sicily without you; and even if we should prove false and subdue Sicily, we should be unable to hold it on account of the length of the voyage and the difficulty of guarding cities that are as large and well equipped as continental cities²; whereas these Syracusans, in hostile proximity to you, not with a mere army in the field, but a city greater than our present force, are always plotting against you, and whenever they get an opportunity against you singly, do not let it slip, as they have shown several times already and especially in their dealings with the Leontines; and now they make bold to urge you to oppose those who seek to

ἀνεχοντας τὴν Σικελίαν μέχρι τοῦδε μὴ ὑπ'
αὐτοὺς εἶναι παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς ὥς ἀναισθήτους.
5 πολὺ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀληθεστέραν γε σωτηρίαν ἡμεῖς
ἀντιπαρακαλοῦμεν, δεόμενοι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπ'
ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέροις μὴ προδιδόναι, νομίσαι τε¹
τοῖσδε μὲν καὶ ἄνευ ξυμμάχων αἰεὶ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς
εἰσέμνην διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι ὁδόν, ὑμῖν δ' οὐ
πολλάκις παρασχέσειν μετὰ τοσῆσδε ἐπικουρίας
ἀμύνασθαι· ἦν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἢ ἄπρακτον ἐάσετε
ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ
πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι πε-
ρανεῖ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.

LXXXVII. “Ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι,
ταῖς τῶνδε διαβολαῖς ἀναπείθεσθε μήτε οἱ ἄλλοι·
εἰρήκαμεν δ' ὑμῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὧν
ὑποπτευόμεθα, καὶ ἔτι ἐν κεφαλαίοις ὑπομνή-
2 σαντες ἀξιόσομεν πείθειν. φαμέν γὰρ ἄρχειν μὲν
τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὑπακούωμεν ἄλλου, ἐλευθεροῦν
δε τὰ ἐνθάδε, ὅπως μὴ ὑπ' αὐτῶν βλαπτώμεθα,
πολλὰ δ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι πράσσειν, διότι καὶ πολλὰ
φυλασσύμεθα, ξύμμαχοι δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ πρότερον
τοῖς ἐνθάδε ὑμῶν ἀδικουμένοις οὐκ ἄκλητοι, παρα-
3 κληθέντες δὲ ἤκειν. καὶ ὑμεῖς μὴθ' ὥς δικασταὶ
γενόμενοι τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων μὴθ' ὥς σωφρο-

¹ τε, Hude reads δέ with M.

¹ πολλὰ πράσσειν, as well as πολυπραγμοσύνη below, is used in a good sense, characterizing the policy of the Athenians at their acme, as described by Pericles in the funeral oration, ii. 40, 41.

prevent these things and who up to this time have kept Sicily from being under their dominion, as though you were without sense. But it is to a safety far more real that we in our turn invite you, begging you not to throw away that safety which we both derive from one another; and to consider that for them, even without allies, the way is always open against you because of their numbers, whereas for you the opportunity will not often present itself to defend yourselves with the help of so great an auxiliary force. But if through your suspicions you suffer this force to depart with its object unaccomplished, or, worse still, defeated, you will hereafter wish that you could see even the merest fraction of it when its presence will no longer avail you aught.

LXXXVII. "Nay, be not moved, men of Camarina, either you or the other peoples of Sicily, by the calumnies of these men. We have told you the whole truth concerning the matters of which we are suspected, and now again briefly recalling to your minds the chief points of our argument, we fully expect to convince you. We say, namely, that we hold sway over the cities in Hellas in order that we may not have to obey some other power, but that we are trying to free those here, in order that we may not be injured by them. We are obliged to be active in many matters,¹ because we have many dangers to guard against; and we come as allies, now as before, to those of you here who are wronged, not uninvited, but by your express invitation. And do not you, by constituting yourselves either judges of our conduct or by tutoring us in moderation²—a hard task at

² σωφρονισταί as in III. lxxv 3; VIII. xlvii 6; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 471 a εὐμενῶς σωφρονισθῆσιν. οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ κολλάζοντες, οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλεθρῷ, σωφρονιστὰι ὄντες, οὐ πολέμιοι.

νισταί, ὃ χαλεπὸν ἤδη, ἀποτρέπειν πειρᾶσθε, καθ' ὅσον δέ τι ὑμῖν τῆς ἡμετέρας πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ τρόπου τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμφέρει, τούτῳ ἀπολαβόντες χρήσασθε, καὶ νομίσατε μὴ πάντας ἐν ἴσῳ βλάπτειν αὐτά, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὠφελεῖν. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πᾶς χωρίῳ, κὰν ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχομεν, ὃ τε οἰόμενος ἀδικήσεσθαι καὶ ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων διὰ τὸ ἐτοίμην¹ ὑπεῖναι ἐλπίδα τῷ μὲν ἀντιτυχεῖν ἐπικουρίας ἀφ' ἡμῶν, τῷ δέ, εἰ ἤξομεν, μὴ ἀδεεῖ εἶναι κινδυνεύειν, ἀμφότεροι ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ' ἀπραγ-
 5 μόνως σφύζεσθαι. ταύτην οὖν τὴν κοινὴν τῷ τε δεομένῳ καὶ ὑμῖν νῦν παροῦσαν ἀσφάλειαν μὴ ἀπώσῃσθε, ἀλλ' ἐξισώσαντες τοῖς ἄλλοις μεθ' ἡμῶν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεύσαί ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλάβετε."

LXXXVIII. Τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Εὐφῆμος εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Καμαριναῖοι ἐπεπόνθεσαν τοιούδε. τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις εὖνοι ἦσαν, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον² τὴν Σικελίαν ὥντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ ὁμορον διάφοροι· δεδιότες δ' οὐχ ἦσσαν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐγγὺς ὄντας μὴ καὶ ἄνευ σφῶν περιγένωνται, τό τε πρῶτον αὐτοῖς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἱππέας ἔπεμψαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ὑπουργεῖν μὲν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις

¹ διὰ τὸ ἐτοίμην ὑπεῖναι ἐλπίδα . . . σφύζεσθαι, the text is probably corrupt. Hude follows van Herwerden in reading ἀν[τι]τυχεῖν, and, with Kruger, emends ἀδεεῖς of the MSS. to ἀδεεῖ, and deletes κινδυνεύειν. Steup, as also Stahl, adopts Reiske's conjecture ἀδεεῖς and deletes κινδυνεύειν.

² εἰ, after κατ' ὅσον in MSS., deleted by Reiske, followed by Kruger.

this late day!—make any attempt to divert us, but in so far as anything in our busy activity and our character is at the same time to your interest, take this and make use of it; and think, not that these qualities of ours are hurtful alike to all, but that they are even profitable to far the greater part of the Hellenes. For everyone in every place, even where we are not already present, both he that thinks he will suffer wrong, and he that plots to do wrong—on account of the certain prospect that is ever present in their minds, in the one case that he will obtain succour from us in return for his allegiance, in the other that, if we shall come, he will run the risk of not escaping unscathed for his wrongdoings—are both alike under constraint, the latter to be moderate however unwilling, the former to be saved without effort of his own. This common safety, then, which is now offered to anyone who may ask for it as well as to you, reject not; but availing yourselves of it as others do, join forces with us and instead of having always to be on your guard against the Syracusans, change your course and at length plot against them even as they have plotted against you.”

LXXXVIII. Thus Euphemus spoke. But what the Camarinaeans had felt was this: They were well disposed to the Athenians, except in so far as they thought that these would enslave Sicily; but with the Syracusans, as is usual with next-door neighbours, they were always at variance. And it was because they were more afraid of the Syracusans, as being so near, that they had in the first instance sent them the few horsemen,¹ lest they might prove superior to the Athenians even without their aid; and they

¹ Ch. lxvii. 2.

- μᾶλλον ἔργῳ, ὥς ἂν δύνωνται μετριώτατα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔλασσον δοκῶσι νεῖμαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπικρατέστεροι τῇ μάχῃ
- 2 ἐγένοντο, λόγῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἴσα ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ οὕτω βουλευσάμενοι ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἀμφοτέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις σφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμος ὢν, εὖορκον δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἐκατέρων ἀπῆλθον.
- 3 Καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐξηρτύοντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ ἐστρατοπεδευμένοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἔπρασσον, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὥς πλείστοι προσχωρήσονται.
- 4 καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία μᾶλλον τῶν Σικελῶν, ὑπήκουσι ὄντες τῶν Συρακοσίων, οὐ¹ πολλοὶ ἀφειστήκεσαν· τῶν δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν ἐχόντων αὐτόνομοι οὖσαι καὶ πρότερον αἰεὶ αἰ² οἰκήσεις εὐθύς, πλὴν ὀλίγοι, μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν, καὶ σίτον τε κατεκόμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ
- 5 χρήματα. ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μὴ προσχωροῦντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες τοὺς μὲν προσηνάγκαζον, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, φρουροὺς τ' ἐσπεμπόντων καὶ βοηθούντων, ἀπεκωλύοντο. τὸν τε χειμῶνα μεθορμισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Νάξου ἐς τὴν Κατάνην καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὃ κατεκαύθη ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων αὐθις ἀνορθώσαντες διεχείμαζον.
- 6 καὶ ἔπεμψαν μὲν ἐς Καρχηδόνᾳ τριήρη περὶ φιλίας, εἰ δύναιντό τι ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς Τυρσηνίαν, ἔστιν ὧν πόλεων ἐπαγγελλομένων καὶ

¹ Canter's correction for οἱ πολλοί of the MSS.

² αἰ added by Bekker.

now resolved for the future to keep on giving to them rather than to the Athenians assistance in fact, though as moderately as possible, and for the present, in order that they might not seem to show less favour to the Athenians, especially since these had proved the stronger in the battle, to give in word the same answer to both. Having thus determined, they made answer, that, as they were allies of both parties that were at war, it seemed to them to be consistent with their oath to aid neither at present. So the envoys of both sides went away.

The Syracusans on their side were getting ready for the war, while the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, in the effort to bring over as many of them as possible. Now, of the Sicels that lived more toward the flat country and were subjects of the Syracusans not many¹ had revolted; but the Sicel settlements in the interior, which even before had always been independent, with few exceptions straightway sided with the Athenians, bringing down grain for the army and in some cases money also. Against those that did not come over the Athenians took the field, and compelled some to do so, but were kept from compelling others by the Syracusans, who sent garrisons to their relief. Removing also the anchorage of their fleet from Naxos to Catana, and restoring the camp which had been burned by the Syracusans, they passed the winter there. They sent also a trireme to Carthage on a mission of friendship, in the hope that they might be able to get some aid; and they sent one also to Tyrrhenia, as some of the cities there offered of

¹ Or, retaining of πολλοί, "most had held aloof," i.e. from the alliance with the Athenians.

αὐτῶν ξυμπολεμεῖν. περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Σικελοῖς καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἑγεσταν πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἵππους σφίσιν ὥς πλείστους πέμπειν, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμόν, πλινθία¹ καὶ σίδηρον, ἡτοίμαζον, καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ὥς ἅμα τῷ ἡρι ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

- 7 Οἱ δ' ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Λακεδαίμονα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποσταλέντες πρέσβεις τοὺς τε Ἰταλιώτας ἅμα παραπλέοντες ἐπειρῶντο πείθειν μὴ περιορᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥς καὶ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἐπιβουλευόμενα, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ Κόρινθῳ ἐγένοντο, λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἀξιῶντες
- 8 σφίσιν κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς βοηθεῖν. καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, εὐθὺς ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ἀμύνειν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ξυναπέστελλον αὐτοῖς πρέσβεις, ὅπως καὶ ἐκείνους ξυναναπείθοιεν τὸν τε αὐτοῦ πόλεμον σαφέστερον ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν
- 9 ὠφελίαν τινὰ πέμπειν. καὶ οἱ τε ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου πρέσβεις παρήσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τῶν ξυμφυγάδων, περαιωθεὶς τότε εὐθὺς ἐπὶ πλοίου φορτικοῦ ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας ἐς Κυλλήνην τῆς Ἠλείας πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεταπεμψάντων ὑπόσπονδος ἐλθόν· ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ
- 10 αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν Μαντινικῶν πρᾶξιν. καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τοὺς τε Κορινθίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην δεομένους πείθειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ διανοουμένων τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ

¹ Hude writes πλινθεῖα, after the Schol. Patm. (τὰ ἐν τύποις ξύλα, οἷς τὰς πλίνθους κατεσκευάζον).

themselves to join them in the war. They also despatched messengers to the various Sicel tribes, and sending to Egesta urged them to send as many horses as possible; and they were getting ready for the circumvallation bricks and iron and whatever else was needful, with a view to taking the war in hand as soon as spring opened.

Meanwhile the Syracusan envoys, who had been sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, as they sailed along the coast tried to persuade the Italiots¹ not to tolerate the conduct of the Athenians, as the plot was aimed equally against them; and when they reached Corinth they made an appeal to the Corinthians, urging them to send them aid on grounds of kinship. And the Corinthians at once took the lead in voting to aid them with all zeal themselves, and also sent envoys along with them to Lacedaemon, to help in persuading them not only to prosecute the war at home more openly against the Athenians, but also to send aid in some form to Sicily. Accordingly there were present at Lacedaemon these envoys from Corinth, and also Alcibiades with his fellow-exiles. He had, at the time of which we have spoken,² at once crossed over on a freight-boat from Thuria, going first to Cyllene in Elis, and had afterwards, on the summons of the Lacedaemonians themselves, come to Lacedaemon under safe-conduct; for he feared them on account of his intrigues in the affair of the Mantineans. So it happened that in the Lacedaemonian assembly the Syracusans, the Corinthians, and Alcibiades, making the same appeal, were prevailing upon the Lacedaemonians. The ephors indeed and others in

¹ Greek colonists settled in the part of Italy called Magna Graecia. ² cf. ch. lxi. 6.

τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων πρέσβεις πέμπειν ἐς Συοα-
κούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ξυμβαίνειν Ἀθηναίοις,
βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐ προθύμων ὄντων, παρελθὼν ὁ Ἀλκι-
βιάδης παρώξυνέ τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ
ἐξώρμησε λέγων τοιάδε.

LXXXIX. “Ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβο-
λῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ χεῖρον τὰ
2 κοινὰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ μου ἀκροάσησθε. τῶν δὲ ἐμῶν
προγόνων τὴν προξενίαν ὑμῶν κατὰ τι ἔγκλημα
ἀπειπόντων αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνων ἐθερά-
πυον ὑμᾶς ἄλλα τε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκ Πύλου
ξυμφορίαν. καὶ διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς
πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καταλασσόμενοι τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς
ἐχθροῖς δύναμιν, δι’ ἐκείνων πράξαντες, ἐμοὶ δὲ
3 ὑτιμίαν περιέθετε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δικαίως ὑπ’
ἐμοῦ πρὸς τε τὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἀργείων τραπο-
μένου καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἡναντιούμην ὑμῖν ἐβλάπτεσθε·
καὶ νῦν, εἴ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὐκ εἰκότως
ὠργίζετό μοι, μετὰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς σκοπῶν ἀναπει-
θέσθω· ἢ εἴ τις, διότι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ προσεκέειμην
μᾶλλον, χεῖρω με ἐνόμιζε, μὴδ’ οὕτως ἡγήσεται
4 ὀρθῶς ἄχθεσθαι. τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις αἰεὶ ποτε
διάφοροί ἐσμεν (πάν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυνα-
στεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται), καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ξυμ-
παρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους. ἅμα
δὲ καὶ τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης τὰ πολλὰ

authority were already intending to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent their making terms with the Athenians, but were not disposed to send them aid; Alcibiades, however, coming forward, inflamed the Lacedaemonians and goaded them on, speaking as follows:

LXXXIX. "It is necessary first of all to speak to you about the prejudice against me, in order that you may not through suspicion of me give a less favourable hearing to matters of public concern. When my ancestors on account of some complaint had renounced their office as your proxenoi, I myself, seeking to revive the relationship, courted your favour in other matters and especially in regard to your misfortune at Pylos.¹ And although I continued zealous, you, in making peace with the Athenians, by negotiating through my personal enemies conferred power upon them but brought dishonour upon me. For these reasons you deserved the injury you suffered when I turned to the side of the Mantineans and Argives, and when I opposed you in other matters.² And if anyone at the actual moment of suffering was unduly angry at me, let him now look at it in the light of the truth and be led to a different conviction; or if anyone thought worse of me because I was more inclined to the cause of the people, let him not even on that ground suppose that he was rightly offended. For my family have always been at variance with tyrants, and as all that is opposed to despotic power has the name of democracy, so from the fact of that opposition of ours the leadership of the people has remained with us. Besides, while the city was a democracy, it was necessary in

¹ cf. v. xliii. 2.

² cf. v. lin. ff.

5 ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔπεσθαι. τῆς δὲ ὑπαρ-
 χούσης ἀκολασίας ἐπειρώμεθα μετριώτεροι ἐς τὰ
 πολιτικά εἶναι. ἄλλοι δ' ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πάλαι
 καὶ νῦν οἱ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἐξῆγον τὸν ὄχλον.
 6 οἷπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐξήλασαν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος
 προύστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ
 πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὔσα καὶ ὅπερ
 ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασώζειν (ἐπεὶ¹ δημοκρατίαν
 γε ἐγινγώσκομεν οἱ φρονούντες τι, καὶ αὐτὸς
 οὐδενὸς ἂν χειρόν, ὅσῳ καὶ† λαιδορῆσαιμι· ἀλλὰ
 περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέ-
 γοιτο), καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν
 ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

XC. “Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς τοιαῦτα
 ξυνέβη· περὶ δὲ ὧν ὑμῖν τε βουλευτέον καὶ ἐμοί,
 2 εἴ τι πλέον οἶδα, ἐσηγητέον, μάθετε ἤδη. ἐπλεύ-
 σαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ δυναίμεθα,
 Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους
 αὐθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχη-
 3 δονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. εἰ δὲ
 προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη
 τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομί-
 σαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκείθεν προσγενομένην
 δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους
 μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἰβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ
 ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους,

¹ Hude writes ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίας γε καταγινγώσκομεν οἱ φρο-
 νούντες τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χειρόν, ὅσῳ καὶ λαιδορῆσαιμι,
 which must be about the meaning of the passage.

most respects to conform to existing conditions. We tried, however, to pursue a moderate course in politics in contrast with the prevailing licence. But there have been others, both in the time of our forefathers and now, who led the masses into more evil ways; and these are the very men who have driven me out. But it was of the whole people that we were leaders, deeming it right to help to preserve that form of government under which the state had, as it chanced, attained its highest greatness and completest freedom, and which had come down to us—for as to democracy of course, all of us who have any sense well understood what it was, and I better than anyone, inasmuch as I have greater cause to abuse it; but indeed nothing new can be said about an admitted folly—and it did not seem to us wise to change our democratic constitution when you, our enemies, were waiting at our gates.

XC. “With regard, then, to the prejudices against me, that is how things fell out; but with reference to the matters about which you must take counsel and which I, if I have any superior knowledge, must bring to your notice, give me now your attention. We sailed to Sicily, first, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could, and after them the Italiots also; and then to make an attempt upon the empire of the Carthaginians and upon the city itself. If these things, either all, or at least the greater part of them, succeeded, then we intended to attack the Peloponnesus, bringing here the whole Hellenic force that had joined us there, hiring besides many barbarians, both Iberians and others of the peoples there that are admittedly the most warlike of the barbarians at the present

τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγη-
σάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς
τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκούντες καὶ τῷ
πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν
βία λαβόντες, τὰς δ' ἐντειχισάμενοι ῥαδίως ἠλπί-
ζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ
4 ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξιν. χρήματα δὲ καὶ
σίτον, ὥστε εὐπορώτερον γίγνεσθαι τι αὐτῶν,
αὐτὰ τὰ προσγεγόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἔμελλε
διαρκῇ ἄνευ τῆς ἐνθένδε προσόδου παρέξειν.

XCI. "Τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ νῦν οἰχομένου
στόλου παρὰ τοῦ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα εἰδότος ὡς
διενοήθημεν ἀκηκόατε· καὶ ὅσοι ὑπόλοιποι στρα-
τηγοί, ἣν δύνωται, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ πράξουσιν. ὡς
δέ, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσετε, οὐκ ἐπιείκειται τὰ κεῖ, μάθετε
2 ἤδη. Σικελιώται γὰρ ἀπειρότεροι μὲν εἰσιν, ὅμως
δ' ἂν ξυστραφέντες ἀθρόοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι περι-
γένοιτο· Συρακόσιοι δὲ μόνοι μάχῃ τε ἤδη
πανδημεὶ ἡσσημένοι καὶ ναυσὶν ἅμα κατειργό-
μενοι ἀδύνατοι ἔσονται τῇ νῦν Ἀθηναίων ἐκεῖ
3 παρασκευῇ ἀντίσχειν. καὶ εἰ αὕτη ἡ πόλις
ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία, καὶ
εὐθύς καὶ Ἰταλία· καὶ ὃν ἄρτι κίνδυνον ἐκεῖθεν
4 προεῖπον, οὐκ ἂν διὰ μακροῦ ὑμῖν ἐπιπέσοι. ὥστε
μὴ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας τις οἰέσθω μόνον βουλευεῖν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε
τάδε ἐν τάχει, στρατιάν τε ἐπὶ νεῶν πέμψετε
τοιαύτην ἐκεῖσε οὔτινες αὐτερέται κομισθέντες
καὶ ὀπλιτεύσουσιν εὐθύς, καὶ ὃ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἔτι

day, and building many triremes in addition to our own, as Italy has timber in abundance. Laying a blockade with these triremes round the Peloponnesus, and at the same time attacking it with our infantry by land, having thus taken some of its cities by assault and walled in others, we expected easily to reduce it, and after that to have sway over the whole Hellenic race. As to money and food, for making any of these projects more feasible, the additional territory acquired in Sicily would of itself furnish these in sufficient quantity, independently of our home revenues.

XCI. "That such were the objects of the expedition which has sailed, you have heard now from one who knows most accurately what we purposed; and the rest of the generals will, if they can, carry out these plans without change. But that the people over there cannot hold out unless you aid them, let me now show you. The Siceliots have indeed less military experience than the Athenians, yet if they were united in one body they could, even as it is, gain the victory. But the Syracusans alone, being already worsted in battle with their full force and at the same time hemmed in at sea, will be unable to withstand the army of the Athenians now there. And if this city shall be taken, all Sicily is theirs, and so presently will Italy be also; nor will it be long before the danger which I have just now predicted from that quarter would fall upon you. Therefore let nobody think that you are deliberating about Sicily only, but about the Peloponnesus also, unless you do quickly the following things: send thither by ship such a body of troops as, after working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites; also what I

THUCYDIDES

χρησιμωτερον εἶναι νομίζω, ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην
 ἄρχοντα, ὥς ἂν τοὺς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ
 τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας προσαναγκάσῃ· οὕτω γὰρ οἷ
 τε ὑπάρχοντες ὑμῖν φίλοι θαρσήσουσι μᾶλλον
 5 καὶ οἱ ἐνδοιάζοντες ἀδεέστερον προσίασιν. καὶ
 τὰ ἐνθάδε χρὴ ἅμα φανερώτερον ἐκπολεμεῖν, ἵνα
 Συρακόσιοί τε νομίζοντες ὑμᾶς ἐπιμέλεσθαι μάλ-
 λον ἀντέχωσι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἦσσαν
 6 ἄλλην ἐπικουρίαν πέμπωσιν. τειχίζειν τε χρὴ
 Δεκέλειαν τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅπερ Ἀθηναῖοι μάλιστα
 αἰεὶ φοβοῦνται καὶ μόνου αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι τῶν ἐν
 τῷ πολέμῳ οὐ διαπεπειρᾶσθαι. βεβαιότατα δ'
 ἂν τις οὕτως τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτει, εἰ, ἃ μάλ-
 ιστα δεδιότας αὐτοὺς αἰσθάνοιτο, ταῦτα σαφῶς
 πυνθανόμενος ἐπιφέρει· εἰκὸς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀκρι-
 βέστατα ἐκάστους τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν δεινὰ ἐπι-
 7 σταμένους φοβεῖσθαι. ἃ δ' ἐν τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει
 αὐτοὶ ὠφελούμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους κωλύσετε,
 πολλὰ παρεῖς τὰ μέγιστα κεφαλαιώσω. οἷς τε
 γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκευάσται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς
 τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα, τὰ δ' αὐτόματα ἥξει· καὶ τὰς
 τοῦ Λαυρείου τῶν ἀργυρείων μετάλλων προσ-
 ὁδους καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ δικαστηρίων νῦν ὠφε-
 λοῦνται εὐθὺς ἀποστερήσονται, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς
 ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσόδου ἦσσαν ἂν φορου-

¹ The occupation of Deceleia took place in 413 B.C. (cf. VII. XIX.).

² i.e. a fortress built to dominate an enemy's territory.

consider even more indispensable than the army, a *Spartan* as commander, that he may organize the forces already present and press into service those that are unwilling. For in this way the friends you have already will be encouraged, and those who are in doubt will come over with less misgiving. And the war here you must at the same time prosecute more openly, in order that the Syracusans, convinced that you are really concerned, may offer greater resistance, and the Athenians be less able to send reinforcements to their own troops. You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in Attica,¹ the very thing the Athenians are always most in dread of and reckon the only peril of which they have not made full trial in this war. And the surest way in which anyone can hurt his enemies is this: acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them that which he perceives they most fear; for it is natural that every man should have the most accurate knowledge of his own dangers and should fear them accordingly. But as to the benefits which you yourselves will gain by this menacing stronghold² and will prevent your opponents from obtaining, I will pass over many and sum up only the most important. Whatever their country is stocked with will for the most part come into your hands, either by capture or by voluntary surrender.³ And the revenues of the Laureian silver mines and whatever profits they now derive from their land and from their courts,⁴ they will at once be deprived of, and above all of the tribute from their allies, that would be less

³ αἰτόματα, refers to slaves, who were part of the "stock."

⁴ The fees and fines arising from the adjudication of cases brought by the allied states.

THUCYDIDES

μένης, οἱ τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν νομίσαντες ἤδη κατὰ κράτος πολεμεῖσθαι ὀλιγωρήσουσιν.

XCII. “Γίγνεσθαι δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατά (καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἶμαι
2 γνώμης) πάνυ θαρσῶ. καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιοτάτων, φιλόπολις ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι, οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαι μου ἐς
3 τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν τὸν λόγον. φυγὰς τε γάρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας καὶ οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας, ἣν πείθησθέ μοι, ὠφελίας· καὶ πολεμιώτεροι οὐχ οἱ τοὺς πολεμίους που βλάψαντες ὑμεῖς ἢ οἱ τοὺς φίλους ἀναγκάσαντες
4 πολεμίους γενέσθαι. τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. οὐδ' ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὔσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὔσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὅς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπὶ ἡ, ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.
5 οὕτως ἐμοί τε ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐς κίνδυνον καὶ ἐς ταιλαιπωρίαν πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς χρῆσθαι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντας τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ὑφ' ἀπάντων προβαλλόμενον λόγον ὥς, εἰ πολέμιός γε ὢν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἂν φίλος ὢν ἱκανῶς ὠφελοίην, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερα ἤκαζον,

350

regularly brought in; for these, convinced that the war is now being prosecuted on your part with all your might, will take their obligations lightly.

XCII. "The accomplishment of any of these projects promptly and more zealously depends, men of Lacedaemon, upon you, for that they are possible—and I do not think that I shall prove wrong in my judgment—I am fully assured. And I claim that no one of you shall think more harshly of me because I, who seemed once to be a lover of my city, now make assault with all my might upon her, in concert with her bitterest enemies; nor do I think that my word should be suspected on the score of the outcast's zeal. For outcast as I am from the villainy of those that expelled me, I am not ousted from doing you good service, if you will but hearken to me; and the worse enemies are not those who, like you, have merely hurt their enemies, but those who have forced their friends to become foes. And as to love of country—I have it not when I am wronged, but had it when I possessed my civil rights in security. And it is not, as I conceive, against a country still my own that I am now going, but far rather one no longer mine that I am seeking to recover. And the true patriot is not the man who, having unjustly lost his fatherland, refrains from attacking it, but he who in his yearning for it tries in every way to get it back. So I urge you, Lacedaemonians, to use me without misgiving for any danger and for any hardships, recognising that, according to the saying which is on everybody's lips, if as an enemy I did you exceeding injury, I might also be of some sufficient service to you as a friend, in so far as I know the affairs of the Athenians, while I could only conjecture yours. And I urge, too,

THUCYDIDES

καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν, νομίσαντας περὶ μεγίστων δὴ τῶν διαφερόντων βουλευέσθαι, μὴ ἀποκνεῖν τὴν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν στρατείαν, ἵνα τὰ τε ἐκεῖ βραχεὶ μορίῳ ξυμπαραγενόμενοι μεγάλα σώσητε καὶ Ἀθηναίων τὴν τε οὔσαν καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δύναμιν καθέλῃτε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτοὶ τε ἀσφαλῶς οἰκῇτε καὶ τῆς ἀπάσης Ἑλλάδος ἐκούσης καὶ οὐ βία, κατ' εὖνοιαν δὲ ἡγήτησθε."

XCIII. Ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διανοούμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, μέλλοντες δὲ ἔτι καὶ περιορώμενοι, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν διδάξαντος ταῦτα ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ καὶ νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ σαφέστατα εἰδύτος ἀκη-
 2 κοέναι· ὥστε τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει τῆς Δεκελείας προσ-
 εἶχον ἤδη τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ παραντίκα καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πέμπειν τινὰ τιμωρίαν. καὶ Γύλιπ-
 πον τὸν Κλεανδρίδου προστάξαντες ἄρχοντα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐκέλευον μετ' ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν Κο-
 ρινθίων βουλευόμενον ποιεῖν ὅπῃ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων
 3 μάλιστα καὶ τάχιστα τις ὠφελία ἦξει τοῖς ἐκεῖ.
 οἱ δὲ δύο μὲν ναῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἤδη ἐκέλευέν
 οἱ πέμπειν ἐς Ἀσίην, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκευά-
 ζεσθαι ὅσας διανοοῦνται πέμπειν καί, ὅταν καιρὸς
 ᾗ, ἐτοίμας εἶναι πλεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ξυνθέμενοι
 ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος.

that you yourselves now, convinced that you are deliberating about interests that are of the greatest importance, shrink not from sending an expedition into Sicily, and also into Attica, in order that, by keeping a small detachment on the island, you may preserve the large interests you have over there and may overthrow the power of the Athenians both present and prospective, and after that may yourselves live in security and be accepted by all the Hellenes of their free will, not by force but through affection, as their leaders."

XCIII. Such was the speech of Alcibiades; and the Lacedaemonians, who had already before this been disposed to make an expedition against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, were now far more encouraged when Alcibiades himself explained these matters in detail, thinking that they had heard them from the one man who had most certain knowledge. And so they now turned their attention to the fortification of Deceleia and, in particular, to sending immediately some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed Gylippus son of Cleandridas commander of the Syracusan forces, they ordered him, in consultation with the envoys of the Syracusans and Corinthians, to devise how under present circumstances help might come to the Syracusans in the best and quickest way. And Gylippus bade the Corinthians send to him at once at Asine¹ two ships, and to equip all the rest they intended to send, and to be ready to sail whenever opportunity offered. Having made these arrangements the envoys left Lacedaemon and set out for home.

¹ Probably the harbour in Messenia (IV. xiii. 1).

4 Ἀφίκετο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τριήρης τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἣν ἀπέστειλαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐπὶ τε χρήματα καὶ ἵππεις. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν τε τροφὴν πέμπειν τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἵππεις. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἑβδομον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

XCIV. Ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἡρὶ εὐθύς ἀρχομένῳ τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης παρέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Μεγάρων,¹ οὓς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος τοῦ τυράννου, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἴρηται, ἀναστήσαντες Συρακοῖσι 2 αὐτοὶ ἔχουσι τὴν γῆν. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐδήωσαν τοὺς τε ἄγρους καὶ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ ἔρυμά τι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ οὐχ ἐλόντες αὐθις καὶ πεζῇ καὶ ναυσὶ παρακομισθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμὸν τό τε πεδίον ἀναβάντες ἐδήουν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἐνεπίμπρασαν, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων περιτυχόντες 3 τισὶν οὐ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀποκτείναντές τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. 4 καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες εἰς Κατάνην, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάμενοι πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Κεντόριπα, Σικελῶν πόλιν, καὶ προσαγαγόμενοι ὁμολογίᾳ ἀπῆσαν, πῖμπράντες ἅμα τὸν σῖτον τῶν 5 τε Ἰνυσησίων καὶ τῶν Ὑβλαίων. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι εἰς Κατάνην καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς τε ἵππεις ἥκοντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους ἄνευ τῶν ἵππων μετὰ σκευῆς, ὥς αὐτόθεν

¹ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, after Μεγάρων in MSS., deleted by Krüger.

At this time also there arrived at Athens from Sicily the trireme that had been sent by the generals for money and cavalry. And the Athenians, hearing their request, voted to send to the army both the supplies and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

XCIV. At the very beginning of the following 414 B.C. spring, the Athenians in Sicily set out from Catana and proceeded along the coast toward Megara, from which, as has been stated before,¹ the Syracusans in the time of the tyrant Gelon had expelled the inhabitants, holding their territory themselves. Here they landed and ravaged the fields; then, attacking a stronghold of the Syracusans without success, they went back again along the coast with both land-force and fleet to the river Terias, and going inland ravaged the plain and set fire to the grain. Meeting with a small force of Syracusans, they killed some of them and after setting up a trophy withdrew to their ships. Having sailed back then to Catana and supplied themselves with provisions from there, they advanced with their whole army to Centoripa,² a Sicel town; and when they had brought it over by capitulation they returned, burning at the same time the grain of the Inessians³ and Hyblaeans.⁴ On their arrival at Catana they found that the horsemen had come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number—with accoutrements but without the horses, for it was expected that horses would be procured

¹ cf. ch. iv. 2.

² Now Centorbi, twenty-seven miles north west from Catana and near Mt. Aetna

³ The site of Inessa is doubtful (cf. III. ciii. 1).

⁴ Hybla Geleatis (ch. lxii. 5).

ἵππων πορισθησομένων, καὶ ἵπποτοξότας τριακόντα καὶ τάλαντα ἀργυρίου τριακόσια.

XCV. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἥρος καὶ ἐπ' Ἄργος στρατεύσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν Κλεωνῶν ἦλθον, σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Θυρεάτιν ὁμορον οὖσαν λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν ἔλαβον, ἣ ἐπράθη τάλαντων οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε 2 καὶ εἴκοσι. καὶ ὁ Θεσπιῶν δῆμος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπιθέμενος τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οὐ κατέσχευ, ἀλλὰ βοηθησάντων Θηβαίων¹ οἱ μὲν ξυνελήφθησαν, οἱ δ' ἐξέπεσον Ἀθήναζε.

XCVI. Καὶ οἱ Συρακούσιοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ὥς ἐπύθοντο τοὺς τε ἱππέας ἤκοντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μέλλοντας ἤδη ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰέναι, νομίσαντες, εἰ μὴ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν κρατήσωσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, χωρίου ἀποκρήμνου τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως σφᾶς, οὐδ' εἰ κρατοῖντο μάχῃ, ἀποτειχισθῆναι, διανοοῦντο τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν φυλάσσειν, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ 2 ταῦτα λάθωσι σφᾶς ἀναβάντες οἱ πολέμιοι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλη γε αὐτοὺς δυνηθῆναι. ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο χωρίον, καὶ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἐπικλινές τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιφανὲς πᾶν ἔσω· καὶ ὠνόμασται ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων διὰ τὸ ἐπιπολῆς 3 τοῦ ἄλλου εἶναι Ἐπιπολαί. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐξελ-

¹ Θηβαίων, so B alone correctly against Ἀθηναίων of all the other MSS., which gives no satisfactory sense; for in case of a real interference on the part of the Athenians, which would have meant an infraction of existing peace relations with the Boeotians (cf. v. xxxii. 5), more exact information was to be expected.

in Sicily—as well as thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents¹ of silver.

XCV. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians, making an expedition to Argos, got as far as Cleonae, but when an earthquake occurred they retired. After this the Argives invaded the Thyreatis, which lies on their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for not less than twenty-five talents.² And in the course of the same summer, not long afterwards, the people of Thespieae attacked the government but did not succeed; for succour came from Thebes and some were arrested, while others fled for refuge to Athens.

XCVI. During the same summer the Syracusans, on learning that the Athenians had received their cavalry and that they were about to march against them immediately, thinking that unless the Athenians should get possession of Epipolae, a precipitous place lying directly above the city, they themselves, even if they were defeated in battle, could not easily be walled in, determined to guard the approaches to it, in order to prevent the enemy from ascending secretly by that way, since they could not possibly do so by any other road. For at all other points the place overhangs the city and slopes right down to it, the whole height being visible from it; and it is called Epipolae by the Syracusans because it lies as an upper surface above the rest of the country. So they went out at daybreak in full

¹ £60,000, \$291,600.

² £5,000, \$24,300.

THUCYDIDES

θόντες πανδημεὶ ἐς τὸν λειμῶνα τὸν¹ παρὰ τὸν Ἄναπον ποταμὸν ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (ἐτύγχανον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη στρατηγοὶ ἄρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν), ἐξέτασιν τε ὀπλων ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἐξακοσίους λογάδας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐξέκριναν πρότερον, ὧν ἦρχε Διόμιλος, φυγὰς ἐξ Ἀνδρου, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἰεν φύλακες καί, ἣν ἐς ἄλλο τι δέη, ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται.

- XCVII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταύτης τῆς νυκτός, ἡ² τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένη ἡμέρᾳ ἐξητάζοντο, ἔλαθον³ αὐτοὺς παντὶ ἤδη τῷ στρατεύματι ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης σχόντες κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον, ὃς ἀπέχει τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐξ ἧ ἑπτὰ σταδίου, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάσαντες ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Θάψον καθορμισάμενοι· ἔστι δὲ χερσονήσος μὲν ἐν στενῷ ἰσθμῷ προύχουσα ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, τῆς δὲ Συρακοσίων πόλεως οὔτε πλοῦν οὔτε ὁδὸν
- 2 πολλὴν ἀπέχει. καὶ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Θάψῳ διασταυρωσάμενος τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἡσύχαζεν· ὁ δὲ πεζὸς ἐχώρει εἰθὺς δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς καὶ φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον πρὶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους αἰσθομένους ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως παραγενέσθαι.
- 3 ἐβοήθουν δὲ οἳ τε ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστος τάχους εἶχε καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμιλον ἐξακόσιοι· στάδιοι δὲ πρὶν προσμεῖξαι ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος ἐγίγνοντο αὐτοῖς
- 4 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. προσπεσόντες οὖν αὐτοῖς τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀτακτότερον καὶ μάχῃ νικηθέντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς

¹ Added by Krüger.

² Added by Madvig.

³ καὶ, before ἔλαθον in the MSS., deleted by Madvig.

force to the meadow along the river *Anapus*--for *Hermocrates* and his fellow-generals, as it chanced, had just come into office--and proceeded to hold a review of the hoplites. And they selected first six hundred picked men of these, under the command of *Diomilus*, a fugitive from *Andros*, that these might be a guard for *Epipolæ*, and if there were need of them anywhere else might be quickly at hand in a body.

xcvii. And the Athenians during the night preceding the day on which the *Syracusans* held their review, came from *Catana* with their whole force and put in unobserved at the place called *Leon*, which is six or seven stadia distant from *Epipolæ*, disembarking the land-force there and anchoring their ships at *Thapsus*. That is a peninsula, with a narrow isthmus, extending into the sea and not far distant from the city of *Syracuse*, either by sea or by land. The naval force of the Athenians, having run a stockade across the isthmus, lay quiet on *Thapsus*; but the land-force advanced at once at a run to *Epipolæ*, and got up by way of *Euryclus* before the *Syracusans*, when they became aware of it, could come up from the review which they were holding in the meadow. They brought aid, however, everyone with what speed he could, the others as well as the six hundred under *Diomilus*; but they had not less than twenty-five stadia to go, after leaving the meadow, before they reached the enemy. Consequently the *Syracusans* fell upon the Athenians in considerable disorder, and being defeated in battle

THUCYDIDES

5 ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν· καὶ ὃ τε Διόμιλος
 μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες
 καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες τοῖς
 Συρακοσίοις, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ
 ἐπικαταβάντες, ὥς οὐκ ἐπεξῆσαν αὐτοῖς, ἐπανα-
 χωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ ὠκοδό-
 μησαν ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν
 ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁπότε
 προίοιεν ἢ μαχοῦμενοι ἢ τειχιοῦντες, τοῖς τε
 σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

XCVIII. Καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἦλθον
 ἕκ τε Ἐγέστης ἱππῆς τριακόσιοι καὶ Σικελῶν
 καὶ Ναξίων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὥς ἑκατόν· καὶ
 Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι, οἷς
 ἵππους τοὺς μὲν παρ' Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων
 ἔλαβον, τοὺς δ' ἐπρίαντο, καὶ ξύμπαντες πεντή-
 2 κοντα καὶ ἑξακόσιοι ἱππῆς ξυνελέγησαν. καὶ
 καταστήσαντες ἐν τῷ Λαβδάλῳ φυλακὴν ἐχώρουν
 πρὸς τὴν Συκὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵνα περ καθεζόμενοι
 εἰσέχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. καὶ ἑκπληξιν
 τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδο-
 μίας· καὶ ἐπεξελθόντες μάχην διεννοοῦντο ποι-
 3 εῖσθαι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. καὶ ἤδη ἀντιπαράτασ-
 σομένων ἀλλήλοις οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ
 ὥς ἐώρων σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα διεσπασμένον τε
 καὶ οὐ ραδίως ξυντασσόμενον, ἀνήγαγον πάλιν ἐς

on Epipolae, retired into the city, Diomilus and about three hundred of the rest being slain. After this the Athenians, having set up a trophy and given up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, next day went down against the city itself; but when the enemy did not come out against them they withdrew and built a fort at Labdalum, on the verge of the bluffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, that it might serve as a magazine for their baggage and stores whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall.

XCVIII. Not long afterwards there came from Egesta three hundred horsemen, and from the Sicels, Naxians, and some others about one hundred; and the Athenians had already two hundred and fifty, for whom they received some horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans and purchased others; so that altogether six hundred and fifty cavalry were mustered. Placing a garrison at Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syce, where they took position and built the round fort¹ with all speed. The Syracusans were struck with consternation by the rapidity of their building; and they went out against them, determined to give battle and not look on idly. And when they were already drawing up for the conflict the generals of the Syracusans, seeing that their own army had become disordered and did not readily get into line, led them back to the city, all save a

¹ Syke (*i.e.* a place set with fig-trees; see Steph. *s.v.* Συκαί) is probably to be located in the middle of the plateau of Epipolae. Here the Athenians built first a circular fort, which later was the starting-point for the wall of circumvallation extending northward towards Trogilus and southward to the Great Harbour. See Map, and also Holm ii. 387 and Freeman, *Sic.* iii. 662 ff.

τὴν πόλιν πλὴν μέρους τινὸς τῶν ἱππέων· οὗτοι
 δὲ ὑπομένοντες ἐκώλυνον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λιθο-
 4 φορεῖν τε καὶ ἀποσκίδνασθαι μακροτέραν. καὶ
 τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλὴ μία τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ οἱ
 ἱππῆς μετ' αὐτῶν πάντες ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς τῶν
 Συρακοσίων ἱππέας προσβαλόντες, καὶ ἀπέκτει-
 νάν τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον τῆς ἵππομαχίας
 ἔστησαν.

XCIX. Καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν
 Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος, οἱ
 δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ξυμφοροῦντες παρέβαλλον
 ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰρώγилон καλούμενον, αἰεὶ ἥπερ βραχύ-
 2 ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν τὸ ἀποτείχισμα. οἱ δὲ
 Συρακόσιοι οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἑρμοκράτους τῶν στρα-
 τηγῶν ἐσηγησαμένου μάχαις μὲν πανδημεὶ πρὸς
 Ἀθηναίους οὐκέτι ἐβούλοντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑπο-
 τευχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι ἢ ἐκείνοι ἔμελλον
 ἄξιον τὸ τεῖχος καί, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλήσεις
 γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν,
 μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοῖς¹ τῆς στρατιᾶς· καὶ
 φθάνειν ἂν τοῖς σταυροῖς προκαταλαμβάνοντες
 τὰς ἐφόδους, ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν πανομένους τοῦ ἔργου
 3 πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. ἐτείχιζον οὖν
 ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι,
 κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον
 τεῖχος ἄγοντες, τὰς τε ἐλάας ἐκκύπτοντες τοῦ
 4 τεμένους καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καθιστάντες. αἱ

¹ αὐτοῖς, Bekker's conjecture, for αὐτοὺς of the MSS.

part of the cavalry. These remained behind and tried to prevent the Athenians from bringing stones and scattering to any great distance. But one tribal¹ division of the Athenian hoplites, and with these all their cavalry, attacked and routed the Syracusan cava'ry, killed some, and set up a trophy of the cavalry fight.

XCIX. On the next day some of the Athenians proceeded to build the wall to the north of the round fort, while others brought together stones and wood and began to lay these down along the line towards the place called Trogilus, in which direction the line of circumvallation would be shortest from the Great Harbour to the outer sea. But the Syracusans, at the suggestion of their generals, and especially of Hermocrates, were no longer inclined to risk pitched battles with their whole force against the Athenians. It seemed better to build a wall across the line where the Athenians were going to bring their wall, so that if they got ahead of them the Athenians would be blocked off, and they decided at the same time, if the Athenians should attack them while at this work, to send a part of the army against them; and they expected that they would get ahead of the Athenians in occupying the approaches with their stockades, and that they would cease from their work and all turn against them. Accordingly they went out and proceeded to build, starting from the city and carrying a cross-wall below the round fort of the Athenians, chopping down the olive-trees of the precinct and setting up wooden towers. The

¹ φυλή is here used for τάξις, the term being borrowed from the civil classification. Each of the ten tribes furnished a division (τάξις).

δὲ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὕτω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιεπεπλεύκεσαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα, ἀλλ' ἔτι οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κατὰ γῆν δὲ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ ἐπιτιμῆα ἐπήγοντο.

C. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀρκούντως ἐδόκει ἔχειν ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ὠκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτειχίσματος, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἦλθον κωλύσοντας, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι δίχα γιγνομένοις ῥᾶον μάχωνται, καὶ ἅμα τὴν καθ' αὐτοὺς περιτείχισιν ἐπειγόμενοι, οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι φυλὴν μίαν καταλιπόντες· φύλακα τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς τε ὀχετοὺς αὐτῶν, οἱ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑποιομηδὸν ποτοῦ ὕδατος ἡγμένοι ἦσαν, διέφθειραν, καὶ τηρήσαντες τοὺς τε ἄλλους Συρακοσίους κατὰ σκηνὰς ὄντας ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ καὶ τινὰς καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀποκεχωρηκότας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ σταυρώματι ἀμελῶς φυλάσσοντας, τριακοσίους μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν λογάδας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐκλεκτοὺς ὀπλισμένους προύταξαν θεῖν δρόμῳ ἐξαπιναιῶς πρὸς τὸ ὑποτείχισμα, ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ δίχα, ἡ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου στρατηγοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν, ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ
2 παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα. καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ τριακόσιοι αἰροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα· καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλιπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν Τεμεΐτην. καὶ αὐτοῖς ξυνεσέπεσον οἱ διώκοντες, καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι βία ἐξεκρούσθησαν πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ τῶν

Athenian ships had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, but the Syracusans were still masters of the parts about the sea, and the Athenians brought their supplies from Thapsus by land.

C. When it seemed to the Syracusans that enough of their counter-wall had been constructed with stone-work and stockade,¹ and the Athenians did not come to hinder them—for they feared that the enemy might more easily deal with them if their forces were divided, and at the same time they were pushing on their own wall of circumvallation—leaving one division as a guard for their cross-wall, they withdrew to the city. Meanwhile the Athenians destroyed their pipes which ran underground into the city and supplied it with drinking-water. Then watching when most of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday—some of them having even gone to their homes in the city—and when those at the stockade were guarding the place carelessly, they stationed in front three hundred picked Athenians and a chosen body of the light-armed troops in heavy armour to go at a run suddenly against the counter-wall; while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, one with one general against the city, in case they should come to the rescue, the other with the other general to that part of the stockade which is by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took the stockade, the guards leaving it and fleeing to the outwork around Temenites.² And their pursuers burst in with them; but these, after getting in, were forced out again by

¹ The *ὑποτείχισμα* seems to have consisted partly of palisading and partly of stone-work. ² cf. ch. lxxv. l.

THUCYDIDES

Ἀργείων τινὲς αὐτόθι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ
 3 πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν. καὶ ἐπαναχωρήσασα ἡ
 πᾶσα στρατιὰ τὴν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθεῖλον καὶ
 τὸ σταύρωμα ἀνέσπασαν καὶ διεφόρησαν τοὺς
 σταυροὺς παρ' ἑαυτούς, καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

CI. Τῇ δ' ὕστεραία ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον
 οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔλους, ὃς
 τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα
 ὄρα, καὶ ἥπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο κατα-
 βάσι διὰ τοῦ ὀμαλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἔλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα
 2 τὸ περιτείχισμα. καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ
 ἐξελθόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπεσταύρουν αὐθις ἀρξά-
 μενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἔλους· καὶ
 τάφρον ἅμα παρώρυσσον, ὅπως μὴ οἶόν τε ἢ τοῖς
 3 Ἀθηναίοις μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης ἀποτείχισαι. οἱ
 δ', ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξείργαστο,
 ἐπιχειροῦσιν αὐθις τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων σταυρώ-
 ματι καὶ τάφρῳ, τὰς μὲν ναῦς κελεύσαντες περι-
 πλεῦσαι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τὸν
 τῶν Συρακοσίων, αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ ὄρθρον κατα-
 βάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐς τὸ ὀμαλὸν καὶ
 διὰ τοῦ ἔλους, ἥ πηλῶδες ἦν καὶ στεριφώτατον,
 θύρας καὶ ξύλα πλατέα ἐπιθέντες καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν
 διαβαδίσαντες, αἰροῦσιν ἅμα ἕω τό τε σταύρωμα
 πλὴν ὀλίγου καὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ
 4 ὑπολειφθὲν εἶλον· καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ
 ἐνίκων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ μείν
 τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχοντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔφυγον,
 οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν. καὶ
 αὐτοὺς βουλόμενοι ἀποκλήσασθαι τῆς διαβάσεως
 οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριακόσιοι λογάδες δρόμῳ
 5 ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὴν γέφυραν. δείσαντες δὲ οἱ

the Syracusans, some of the Argives and a few of the Athenians being slain there. Then the whole army withdrew and pulled down the counter-wall and tore up the stockade, bringing the stakes over to their own lines, and set up a trophy.

CI. The next day the Athenians, starting from the round fort, began to fortify the bluff which is above the marsh,¹ where on this side of Epipolae it looks toward the Great Harbour, and where they would find the line of circumvallation shortest as they came down through the level ground and the marsh to the harbour. The Syracusans meanwhile also went out and proceeded to build another stockade, starting from the city, through the middle of the marsh; and they dug at the same time a ditch alongside, that it might not be possible for the Athenians to complete their wall to the sea. But the latter, when their wall to the bluff was finished, again attacked the stockade and ditch of the Syracusans, having ordered their ships to sail around from Thapsus into the Great Harbour at Syracuse and themselves gone down about daybreak from Epipolae to the level ground. Laying down doors and planks through the marsh where the soil was clayey and firmest and crossing over on these, they took at daylight the ditch, and all but a little of the stockade, and later the remaining part. A battle occurred also, in which the Athenians were victorious, those of the Syracusans on the right wing fleeing to the city, those on the left along the river. Wishing to cut off the latter from the crossing, the three hundred picked men of the Athenians pushed on at a run to the bridge. But

¹ The *Lysimeleia*.

Συρακόσιοι (ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων αὐτοῖς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθα) ὁμόσε χωροῦσι τοῖς τριακοσίοις τούτοις, καὶ τρέπουσί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ προσπεσόντων αὐτῶν ξυνεφοβήθη καὶ ἡ πρώτη φυλὴ
 6 τοῦ κέρως. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Λάμαχος παρεβοήθει ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τοῦ ἑαυτῶν μετὰ τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβὼν, καὶ ἐπιδιαβὰς τάφρον τινα καὶ μονωθείς μετ' ὀλίγων τῶν ξυνδιαβάντων ἀποθνήσκει αὐτός τε καὶ πέντε ἢ ἕξ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Συρακόσιοι εὐθύς κατὰ τάχος φθάνουσιν ἀρπάσαντες πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλές, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπιόντος ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεχώρουν.

CII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγόντες ὥς ἐώρων ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, αὐτοὶ τε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως¹ ἀναθαρσίσαντες ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ μέρος τι αὐτῶν πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλον τὸν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς, ἡγούμενοι ἐρήμον αἰρή-
 2 σειν. καὶ τὸ μὲν δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα αὐτῶν αἰροῦσι καὶ διεπόρθησαν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον Νικίας διεκώλυσεν· ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δι' ἀσθενείαν ὑπολελειμμένος· τὰς γὰρ μηχανὰς καὶ ξύλα ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ τείχους ἦν καταβεβλημένα, ἐμπρῆσαι τοὺς ὑπηρέτας ἐκέλευσεν, ὥς ἔγνω ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους ἐρημία ἀνδρῶν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ
 3 περιγενέσθαι. καὶ ξυνέβη οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσῆλθον οἱ Συρακόσιοι διὰ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τε τὸν κύκλον

¹ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, omitted by Hude with C.

the Syracusans became alarmed, and, as most of their cavalry was there, closed with these three hundred, routed them, and attacked the right wing of the Athenians. On their charge the first division of this wing also became involved in the panic. And Lamachus, seeing this, came to their aid from his own place on the left wing, with a few bowmen and the Argives, whom he took with him; and advancing across a ditch and being cut off with a few of those who had crossed with him, he was killed himself and five or six of his followers. These the Syracusans at once hastily snatched up and succeeded in carrying over the river to safety, themselves retreating when the rest of the Athenian army began now to advance.

CII. Meanwhile those of them who had fled at first to the city, seeing what was going on, themselves took courage, and coming back from the city drew up against the Athenians in front of them; and they sent a part of their number against the round fort on Epipolæ, thinking that they would find it without defenders and be able to take it. And they did indeed take and demolish their outwork of one thousand feet in length, but the round fort itself Nicias prevented their taking; for he happened to have been left behind there on account of illness. He ordered the attendants to set fire to the engines and wood that had been thrown down before the wall, seeing that they would be unable through lack of men to be saved in any other way. And it turned out so; for the Syracusans, coming no nearer because of the fire, now retreated. And, besides, reinforcements were already coming up to

βοήθεια ἤδη κάτωθεν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποδιω-
 ξάντων τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐπανήει, καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα αὐτῶν
 ἐκ τῆς Θάψου, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, κατέπλεον ἐς τὸν
 4 μέγαν λιμένα. ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ ἄνωθεν κατὰ τάχος
 ἀπῆσαν καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων
 ἐς τὴν πόλιν, νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς παρ-
 ούσης σφίσι δυνάμεως ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλῦσαι
 τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τειχισμόν.

CIII. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον
 ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέ-
 δοσαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Λαμά-
 χου καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκομίσαντο. καὶ παρόντος ἤδη
 σφίσι παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος, καὶ τοῦ ναυ-
 τικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν καὶ τοῦ
 κρημνωδους ἀρξάμενοι ἀπετείχιζον μέχρι τῆς
 2 θαλάσσης τείχει διπλῶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους. τὰ δ'
 ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐσήγετο ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας
 πανταχόθεν. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν πολλοὶ
 ξύμμαχοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἳ πρότερον περιεω-
 ρῶντο, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Τυρσηνίας νῆες πεντηκόντεροι
 τρεῖς. καὶ τᾶλλα προυχώρει αὐτοῖς ἐς ἐλπίδας.
 3 καὶ γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πολέμῳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐνό-
 μιζον ἂν περιγενέσθαι, ὥς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς
 Πελοποννήσου ὠφελία οὐδεμία ἦκε, τοὺς δὲ
 λόγους ἐν τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐποιοῦντο ξυμβα-
 τικοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν· οὗτος γὰρ δὴ μόνος
 4 εἶχε Λαμίας τεθνεώτος τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ κύρωσις
 μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγίγνετο, οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων
 ἀπορούτων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν¹ πολιορκουμένων,
 πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρὸς τε ἐκείνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι

¹ πρὶν. Hude omits, with C.

the round fort from the Athenians below, who had chased away the enemy there, and their ships at the same time were sailing down, as they had been ordered, from Thapsus into the Great Harbour. Seeing these things, the men on the heights and the main army of the Syracusans hastily withdrew into the city, thinking that with the force they then had at their disposal they could no longer prevent the building of the wall to the sea.

CIII. After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored their dead to the Syracusans under truce, themselves getting back the bodies of Lamachus and his men. The whole of their armament being now present, both fleet and land-force, starting from the bluff of Epipolæ they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall down to the sea. Provisions were coming in for the army from all quarters of Italy. And there came also as allies to the Athenians many of the Sicels, who before had been hesitating, and from Tyrrhenia three fifty-oared galleys. And other matters were progressing according to their hopes. For the Syracusans no longer thought they could win at war, as no aid had come to them even from the Peloponnesus; and indeed they were discussing terms of agreement, not only among themselves, but even with Nicias, who now since the death of Lamachus had sole command. No decision was reached; but, as is natural when men are in perplexity and more straitly besieged than before, many proposals were made to

κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. καὶ γάρ τινα καὶ ὑποψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς τε ἐφ' ὧν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ξυνέβη ἔπαυσαν, ὡς ἢ δυστυχία ἢ προδοσία τῇ ἐκείνων βλαπτόμενοι, καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθείλοντο, Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Εὐκλέα καὶ Τελλίαν.

CIV. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Γύλιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου νῆες περὶ Λευκάδα ἤδη ἦσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν διὰ τάχους βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμένοι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι, αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ Πυθὴν ὁ Κορίνθιος ναυσὶ δυοῖν μὲν Λακωνικαῖν, δυοῖν δὲ Κορινθίαιν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπεραιώθησαν τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐς Τάραντα, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς ταῖς σφετέραις δέκα Λευκαδίας δύο καὶ Ἀμπρακιώτιδας τρεῖς προσπληρώσαντες ὕστερον ἔμελλον πλεύσεσθαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος ἐς τὴν Θουρίαν πρῶτον πρεσβευσάμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρός ποτε πολιτείαν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος αὐτοὺς προσαγαγέσθαι, ἄρας παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ ἀρπασθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνέμου,¹ ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας κατὰ βορέαν ἐστηκώς, ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τῷ Τάραντι προσμίσγει καὶ τὰς ναῦς ὅσαι ἐπόνησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ χειμῶνος ἀνελεύσας ἐπεσκεύαζεν. ὁ δὲ Νικίας πυθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλήθος

¹ κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, in MSS. after ἀνέμου, deleted by Goeller.

him, and still more were discussed in the city. For under their present evils they had some suspicion even of one another; and the generals under whose lead these things had happened were deposed, on the ground that their disasters were due to their ill-luck or treachery, and in their stead were chosen Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

CIV. Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth¹ were already at Leucas, proposing to bring aid to Sicily in all haste. As the reports that were coming to them were alarming and all to the same false purport, that Syracuse had already been completely walled off, Gylippus no longer had any hope of Sicily, but wishing to save Italy, he himself and Pythen the Corinthian, with two Laconian vessels and two Corinthian, crossed the Ionian gulf to Tarentum as quickly as possible; while the Corinthians, after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian ships, were to sail later. From Tarentum, Gylippus, after first going on a mission to Thuria, on account of his father having been once a citizen there,² and failing to win them over, weighed anchor and sailed along the coast of Italy. Caught by a wind, which settling in the north blows violently in that region, he was carried out to sea, and then after a most violent storm again reached Tarentum; and there hauling ashore all of his ships that had suffered from the storm he set to repairing them. But Nicias, although he heard that he was sailing up, despised

¹ cf. ch. xciii. 3.

² Or, reading, with B.H. *καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀναίρεσάμενος*, "and having revived the sometime citizenship of his father."

THUCYDIDES


τῶν νεῶν, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ Θούριοι ἔπαθον, καὶ ληστικώτερον ἔδοξε παρεσκευασμένους πλεῖν καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακὴν πω ἐποιεῖτο.



- CV. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ θέρους καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἐσέβαλον αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλὴν ἐδήωσαν. καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀργείοις τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐβοήθησαν, αἵπερ τὰς σπονδὰς φανερώτατα τὰς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτοῖς ἔλυσαν.
- 2 πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ληστείαις ἐκ Πύλου καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀποβαίνοντες μετὰ τε Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων ξυνεπολέμουν, καὶ πολλάκις Ἀργείων κελευόντων ὅσον σχόντας μόνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μετὰ σφῶν δηώσαντας ἀπελθεῖν οὐκ ἤθελον· τότε δὲ Πυθοδώρου καὶ Λαισποδίου καὶ Δημαράτου ἀρχόντων ἀποβάντες ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηρὰν καὶ Πρασιὰς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐδήωσαν τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἤδη εὐπροφάσιστον μᾶλλον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοῦ ἀμύνεσθαι ἐποίησαν.
- 3 ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ ἀπέκτεινάν τινας, καὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐπ' οἴκου.

the small number of his ships, just as the Thurians had done, and thinking they were coming equipped rather as privateers than as men-of-war, he took as yet no precautions.

CV. About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argos and ravaged most of the country. And the Athenians brought succour to the Argives with thirty ships, an act which violated their treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner. For before this they waged the war, in cooperation with the Argives and Mantineans, by predatory excursions from Pylos and by making landings round the rest of the Peloponnesus rather than in Laconia; and although the Argives frequently urged them only to make a landing with arms on Laconian territory, devastate in concert with them even the least part, and then go away, they refused. But at this time, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and laid waste some of their territory, and so gave the Lacedaemonians from now on a more plausible excuse for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the Athenians had withdrawn from Argos with their ships, and the Lacedaemonians also had retired, the Argives made an incursion into Phliasia, ravaging part of their land and killing some of the inhabitants, and then returned home.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE WINDMILL PRESS
KINGSWOOD, SURREY





THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED

LATIN AUTHORS

- AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- APULIUS: THE GOLDEN ASS (METAMORPHOSES). W. Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (*7th Imp.*)
- ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS OF. W. Watt (1631). 2 Vols. (Vol. I *7th Imp.*, Vol. II *6th Imp.*)
- ST. AUGUSTINE, SELECT LETTERS. J. H. Baxter.
- AUSONIUS. H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- BEDE. J. E. King. 2 Vols.
- BOETHIUS: TRACTS AND DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE. Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. (*4th Imp.*)
- CAESAR: CIVIL WARS. A. G. Peskett. (*5th Imp.*)
- CAESAR: GALLIC WAR. H. J. Edwards. (*9th Imp.*)
- CATO AND VARRO: DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash and W. D. Hooper. (*2nd Imp.*)
- CATULLUS. F. W. Cornish; TIBULLUS. J. B. Postgate; and PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. J. W. Mackail. (*12th Imp.*)
- CELSUS: DE MEDICINA. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd Imp. revised.*)
- CICERO: BRUTUS AND ORATOR. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell. (*3rd Imp.*)
- CICERO: DE FATO; PARADOXA STOICORUM; DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA. H. Rackham. (With De Oratore, Vol. II.) (*2nd Imp.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- CICERO : DE FINIBUS. H. Rackham. (*4th Imp. revised.*)
 CICERO : DE INVENTIONE, etc. H. M. Hubbell.
 CICERO : DE NATURA DEORUM AND ACADEMICA. H. Rackham. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CICERO : DE OFFICIIS. Walter Miller. (*3th Imp.*)
 CICERO : DE ORATORE. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CICERO : DE REPUBLICA AND DE LEGIBUS. Clinton W. Keyes. (*3rd Imp.*)
 CICERO : DE SENECTUTE, DE AMICITIA, DE DIVINATIONE. W. A. Falconer. (*5th Imp.*)
 CICERO : IN CATILINAM, PRO MURENA, PRO SULLA, PRO FLACCO. Louis E. Lord. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
 CICERO : LETTERS TO ATTICUS. E. O. Winstedt. 3 Vols. (Vol. I *6th Imp.*, Vols. II and III *3rd Imp.*)
 CICERO : LETTERS TO HIS FRIENDS. W. Glynn Williams. 3 Vols. (Vols. I and II *3rd Imp.*, Vol. III *2nd Imp. revised and enlarged.*)
 CICERO : PHILIPPICS. W. C. A. Ker. (*3rd Imp.*)
 CICERO : PRO ARCHIA, POST RUDITUM, DE DOMO, DE HARUSPICUM RESPONSIS, PRO PLANCIO. N. H. Watts. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CICERO : PRO CALPURNIA, PRO LEGE MANILIA, PRO CLUENTIO, PRO RABIRIO. H. Grose Hodge. (*3rd Imp.*)
 CICERO : PRO MILONE, IN PISONEM, PRO SCAURO, PRO FONTEIO, PRO RABIRIO POSTUMO, PRO MARCELLO, PRO LIGARIO, PRO REGE DEIOTARO. N. H. Watts. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CICERO : PRO QUINCTIO, PRO ROSCIO AMERINO, PRO ROSCIO COMOEDO, CONTRA RULLUM. J. H. Freese. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CICERO : TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. J. E. King. (*4th Imp.*)
 CICERO : VERRINE ORATIONS. L. H. G. Greenwood. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*)
 CLAUDIAN. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols.
 COLUMELLA : DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash. 2 Vols. Vol. I. Books I-IV. (*2nd Imp.*)
 CURTIUS, Q. : HISTORY OF ALEXANDER. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols.
 FLORUS. E. S. Forster ; and CORNELIUS NEPOS. J. C. Rolfe. (*2nd Imp.*)
 FRONTINUS : STRATAGEMS AND AQUEDUCTS. C. E. Bennett and M. B. McElwain. (*2nd Imp.*)
 FRONTO : CORRESPONDENCE. C. R. Haines. 2 Vols.
 GELLIUS. J. C. Rolfe. 3 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- HORACE: ODES AND EPODES.** C. E. Bennett. (13th *Imp. revised.*)
- HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES, ARS POETICA.** H. R. Fairclough. (8th *Imp. revised.*)
- JEROME: SELECT LETTERS.** F. A. Wright.
- JUVENAL AND PERSIUS.** G. G. Ramsay. (7th *Imp.*)
- LIVY.** B. O. Foster, F. G. Moore, Evan T. Sage and A. C. Schlesinger. 13 Vols. Vols. I-XII. (Vol. I 3rd *Imp.*, Vols. II-VII, IX-XII 2nd *Imp. revised.*)
- LUCAN.** J. D. Duff. (3rd *Imp.*)
- LUCRETIUS.** W. H. D. Rouse. (6th *Imp. revised.*)
- MARTIAL.** W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 5th *Imp.*, Vol. II 4th *Imp. revised.*)
- MINOR LATIN POETS: from PUBLILIUS SYRUS to RUTILIUS NAMATIUS,** including GRATTIUS, CALPURNIUS SICULUS, NEMESIANUS, AVIANUS, with "Aetna," "Phoenix" and other poems. J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff. (2nd *Imp.*)
- OVID: THE ART OF LOVE AND OTHER POEMS.** J. H. Mozley. (3rd *Imp.*)
- OVID: FASTI.** Sir James G. Frazer. (2nd *Imp.*)
- OVID: HEROIDES AND AMORES.** Grant Showerman. (4th *Imp.*)
- OVID: METAMORPHOSES.** F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 10th *Imp.*, Vol. II 8th *Imp.*)
- OVID: TRISTIA AND EX PONTO.** A. L. Wheeler. (2nd *Imp.*)
- PETRONIUS.** M. Heseltine; **SENECA: APOCOCYNTOSIS.** W. H. D. Rouse. (8th *Imp. revised.*)
- PLAUTUS.** Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. (Vols. I and II 5th *Imp.*, Vol. III 4th *Imp.*, Vols. IV and V 2nd *Imp.*)
- PLINY: LETTERS.** Melmoth's translation revised by W. M. L. Hutchinson. 2 Vols. (Vol. I 5th *Imp.*, Vol. II 4th *Imp.*)
- PLINY: NATURAL HISTORY.** H. Rackham and W. H. S. Jones. 10 Vols. Vols. I-V. (Vols. I-IV 2nd *Imp.*)
- PROPERTIUS.** H. E. Butler. (5th *Imp.*)
- PRUDENTIUS.** H. J. Thomson. 2 Vols. Vol. I.
- QUINTILIAN.** H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (2nd *Imp.*)
- REMAINS OF OLD LATIN.** E. H. Warmington. 4 Vols. Vol. I (Ennius and Caecilius). Vol. II (Livius, Naevius, Pacuvius, Accius). Vol. III (Lucilius, Laws of the XII Tables). Vol. IV (Archaic Inscriptions). (Vol. IV 2nd *Imp.*)
- SALLUST.** J. C. Rolfe. (3rd *Imp. revised.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE. D. Magie. 3 Vols.
(Vol. I *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- SENECA: APOCOLOCYNTOSIS. Cf. PETRONIUS.
- SENECA: EPISTULAE MORALES. R. M. Gummere. 3 Vols.
(Vol. I *3rd Imp.*, Vols. II and III *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- SENECA: MORAL ESSAYS. J. W. Basore. 3 Vols. (Vol. II
3rd Imp. revised, Vol. III *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- SENECA: TRAGEDIÆ. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd
Imp.*, Vol. II *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- SIDONIUS: POEMS AND LETTERS. W. B. Anderson. 2 Vols.
Vol. I.
- SILIUS ITALICUS. J. D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*,
Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)
- STATIUS. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols.
- SUETONIUS. J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *7th Imp.*, Vol. II
6th Imp.)
- TACITUS: DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson; and AGRICOLA
AND GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton. (*6th Imp.*)
- TACITUS: HISTORIES AND ANNALS. C. H. Moore and J.
Jackson. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and II *3rd Imp.*, Vols. III and
IV *2nd Imp.*)
- TERENCE. John Saigant. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *6th Imp.*, Vol.
II *5th Imp.*)
- TERTULLIAN: APOLOGIA AND DE SPECTACULIS. T. R. Glover;
MINUCIUS FELIX. G. H. Rendall.
- VALERIUS FLACCUS. J. H. Mozley. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- VARRO: DE LINGUA LATINA. R. G. Kent. 2 Vols. (*2nd
Imp. revised.*)
- VELLEIUS PATERCULUS AND RES GESTAE DIVI AUGUSTI.
F. W. Shipley.
- VIRGIL. H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *17th Imp.*, Vol.
II *13th Imp. revised.*)
- VITRUVIUS: DE ARCHITECTURA. F. Granger. 2 Vols.
(Vol. I *2nd Imp.*)

GREEK AUTHORS

- ACHILLES TATIUS. S. Gaslee. (*2nd Imp.*)
- AENEAS TACTICUS, ASCLEPIODOTUS AND ONASANDER. The
Illinois Greek Club. (*2nd Imp.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- AESCHINES.** C. D. Adams. (*2nd Imp.*)
- AESCHYLUS.** H. Weir Smyth. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *5th Imp.*, Vol. II *4th Imp.*)
- ALCIPHRON, AELIAN AND PHILOSTRATUS: LETTERS.** A. R. Benner and F. H. Fobes.
- APOLLODORUS.** Sir James G. Frazer. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- APOLLONIUS RHODIUS.** R. C. Seaton. (*4th Imp.*)
- THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS.** Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. (*7th Imp.*)
- APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY.** Horace White. 4 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd Imp.*, Vols. II, III and IV *2nd Imp.*)
- ARATUS.** Cf. CALLIMACHUS.
- ARISTOPHANES.** Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols. (Vols. I and II *5th Imp.*, Vol. III *4th Imp.*) Verse trans.
- ARISTOTLE: ART OF RHETORIC.** J. H. Freese. (*3rd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VIRTUES AND VICES.** H. Rackham. (*3rd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: GENERATION OF ANIMALS.** A. L. Peck. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS.** H. Tredennick. 2 Vols. (*3rd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: MINOR WORKS.** W. S. Hett. "On Colours," "On Things Heard," "Physiognomics," "On Plants," "On Marvellous Things Heard," "Mechanical Problems," "On Indivisible Lines," "Situations and Names of Winds," "On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias."
- ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.** H. Rackham. (*5th Imp. revised.*)
- ARISTOTLE: OECONOMICA AND MAGNA MORALIA.** G. C. Armstrong. (With *Metaphysics*, Vol. II.) (*3rd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: ON THE HEAVENS.** W. K. C. Guthrie. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL, PARVA NATURALIA, ON BREATH.** W. S. Hett. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- ARISTOTLE: ORGANON.** H. P. Cooke and H. Tredennick. 3 Vols. Vol. I. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: PARTS OF ANIMALS.** A. L. Peck; **MOTION AND PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS.** E. S. Forster. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: PHYSICS.** Rev. P. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: POETICS and LONGINUS.** W. Hamilton Gifford; **DLMETRIUS ON STYLE.** W. Rhys Roberts. (*4th Imp. revised.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- ARISTOTLE: POLITICS. H. Rackham. (*3rd Imp.*)
- ARISTOTLE: PROBLEMS. W. S. Hett. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- ARISTOTLE: RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM. H. Rackham. (With Problems, Vol. II.)
- ARRIAN: HISTORY OF ALEXANDER AND INDICA. Rev. E. Iliffe Robson. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ATHENAEUS: DEIPNOSOPHISTAE. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols. (Vols. I, V and VI *2nd Imp.*)
- ST. BASIL: LETTERS. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- CALLIMACHUS AND LYCOPHRON. A. W. Mair; ARATUS. G. R. Mair.
- CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth. (*2nd Imp.*)
- COLLUTHUS. Cf. OPIAN.
- DAPHNIS AND CHLOE. Cf. LONGUS.
- DEMOSTHENES I: OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS AND MINOR ORATIONS: I-XVII AND XX. J. H. Vince.
- DEMOSTHENES II: DE CORONA AND DE FALSA LEGATIONE. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- DEMOSTHENES III: MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON. J. H. Vince.
- DEMOSTHENES IV-VI: PRIVATE ORATIONS AND IN NEAERAM. A. T. Murray. (Vol. IV *2nd Imp.*)
- DEMOSTHENES VII: FUNERAL SPEECH, EROTIC ESSAY, EXORDIA AND LETTERS. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt.
- DIO CASSIUS: ROMAN HISTORY. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. I and II *2nd Imp.*)
- DIO CHRYSOSTOM. 5 Vols. Vols I and II. J. W. Cohoon. Vol. III. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. Vols. IV and V. H. Lamar Crosby. (Vols. I-III *2nd Imp.*)
- DIODORUS SICULUS. 12 Vols. Vols. I-V. C. H. Oldfather. Vol. IX. Russel M. Geer. (Vols. I-III *2nd Imp.*)
- DIOGENES LAERTIUS. R. D. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *4th Imp.*, Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)
- DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS: ROMAN ANTIQUITIES. Spelman's translation revised by E. Cary. 7 Vols. (Vols. I-IV *2nd Imp.*)
- EPICETUS. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*)
- EURIPIDES. A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vol. I *7th Imp.*, Vols. II-IV *6th Imp.*) Verse trans.
- EUSEBIUS: ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Kirsopp Lake and

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*, Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)
- GALEN: ON THE NATURAL FACULTIES. A. J. Brock. (*3rd Imp.*)
- THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. (Vols. I and II *4th Imp.*, Vols. III and IV *3rd Imp.*)
- THE GREEK BUCOLIC POETS (THEOCRITUS, BION, MOSCHUS). J. M. Edmonds. (*7th Imp. revised.*)
- GREEK ELEGY AND IAMBUS WITH THE ANACREONTEA. J. M. Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*)
- GREEK MATHEMATICAL WORKS. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- HERODES. Cf. THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS.
- HERODOTUS. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. I-III *4th Imp.*, Vol. IV *3rd Imp.*)
- HESIOD AND THE HOMERIC HYMNS. H. G. Evelyn White. (*7th Imp. revised and enlarged.*)
- HIPPOCRATES AND THE FRAGMENTS OF HERACLEITUS. W. H. S. Jones and E. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd Imp.*, Vols. II-IV *2nd Imp.*)
- HOMER: ILIAD. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (*6th Imp.*)
- HOMER: ODYSSEY. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (*7th Imp.*)
- ISAEUS. E. S. Forster. (*2nd Imp.*)
- ISOCRATES. George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols.
- ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOASAPH. Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- JOSEPHUS. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols. Vols. I-VII. (Vols. I, V and VI *2nd Imp.*)
- JULIAN. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*, Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)
- LONGUS: DAPHNIS AND CHLOE. Thornley's translation revised by J. M. Edmonds; and PARTHENIUS. S. Gascolee. (*3rd Imp.*)
- LUCIAN. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I-V. (Vols. I, II and IV *2nd Imp.*, Vol. III *3rd Imp.*)
- LYCOPHRON. Cf. CALLIMACHUS.
- LYRA GRAECA. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd Imp.*, Vol. II *2nd Ed. revised and enlarged*, Vol. III *3rd Imp. revised.*)
- LYSIAS. W. R. M. Lamb. (*2nd Imp.*)
- MANETHO. W. G. Waddell; PTOLEMY: TETRABIBLOS. F. E. Robbins. (*2nd Imp.*)
- MARCUS AURELIUS. C. R. Haines. (*3rd Imp. revised.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- MENANDER. F. G. Allinson. (*2nd Imp. revised.*)
- MINOR ATTIC ORATORS. 2 Vols. Vol. I (Antiphon, Andocides). K. J. Maidment.
- NONNOS: DIONYSIACA. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols. (Vol. III *2nd Imp.*)
- OPPIAN, COLLUTHUS, TRYPHIODORUS. A. W. Mair.
- PAPYRI. NON-LITERARY SELECTIONS. A. S. Hunt and C. C. Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*) LITERARY SELECTIONS. Vol. I (Poetry). D. L. Page. (*3rd Imp.*)
- PARTHENIUS. Cf. LONGUS.
- PAUSANIAS: DESCRIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. S. Jones. 5 Vols. and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley. (Vols. I and III *2nd Imp.*)
- PHILO. 11 Vols. Vols. I-V. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H. Whitaker; Vols. VI-IX. F. H. Colson. (Vols. I, II, V, VI and VII *2nd Imp.*, Vol. IV *3rd Imp. revised.*)
- PHILOSTRATUS: THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS OF TYANA. F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. (*3rd Imp.*)
- PHILOSTRATUS: IMAGINES; CALLISTRATUS: DESCRIPTIONS. A. Fairbanks.
- PHILOSTRATUS AND EUNAPIUS: LIVES OF THE SOPHISTS. Wilmer Cave Wright. (*2nd Imp.*)
- PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. (*7th Imp. revised.*)
- PLATO I: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS. H. N. Fowler. (*9th Imp.*)
- PLATO II: THEAETETUS AND SOPHIST. H. N. Fowler. (*4th Imp.*)
- PLATO III: STATESMAN, PHILEBUS. H. N. Fowler; Ion. W. R. M. Lamb. (*4th Imp.*)
- PLATO IV: LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHYDEMUS. W. R. M. Lamb. (*3rd Imp. revised.*)
- PLATO V: LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS. W. R. M. Lamb. (*4th Imp. revised.*)
- PLATO VI: CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, GREATER HIPPIAS, LESSER HIPPIAS. H. N. Fowler. (*3rd Imp.*)
- PLATO VII: TIMAEUS, CRITIAS, CLITOPHO, MENEXENUS, EPISTULAE. Rev. R. G. Bury. (*3rd Imp.*)
- PLATO VIII: CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, HIPPARCHUS, THE LOVERS, THEAGES, MINOS AND EPINOMIS. W. R. M. Lamb.
- PLATO: LAWS. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- PLATO: REPUBLIC. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *4th Imp.*, Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

- PLUTARCH : MORALIA. 14 Vols. Vols. I-V. F. C. Babbitt ; Vol. VI. W. C. Helmhold ; Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. (Vols. I, III and X *2nd Imp.*)
- PLUTARCH : THE PARALLEL LIVES. B. Perrin. 11 Vols. (Vols. I, II and VII *3rd Imp.*, Vols. III, IV, VI, VIII-XI *2nd Imp.*)
- POLYBIUS. W. R. Paton. 6 Vols.
- PROCOPIUS : HISTORY OF THE WARS. H. B. Dewing. 7 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*)
- PTOLEMY : TETRABIBLOS. Cf. MANETHO.
- QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS. A. S. Way. (*2nd Imp.*) Verse trans.
- SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and III *2nd Imp.*)
- SOPHOCLES. F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *9th Imp.*, Vol. II *6th Imp.*) Verse trans.
- STRABO : GEOGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. I and VIII *3rd Imp.*, Vols. II, V and VI *2nd Imp.*)
- THEOPHRASTUS : CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds ; HERODES, etc. A. D. Knox. (*2nd Imp.*)
- THEOPHRASTUS : ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Sir Arthur Hort. 2 Vols. (*2nd Imp.*)
- THUCYDIDES. C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. (Vol. I *3rd Imp.*, Vols. II-IV *2nd Imp. revised.*)
- TRYPHIODORUS. Cf. OPIAN.
- XENOPHON : CYROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I *2nd Imp.*, Vol. II *3rd Imp.*)
- XENOPHON : HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, AND SYMPOSIUM. C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I and III *3rd Imp.*, Vol. II *4th Imp.*)
- XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA AND OECONOMICUS. F. C. Marchant. (*2nd Imp.*)
- XENOPHON : SCRIPPIA MINORA. E. C. Marchant. (*2nd Imp.*)

VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

GREEK AUTHORS

- ARISTOTLE : DE MUNDO, etc. D. Furley and E. S. Forster.
- ARISTOTLE : HISTORY OF ANIMALS. A. L. Peck.

THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

ARISTOTLE: METEOROLOGICA. H. D. P. Lee.

PLOTINUS. A. H. Armstrong.

LATIN AUTHORS

ST. AUGUSTINE: CITY OF GOD.

[CICERO:] AD HERENNIIUM. H. Caplan.

CICERO: PRO SESTIO, IN VATINIUM, PRO CAELIO, DE PROVINCIIIS CONSULARIBUS, PRO BALBO. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner.

PHAEDRUS AND OTHER FABULISTS. B. E. Perry.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
Cloth 15s.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
HARVARD UNIV. PRESS
Cloth \$3.00

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
NEW DELHI
Issue Record.

Catalogue No. 938.05/Pnu/Smi.-745

Author—Thucydides.

Title—Thucydides. Vol.III.

Borrower No.	Date of Issue	Date of Return
Dr. A.N. Krishnan. Muzangar	26/7/54	6/9/54
J.P. Joshi	26/11/76	28/11/76

